Manuale Thomistarum

Volume Three: On Beatitude, Human Acts, and the Virtues

Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Sonnet 5 Translation

MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS

OR

A BRIEF COURSE OF THEOLOGY

Published for the Benefit and Convenience of Students

By the Right Reverend Father

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THIRD VOLUME

Third Edition

LYON

At the Expense of the Anisson Brothers and Jean Posuel

1690

With the King's Privilege

Introduction

This volume continues the translation of Jean-Baptiste Gonet's Manuale Thomistarum, and covers what the work itself calls its Second Part: God as man's last end, and the means by which man is led to him. Readers of the earlier volumes will already know their author — the Béziers-born Dominican who held the chair of scholastic theology at Bordeaux for most of his working life, who was suspended from teaching for three years in 1660 after judging Pascal's Lettres provinciales free of Jansenist heresy, who served as provincial of Toulouse in 1671, and who died at Béziers on 24 January 1681.

Where the first two volumes of the Manuale treated God in himself — his unity and attributes, the Trinity of Persons, and, alongside him, the angels and the nature of man — this volume turns from God as he is in himself to God as man's end, and from there to the whole moral apparatus by which a rational creature is carried toward that end. This is the same pivot Saint Thomas makes at the opening of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, and Gonet follows his master's order closely: beatitude first, as the end itself; then the acts, both voluntary and involuntary, by which any end at all is pursued; then human acts specifically, in their moral being; then the virtues that perfect those acts; and finally sin, the privation that corrupts them.

Treatise I, on beatitude, asks what happiness is before asking how it is reached — whether it consists in one act or many, what its chief properties are, and what is owed to the blessed both in soul and, after the resurrection, in body. Treatise II turns to the voluntary and the involuntary as such, the raw material, so to speak, out of which moral acts are built, before Treatise III narrows to human acts properly speaking: their sources in intellect and will, the steps by which a particular act of choice is arrived at, and the conditions under which an act is imputable to its agent at all.

Treatise IV, on the virtues in common, and Treatise V, on sin, form the constructive and privative halves of the same moral architecture. Gonet's treatment of the virtues addresses their division, their relation to the passions, and the vexed question — never far from the surface in a seventeenth-century Dominican — of what the acquired moral virtues can and cannot do without charity, a question that reaches directly into the disputes over nature and grace that occupied Gonet throughout his career. The treatise on sin closes the volume by examining sin's causes, its subject, its varieties, and, at some length, the disputed question of the sin of omission, where Gonet engages closely with Saint Thomas's own text in the Prima Secundae.

As in the earlier volumes, each thesis in the Manuale is stated plainly, supported by its chief reasons, and defended against the standard objections of adversaries, all compressed from the fuller apparatus of authorities and disputations in Gonet's Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae. It is in the hope of extending to English-language readers the same access to this stage of Gonet's synthesis — on beatitude, human acts, and the virtues — that the present translation has been undertaken.

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Second Part of the Manual of the Thomists. On God as the Last End, and the Means Leading to Him

Preface

Dionysius, in chapter 4 of his book On the Divine Names, wisely teaches that the love of God produces a circular motion, an admirable circle, as He pours forth His beneficence outside Himself upon created things, and most sweetly draws and calls us back to Himself by the allurements of His goodness, He who is the beginning and end of all things; so that, having gone forth from Him through creation, we may return to Him through beatitude — which Pico della Mirandola accordingly defines as the return of the intellectual creature to its principle. Whence, after St. Thomas, in the first part of his Summa, considered God as one and triune, and as the principle of all created things, he next contemplates Him as the last end of the rational creature, and treats of beatitude, and of the means conducing to its attainment — namely, of human acts, of the virtues and gifts in general, of the vices and sins opposed to them (since the same science treats of contraries), of laws, of grace, and of the virtues in particular, both theological and moral. Of these matters, in this second part of our Manual, we shall discourse, with as much brevity and clarity as we are able, in the following treatises.

Treatise I

On Beatitude

Before we discuss beatitude, which is the true and last end of man, we have thought it necessary to premise some points about the last end in general.

Chapter I

On the last end of man in general

We omit here many things about the end in general which are treated elsewhere, so that we may proceed to more useful matters, and resolve three difficulties concerning the last end.

§ I

Which actions of man are for the sake of an end, or effects of the end?

It must be noted first that actions which proceed from man are of a twofold kind: some are called "actions of man," others are called "human actions." The former are those which are produced by man, but which are nevertheless common to him with other creatures lacking reason. The latter, however, are called those which are proper to man insofar as he is man, that is, which belong to man insofar as he differs from brute animals. Now man differs from brutes in acting in two ways: first, as to the substance of the work, because he elicits immaterial and intellectual operations, of which brutes are not capable; second, as to the mode of acting, because he moves himself not only physically and vitally, as brutes do, but also morally, acting with indifference, freedom, and dominion over his own acts. Hence actions proceeding from man can be called human in a twofold way, namely as to substance and as to mode. In the first way, all operations proceeding from the intellective grade, even those which precede all deliberation of reason, are called human; in the second way, only free or deliberate actions. From this you will understand that actions in man can be distinguished into four kinds. Some are human neither as to substance nor as to mode of operating, but are purely brutal and animal, such as bodily actions which do not proceed from deliberation of reason. Others are human as to substance, but not as to mode, such as all necessary intellections and volitions. Others, on the contrary, are human as to mode, but not as to substance, such as the acts of eating and drinking and other bodily actions which are performed with deliberation and command of reason. Others, finally, are human both as to substance and mode, such as all free intellections or volitions.

It must be noted, second, that there are several acts elicited by the will, some of which concern the end to be obtained, such as simple volition and intention; others concern the end already obtained, such as fruition; others concern the means conducing to the end, such as choice and use. Concerning these latter there is no difficulty or controversy among theologians, for it is manifest that they are for the sake of the end or effects of the end, since the will chooses the means and uses them in order to attain the end; but the difficulty concerns only the two former, which regard the end to be obtained, or already obtained. Whence:

I say first: the acts by which the will is borne toward an end not yet obtained, such as simple volition and intention, are effects of the end. Thus the theologians commonly teach, against Vásquez and Lorca, who teach that the end exercises its causality only with respect to those acts which concern the means, not with respect to those which regard the end itself.

This conclusion is proved, first, from St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 2, where he says thus: Just as for the efficient cause to exert influence is to act, so for the final cause to exert influence is to be sought or desired. By these words he clearly teaches that the causality of the end consists in this, that it is sought or desired, that is, in this, that it moves and entices the appetite to love itself. But the goodness of the end not only moves and entices the will to the choice and use of the means, but also to love and desire of itself. Therefore not only the choice and use of the means, but also the love or volition of the end, is its effect.

It is proved, second: love or simple volition of the end (the same, proportionally, must be said of intention) is an act of the will efficiently produced by it. Therefore it is truly and properly for the sake of the end. The consequence is proved, for whatever terminates the causality of the efficient cause must also terminate the causality of the final cause, since the end is the first of all causes, and an intellectual agent does not act except as moved by an end.

I say, second: the act of delight and rest in the end already obtained, which is called fruition, is not properly for the sake of the end. This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 6, ad 1, where he teaches that delight is not for the sake of something else as for a final cause, but as for a formal or objective cause. Here he is not speaking of objective delight, which is not numbered with the end, as some indeed interpret, but of formal delight, since he speaks of that which is the quieting of the appetite in the good.

Reason also supports this, for since delight or rest naturally follows upon the possession of the end, and is, as it were, a corollary and complement of it, it is not numbered together with the end. Therefore, just as the end is not for the sake of an end, nor is it the effect of one, so neither is delight or fruition. Whence it is not, rigorously speaking, a human act, but the goal and complement of human acts. The same must be said of beatific love, since it is not within the free power of man, nor does man move and apply himself to it by deliberation of reason and election of the will, but is specially moved and applied to it by God. Wherefore it ought to be called, not so much a human act, as the fruit and crown of all human acts.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: to occur for the sake of an end is to occur from love of the end; but the first volition does not occur from love of the end, since it is itself the first love of the end; therefore it does not occur for the sake of the end, nor consequently is it an effect of the end.

I respond with the Carmelites of Salamanca that just as when it is said that accidents operate in virtue of the substance — for example, heat in virtue of fire — this renders the

construction transitive, as Cajetan says, not in the sense that they act by some superadded power flowing from the substance and passing into the accidents themselves, but that they act through themselves, as being powers flowing from the substance and subordinated to it. So likewise, when it is said that the first volition occurs from love of the end, this must be understood intransitively, because that volition is itself the love of the end, not transitively, as though it presupposed another, prior love.

You will object, second: only human acts are for the sake of an end; but simple volition and intention of the end are not human acts; therefore they are not for the sake of the end. The minor is proved: those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will, as the Holy Doctor says here, art. 1. But simple volition and intention of the end do not proceed from deliberation of reason; for just as consultation is not about the end but about the means, so neither is deliberation. Therefore simple volition and intention of the end are not properly human acts.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its proof I say with Conrad that deliberation is customarily taken in two ways: either properly and strictly, for that which is required for the choice of means and presupposes intention of the end; or broadly and commonly, for that which is required for acting well or badly in a moral sense, for which the faculty of discerning between good and evil suffices. And it is in this latter sense that St. Thomas's statement must be understood, that those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will — not, however, concerning the first act.

I add that even indeliberate and necessary acts of the will or intellect can in some way be called human, not indeed simply and absolutely, but in a qualified sense, namely causally and initiatively, because although they are not deliberate acts, they are nevertheless the beginning and origin of deliberation. Just as the motion of the heart is initiative of life, though not consummative of it, because although in it the animal does not yet move itself perfectly, it is nevertheless the beginning of the life, that is, of the actions, in which the animal moves itself.

You will object, third, against the second conclusion: St. Thomas here, art. 1, says that all human actions are for the sake of an end; but fruition or delight in the end obtained is a human action; therefore it is for the sake of the end.

I respond, first, denying the minor; for as we said above, fruition is not rigorously a human act, but the goal and complement of human acts.

I respond, second: St. Thomas must be understood as speaking of human actions which are distinguished from the end, and are numbered along with it; but fruition or delight,

or rest in the end already obtained, is not numbered along with the end, but is, as it were, its complement and corollary. Whence, just as the end is not for the sake of an end, so neither is the act of fruition, delight, or rest in the end already obtained.

You will say: everything which has an efficient cause also has a final cause, since the efficient does not act except as moved by an end; but fruition is an act of the will, efficiently produced by it; therefore it has a final cause, and consequently is for the sake of an end.

I respond, distinguishing the major: everything which has an efficient cause has a final cause, if it is not itself the end, I grant. If it is itself the end, I deny. For the end, as end, does not have a final cause: for example, if someone were to place the notion of the last end in contemplation, that act would have an efficient cause, but not a final one, because it would itself be the end.

You will press further: the will delights in the end obtained, for its own sake; therefore the delight of the will resting in the end is for the sake of the end.

I respond, distinguishing the antecedent: if "for the sake of" denotes a formal cause, I grant. If it denotes a final cause, I deny. The solution is that of St. Thomas in the place cited above.

§ II

Whether, in whatever man wills, he wills it for the sake of the formal last end, that is, for the sake of beatitude in general?

I say, first: in all that man wills and does, he does not formally intend the formal or general last end, that is, beatitude in general, but he does so well, interpretatively and virtually.

The first part is evident, for experience shows that, without the intellect formally thinking of beatitude, the will often operates and loves particular goods. The second part, however, is shown thus: a man is said to will something interpretatively when he seeks something which by its nature is ordered to that thing, although he is not then thinking of it. For example, one who gives alms for the sake of the honesty of mercy, thinking nothing of God or of beatitude, is judged to act interpretatively for the sake of God and for the sake of beatitude, because that very honest good, which is expressly intended, is by its nature referred to God, and is a means by which we tend toward beatitude. But a particular good is by its nature ordered to the formal last end and to beatitude in general, since it is, as it were, a certain inchoation and participation of it.

Therefore, when man seeks particular goods, he interpretatively wills the formal last end, or beatitude in general. Hence the holy Fathers and philosophers often say that all that man seeks, he seeks in order to be happy and blessed. This is so true that St. Augustine, in his treatise on the Epicureans and Stoics, chapter 3, says: He who is evil would not be evil, unless he hoped thereby to be blessed. And in his sermon on Psalm 118: To be blessed (he says) is so great a good that both the good and the wicked wish for it. Nor is it strange that the good are therefore good; but it is strange that even the wicked are therefore wicked, that they may be blessed; for whoever is given over to lusts, and is corrupted by luxury and debauchery, seeks beatitude in this very evil.

The third part, however, which asserts that man, in all that he wills and does, intends beatitude not only interpretatively but also virtually, is proved thus: from the volition of the last end in general, or of beatitude, there remains in the will a power for seeking the proximate end and particular goods; therefore he seeks these virtually for the sake of the last end. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is taught expressly by St. Thomas here, art. 6, ad 3, where he says that the power of the first intention, which regards the last end, remains in every appetite for any thing whatsoever, even if the last end is not actually thought of. And in book 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, quaestiuncula 4, ad 6: The desire of beatitude (he says) is virtually present in all desires, as a cause in its effect. Reason also persuades us of this: since the intention of the last end in general, or of beatitude, is a volition of the general end, its influence must extend, at least virtually, to all secondary volitions; just as the influence of the first and most universal efficient cause extends to all effects universally; for the influence of a general end ought to extend no less than the influence of a universal efficient cause.

You will say, second, that from this it follows that no act would be idle. For an act is called idle which lacks an end, or which is not ordered to any end; but if every human action regards beatitude in general, none will lack an end, or fail to be ordered to some end; therefore none will be idle.

But I deny the inference, and to its proof I say that a human act is not called idle from the fact that it is not ordered to the last end formally, that is, to beatitude in general, but from the fact that it lacks some particular and intermediate end, prescribed by the agent.

I say, second: man, in every human operation, acts, at least virtually, for the sake of some ultimate material end, or for a particular end, whether true or apparent. Thus our Thomists commonly teach, and it follows evidently from what has been said in the preceding conclusion; for since intention is an efficacious appetite for the end, and regards it as future and to be obtained, it cannot be borne toward a common thing as

wholly abstracted from a subject, but only toward a common thing as it exists, or is thought to be able to exist, in a subject. Therefore, whenever man formally intends the last end, or the good as such, and beatitude in general, he in fact wills some ultimate particular end, applying such a notion of the good as such, or of beatitude in general, to some particular thing — that is, to God, or to a creature, whether an honest, useful, or delightful good — although through an inefficacious affection of simple complacency, he can be borne toward the notion of the good as such, and toward beatitude in general, abstracted from every subject.

§ III

Whether the will can simultaneously intend several total and adequate last ends?

I say, first: the will cannot efficaciously seek two total and adequate last ends. Thus St. Thomas here, art. 5, and the theologians commonly.

This is proved, first, by the reason given in the argument sed contra: an adequate and total last end must totally dominate the will; but it is contradictory for there to be two ends which totally dominate the will, and to which the will is totally subject and which it serves, according to that saying of Christ, Matthew 7: No one can serve two masters. Therefore it is repugnant that there be several total and adequate last ends.

It is proved, second, by another reason given in the body of the same article: it belongs to the notion of a last end, simply speaking, to be a perfect and satiating good of the whole appetite of man; but if there were two last ends simply speaking, neither would be a perfect good, since one would lack what the other had; nor would either satisfy the whole appetite of man, for beyond either, something else would still be sought. Therefore it is repugnant that there be two last ends simply speaking.

It is proved, third: it belongs to the notion of a last end, simply speaking, that all things be ordered to it, while it itself is not ordered to anything else. But it is repugnant that there be two such goods, for either one would be ordered to the other, or not. If it were so ordered, it would already be a subordinate good, not a last end. If it were not so ordered to the other, then that other would not be a last end, as not subjecting all things to its own order. Therefore a twofold last end, simply speaking, is repugnant. Whence the Gentiles, who invented many gods, divided the notion of first cause and last end among them, attributing one good to one god and worshipping another for other goods: for example, Mars for military affairs, Apollo for knowledge, Venus for generation, Ceres for the fertility of the earth, subordinating one of these gods to another according to their own judgment. Hence Tertullian, in the Apologeticus, mocking the superstition

of the Romans in choosing their gods, says most elegantly: Among you, divinity is weighed by human judgment; unless a god has pleased man, he will not be a god; man must already be propitious to the god.

I say, second: someone can tend toward two adequate last ends, if he tends toward one efficaciously and absolutely, and toward the other inefficaciously and in a qualified sense. Thus teach Martinez, Ildephonsus, and other of our Thomists, and they prove it by a double example. The first is: when someone existing in mortal sin does a morally good work — for example, gives alms to a poor man from a motive of mercy — through such an act he tends toward God as toward his last end; because, since almsgiving rightly done, and every moral good, is derived from God as the author of nature and of honest good, it by its nature tends, and causes man to tend, toward God as toward his natural last end — inefficaciously, however, and in a qualified sense, since through such an action he does not abandon the creature, or the private and particular good, to which as to a last end he has been turned through mortal sin. The other example is: when someone existing in grace sins venially; for through venial sin he tends toward the creature as toward a last end, inefficaciously however, because such a tendency toward the creature does not suffice to turn him away from God, whom he regards as his end through charity. Therefore he then has two last ends, one willed inefficaciously, the other efficaciously.

Nor is what the Author of Theologia Mentis et Cordis says true, namely that the last end of the sinner acting well, and of the just man sinning venially, is beatitude in general, which we incessantly seek in every act. For since the appetite of man always tends toward the good, and this implies existence, or at least an order to existence, it cannot efficaciously be borne toward a common thing as wholly abstracted from a subject, but only toward a common thing as it exists, or is thought to be able to exist, in a subject. Whence, whenever man intends the formal last end, or beatitude in general, he wills some particular last end, applying the notion of happiness or the last end to some thing, or to certain things, that is, to God, or to a creature, whether an honest, useful, or delightful good, as we showed in the preceding section.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: man sinning mortally constitutes his last end in a creature, as theologians commonly teach against Adrian; but man can commit various mortal sins, even disparate ones — fornication, theft, pride — and thus love various creatures inordinately; therefore he can have several last ends simply speaking.

I respond that the last end of one sinning mortally is the sinner himself, or his own private good, to which he orders all that he wills; but that creature for the sake of which he sins mortally is only the proximate end toward which he tends, and by which his act is specified. Whence, although that may be manifold, he cannot on that account have several last ends simply speaking. The solution is that of St. Thomas, book 4, dist. 42, q. 2, art. 1, where he says thus: The last end in the love of changeable goods is man himself, for whose sake he seeks all other things; and therefore, if the root of sin is taken from the side of the sinner himself, it is one; but if it is taken from the side of those things which the sinner seeks for his own sake, there will be several. But more on this in the Treatise on Sins.

You will object, second, against the second conclusion: it belongs to the notion of the last end that it be the supreme good, satisfying the appetite, and that all other things be ordered to it; therefore it is repugnant that there be two last ends, even though one is sought inefficaciously. The consequence is clear, because if one contains all appetibility, it leaves nothing to be sought in the other; and if all things must be ordered to one, the other too is ordered to it, and thus cannot be a last end, as we argued above.

I respond, granting the antecedent, distinguishing the consequent: it is repugnant that there be two last ends existing in reality, I grant. In the apprehension of man, I deny. For the existence of a last end is repugnant to the existence of another last end, because this would destroy the essence of the last end, of whose notion it is that it be the supreme good, satisfying the appetite, and that all other things be ordered to it. But the apprehension of a last end is not repugnant to the apprehension of another, imperfect last end, because apprehension is not so efficacious that an imperfect, contrary apprehension cannot coexist with it — especially when those cognitions are of different genera, one being practical and the other purely speculative, as happens in the case proposed; for one sinning mortally practically judges the last end to be a changeable good, and speculatively, to be God. From this you will understand the reason a priori why man cannot have two last ends efficaciously willed, but can, if one is sought efficaciously and the other inefficaciously; because indeed two efficacious volitions require two practical judgments about the desirability of each end, which are incompossible; but for two volitions, of which one is efficacious and the other inefficacious, two judgments suffice, one of which is practical and the other speculative, which have no incompossibility or repugnance between them.

Chapter II

On objective beatitude

It is manifest that our objective beatitude consists in no created good, but in God alone. First, because the last end and the first principle correspond to each other; but to be the first principle belongs to God alone; therefore also to be the last end. Whence in the Apocalypse it is said, Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. Second, also because objective beatitude is the perfectly satiating good of man, and consequently of both faculties existing in his soul, namely the intellect and the will. But God alone can satiate the intellect of man as regards the knowledge of the true, and his will as regards the fruition of the good. Therefore in Him alone does our objective beatitude consist. The major is established; the minor also, as regards both parts, is manifest; for the object of the intellect is the universal true, and the object of the will is the universal good; but the universal true and good are found in God alone, not in any creature, which has only participated truth and goodness, ordered to God Himself, who is the source of all truth and goodness. Therefore He alone can satiate the appetite of man, as regards the knowledge of the true and the fruition of the good. Whence Augustine, in the book On the Morals of the Church, chapter 8: God is for us the sum of goods; God is for us the highest good; we must neither remain below it nor seek beyond it; for the one is dangerous, the other is nothing.

The same truth can be further declared and illustrated by going through the individual created goods, which are of three kinds — namely goods of the soul, which are virtues and sciences; goods of the body, which are health, strength, beauty, pleasure; and goods of fortune, which are riches, honors, dignities, and the like — and showing that our beatitude can consist in none of these goods. First, then, beginning with the goods of fortune, which are the least of all, it is manifest that they are not the objective beatitude of man, since they are purely external, inferior to man and subservient to him for sustaining life, and do not satiate man's appetite, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 9: The covetous man is not satisfied with money; and that saying of Bernard: The heart of man is no more satiated with gold than the body with wind. I add that beatitude is a good to be enjoyed by possession; riches, however, are good not by possession, but by pouring out, as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 2, art. 1.

The same must be said of honors, dignities, and worldly power; for these too are purely external goods, and do not satisfy the hunger of the human heart, but rather sharpen it, and moreover are fleeting and transitory. An example of this is many Supreme Pontiffs, who could not count even a whole month, nay, not even a whole week, of their

pontificate. Thus Stephen II, 4 days; Urban VII, 7 days; Boniface VI, 15 days; Celestine IV, 17 days; Sisinnius, 20 days; Marcellus II, 21 days; Damasus II, 23 days; Pius III, 26 days; Leo XI, 27 days — are said to have held the pontificate, and to have completed it in so brief a span. Hence Bernard, writing to Eugenius, and impressing upon him this brevity of pontificates, in Epistle 237, says thus: In all things, remember that you are a man, and fear him who takes away the spirit of princes; let this always be before your eyes. How many deaths of Roman pontiffs have you seen with your own eyes! Let your predecessors themselves warn you most certainly and most swiftly of their departure, and let the short duration of their rule announce to you the paucity of your own days.

It is also established that beatitude cannot consist in any bodily good, because these goods are common to men and to brute animals, indeed are often found more perfectly in brutes than in men — such as longer life, firmer health, greater strength, more acute senses. The same must be said of bodily pleasures: whence Seneca, Epistle 74: Why do you name pleasure to me? I seek the good of man, not of a beast or brute animal, whose belly is more capacious, and better suited to receiving bodily pleasures. Those creatures use food more avidly, and are not equally wearied by venery. I add that beatitude must exclude all evils; but bodily pleasures do not banish all evils, but rather are sprinkled with many bitternesses. Whence Hugh of St. Victor says elegantly: Pleasure has honey in the mouth, gall in the heart, a sting in the tail. And Boethius, book 3 of the Consolation: Every pleasure has this — it goads those who enjoy it with stings, and, like the swarm of flying bees, having poured out its pleasant honey, flees, and strikes the heart it has wounded with too clinging a sting.

Finally, that objective beatitude of man does not consist in the goods of the soul, namely the sciences and the virtues, is no less evident; for the natural sciences inflame rather than extinguish the thirst of the soul and the natural desire to know, because their objects are not the supreme good, nor do they contain the first truth; and besides, in learning them, the greatest labor and affliction of spirit occurs, according to that saying of Ecclesiastes 1: In much wisdom is much indignation, and he who adds knowledge, adds also labor. As for the virtues and their operations, they are ordainable to something else — for example, the operations of justice to preserving peace among men, acts of fortitude to victory and to peace; and so with the other moral virtues, all of which are ordered to this, that through them a mean may be preserved in the internal passions, and decorum in external works. Therefore they cannot be the felicity of man, which is not ordainable to a further end. Whence Augustine, in his treatise on the Epicureans and Stoics, chapter 8: It is not the virtue of your soul that makes you blessed, but He who gave you virtue. And book 22 of The City of God, chapter 3: The reward of virtue will be He Himself who

gave the virtue. And elsewhere, comparing the sect of the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians, he has this: The Epicurean says: to enjoy my flesh is good. The Stoic: to enjoy my mind is good. The Christian, however: to cleave to God is good for me.

These things having been premised, we must briefly resolve a celebrated question and controversy debated among theologians concerning the objective beatitude of man, namely, whether God as one is sufficient to beatify us, such that, if per impossibile He were not seen as triune, the beatitude of man would still subsist?

I respond negatively, against Scotus, Suárez, Molina, and other more recent authors.

The fundamental reason is this: in order that the vision of God be beatific, it must terminate at Him as He is in Himself; but if, per impossibile, the divine essence were seen without the Persons, the vision of God would not terminate at Him as He is in Himself; therefore it would not be beatific. The minor is established, for God, as He is in Himself, is not only one, but also triune. The major is proved, first, from 1 John 1: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him (namely in beatitude), because we shall see Him as He is. Here the causal "because" must be weighed, for it signifies the cause or reason a priori why the vision of God is beatific — namely, that it terminates at Him as He is in Himself. Second, the same major is proved thus: in order that the knowledge of God be perfectly beatific, it must be intuitive, and not purely abstractive; but intuitive knowledge of God must terminate at Him as He is in Himself, because intuitive knowledge is distinguished from abstractive knowledge in this, that the latter apprehends the object proportionally to the capacity of the intellect, and does not distinguish it as it is in itself, but only in its relation to the intellect itself, whereas the former sees and intuits the object as it is in itself, on the part of the thing. Third, the same major is shown thus: in order that the vision of God be beatific, it must perfectly satiate and quiet the appetite; but a vision which does not terminate at God as He is in Himself, and as He subsists in three Persons, will not perfectly satiate nor quiet the appetite; therefore, in order to be beatific, it must terminate at God as He is in Himself, and as He subsists in three Persons. The major is clear; the minor is proved: one who sees a certain nature desires to see the mode in which it subsists, and is not quieted until he sees it; but the divine nature subsists in three Persons; therefore, unless the vision of God terminates at Him as subsisting in three Persons, it will not perfectly satiate nor quiet the appetite of the blessed. I add that the blessed, seeing the essence, naturally desires to see the properties necessarily connected with the essence; but the personal properties are so necessarily connected with the essence that they belong to the quidditative concept of the Divinity, as we have demonstrated in the Treatise on the Trinity; therefore the blessed, seeing the essence, naturally desires to see those properties, and consequently his

appetite cannot be perfectly satiated unless he sees them. I add also that our beatitude is a participation in the divine felicity; but God would not be perfectly blessed if, per impossibile, He knew Himself as one and not as triune, because such knowledge would not be most perfect, being neither intuitive nor comprehensive; therefore likewise, if God were known by us as one and not as triune, such knowledge would not be our beatitude. Whence in John 17 it is said: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent; where, as the object of eternal life or felicity, the Father and the Son are assigned, who, since they love each other with infinite love, cannot be seen as they are in themselves unless the Holy Spirit is likewise seen, who is the fruit and term of this mutual and infinite love.

You will object, first: the essence of beatitude consists in this, that it be the vision and attainment of the supreme good; but, the divine essence being seen, even if the Persons were not seen, man would see and attain the supreme and infinite good, since the relations add no goodness or perfection to the essence, as we taught in the Treatise on the Trinity; therefore, the essence being seen without the Persons, our beatitude would subsist.

I respond, distinguishing the major: the essence of beatitude consists in this, that it be the vision and attainment of the supreme good in the manner in which it is in itself — I grant the major. Without such a manner, I deny the major; and under the same distinction of the minor, I deny the consequence. The solution is clear from what was said above: for the vision of God is not beatific from the precise concept of the vision and attainment of the supreme good, but from the concept of the vision and attainment of God as He is in Himself, because it is only under this concept that it is a cognition intuitive of, and quieting to, the appetite of the blessed, as shown above. Whence, just as in the opinion of our adversaries an abstractive knowledge of the quiddity and essence of God would not be beatific — because although it would be knowledge of the supreme good, it would not be knowledge of Him as He is in Himself — so in our view, the vision of the divine essence without the Persons would not be beatific, because, although it would terminate at the supreme good, it would not be as He is in Himself, since in fact the divine nature subsists and exists in three Persons.

You will object, second: the relations do not belong to the essence of the formal and primary object of our beatitude; therefore, even if they were not seen, our beatitude would still subsist. The consequence seems manifest; the antecedent is taught by our Thomists in the treatise on the beatific vision, and is clear because the beatific vision is a participation in the divine intellection, and consequently has the same formal and primary object; but the formal and primary object, both motive and terminative, of the

divine intellection, is the divine essence, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations, as shown in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God, chapter 1; therefore also of the beatific vision.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for although the relations are not, in respect of themselves, the formal and primary object of our beatitude, they are nevertheless not a secondary object, but pertain to the primary object, as essential modes of it; whence it is repugnant that the divine essence be seen without the Persons, and, these not being seen, that the essence of beatitude should subsist — just as it is repugnant that a colored body be seen by the bodily eye unless it be extended and figured, because the common sensible must modify the proper sensible.

You will say: the divine relations do not belong to the quiddity of God as He is the first principle, even as essential modes of it, otherwise the Trinity of Persons could naturally be known from creatures; therefore neither do they belong to the essence of God as He is the last end, and our objective beatitude, even as essential modes of it. The antecedent is clear; the consequence, however, is proved from the fact that under the same aspect God is the last end and the first principle of creatures.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and its proof. For although that which is the first principle is also the last beatifying end, it is not constituted beatifying under that same aspect under which it is constituted the first principle; for it is constituted in the notion of first principle through omnipotence, or creation, which belongs to God according to Himself, as understood prior to the relations and Persons; but in the notion of the last beatifying end it is constituted through the vision of His essence as He is in Himself; whence, since that essence cannot be seen as it is in itself without the relations and Persons in which it subsists and exists, these belong to the essence and quiddity of God as He has the character of the last beatifying end, as essential modes of it.

Chapter III

On the essence of formal beatitude

The objective beatitude having been explained, it remains that we declare the formal beatitude, which is its possession or attainment, and in what act it essentially consists, that is, through what operation the blessed possess God as the supreme good and beatifying last end — this we shall explain.

§ I

Points to be premised for the resolution of this most celebrated question

Four points must be presupposed as certain, and received almost unanimously by nearly all theologians of this age. The first is that man cannot be beatified through an uncreated vision of God united to himself. The fundamental reason is that formal beatitude is a vital operation, by which the blessed lives in second act, according to John 17: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the true God; but it is contradictory for the blessed to live in second act through an uncreated vision of God; therefore also to be formally beatified through it. The major is established; the minor is proved. Actual life must belong to the living thing intrinsically, either through identity, as happens in God, who lives in second act through an act wholly identified with Himself, or through effective procession from Himself, as happens in created actual life; but the divine intellection cannot belong to the created intellect intrinsically in either of these ways, since in each the greatest imperfection would be involved; therefore it is altogether repugnant that a created intellect be constituted living in second act through it.

Second, it must be supposed that beatitude does not consist in a special influx of God into the essence of the soul, whereby the soul is substantially sanctified, deified, and in a certain manner transformed into God, as glowing iron is transformed into fire, and the diaphanous into light, as Henry of Ghent teaches, Quodlibet 13, q. 12. This supposition is proved: since God is not present to things except through operation, as we showed in the Treatise on the Attributes, chapter 9, He cannot have a special presence and influx into the essence of the soul except by producing or conserving in it some supernatural form or quality, which can be nothing other than sanctifying grace, which alone resides in the essence of the soul; but this influx is not formal beatitude, otherwise all the just would be blessed; therefore beatitude does not consist in an influx of God into the essence of the soul.

This is confirmed: through formal beatitude we attain, possess, and hold God, whence the blessed are called comprehensors; but through the operation and influx of God into the soul, we do not hold and possess God, but rather He holds and possesses us, as is clear from the influx of immensity by which God is present to all things; for through it God contains and bears all things by the word of His power, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter 1. Therefore formal beatitude does not consist in an influx of God into the essence of the soul.

Third, it must be supposed that formal beatitude does not consist in something after the manner of a first act, but in an actual operation. This is proved by this reason of St.

Thomas, here, q. 3, art. 2: formal beatitude is the ultimate perfection of man; but the ultimate perfection of man is not a first act, but an operation and second act; therefore formal beatitude consists in an operation. The major is established, for if beatitude were not the ultimate perfection of man, it would not perfectly satiate his appetite, for he would still desire a further perfection. The minor also seems certain: both because a first act is ordered to a second, which is against the notion of ultimate perfection; and also because, since God is the purest act, devoid of all potentiality, man is assimilated to Him more through operation and second act than through habit or first act, and consequently attains a greater perfection.

Fourth, we suppose that this operation, in which formal beatitude consists, is elicited by the blessed himself, and proceeds effectively from him; indeed, that it involves a contradiction that the blessed should see God through an action not elicited by himself, and immediately produced by God. The first part, which is against the Nominalists, is established from what has been said in the first supposition, for the operation in which formal beatitude consists is a vital act; but it belongs to the notion of a vital act that it proceed from an intrinsic and vital principle; therefore the operation in which formal beatitude consists is in fact elicited by the blessed himself, and he does not stand in a merely passive relation to it. I add that, granted that it could, by absolute power, be produced by God alone, it cannot be denied that it is more fitting and more connatural for man to be beatified through a form effectively caused by himself, than through a form merely received in him; but we must always, and especially with regard to the blessed, attribute to God that which is more fitting and more in conformity with the natures of things, unless the opposite is revealed or impossible, because, as it is said in Wisdom 8, He reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly; therefore, since it is not repugnant that the blessed effectively cause his formal beatitude, nor is it revealed that he does not cause it, we are bound to assert that he actively concurs to it, and does not stand merely passively.

Nor does it avail to say that it belongs to the notion of reward that it proceed from the rewarder alone. For this is true of the objective reward, that is, of the thing which is given as a reward; but it is false of the formal reward, that is, of the attainment and retention of the reward; for this, since it is our action, must proceed effectively from us. Nor is it inconvenient to grant that man beatifies himself — in a qualified sense, namely insofar as he produces the vision in which his beatitude formally consists — just as he is said to sanctify himself, 1 John 3: He who has this hope in Him sanctifies himself, because he effectively concurs to the acts disposing to justification. It cannot, however, be said that man beatifies himself simply, because for this to be true it would be required that man be

the cause of those things which are required for beatitude itself, namely the light of glory, and the union of the divine essence in the manner of a species.

The second part of the supposition, which asserts that it involves a contradiction that the blessed see God through an action not elicited by himself, is gathered from what has been said in the first: for if the blessed stood merely passively with regard to the beatific vision, he would simultaneously live and not live, which are contradictory. He would indeed live, because intellection is a vital act, and the beatific vision is eternal life, as is said in John 17; he would not live, however, because it belongs to the notion of a vital act that it proceed effectively from an intrinsic and vital principle; whence it is contradictory that someone move himself vitally by a motion caused by another, or that he vitally generate by a generation precisely received and not elicited by himself.

This is confirmed: a living thing differs from a non-living thing only in this, that a non-living thing has perfection in itself, but not from itself; a living thing, however, not only receives that perfection in itself, but also has it from itself — either through identity, as happens in the actual divine life, or through elicitation or real procession, as happens in created actual life. But that which precisely receives motion, and does not effectively cause it, does not have it from itself, but only in itself; therefore through it a thing does not live, nor can a living thing be constituted in second act.

You will say: God can produce by Himself alone whatever He produces through a second cause, as St. Thomas teaches, Part 1, q. 105, art. 2, in these words: It is erroneous to say that God cannot by Himself produce all the determined effects which are produced through any created cause. But through an intellect elevated by the light of glory He can produce the beatific vision; therefore also without it.

I respond that God can produce by Himself alone whatever He produces through a second cause, if that cause is purely efficient, but not if it is at the same time formal; but the intellect is not only an efficient cause, but also an extrinsic formal cause with respect to intellection, which derives its species from the vital principle. Or, second, I respond that the major is true of those effects which do not have an essential dependence on some cause, but not of those which essentially depend on some cause, because God cannot destroy the essences of things; but the beatific vision, since it is a vital action, essentially depends on the created intellect. And an instance can be made from generation, nutrition, and augmentation, which God cannot produce by Himself alone, because, being essentially vital actions, they must proceed from a generative, nutritive, and augmentative vital power. Similarly, the mental word, under the aspect in which it is vital — a vital term expressed and produced by an intelligent vital principle in act —

cannot be supplied by God, and produced without the actual concurrence of the intellect, although, as it is the most actual representation of the object, it can be supplied by Him, as happens in the beatific vision, in which the divine essence most actually represents itself to the intellect of the blessed, and consequently plays the role of the word, insofar as it is the most actual representation of the object, as we declared in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision.

§ II

Formal beatitude consists essentially not in several, but in one act only: and this act is neither love nor fruition or delight, but the clear vision of God

The first part of this assertion, which is against Valencia, Suárez, and other more recent authors, who hold that formal beatitude essentially includes several operations, namely vision and love, is proved by this fundamental reason. Formal beatitude is the first attainment of the last end, radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude; but this belongs only to one operation; therefore formal beatitude consists essentially in one, and not in many, operations. The major is certain, for in other essences we understand that to be the formal constitutive which belongs to them first, and in which the other perfections are radically contained — as is clear in man, whose constitutive is rationality, because it belongs to him first, and is the root of risibility and the other properties which belong to human nature. Therefore, since formal beatitude is placed in the attainment of the last end, it must essentially consist in that to which the notion of attainment, radically or causally containing the remaining perfections accompanying the beatific state, belongs first. The minor is likewise no less certain, for between two operations of a rational nature, belonging to different faculties — namely the intellect and the will — there necessarily intervenes an order of priority and posteriority, since nothing is willed unless first known; therefore neither can be the first attainment of the last end, radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude. Just as, because between rationality and risibility there is an order and subordination, and risibility presupposes rationality, it is impossible that both should first constitute the essence of man, and radically contain all the other perfections belonging to human nature.

Nor does it avail what our adversaries say, namely that several operations concur partially to the attainment of the last end, namely vision and love. For besides the fact that no act of the will is the attainment or acquisition of the last end, as we shall show below, granting this, though it is not granted, the whole force of our argument still stands; because since beatific love necessarily presupposes the clear vision of God, and is

subordinated to it, it cannot be the first attainment of God, radically containing all the perfections of the blessed, but this can belong to vision alone, as will be clear below; and so, even granting this, it will remain true that formal beatitude essentially consists in a single operation, although it concomitantly or consecutively includes several. Whence many are mistaken in this matter, confusing the essence of beatitude with its state; for although the state of beatitude includes several operations, namely the clear vision of God, beatific love, and the fruition or delight resulting from them, the essence of beatitude is nevertheless a single, most simple act, namely the clear vision of God, which is the root and cause of love and delight. For if it were composed of several operations, it would not be simpler than other created things — indeed it would be, as it were, one accidental unity, and by aggregation of several elements, which is repugnant to its supreme perfection; for the more perfect a form is, the simpler it must be, as is clear in the angel, who, the higher and more perfect he is, the simpler he is, and uses fewer and more universal species, as shown in the treatise on the Angels.

The second part, which asserts that the act in which formal beatitude essentially consists is not beatific love, is proved, against Scotus, by the reason already suggested: formal beatitude is the first attainment of the last end; but beatific love is not the first attainment of the last end — both because it presupposes the beatific vision, through which we attain the last end, as will be clear below; and also because love is not attainment of the last end, which is shown in two ways. First, by a general reason, because no act of the will can be the attainment of the last end: for to will is a kind of seeking; but to seek is not to attain the thing sought, but to be inclined and to tend toward it. Whence St. Thomas, here, q. 3, art. 4: If to attain were through an act of the will, then immediately from the outset the covetous man would have attained the money, when he wills to have it. Second, the same is proved specially concerning beatific love: love of the fatherland is of the same species as love in the way; but love in the way is not the attainment of the last end, otherwise wayfarers would be comprehensors; therefore neither is love of the fatherland.

Nor does it avail what some disciples of Scotus reply, namely that love in the way and love in the fatherland, because they are regulated by different cognitions, differ in species from each other. First, because cognition does not specify the acts of the will, neither as that which nor as that by which, but the goodness apprehended does, apprehension entering only as a condition applying the will, as our Thomists teach in Philosophy. Second, because if love in the way and love in the fatherland differed in species from each other, from the diversity of the cognitions regulating them, it would follow that the habit of charity of the wayfarer would be distinguished in species from the habit of

charity of the comprehensors, and consequently the charity of the way would not remain, but would be evacuated in the fatherland, against that saying of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13: Charity never fails. The inference is proved: for this reason there are given in the intellect habits diverse in species in the way and in the fatherland, namely of faith and of the light of glory, because the knowledge of the fatherland is distinguished in species from the knowledge of the way; therefore, if the love of the fatherland similarly differs in species from the love of the way, we must admit in the will, for each state, habits of diverse species.

Nor does it avail, either, what others say, namely that the love of the fatherland, although of the same species as the love of life, nevertheless obtains the character of attainment of the last end, which does not belong to the love of the way, either by reason of greater intensity, or by reason of a certain consummative mode, or from an individual condition. For the love of the Blessed Virgin, while she was in the way, surpassed in intensity the loves of all the blessed, and yet did not have the character of attainment of the last end; therefore, by reason of degrees of intensity, the love of the fatherland cannot obtain the character of attainment. From this the addition concerning the consummative mode is also refuted, for a mode partakes of the nature of the thing of which it is a mode; wherefore the mode of intensity cannot be an attainment, because the entity of love, of which it is a mode, is not an attainment; therefore, by the same reason, that consummative mode of beatific love will not be an attainment either. That it also does not obtain the character of attainment from an individual condition seems manifest: both because in the intellect, an act which is an attainment is distinguished in species from an act which is not attaining — for example, the act of faith from the clear vision of God; and also because in the will, desire is distinguished in species from joy, because desire concerns a good not possessed, while joy concerns a good possessed. But likewise, the act of love which would be attainment of the last end would require the presence of the object, no less than joy; therefore it would be distinguished in species from an act of love which was not attaining, and consequently it cannot belong to love from its individual character that it be attainment of the last end.

The third part, which asserts that formal beatitude does not consist essentially in beatific fruition, seems manifest; for just as desire concerns an absent good not yet possessed, so fruition or delight concerns a good already possessed and had; whence it does not effect, but presupposes, the attainment of the end, and as St. Thomas says here, art. 4: Delight comes to the will from the fact that the end is present, not, conversely, does something become present from the fact that the will delights in it.

The fourth part, finally, affirming that formal beatitude essentially consists in the clear vision of God, follows from the preceding: for if such beatitude is a single, simple act, and that act is neither love, nor fruition, or delight, it must necessarily be the vision of God itself; for no operation is found in the blessed, apart from these, which could have the character of formal beatitude. Whence Augustine, in the Soliloquies, chapter 36: This is full beatitude, and the total glorification of man, to see the face of God. And on Psalm 90: I know not what great thing it is that we shall see, when our whole reward is vision.

Moreover, as we argued above, formal beatitude is the attainment of the last end, radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude; but the clear vision of God has these two conditions; therefore in it formal beatitude essentially consists. The major is clear; the minor, as regards the second part, is also evident; for the beatific vision is the root of necessary love, of supreme delight, of complete impeccability, and of the other perfections and properties which connaturally belong to beatitude, as will be established from what will be said in the following chapter. As to the first part, it is proved: first, from Augustine, book 83, question 35, where he says thus: What else is it to live blessedly, but to have something eternal by knowing it? By these words he clearly teaches that the clear vision of God is the attainment of beatitude. Second, from the difference found between the intellect and the will: for the intellect draws things to itself, and makes them present to itself, either according to intelligible being, if the cognition is of a thing either absent or material, or according to entitative being, if the cognition is of a spiritual object intimately present, such as God clearly seen. The will, however, does not draw things to itself, but rather is borne toward them, according to that saying of Augustine: My love is my weight; wherever I am borne, I am borne by it. But to draw things to oneself, and to make them present to oneself, is to attain and possess them; to be drawn, however, is to be possessed, or rather to be impelled toward the thing loved; therefore the intellectual creature attains God through an act of the intellect, not through an act of the will. Third, since grace, which imitates nature, is most orderly, it ought not to elevate to the greatest and most excellent office, such as the attainment of the last end, except through the most excellent and most perfect operation of the rational creature; but the beatific vision is the most perfect operation of the intellectual creature, since it is a participation in the greater excellence of God — for it participates in the divine understanding, which expresses in God a greater perfection than volition and the other attributes; therefore the beatific vision is the attainment of the last end. Augustine, cited above, indicates this reason, in these words: The most excellent of all things is that which is eternal, and therefore we cannot have it except by that whereby we are more excellent, that is, by the mind.

This same part can further be proved by this argument: beatitude consists essentially in that operation which formally or causally satiates every appetite of the rational creature, whence it is called the quieting of desires; but the beatific vision does this; therefore in it formal beatitude essentially consists. The major is established from what has been said above; the minor we have shown at length in the digression contained in the Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, treatise on beatitude, disp. 3, toward the end of article 2, which can be briefly declared in this way. There are four principal desires of men, by which, as by four winds, all the whirlwinds of human ways are stirred up. The first is the desire of truth, common with the Angels; the second is the desire of pleasure, common with brute animals; the third is the desire of eternity, common with all things which flee, as far as they can, destruction and corruption; the fourth is the desire of dignity and greatness, proper to men for political and civil life. But these four desires are most fully and most perfectly fulfilled through the beatific vision; therefore it satiates every desire of the rational creature. The minor is proved, as regards each part, by going through these four desires. And first, as regards the desire of truth, the matter is so clear and evident that it scarcely needs proof; for since each of the blessed sees the essence of God, which is truth itself by essence, in which all created and uncreated truths are contained in the most eminent way, it is manifest that it overflows with all knowledge, not only of created things but also of the attributes of the Creator Himself, and that he sees in the Word all the mysteries of our faith, this whole universe, many possible and future creatures, and finally all things which pertain immediately to it, as shown in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision. Whence Gregory the Great says excellently, book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 33: What is there that they do not know, there where they know all in knowing Him who knows all things?

Then, as regards the desire for pleasure or delight, it is no less evident that it is perfectly satiated through the beatific vision, since, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 31, art. 5, three things concur for delight, namely a knowing or sensing faculty, an object suited to it, and the union of the object with it; and these three are found in the beatific vision in the most perfect way; for the intellect, from which it is elicited, is, among the cognitive faculties, purer, higher, nobler, and, so to speak, more vigorous, and consequently much more apt for knowing; and God, as the first truth and the first intelligible, is the highest and noblest object; and the union of that object with the intellect is so intimate that, except for the hypostatic union, a greater and more intimate union cannot be given. Wherefore this is the difference between the joy of this world and of paradise, that the former, being small and modest, is said to enter into the heart of man; the latter, however, being immense and infinite, cannot be contained by the human heart, so that it is better said that man enters into that joy, than that that joy enters into the heart of man,

according to that saying of Christ, Matthew 25: Enter into the joy of thy Lord. Whence Anselm, in the Proslogion, chapter 26: Not only, then, will that joy enter into those who rejoice, but all who rejoice will enter into the joy of the Lord. So great is the joy over God of the heavenly fatherland, that it cannot be contained in man, and therefore man enters into that incomprehensible joy, and that joy does not enter into man as comprehended by man.

Moreover, this immense joy flows from a threefold source, or has three principal causes: for first, the blessed rejoice over the divine good, and the infinite felicity of God; for true friendship, such as charity is, rejoices with the goods of a friend. Second, they rejoice over their own good, and over the felicity which they enjoy, by enjoying God as their own good. Third, they rejoice over the goods and felicity of the other Saints, among whom, as Gregory the Great says, There will be no envy of unequal glory, since unity of charity will reign in all.

Augustine describes this immense joy elegantly, On the Spirit, chapter 64, in these words: What, or how great, then, is that joy, where such and so great a good is found? O human heart, needy heart, inexperienced heart, overwhelmed, indeed overburdened with troubles — how great would be your joy if you abounded with all these things? Ask your own depths whether they can contain their own joy over so great a beatitude of themselves. But surely, if some other whom you loved altogether as yourself had that same beatitude, your joy would be doubled, because you would rejoice no less for him than for yourself. And if two, or three, or many more had this same thing, you would rejoice as much for each individually as for yourself, if you loved each as yourself. Therefore, in that perfect charity of innumerable blessed, of Angels and of men, where no one loves another less than himself, the joy will be innumerable. If, then, the heart of man will scarcely contain its own joy over its own so great good, how will it be capable of so great and so many joys in that perfect felicity, where each one, without comparison, will love God more than himself, and all others together with himself, and therefore will rejoice, beyond estimation, more over the felicity of God than over his own, and that of all his other loved ones?

Third, through the beatific vision the desire for eternity is fulfilled, for that vision is eternal and immutable, and is not measured by time or by aevum, but by eternity, because the principles concurring to it, namely the light of glory, and the divine essence united by way of species to the intellect of the blessed, remain altogether unvaried. Whence Bernard, sermon 30 on the Canticle: That vision (he says) stands still, because the form which is then seen stands still, nor will it undergo any change from what it is, was, or will be.

Finally, through the same vision the desire for greatness is satiated, because through it the blessed is raised to the supreme height of greatness and dignity, and not only becomes godlike, but in a certain manner is even made God, according to that saying of the Prophet, I have said, you are gods. For just as whiteness, united to a man, makes him white, heat makes him hot, wisdom makes him wise, so the divine essence, united by way of an intelligible form to the intellect of the blessed, renders him in a certain manner God — if not in entitative being, at least in intentional and intelligible being — especially since the intellect in a certain manner passes into the thing understood, and from the intellect and the intelligible there is made a greater unity than from matter and form, as the Commentator of Aristotle says. Whence in 1 John 3 it is said: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is. And St. Thomas, Book 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 51, says that according to this vision, man is most assimilated to God.

From these things it is established that all the desires of man are most fully and most perfectly satiated through the beatific vision, and consequently that in it the formal beatitude of man consists, which St. John describes elegantly, Apocalypse 22, under the symbol and figure of a most pleasant river, in these words: He showed me a river of living water, bright as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of the street thereof, and on both sides of the river, was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits, yielding its fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree for the healing of the nations. Certainly heavenly beatitude could not have been described under a more fitting symbol: for that river of living water, shining like crystal, is nothing other than the clear vision of God, which, like a most limpid and pure river, gladdens the whole city of God. That river is said to proceed from the throne of God and of the Lamb, because the beatific vision draws its origin from the power of God and the merits of Christ; or because the joys of eternal beatitude proceed chiefly from the fruition of God, one and triune, and of Christ, God and man, according to that saying of John 17: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent. Moreover, that heavenly river is said to be surrounded on both sides by most pleasant trees, which yield their fruits every month, because the vision of God has many attendant joys, which never grow old, but always appear new. Finally, not only the fruits, but also the leaves of these trees, are said to be for the healing of the nations, because in that heavenly beatitude nothing is useless, nothing superfluous; all things which pertain to it are precious, and useful, and delightful. The very leaves of the tree of life, that is, the endowments of the glorified body, flowing from the endowments of the soul, drive away all languor and infirmity, and confer perpetual incorruption and health, as will appear below, when we treat of the endowments of the glorified body.

§ III

The chief objections are resolved

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: formal beatitude consists in the most perfect conjunction with God; but that conjunction which occurs through both acts of the intellect and will, namely vision and love, is more perfect than that which occurs through vision alone; therefore formal beatitude does not consist in a single act, but in several.

I respond that formal beatitude does not consist in the most perfect conjunction with God, absolutely and simply — otherwise it would have to consist in the hypostatic union — but in the most perfect conjunction in the genus of attainment; but although an act of the will adds a character of conjunction over and above the act of the intellect, it does not add a character of attainment, because, as we showed above, an act of the will is not one of attainment, but only of impelling and inclining toward the object willed.

You will say, first: once attainment has occurred through an act of the intellect, God still remains further attainable — but only through an act of the will; therefore that act adds not only a character of conjunction, but also of attainment. The minor is certain; the major is proved. Through an act of the intellect, God is held only under the aspect of the true; but He is also attainable under the aspect of the good, since as such He has the character of the last end, of whose notion it is that it be attainable by the rational creature; therefore, God having been attained through the act of the beatific vision, He still remains further attainable through love. Whence St. Thomas, here, q. 4, art. 8, ad 3, says that the perfection of charity is essential to beatitude as regards the love of God, but not as regards the love of neighbor.

I respond, denying the major, and to its proof, I distinguish the major: God is held only under the aspect of the true, taking "under" as denoting the formal reason under which, I grant the major; as the reason that is attained, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: God is also attainable under the aspect of the good, as the reason under which, I deny the minor; as the reason which is attained, I grant the minor, and I deny the consequence. Thus, just as the intellect understands not only the notion of the true, but also the notion of the good, and of being, and all the formalities which can belong to any thing, although it understands all these under the notion of the true, as the reason under which; so it attains not only the true, but also the good, and all the divine perfections, though it attains all of them under the notion of the true as the reason under which; and because God is attainable only under this notion, as the reason under which, although as the thing which He is attainable under every other aspect, therefore He is

adequately held by the intellect, and beyond its act there remains no further attainment, even though there remains a further conjunction, through beatific love. As for St. Thomas, it must be said that he only wished to declare in the place cited that the love of God is essential to beatitude consecutively, that is, that it follows upon the essence of beatitude, no supposition of anything extrinsic being made — as distinguished from the love of neighbor, which does not follow upon the essence of beatitude in itself, but upon the supposition of the creation of one's neighbor.

You will say, second: it belongs to the same mobile thing to attain the end or center, to which it belongs to tend toward it; but man through charity tends toward God, and merits beatitude; therefore he also attains it through the act of love.

I respond that although it belongs to the same mobile thing to attain the center or end, to which it belongs to tend toward it, it need not attain and possess it through the same power and faculty by which it tends toward it. For a stone, through gravity, which is its inclination, tends toward the center, but is united to it through quantity or "where." The covetous man is moved by appetite to seek money, and with his hand perceives and seizes it. The soldier fights with his hand, and receives the crown on his head. Although, therefore, merit and tendency toward the last end belong to the will, its attainment nevertheless pertains to the intellect.

You will say, third: the intellect attains its object for this reason, that the one understanding, through its act, becomes one with the object understood; but the one loving also becomes one, through love, with the object loved; therefore the will likewise attains its object.

I respond, distinguishing the major: it becomes one with the object understood, through assimilation, I grant the major; in whatever way it becomes one, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the one loving becomes one with the object loved, by reason of weight and inclination toward it, I grant the minor; by reason of likeness and identity of nature with it, I deny the minor and the consequence.

You will object, second, against the second part of the assertion: formal beatitude consists in the most perfect operation of the intellectual nature; but love is more perfect than vision; therefore beatitude consists in love. The major seems certain; the minor is proved in several ways. First, from St. Thomas, I, q. 82, art. 3, where he teaches that the love of things which are above us exceeds in perfection the knowledge of them, and, conversely, that the knowledge of things which are below us surpasses the love of them. Second, because the order of the Seraphim, so named from the ardor of charity, is more perfect than the order of the Cherubim, who are so named from the fullness of

knowledge. Third, because the will is a more perfect faculty than the intellect, both because it moves the intellect as to exercise, and also because it acts freely, while the intellect acts after the manner of nature; but to act freely is a more perfect mode of acting than to act necessarily; therefore the most perfect act of the will, such as beatific love, exceeds in perfection the most perfect act of the intellect, such as the beatific vision. Fourth, that is more perfect whose opposite is worse; but hatred, opposed to charity, is worse than the lack of vision; therefore love exceeds vision.

I respond, first, distinguishing the major: formal beatitude consists in the most perfect operation entitatively, I deny the major; the most perfect in the line of attainment, I grant the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: beatific love is more perfect than vision, in the order of entity, I grant; in the order of attainment, I deny the minor and the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said above: for since formal beatitude is the attainment of the beatific object, it cannot be inferred, merely from the entitative excess of one operation over another, that the former is formal beatitude, unless it also excels the latter in the line of attainment.

I respond, second, granting the major, denying the minor. To its first proof, drawn from the authority of St. Thomas, I say that he there speaks of the love and knowledge of wayfarers, who understand higher things through the species of quiddities and material things, which do not represent the higher essences as they are in themselves, but by analogy and likeness to those material and corporeal things from which they are drawn; and of cognition so terminated at higher things, it is true that it is excelled in perfection by love of them, which is borne toward them as they are in themselves — but this is not true of the cognition of the fatherland, especially of the beatific vision, since it does not occur through a species and likeness of creatures, but the divine essence itself immediately, through itself, plays the role of species and intelligible form. From this the answer to the second proof is clear. For the Seraphim are not so named from the ardor of the charity of the fatherland, but of the way; and likewise the Cherubim take their name not from the knowledge of the comprehensor, but of the wayfarer; whence from the excellence of the order of the Seraphim over the order of the Cherubim, it can only be inferred that the love of the way exceeds the knowledge of the wayfarer, not that it exceeds the beatific vision.

To the third, I deny the antecedent, namely that the will is more perfect than the intellect; for, as Aristotle says, Ethics X, chapter 7: The mind is the most excellent of all things that are in us. To the first proof for the contrary, I say that although the will moves the intellect as to exercise, in the genus of efficient cause, it is nevertheless moved by it as to specification, on the part of the object, and in the genus of final cause; and this

mode of acting and moving is the more perfect. To the second proof I say likewise that although formal freedom is found only in the will, it is nevertheless radically in the intellect; whence, just as the intellect depends on the will, and is subordinated to it in formal freedom, so also the will is subordinated to the intellect, and depends on it as on the first root of all freedom. I add that the mode of acting freely is not more perfect simply than the mode of acting naturally, but only in a qualified sense, namely in the moral genus; for the mode by which God acts ad intra, in producing the Son and the Holy Spirit, is more perfect than the mode by which He acts ad extra, in producing creatures, and yet the former is free, the latter truly natural.

To the fourth, granting the major, I distinguish the minor: hatred is worse than the lack of vision, in the moral line, I grant the minor; in the physical genus, I deny the minor. From this it can only be inferred that love excels vision in the moral genus, which we willingly grant, since vision, being devoid of freedom, is not in the moral genus; but not that it excels it in the physical genus, which alone we deny.

You will object, third, against the third part, which asserts that formal beatitude does not consist in the fruition of God: Benedict XII, in the Extravagant Benedictus Deus, says that the souls of the Saints are truly blessed by vision and fruition; therefore he holds that formal beatitude consists, at least partially, in the fruition of God. The same is gathered from St. Thomas, below, q. 11, art. 3, ad 3, where he asserts that fruition is the last end, not as the thing which is ultimately sought, but as the attainment of the last end.

I respond that the mind of the Pontiff in that Extravagant was only to define that the souls of the just, before the day of judgment, are truly blessed; whether by an operation of the intellect or of the will, or of both faculties, his definition did not touch upon, but left to the disputation of theologians. Whence he does not say that they are constituted essentially blessed by fruition and vision, but that they are truly blessed by vision and fruition, which is easily explained as referring to vision as entering into beatitude as its essence, and fruition as a property resulting from it. Similarly, the authority of St. Thomas is answered thus: fruition is the attainment of the last end, not formally, but consecutively and objectively, because it follows upon the beatific vision, which is the attainment, and has it for its object. Or, second, it can be said that it is the attainment, not formally, but completively, because it completes and perfects the beatific vision, upon which it follows as a property.

You will object, fourth, against the fourth part of the assertion, in which we said that formal beatitude essentially consists in the beatific vision: formal beatitude must, of

itself, totally and perfectly satiate the appetite of man; but the clear vision of God does not do this, since man is inclined not only to see God, but also to love Him and to enjoy Him; therefore formal beatitude does not essentially consist in the clear vision of God.

I respond that formal beatitude must, of itself, satiate the primary inclination of man; the secondary inclinations, however, not formally through itself, but only causally. Now the primary inclination of man is the inclination to know the true, and this is formally satiated by the clear vision of God; the other inclinations it satiates only causally, namely by causing the acts through which they are satiated, namely beatific love and fruition.

You will object, last: it belongs to the notion of the last end that it not be ordered to a further end, but that all things be ordered to it; but the clear vision of God is ordered to beatific love as to an end, and not conversely, love to vision; for, as Anselm says, book 2, Cur Deus Homo: It is a perverse order to love in order that you may understand, but a most correct order to understand in order that you may love; therefore formal beatitude does not consist in the clear vision of God.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor; for since the clear vision of God is the essence of formal beatitude, and love is its property — and properties exist to perfect the nature of which they are properties — hence it follows that beatific love regards vision as its end, and not conversely does vision regard beatific love. As for Anselm, it must be said that he there does not compare love with knowledge of the fatherland, but with knowledge of the way; for since the latter is imperfect, love is ordered to it as to a proximate end; whence it would be a perverse order to love in the way in order to understand, and it is the most correct order to understand in order to love.

Chapter IV

On the properties of formal beatitude

The essence of formal beatitude having been explained, it remains that we declare its properties, which are chiefly four, namely love, delight, impeccability, and incorruptibility, or perpetuity.

§ I

The first property of formal beatitude: the happy necessity of loving

No one doubts that the blessed, seeing God, are necessitated by a necessity of specification to love Him; for since in God clearly seen no notion of evil can appear, the will, which is the appetite for the good, can by no means hate or flee Him — just as, for the same reason, man in the way is necessitated, as to specification, to will the good as such, abstracted from the true and the apparent. But there is a difficulty concerning necessity as to exercise, on account of the Scotists, who contend that the exercise of the love of the blessed is free and contingent by its own nature, although, from the extrinsic providence of God, removing all things which could divert it from charity, it has the property of being destined to endure forever. We, however, assert that the will of the blessed, seeing God, is so seized by love of Him that it can by no means either divert or suspend the exercise of divine love; and consequently that formal beatitude, or the clear vision of God, essentially entails or accompanies a happy necessity of loving God, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise.

The fundamental reason is this: the will, since it is a rational appetite, and follows the guidance and dictate of reason, cannot cease from any act, unless the intellect conceives in it some notion of evil, or in its cessation some notion of a greater good; but the blessed can judge neither of these concerning the love of God; therefore he cannot cease from the act of love. The major is established; the minor also seems manifest, for in the fatherland the act of love is joyous and easy, since charity in the fatherland is, as it were, in its own center, being conjoined with the clear vision of God, and regulated by the light of glory. Nor can there be lassitude and weariness in its exercise, since it does not depend on any bodily organ, for the vision from which it follows is not by conversion to phantasms. Nor can any nausea or disgust be found in the continuation of beatific love, because the uncreated good, since it is of infinite sweetness and delightfulness, fills so sweetly, satiates so delightfully, that in its fruition desire reigns, and in satiety its appetite flourishes. Whence St. Peter says that the blessed Angels, continually contemplating the Holy Spirit, desire to look into Him. And St. Gregory in the Morals: When we shall have come (he says) to the very fountain of life, there will be impressed on us delightfully both thirst and satiety at once; but far will be the necessity from the thirst, and far the disgust from the satiety, because, being thirsty, we shall be satiated, and being satiated, we shall thirst. Finally, the clear vision of God cannot admit of an erroneous judgment, by which the blessed would judge it good for him to cease from the love of God, but rather he has a contrary act, by which he judges that it is good for him continually to adhere to God through love, and never to be torn from Him; so that the will cannot for even one

instant divert the intellect from that judgment.

You will say, first: the blessed can apprehend in the privation or cessation of beatific love some notion of good, namely the exercise of liberty; therefore they can cease from such love, or interrupt its exercise.

I respond, denying the antecedent, for liberty cannot be exercised concerning the universal and infinite good, but only concerning creatures and particular and limited goods, which have no necessary connection with it — just as the intellect cannot exercise the faculty of discoursing and reasoning concerning principles, but only concerning conclusions which are virtually contained in them.

You will press further: through faith, God is proposed to the will as the supreme and infinite good, and yet the love regulated by it is free; therefore, although in the fatherland, through the light of glory and the clear vision, He is proposed as the supreme and infinite good, the love regulated by it will likewise be free.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, for although each light represents God as the supreme and infinite good, the one represents Him clearly, and as He is in Himself; the other, however, obscurely, and proposes such a good through borrowed species. Whence, just as the intellect is convinced by the true when proposed in the first manner, but not in the second, so too the will is necessitated only by the supreme good clearly known.

You will urge: every act of a free faculty is free; but the will is a free faculty, for as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter 105: Either there is no will, or it must be called free; therefore beatific love is free, at least as to exercise.

This is confirmed: the same Holy Doctor, book 5 of the Trinity, says thus: If something is voluntary, it is not necessary; but beatific love is voluntary; therefore it is not necessary, but free, at least as to exercise.

To the pressing objection, I respond that, just as in our intellect there is found the character of the discursive, with respect to conclusions, and the character of the intellective without discourse, with respect to principles, so in our will there is found a mode of acting naturally, and a mode of acting freely. Augustine did not say that the will is free in every act, but only that it would not be will if it were not free — which must be understood with respect to certain acts. Or, second, it can be said, with St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 5, ad 1, that the will is always free from the necessity of coaction, because in its acts it cannot suffer force, but is not always free from the necessity of natural inclination; and beatific love enjoys the first kind of freedom, namely from the

necessity of coaction, while nevertheless it is necessary as to specification and exercise with this same freedom. By this the confirmation is answered, for when St. Augustine says, if something is voluntary, it is not necessary, this must be understood of the necessity of coaction, not of the necessity of natural inclination; whence, although beatific love is voluntary, it is nevertheless necessary in this second way. Just as the love by which God loves Himself, and by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, is voluntary, and consequently free from the necessity of coaction, while nevertheless it is necessary by a necessity of natural inclination, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise. More on this below, when we treat of free will.

You will say, second: no object necessitates the will as to the exercise of an act, as St. Thomas often teaches, because it belongs to the object to specify the faculty, but not to move it as to exercise; whence, if it necessitates, it necessitates only as to specification; therefore God, even clearly seen, does not necessitate the will to the exercise of love.

I respond that St. Thomas only means that no object, by force and formality of the object, necessitates the will; with this it stands that it can necessitate it by the will's own nature, which, being both free and natural, sometimes operates as free, sometimes as natural. The first belongs to it with regard to an object proposed with indifference, the second with regard to an object proposed without indifference of judgment.

§ II

The second property of formal beatitude: supreme joy or delight

From the clear vision of God, and beatific love, there arises in the blessed an ineffable joy and supreme delight, so great that St. Bernard, Epistle 114, says that compared to it, all other pleasantness is sorrow, all sweetness is pain, all sweet things bitter, all beautiful things foul, and finally, whatever else could delight is troublesome. First, the blessed rejoice over the divine good considered in itself. Of this joy is understood that saying of Apocalypse 19: For the Lord our almighty God hath reigned, let us be glad and rejoice, and give glory to Him. Second, they rejoice over their own good, and over the felicity which they enjoy; of this joy the Royal Prophet speaks, Psalm 19, when he says: Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance: at Thy right hand are delights, even to the end. The first joy or delight is elicited by charity, as its secondary act, because, as St. Thomas teaches throughout II-II, q. 28, to rejoice over the good of a friend is an act and fruit of friendship and charity. Concerning the second, there is a difficulty as to from what it is elicited, since, belonging to the love of concupiscence, it does not seem able to proceed from charity, which is a love of friendship. Whence Suárez, and other more recent authors, hold that it is elicited by the habit of hope, which they say remains in the fatherland. But this manifestly conflicts with St. Thomas, who teaches in many places that hope does not remain in the fatherland. For in this part, q. 67, art. 4, he asks, Does hope remain after death in the state of glory? And he answers that it does not remain, and proves this thus: motion ceases when the term is obtained; but hope has itself after the manner of a motion tending toward beatitude and the clear vision of God; therefore, that being obtained, it perishes. This reason the Apostle suggests, Romans 8, in these words: Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? The same he teaches, II-II, q. 18, art. 2, where he argues thus: when that which gives the species is removed, the species is dissolved; but in the fatherland there does not subsist that which gives species to the virtue of hope, namely the act of hoping for eternal beatitude, as to be obtained by divine aid, since in the fatherland beatitude itself is already had; therefore, in the fatherland, hope does not remain.

Nor does it avail what Suárez says, namely that the habit of hope does not primarily and essentially regard the act of hoping for beatitude, but the act of the love of concupiscence, by which one loves God as one's own proper good. For a virtue is named from the principal act which it elicits; but the second theological virtue is called by all "hope"; therefore its chief act is the act of hoping, not the love of concupiscence, by which one loves God as one's own proper good. I add that hope, which is a virtue, corresponds to hope which is a passion; but the principal act of hope which is a passion is

not to desire one's own proper and fitting good, but to hope for an arduous, possible good, and hence it is found not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the irascible; therefore, likewise, the chief act of the virtue of hope is not the love of concupiscence, by which one loves God as one's own proper good, but the act of hoping, by which future beatitude is expected.

It must be said, therefore, that the delight by which the blessed delight in God as their own beatifying good is elicited by the habit of charity; for since it cannot be elicited by faith, nor by hope, which do not remain in the fatherland, it follows that it is elicited by charity. I add that from the same habit that delight is elicited, from which arises the love which is its cause; but the love of concupiscence, by which the blessed love God as their own proper good, proceeds from the virtue of charity, because, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 25, art. 4, through charity we love not only God and our neighbor, but also ourselves; therefore also the delight which follows upon that love.

You will say: the love of concupiscence for future beatitude, and the joy following upon it, do not belong to charity, but to hope, according to that saying of the Apostle, Romans 12: Rejoicing in hope; therefore, even in the fatherland, the love of concupiscence, by which the blessed love God as their own proper good, and the delight which follows upon it, are not elicited by the habit of charity, but of hope.

But I deny the consequence, for the love of concupiscence by which, in the way, we seek beatitude, and delight in it, regards it under the aspect of an arduous, future good, which is the formal object of hope; but in the fatherland, the love by which the blessed love beatitude, and delight in it, regards it as a present good, and already obtained, whence it cannot be elicited by hope, which is of an arduous and future good, and consequently does not remain in the blessed; but only by charity, to which, as to the nearest virtue, it is reduced, and which alone of the theological virtues remains in the fatherland. Nor is it an obstacle that charity is a love of friendship, and love of friendship regards the good of the friend, while love of concupiscence regards one's own good. For one's own good is not always opposed to the good of a friend, but is sometimes subordinated to it, and connected with it; whence the love of concupiscence, by which we love ourselves, can arise, and in fact does arise, from the virtue of charity, by which we love God and our neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches above. Since, therefore, beatitude, and the delight which the blessed derive from it, are not opposed to God and His good, but are subordinated to it, and connected with it, they proceed, as its secondary acts, from the virtue of charity, by which they love God.

§ III

The third property of formal beatitude: the happy impotence to sin, arising from the clear vision of God, and beatific love

Scotus and the Nominalists teach that the blessed are impeccable only extrinsically, and by divine providence preventing them from falling into sin. The other theologians, however, assert that they are impeccable intrinsically, and that this happy impotence to sin proceeds from a twofold root or cause, namely from the clear vision of God, and from beatific love.

The beatific vision, then, excludes from the blessed the potency to sin for four reasons. First, because it intimately and immovably conjoins him to the first rule of his operation, namely to his last end; for to sin is nothing other than to deflect and decline from the rectitude of one's rule. Whence, just as if the hand of an artisan were itself the rule of cutting, or had such a rule inseparably conjoined to itself, it could not cut except rightly; so the will of the blessed, which is immovably conjoined to the rule of its operation, can only operate rightly.

Second, because it fills the whole capacity of the rational creature; for just as the heaven is substantially immutable, and incorruptible, because the whole capacity of its matter is fulfilled by its form, so the will of the blessed is rendered immutable from good to evil, and consequently impeccable, because its whole capacity is fulfilled by the beatific vision, through which all the desires of man are fully and perfectly satiated, as shown in the preceding chapter. Whence Isidore, book 1, On the Supreme Good, chapter 12, says that although the Angels are by their nature mutable, divine contemplation does not permit them to change.

Third, because there cannot be sin in the will, unless error, ignorance, or inconsideration precede in the intellect, as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins; but the beatific vision excludes all these defects from the intellect; therefore it also takes away the potency to sin from the will.

Fourth, the will of one seeing God is related to the divine good just as the will of a wayfarer is related to the good in general; whence, just as it is impossible for someone in the way to operate except with regard to the notion of the good in general, so he who sees God cannot will anything which is not ordered to Him, and consequently cannot sin, since one who sins seeks an object without order to the divine good.

The second root from which the impeccability of the blessed arises is beatific love; for through sin man is turned away from God as his last end, but through charity he is

converted to God as his last end; therefore, since aversion from God and conversion to Him cannot exist simultaneously, sin is altogether incompossible with beatific love. Whence Gregory, book 5 of the Morals, chapter 27: Angelic nature is in itself mutable, which mutability it overcomes by this, that it is bound by the chains of love to Him who is always the same. And Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 9: There, the love of the unchangeable good is, if this can be said, secure from the fear of evil to be avoided.

You will say: love in the way and love in the fatherland are of the same species; indeed, the same habit of charity which was in the way remains in the fatherland; but love in the way does not exclude the potency to sin; therefore neither does love in the fatherland.

I respond that although charity is of the same species in the fatherland and in the way, it has nevertheless a different mode of operating; because in the way it is regulated by faith and obscure knowledge, which does not represent God clearly and as He is in Himself; in the fatherland, however, it is regulated by the light of glory, and the clear vision, which represents God as having every notion of good clearly, and judges that nothing is desirable which is not ordinable to God — from which it follows that the charity of the fatherland removes the potency to sin, but not the charity of the way.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that it is not possible, even by the absolute power of God, that sin of actual commission be conjoined with the vision and love of beatitude. The first part is clear from what has been said, for it is impossible that someone should sin, unless a practical judgment precedes, by which it is judged that here and now something is to be sought which is not ordinable to God; but such a judgment is contradictory to being conjoined with the beatific vision, for that is a perfect judgment, by which the blessed speculatively and practically judges that God is to be loved above all things, and all things are to be referred to Him as to the last end; therefore actual sin of commission cannot, even by absolute power, be composed with the beatific vision.

That it also cannot be conjoined with beatific love is no less evident; for, as we said above, through mortal sin man is turned away from God as from his last end, and is converted to a creature as his last end; but charity converts man to God as to his last end; but it is contradictory to have simultaneously an aversion from God as the last end, and a conversion to Him as the last end; therefore also for beatific love to exist simultaneously with actual mortal sin.

This same incompossibility of mortal sin with the beatific vision and love can also be demonstrated by this reasoning, even with respect to the absolute power of God. When

certain forms are repugnant by the nature of the thing, they cannot be conjoined with each other, unless God concurs with a special and extraordinary concurrence to the conjunction of both, as is clear in heat and cold in intense degrees. But God cannot, by a special concurrence, concur to the conjunction of mortal sin with the beatific vision and love, otherwise sin would be attributed to Him as its special author, which is repugnant to His infinite sanctity — just as, if by absolute power He were to prevent the heat of fire from expelling cold from water, the preservation of the cold would be reduced to Him as its special author and preserver; therefore it is repugnant, by the absolute power of God, that mortal sin be conjoined with the clear vision of God and beatific love.

It is gathered, second, that the beatific vision and love cannot, even by the absolute power of God, be conjoined not only with sin of commission, but also not with sin of omission; because the vision and beatific love, by the nature of the thing, require the exclusion or prevention of sin, not only of commission, but also of omission; whence, in order for it to be compared with them, there would be required, not indeed a positive concurrence of God conserving the sin of omission, but a negation of the concurrence postulated by vision and love, in order that they might prevent it; but by that very fact that God would deny the concurrence owed to them, the sin of omission would be attributed to Him, as we argued above concerning the sin of commission; therefore it is repugnant that not only sin of commission, but also of omission, be conjoined with the beatific vision and love.

This is confirmed: for a sin of omission, at least an interpretative act is required, that is, a foundation by which a prudent person would judge that the will was so disposed as if it willed to omit through a positive act; but supposing that the will of the blessed, by force of love and vision, demands concurrence for avoiding the sin of omission, there is no foundation for prudently judging that it is so disposed as if it willed to omit through a positive act, but rather there would be a foundation for judging that such an omission is sought by God, denying such concurrence; therefore it is repugnant for the beatific vision and love to be conjoined with sin of omission.

You will say: God can impose a precept on the blessed concerning some free act, for example, of guarding men; but, that precept supposed, the blessed can omit such an act, since, even that being supposed, he exercises it freely; therefore he can sin by a sin of omission.

I respond, distinguishing the minor: supposing that precept, the blessed can omit such an act by a physical and natural omission, I grant the minor; by a moral and culpable omission, I deny the minor. Or otherwise the same minor can be distinguished: the

blessed can omit such an act by antecedent potency, and in the divided sense, I grant the antecedent; by consequent potency, and in the composite sense, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. These things can be explained by the example of Christ, who, with respect to an act falling under precept, was free as to exercise, and yet could not sin; because although He could have omitted such an act, insofar as omission is the pure negation of the opposite act, He could not do so insofar as it is the privation of the said act as due; or because, although He could have omitted it by antecedent potency, and in the divided sense, He could not by consequent potency, and in the composite sense. Of this at greater length in the Treatise on the Incarnation, when we shall expound the concord of Christ's freedom with His impeccability.

It is gathered, third, that habitual sin cannot, by absolute power, be conjoined with the beatific vision and love, because it is impossible, through any power, that man simultaneously have two last ends simply speaking, even if he has one actually, and the other habitually, as shown above in chapter 1; but the blessed, seeing and loving God, has Him actually as his last end simply speaking, since the beatific vision is the attainment of God as the last end; but he who is in a state of mortal sin is habitually converted to a creature as his last end; therefore it is repugnant that habitual sin be conjoined with the beatific vision and love; otherwise such a conjunction would be attributed to God as its special author, as we said above concerning the sin of commission and omission.

I add that habitual sin, or the stain of sin, is nothing other than the privation of sanctifying grace, as voluntary, or caused by a preceding sinful act of the will; but such a privation is incompossible with the beatific vision and love; therefore also habitual sin, or the stain of sin. The major will be established in the Treatise on Sins; the minor is clear, both because in the blessed there cannot be given a sinful act of the will, from which such a voluntary privation of sanctifying grace would result, as is clear from what has been said above; and also from the fact that the beatific vision and love are vital acts with a supernatural vitality; whence, just as vital acts of the natural order — for example, intellection or volition — necessarily and indispensably presuppose in the subject from which they are elicited the radical principle of natural life, namely the rational soul, so the beatific vision and love must necessarily and indispensably presuppose in the subject from which they are elicited the radical principle of supernatural life, which is nothing other than sanctifying grace itself, as will be established from what will be said in the Treatise on Grace.

It is gathered, fourth, that venial sin cannot be conjoined with beatific love. For although venial sin does not turn one away from God as the last end, it nevertheless diverts one from Him; whence, just as the act of charity is a conversion to God, and mortal sin is an

aversion from God, so venial sin is a diversion from Him; but with beatific love, not only aversion from God, but also diversion, is incompossible; therefore not only mortal sin, but also venial sin, cannot coexist with beatific love. The major is certain; the minor is proved. Necessary love, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise, is incompossible not only with aversion from God, but also with diversion from Him; for since it is continuous, and never interrupted, all that the blessed loves he actually refers and orders to the divine goodness as to his last end; but beatific love, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise, is necessary, as we showed in § 1; therefore with it, not only aversion, but not even diversion from God, is compossible.

§ IV

The fourth property of formal beatitude: its perpetuity, or unlosability

It is certain, from faith, that the beatitude of the saints will be perpetual, and will never cease, for in the Symbol of Faith we profess that we look for the life of the world to come. And in 1 Peter 1, beatitude is called an incorruptible, undefiled, and unfading inheritance. And Augustine, book 15 of the Trinity, chapter 8, says that life can in no way be truly blessed, unless it is everlasting.

But there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians, whether this belongs to it intrinsically, and by the nature of the thing, or only extrinsically, and by the gratuitous will of God, conserving it perpetually? For Scotus and Durandus hold that it is perpetual only by the will of God, and not intrinsically. Others say, with Curiel, that beatitude can be considered in two ways, namely under the aspect of beatitude, and of a perfect and fully satiating good, and under the aspect of vision and operation; and in the first way it is intrinsically unlosable and incorruptible, but not in the second way. The Thomists, however, commonly teach that the beatific vision, both as beatitude and as vision, is intrinsically incorruptible.

The first is clear, for it belongs to the notion of formal beatitude that it perfectly satiate and quiet the appetite of the blessed; but if vision, insofar as it is formal beatitude, were not perpetual and intrinsically unlosable, it would not perfectly satiate nor quiet the appetite of the blessed; therefore vision, insofar as it is formal beatitude, is perpetual and intrinsically unlosable. The major is clear; the minor is proved. One of the things the blessed desires is the perpetuity of the good which he possesses; whence he would be greatly anxious, if he thought that such a good were not perpetual; therefore, if vision, as formal beatitude, were not perpetual and intrinsically unlosable, it would not satiate nor perfectly quiet the appetite of the blessed.

Nor does it avail to say that, for the blessed to be quieted, and all anxiety removed from him, it suffices that God has decreed to conserve his beatitude perpetually, and that this be known to him. For against this is the fact that it belongs to the notion of formal beatitude that, by reason of itself, or of what is owed to it, it satiate the appetite of the blessed and exclude all misery and anxiety, as is established from what was said in the preceding chapter; therefore vision, as formal beatitude, must, by reason of itself, or of what is owed to it, be perpetual and unlosable, and it does not suffice that this belong to it extrinsically and by the gratuitous will of God, for perfectly quieting the appetite by which the blessed desires the perpetuity of the good which he possesses.

That the beatific vision, not only as formal beatitude, but also as vision and operation, is intrinsically incorruptible, is proved, against Curiel: first, because it essentially belongs to vision that it be formal beatitude, as shown in the preceding chapter; therefore if, as formal beatitude, it demands intrinsically to endure perpetually, this same thing belongs to it insofar as it is vision. Second, that operation demands intrinsically to endure perpetually whose principles are intrinsically invariable and incorruptible; but the principles of the beatific vision, namely the light of glory, and the divine essence, united by way of species to the intellect of the blessed, are invariable and intrinsically incorruptible; therefore also the beatific vision itself. Third, an action which is measured by eternity is intrinsically immutable and incorruptible, for, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 10, art. 2, the notion of eternity follows upon immutability, just as the notion of time follows upon motion; but the beatific vision is measured by eternity, as we demonstrated in the Treatise on the Vision of God, last chapter; therefore it is intrinsically immutable and incorruptible. Fourth, a form perfectly fulfilling and satiating the appetite of the blessed is by its nature incorruptible and unlosable, just as the form of the heavens is intrinsically incorruptible, because it perfectly satiates the appetite of matter, and does not allow it to seek any form contrary to itself; but the beatific vision totally satiates the appetite of the blessed, and fulfills all his desires, as shown in the preceding chapter; therefore by its nature it is incorruptible. Finally, St. Thomas, I, q. 50, art. 5, ad 3, says that something is not called corruptible by the fact that God could reduce it to nothing, by withdrawing His conservation, but by the fact that it has in itself some principle of corruption. Whence the heavens, the Angels, and rational souls are, and are called, incorruptible, because although, by the absolute power of God, and the suspension of the divine conserving concurrence, they could be destroyed, and cease to exist, they nevertheless do not have in themselves any principle of corruption; but likewise, although the beatific vision could be destroyed by the absolute power of God, it does not have in itself any principle of corruption, since its subject is incorruptible, namely the intellect, and the principles which concur to it, namely the light of glory, and the divine

essence, as bearing the role of intelligible species, are likewise immutable and incorruptible, and exclude sin, which could be the moral cause of its destruction; therefore it is intrinsically incorruptible. Whence the vision which was communicated to Paul in rapture was, of itself and by its nature, perpetual, and by its intrinsic nature demanded to be conserved; but by the dispensation of God, and by a miracle, it did not in fact endure — just as the heaven or an Angel, which are intrinsically incorruptible, and demand to be perpetually conserved, can, by absolute power, cease to exist.

You will object, first: that form or operation is intrinsically corruptible which has a potency to non-being; but the beatific vision has a potency to non-being, since it can be destroyed by God; therefore it is intrinsically corruptible.

I respond, distinguishing the major: that form or operation is intrinsically corruptible which has a physical or natural potency to non-being, I grant the major; only a logical or obediential potency, I deny the major, and under the same distinction of the minor, I deny the consequence. Thus, for something to be called intrinsically incorruptible with respect to God, it does not suffice that there be no repugnance, or a logical and obediential potency, for it to be destroyed by Him (otherwise the Angels, the heavens, the rational soul, and the hypostatic union could be said to be intrinsically corruptible, since in them there is an obediential potency to non-being, and they could, by the absolute power of God, be destroyed and annihilated); but a physical potency is required, secondarily inclined toward non-being: for man, for example, is called intrinsically corruptible for this reason, that the matter of which he is composed seeks other forms incompatible with the rational soul, and consequently seeks the expulsion of the soul, and the non-being of the man.

You will object, second: a form received in a subject that is not connatural, but foreign, is received in it in a losable or corruptible manner, as is clear in heat, which in its proper and connatural subject, namely fire, is unlosable, but in water is losable, because water is a subject foreign to it; but the beatific vision is in man, and in the Angel, as in a foreign and non-connatural subject, since the light of glory, on which it depends, is connatural to no created or creatable intellect; therefore the beatific vision is losably and corruptibly in the human and angelic intellect.

I respond that the major is true when the form does not have of itself that it be incorruptible, but from the condition of the subject; for then, if it is received in a foreign subject, it is in it corruptibly; but it is otherwise when it is incorruptible of itself and by its own nature, for then it not only does not participate in the corruptibility of the subject, but even draws and elevates it to its own incorruptibility, as is clear in the

subsistence of the Word, which, because it is of itself and by its nature incorruptible and eternal, communicated to a foreign subject, namely the humanity of Christ, it remains incorruptible and perpetual, and draws it to its own perpetuity and incorruption; whence Christ never gave up the nature He once assumed, even when the union of it was dissolved through death. Since, therefore, the beatific vision is, of itself and by its own nature, incorruptible (because the principles which concur to it, namely the light of glory, and the divine essence united in the manner of a species to the intellect of the blessed, are incorruptible), although received in a foreign and non-connatural subject, it does not participate in its mutability, but rather draws it to immutable and incorruptible being. Whence, although the intellect in itself is measured by aevum, yet as it is subjected to the light of glory, and to the beatific vision, it is measured by participated eternity, just as the light itself, and the vision, are.

You will say: sanctifying grace is the root of the light of glory, and of the beatific vision, and yet it is not intrinsically incorruptible, since it is daily corrupted through sin; therefore, a fortiori, the light of glory, and the beatific vision, are not intrinsically incorruptible; for a property cannot be more incorruptible than the nature from which it flows.

I respond that although the grace of the way is not intrinsically incorruptible, nor does it demand perpetual duration, the consummated grace of the fatherland does, and this is the root of the light of glory, and of the beatific vision.

But if you press further, and say that grace as consummated does not differ intrinsically from the grace of the wayfarer; therefore, if the grace of the way is not intrinsically incorruptible, neither will the consummated grace of the fatherland be so — I shall respond, denying the consequence; for although the grace of the way and of the fatherland are of the same entity, and consequently, as to entity, demand intrinsic incorruptibility, they nevertheless have a twofold state, in one of which, namely the way, it lacks not incorruptibility as to entity, but the state of incorruptibility, because it does not fully subject to itself the created free will, but rather is subjected to it; in the other, however, namely in the state of the term, it enjoys incorruptibility as to entity, and the state of incorruptibility, for the opposite reason, because indeed it totally and fully subjects to itself the flexibility of the will, by which it tends toward evil. Thus, just as grace, without intrinsic variation of entity, is by mere variation of state the root of faith in the way, and of the light of glory in the term, so precisely by a change of state it passes from the corruptible character of the state, to the state of incorruptibility. And because it connaturally seeks, so to speak, to root the light of glory, but faith only accidentally, as substituted for such a light, and as it were its vicar, it connaturally postulates the state of

incorruptibility, yet permits the state of corruptibility.

Chapter V

On the endowments and aureoles of the blessed

A dowry is taken by jurists for a gift with which a bride is endowed, when she is solemnly led into the house of her husband, both for the solace of the marriage, and its sustenance, and for the adornment of the bride herself, as is said in the law "Dotis," in the Digest "De Jure Dotium." Whence, since in beatitude there is a perpetual conjunction between the soul and God, and, as it were, a certain spiritual marriage, dowries must be admitted in the blessed, and are in fact admitted by theologians — some indeed on the part of the soul, others on the part of the body — of which we must here treat briefly.

§ I

The dowries of the blessed soul

There are only three dowries of the blessed soul, namely vision, comprehension or attainment, and delight. Thus St. Thomas, I, q. 12, art. 7, ad 1, and in the Supplement, q. 95, art. 3, and other theologians commonly. The reason is that the dowries of the fatherland immediately conjoin the soul to God, and correspond to the virtues of the way immediately tending toward Him; but the virtues of the way immediately tending toward God are only three, namely faith, hope, and charity; therefore also the dowries of the blessed soul are three, namely vision, comprehension, and delight. Vision, by reason of its clarity, corresponds to faith, and excludes its imperfection, namely obscurity. To hope corresponds comprehension, by which we hold God, toward whom we ran through hope, and excludes its imperfection, for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? as the Apostle says. Finally, delight or fruition corresponds to charity, and excludes its imperfection, insofar as the object which, being absent, was loved and desired by charity in the way, being present and possessed, causes delight and fruition in the fatherland.

Concerning these dowries there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians, whether they are habits or acts. For many hold that they are acts, others habits, others that they include both. But the second opinion seems more probable, first because St. Thomas expressly teaches it, book 4, dist. 49, q. 4, art. 2, in the body, in these words: According to others it must be said that beatitude and dowry really differ, so that beatitude is called the perfect operation itself, by which the soul is conjoined to God, but the dowries are called habits or dispositions, etc. Second, by the reason which the same

Holy Doctor there suggests, for the dowries adorn and dispose the soul for spiritual conjunction with God; but vision, comprehension, and fruition, as they are operations, do not dispose the soul for such conjunction, but are the conjunction itself; therefore the notion of dowry does not belong to the acts, but to the habits of the light of glory and of charity, which precede them. To perceive this better, it must be observed that there is a twofold reason or formality found in these habits, for first they have this, that they are principles of eliciting operations which either are the consummation of beatitude, or follow upon it; and thus they do not put on the notion of dowry any more than the consummation of matrimony itself does. Second, that they elevate the soul to a certain higher and dissimilar state from the state of the way, by reason of which it can no longer have the imperfections of this life; and under this aspect they put on the notion of dowry, that is, of adornment, of disposition, and habilitation of the bride for those divine nuptials — for example, the light of glory is not only the principle by which the vision of God is elicited, but also of disposing the intellect to receive the divine essence in place of the species, and thus of clarifying the intellect, such that it is not capable of any obscurity, but only of evidence and clarity, and under this aspect it is called vision habitually and by way of dowry. Similarly comprehension, insofar as it is a dowry, denotes the same habit of the light of glory, not as clarifying the intellect, and disposing it to receive the divine essence as an intelligible species, but as holding habitually that very vision, which is attainment or actual comprehension. Finally, the dowry of fruition, or delight, is the very habit of charity, not as it is the principle of love (for under this aspect it is found also in the way), but as causing beatific delight, which differs in species from love, and thus is found only in the fatherland.

From this the chief arguments which are usually made against the aforesaid opinion are solved.

§ II

The dowries of the glorious body

Just as in entering beatitude, the soul, betrothed to Christ, receives three dowries, namely vision, comprehension, and fruition, as shown in the preceding section: so the body, at the resurrection, when it will be conjoined to the blessed soul, will receive four dowries or ornaments, namely impassibility, subtlety, agility, and clarity.

Impassibility will exclude not only death and corruption, but also every pain and injurious or corruptive passion, though not a perfective passion, such as the reception of immanent actions, even sensitive ones, and of all perfecting accidents, because only that which involves imperfection, not that which involves perfection, is to be taken away

from glorious bodies. This dowry in glorious bodies will arise from the dominion of the soul over the body, or from the full subjection of the body to the soul, whereby it will come about that the potentiality and appetite of matter remain either fulfilled, or at least restrained and bound to the very form or soul, so that they leave no room for any alteration, or disposition toward another form, as St. Thomas teaches, book 4, dist. 44, q. 2, art. 1. Or it can also be said, with the same Holy Doctor, ibid., art. 2, ad 1, that from the beatitude and glory of the soul, some supernatural perfection or quality will flow and overflow into the glorious body, by which it is rendered apt for such subjection, which perfection or quality is called the dowry of the glorified body. Whence Augustine, Epistle 56, to Dioscorus: God (he says) made the soul of such powerful nature, that from its most full beatitude, which is promised to the saints at the end of time, there overflows even into the inferior nature, which is the body, not the beatitude which is proper to the one enjoying and understanding, but the fullness of health, that is, the vigor of incorruption.

Subtlety will free the glorious body from every earthly stain of concretion and grossness, and will render it, otherwise animal and earthly, as it were heavenly and spiritual, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15: It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. Not that it is to be changed into spirit, as certain heretics once dreamed, but because it will be perfectly subject to the spirit, and, as it were, elevated to the condition of spirit. Glorious bodies will also have, by reason of this dowry, the power and faculty of penetrating all other bodies — not that this effect is produced physically or efficiently, but only morally, insofar as, at its presence, and as a sign of such dowry, that penetration will be granted by God, according to the will of the blessed, as St. Thomas teaches in the Supplement, q. 83, art. 2, where he argues thus: The necessity of distinction of two bodies as to place is caused by the nature of dimensive quantity, to which place belongs of itself. But subtlety does not take away dimension from the glorious body, whence it in no way takes away from it the aforesaid necessity of distinction of place from another body; and therefore the glorious body will not have, by reason of its subtlety, that it can be simultaneously with another body, but it will be able to be simultaneously with another body by the operation of divine power. For just as the body of Peter did not have, from any inherent property, that the sick were healed by his shadow, but this happened by divine power, for the edification of the faith, so the divine power will bring it about that the glorious body can be simultaneously with another body, for the perfection of glory. Similar things he has on 1 Corinthians 15, lecture 6.

Agility is the aptitude or power which will be in glorious bodies, for moving themselves promptly wherever the blessed wish, and without any weariness whatsoever. For, as the

Holy Doctor discusses in the Supplement, q. 84, art. 1: Through the dowries, the glorious body will be perfectly subject to the glorified soul; but the soul is joined to the body, not only as form, but also as mover; in both ways, therefore, the glorious body must be supremely subject to the glorified soul. Whence, just as through the dowry of subtlety it is subjected to it totally, insofar as the soul is the form of the body giving it specific being, so through the dowry of agility it is subjected to it insofar as the soul is the mover, that is, so that it may be ready and apt to obey the spirit in all motions and actions of the soul. Now such will be the agility of glorified bodies that St. Hilary, on Psalm 138, compares it to the speed of the flight of eagles: They will grow wings (he says), like eagles, taking on in the transformation of the resurrection the nature of flying up to heaven. Laurentius Justinianus explains it by the example of a sunbeam, which reaches immediately from the east to the farthest regions of the west. St. Anselm, in the book of Similitudes, chapter 51, says that the agility of glorious bodies will be equal to the agility of the Angels: Such speed (he says) will accompany us, that we shall be as swift as the very Angels of God, who, turning from heaven to earth, glide down more swiftly than can be told. It must be noted, however, that just as angelic motion, whether continuous or discrete, cannot occur in an instant, as shown in the Treatise on the Angels, chapter 6, §3, so neither can the local motion of the glorious body, however swift and quick, be instantaneous, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, art. 3, for this is repugnant to the nature and quiddity of local motion, which, being something successive, and consisting of prior and posterior parts, cannot occur in an instant.

Finally, the fourth dowry of the glorious body is clarity or luminosity, which will overflow into it from the glory of the soul, as St. Thomas teaches, 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 86, where he says thus: Just as the soul, enjoying the divine vision, will be filled with a certain spiritual clarity, so, by a certain overflow from the soul into the body, the body itself will, in its own way, be clothed with the clarity of glory. Nor does it avail to say, with certain more recent authors who hold the opposite opinion, that there is no connection between the clarity of the glory of the soul, and the light of the glorious body, such that the latter is called a property of the former, and flows from it, since the one is spiritual and the other corporeal. It does not avail, I say, because just as there is a connection between the powers of the body, which flow from the soul, and the soul itself, although the soul is spiritual, and those powers corporeal — such as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers — and between the infused moral virtues, and sanctifying grace, although the latter resides in the essence of the soul, and the former are subjected in the sensitive appetite, such as temperance and fortitude — so between the clarity of the blessed soul, and the light of the glorious body, a connection and bond can be found, and the latter can flow from the former, although the one is spiritual and the

other corporeal. Whence Augustine, cited above, says that God made the soul of such powerful virtue, that from its beatitude there overflows into the body the fullness of health, and the vigor of incorruption. And by the same reason by which incorruption flows from the soul into the body, clarity too can flow, because just as impassibility is connected with the beatitude of the soul, so also is clarity. This can be confirmed from the mystery of the Transfiguration, in which the clarity of the body of Christ was derived both from His divinity, and from the glory of His soul, as St. Thomas teaches from Damascene, III, q. 45, art. 2.

Here some ask whether the clarity or luminosity to exist in blessed bodies will be not only according to the surface, but also according to the depth, such that the said bodies will not only be lucid, as mirrors, but also transparent and pervious, as crystal, so that the interior organization can be perfectly seen. I respond affirmatively, with St. Thomas, in the Supplement, q. 85, art. 1, ad 2, where he says thus: To the second it must be said that Gregory (book 18 of the Morals, chapter 27) compares glorious bodies to gold, on account of their clarity, and to glass, because they will be translucent. Whence it seems it must be said that they will be at once pervious and clear. Wherefore Gregory adds there: The very harmony of the body itself will be visible to the bodily eyes, and so each one will then be visible to another, as now he cannot be visible to himself. Likewise Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 18, about the middle: The just (he says) shall shine as the sun, and as the moon, and as the brightness of the firmament. And, foreseeing this incredulity of men, God gave to little worms in summer a shining body, so that from the things which appear we might believe what we expect; for He who can grant the part, will also be able to grant the whole; and He who made even the worm shine with light, will much more illumine the just man.

You will say: the individual parts of the glorious body will retain their color, for that is required for beauty, which is defined by Augustine as the agreement of parts with a certain sweetness of color; but every color causes opacity, and impedes transparency and diaphaneity; therefore glorified bodies will not be transparent, but opaque.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor: for the color of the body does not impede its transparency and diaphaneity, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, and experience shows, for we see that the topaz retains at once its yellow color, and sufficient diaphaneity that it can be seen through entirely to the opposite side. And if there were other colors in the midst — red, green, blue, etc. — with the same diaphaneity, they could doubtless be seen. And although there would be a natural repugnance to conjoining color and light in the highest degree in the same body simultaneously, on account of the diverse dispositions which they require in the subject, God can easily

overcome this, as indeed He does overcome it in the glorious body of Christ.

§ III

The aureoles of the blessed

Besides the essential beatitude, and the dowries of the blessed soul, and of the glorious body, common to all the blessed, theologians admit certain singular prerogatives, belonging to some alone, on account of the exceptional acts of certain particular virtues, which they call aureoles, or little crowns, as distinguished from the essential reward, which is called the golden crown, or crown of gold.

The definition of the aureole is given by St. Thomas, book 4, dist. 49, q. 5, art. 5, saying that it is: A privileged reward, corresponding to a privileged victory. That is, a certain accidental joy which the blessed perceive from the victory which they won by force of some particular virtue. Whence, according to the threefold victory which the blessed, having perfectly triumphed over the threefold enemy — the world, the flesh, the devil — obtain from this life: over the world through martyrdom, over the flesh through virginity, over the devil through doctrine and preaching, expelling him from themselves and from the hearts of others — a threefold aureole is assigned: the first, of the Martyrs; the second, of the Virgins; the third, of the Doctors.

The aureole of martyrdom requires three things: first, death actually undergone, or such as would naturally have followed, if it had not been miraculously prevented by God. Whence those are not called martyrs who only desire to become martyrs, or who do not receive lethal wounds, from which death would naturally follow. On the other hand, John the Evangelist was a true martyr, as the Church celebrates him, who, being cast into a vat of boiling oil, was miraculously freed. Second, it is required that death be undergone either for the faith of Christ, or for the defense of the Church, or for the sake of some virtue. For lack of this, he is not a martyr who dies in war, even against heretics, if not for the cause of religion, but for the defense of the kingdom, or on some other political title. Third, there is required the will, at least virtual, to die for Christ, and to undergo martyrdom; whence one who, while sleeping, is killed by a tyrant out of hatred of the faith, if he never had the will to die for the faith of Christ, does not obtain the aureole of martyrdom — otherwise if, before sleeping, he had the will to die for the faith of Christ.

The aureole of virginity requires two things, namely bodily incorruption, and the resolve to preserve it to the end of life, as St. Thomas teaches, book 4, dist. 49, q. 5, art. 3, ad 1 of the question. Whence, to obtain that aureole, a vow of preserving virginity is not

necessary, but a simple resolve suffices; nor is it lost, if bodily virginity is violently taken away. From this the Holy Doctor infers, in the same place, ad 4, that a virgin does not lose the aureole of virginity, even if, having been violated, she conceives and gives birth. But if you ask whether a virgin, once departing from the resolve of preserving virginity, and afterward, having resumed the resolve, preserving virginity to the end of life, merits that aureole — I shall answer affirmatively, with the same Angelic Doctor, in the same place, ad 1 of the question, because the virginity of the mind, interrupted by a contrary resolve, can be repaired, but not so the virginity of the body. From this Paludanus infers, book 4, dist. 49, q. 8, art. 4, that she does not lose the aureole of virginity, who, violated against her will, lost the integrity of the body, if afterward she consented to the deed, and afterward, the resolve being resumed, preserved her virginity to death; because the later consent was not the cause of the prior act, and moreover, the total change of the interior resolve does not take away virginity, if, the resolve being resumed again, it is preserved. From this you will understand that virginity is not lost, nor its aureole, unless these two things concur together, namely corruption of the body, and consent to it.

Finally, the aureole of the Doctor requires three things: first, that one actually teach, for the crown is not owed to one who is capable of contending, but to one who actually contends. Second, that he teach those things which pertain to salvation, for the aureole is not owed to just any doctrine, but only to that which is directed toward salvation, according to that saying of Daniel 12: They that instruct many to justice, as stars for perpetual eternities. Third, that he do it with a right intention, that is, for the sake of the utility of souls, and the glory of God — otherwise, if for the sake of his own glory and vain self-esteem. It is not required, however, that the one who teaches be a Prelate, or graduated in Theology, or that he teach by voice and preaching, but it suffices that he do it by writing, or by lecturing, or that he privately and secretly instruct penitents in confession. Whence the aureole of the Doctor is merited not only by Prelates, Doctors, and Preachers, but also by Writers, Lecturers, and Confessors.

Treatise II

On the Voluntary and Involuntary

The Treatise on beatitude having been completed, we must treat of the means by which we attain it, which are human acts. But because the first and general condition of human acts is that they proceed from the will, whence they are called voluntary, before we discourse on them in particular, a brief treatise must be premised, in which we shall treat, first, of the voluntary; second, of the involuntary; third, of the mixed, composed of both; fourth, of the free voluntary, or of liberty, which is the root and foundation of the whole goodness and moral malice of human acts.

Chapter I

On the voluntary

§ I

The definition of the voluntary, and its division

The voluntary is commonly defined as that which is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge of the end. It is said to be from an intrinsic principle, so as to be distinguished from violent motion, which is from an extrinsic principle, as is said in Physics 2. It is added, "with knowledge of the end," so as to be distinguished from natural motion, whose principle is indeed internal, but which is not directed by any preceding knowledge. Whence the acts of vegetation and nutrition, and whatever is not subject to the command of the will — such as the first knowledge of the end, which does not proceed from any other knowledge, since it is itself the first knowledge — cannot be called voluntary, and consequently human, because such acts are performed even against our will. Moreover, since the knowledge of the end is twofold — one perfect, which apprehends not only the thing which is the end, but also the notion of the end, and the proportion of the means to it, and belongs to man; the other imperfect, which stops at the mere apprehension of the thing which is the end, without considering the final notion, which is found in brute animals — the voluntary is likewise twofold: one perfect, belonging to man; the other imperfect, belonging to brute animals.

Likewise, in man, one kind of voluntary is free, which proceeds from its principle in such a way that, all the requisites for proceeding being posited, it can still not proceed; the other is necessary, which, all the prerequisites being posited, proceeds in such a way that it cannot not proceed. This latter is again twofold: one arising from an imperfection of knowledge, in which way the first-first and undeliberated motions in man are necessary;

the other proceeding from the supreme perfection of knowledge, and of an object adequating the capacity of the faculty, and thus objectively determining it to its pursuit — and thus beatific love is necessary, because it is regulated by the beatific vision, which removes objective indifference of judgment, and represents God clearly to the will as He is in Himself.

There is, however, some controversy among theologians, whether the notion of the voluntary is more perfectly found in free acts than in acts necessary in the second way — for example, whether the love by which we here freely love God is more voluntary than beatific love, by which the blessed necessarily love God in the fatherland? I respond negatively, against Vásquez and Lorca. The fundamental reason is that the voluntary is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge of the end; therefore that act is voluntary in a more perfect way which proceeds from a more intrinsic principle, and from a more perfect knowledge; but beatific love is more intrinsic than the love of the way, since it is borne toward God with the whole of its striving, and proceeds from a more perfect knowledge, for it flows from the beatific vision, which is the most perfect knowledge of the last end; therefore it is more voluntary. This is more openly established in divine acts, for who would say that the necessary love by which God loves Himself is not more voluntary to Him than that by which He freely loves creatures; and that the notional love by which the Holy Spirit is produced is less voluntary to God than the production of this universe?

Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas sometimes says that the notional acts in God are not perfectly voluntary; for either he takes "voluntary" for "free," or he speaks of the generation of the Son, which is not formally voluntary, since the Son does not proceed from the will, but from the intellect, but only concomitantly, because the Father wills to generate, and delights in such generation, as the Holy Doctor himself explains, I, q. 41, art. 2.

Nor is it an obstacle that he, here, q. 6, art. 2, attributes the perfect notion of the voluntary only to those acts which proceed with freedom and deliberation, which praise and blame accompany. For he only gives a certain example of the perfect voluntary, in that which is more known to us, namely in the free act, from which it is not permissible to infer that there is no perfect voluntary without freedom. Just as, if someone says that an animal is distinguished from a plant in that it senses, in the way we see man sense, it is not permissible to gather from this that only men sense, and not brute animals.

You will say: the mode of acting freely, since it belongs to rational nature, according to the degree of perfection which it has above the irrational, is more perfect than the mode

of acting necessarily; therefore the notion of the voluntary belongs more perfectly to it.

I respond, distinguishing the antecedent: it is more perfect than the mode of acting necessarily which follows imperfect knowledge, I grant the antecedent. Than the mode of acting necessarily which arises from perfect knowledge, I deny the antecedent. For just as the mode of acting freely is proper to rational nature, insofar as it exceeds all other inferior natures, so also is the mode of acting necessarily, following upon perfect knowledge, as is clear in beatific love; for that belongs to the intellectual creature, insofar as it exceeds all other inferior natures.

§ II

Whether omission, in order to be voluntary, requires an obligation not to omit?

Álvarez, Martínez, and John of St. Thomas deny it; Cajetan, Conrad, Medina, Ildephonsus, the Carmelites of Salamanca, Curiel, and many others affirm it — which opinion seems more probable, and more conformable to the mind of the Holy Doctor here, q. 6, art. 3.

For the resolution, it must be observed, with the Carmelites of Salamanca, that an omission can occur in two ways, namely by the non-positing of an act, or by the cessation and interruption of an act already begun — for example, someone can omit Mass in two ways: first, if he does not hear it at all; second, if, in the middle of Mass, he deliberately leaves the church, to play or to study. This being posited:

It must be said that an omission which is precisely by the non-positing of an act cannot be voluntary without an obligation not to omit — but that which is by the cessation and interruption of an act already begun can.

The first part is proved: for an omission to be voluntary, it must in some way be caused by the will, since it belongs to the notion of the voluntary to be from an intrinsic principle; but an omission which is precisely by the negation of an act cannot in any way be caused by the will, unless an obligation is present; therefore, this being excluded, it cannot be voluntary. The major is established; the minor is proved. An omission cannot be caused by the will, unless it is caused either as a privation, or as a negation. If it is caused as a privation, it manifestly requires an obligation, since privation is only of a due form. But if it is caused as the pure negation of the omitted act, it necessarily requires that the act itself precede; because negations cannot otherwise occur and be newly introduced, except insofar as pre-existing opposite forms are destroyed — as is clear in the negation of light, which cannot occur otherwise than by destroying the light itself. Therefore the omission of an act cannot be caused by the will, unless either the act which

is omitted immediately precedes, or there is an obligation not to omit.

From this the second part of the conclusion remains proved; for one who expels a form from a subject, by that very fact, apart from any obligation, causes in it the non-being of such a form; therefore, since the will removes and destroys a pre-existing act, it causes, apart from any obligation whatsoever, the non-being and omission of such an act. And certainly, who would say that a man present in church, hearing Mass, who in the middle of Mass deliberately leaves the church to play, does not voluntarily omit the Mass, because he does so on a weekday; or does not omit the Mass no less voluntarily than a lunch he is not thinking of? Therefore an omission which is by the cessation and interruption of an act already begun can be voluntary without an obligation not to omit.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: the voluntary is defined as that which is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge of the end; but even if there is no precept, a foreseen omission is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge of the end; for since a precept sounding from without is something merely extrinsic, it has no bearing on the notion of an intrinsic principle; therefore, apart from a precept, a foreseen omission is voluntary.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor. For, apart from a precept, an omission which is precisely by the negation of an act cannot be caused by the will; because it cannot be caused by it except as a privation, which necessarily requires an obligation and requirement of the form. Nor does it avail what a certain more recent author says, namely that thought or awareness of reason concerning the act which is omitted suffices for its omission to take on the character of a privation, and consequently to be voluntary. For privation essentially imports an obligation or requirement of the form; but the mere thought or awareness of the celebration of Mass, for example, on a day when its precept does not oblige, does not cause an obligation or requirement of hearing Mass, since such thought does not dictate that Mass ought to be heard on such a day, but only that it can be heard; therefore such thought or awareness of the celebration of Mass does not suffice for its omission on a weekday to take on the character of privation, and to be voluntary. As for the proof of the minor, it must be said that although a precept is something extrinsic, it does not have no bearing on the notion of the voluntary, which is from an intrinsic principle, but is a necessary condition for the omission to be caused by the will, and consequently to be voluntary; because, as we just said, it cannot be caused by the will, unless it has the character of a privation, nor can it take on such a character, unless a precept is supposed.

You will object, second: whatever is in the power of the will is voluntary; but the omission of Mass, even if there is no precept, is in the power of the will; therefore it is voluntary.

I respond, distinguishing the major: whatever is in the power of the will is voluntary in potency, I grant; in act, I deny; and, the minor being granted, I distinguish the consequent by the distinction of the major. What we said of the voluntary must also be said of the free, which is a certain species of the voluntary; for that which is in the power of the will, with indifference and power for its omission, is free in potency and in first act, but not in second act, if there is no exercise of freedom. More on this at length in the Treatise on Sins.

From what has been said it is inferred that an effect which follows upon an omission is not voluntary, unless the omission itself is voluntary, and consequently unless either the act which is omitted immediately precedes, or there is an obligation not to omit — for example, someone omits to steer a ship, from which omission the sinking of the ship follows; such sinking will not be voluntary, unless the one who omits is bound to direct it, or at least an actual directing preceded, and was interrupted. The reason is manifest, for the aforesaid effect is not reduced to the will, nor does it partake of the notion of the voluntary, except through the medium of the omission; whence, where this has not been voluntary, neither will such an effect be voluntary; since, therefore, in order for the omission to be voluntary, one of the aforesaid — namely either the obligation of the omitted act, or its pre-existence — is required, as we showed above, it follows, a fortiori, that the same is required for the effect following from it to be voluntary.

Chapter II

On the involuntary

There are four causes of the involuntary: violence, fear, concupiscence or vehement passion, and ignorance. For just as the voluntary is caused from a twofold principle, namely from the will or operating appetite, which is the intrinsic principle, and from directing knowledge; so its opposite, namely the involuntary, must be caused by opposite principles, and must arise either from the fact that the operation proceeds from an extrinsic principle, as happens in things which are from violence or fear, or because knowledge is removed, or bound, or disturbed, as happens through ignorance and concupiscence or passion. But because only those things which occur from violence are involuntary simply, while those which occur from fear, concupiscence, and ignorance are mixed from the voluntary and involuntary, we shall treat here only of the first, and of the others in the following chapter.

The violent, then, is defined by the philosophers as that which is from an extrinsic principle, the patient not contributing force — which must not be understood purely negatively (as if it sufficed that the subject on which the force is inflicted not cooperate with the violent motion), but also positively, such that the patient positively resists, and opposes the extrinsic agent. From this you will understand that these four terms — necessary, violent, coerced, involuntary — which are sometimes confused, differ from each other according to the diverse formalities which they express. For "necessary" is said as it is opposed to the contingent or indifferent, and imports a determination to one, excluding the faculty for the opposite. "Violent" indeed includes the same necessity and determination on the part of the one who suffers the violence, but adds, over and above the necessary, that it be from an extrinsic principle, because nothing is violated by its own proper and intrinsic principle, although something can occur necessarily and yet be from an intrinsic principle, as is clear in brute animals, and in first-first motions. "Coerced" is almost the same as "violent," but properly speaking, "coerced" is opposed only to the spontaneous or voluntary, and therefore is found only in knowing beings; "violent," however, is also found in inanimate things, as when a stone is thrown upward. "Involuntary" is sometimes taken for "coerced" or "violent," but nevertheless it extends more widely, because it can happen that something is involuntary not only by reason of violence, or because it is from an extrinsic principle, but also by reason of ignorance, and from a defect of knowledge, as we shall say in the following chapter.

Here theologians ask whether the human will, or other created things, can suffer violence from God, and be coerced by Him. For the resolution of this difficulty:

I say, first, that by no power can violence be inflicted on the will in an act elicited by it. The reason is that every act elicited by the will is essentially voluntary, since it is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge of the end — indeed, it is a certain actual inclination of the will. Therefore it cannot be coerced or violent, according to that saying of Anselm, book on Free Will, chapter 6: No one can will unwillingly, because he cannot will while not willing to will.

You will say, first: the will in an elicited act can be necessitated by God, as is clear in beatific love; therefore also coerced. But I deny the consequence, for in order that the will be necessitated in an elicited act, it suffices that it be moved and applied to it without indifference of judgment; but for it to be coerced, such an act would have to be from an extrinsic principle, with the resistance of what is intrinsic — which is repugnant to an act of the will, since it is essentially a vital act, and its actual inclination.

You will say, second: God can incline a will inclined toward some object — for example, toward hatred of an enemy — by an efficacious motion toward the opposite, and transfer it from hatred to love; therefore He can inflict violence on it, even as to elicited acts.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence. For, as St. Thomas discusses excellently, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 8: however much the will is changed in respect of something, it is not said to be coerced into it. The reason for this is that to will something is itself to be inclined toward it, but coercion and violence are against the inclination of the thing which is coerced. When, therefore, God changes the will, He brings it about that another inclination succeeds the preceding one, such that the first is removed, and the second remains; whence that toward which He induces the will is not contrary to the inclination now existing, but to the inclination which was previously in it; whence there is neither violence nor coercion.

You will say, third: sin is against the natural inclination of man, as is said in the Treatise on Sins; therefore when man sins, he acts against a natural inclination, and consequently suffers violence.

I respond that sin is against the inadequate and partial natural inclination of man, which, insofar as he is rational, he has toward the honest good consonant with reason, which is a partial and inadequate object of the human will; but not against his total and adequate inclination, by which he is borne toward his adequate object, which is the good in general, as abstracted from true or apparent, from honest or delightful. Whence, although the act of sin can be called violent to man in a qualified sense, it is not so simply and absolutely.

I say, second: the will can suffer violence, as regards the acts commanded by it, and elicited by other inferior faculties. This is clear, for the acts of other faculties can either be exercised or impeded contrary to the inclination of the will — for example, the eyes can be forcibly opened for a man unwilling to see; in which case that vision would not indeed be violent with respect to the visual faculty, since it would proceed from it as from an intrinsic principle, but it would indeed be violent with respect to the will, which would resist it; whence, since the will is a universal inclination, tending toward the good of the whole suppositum, such a vision would have to be called absolutely violent.

I say, third: not only the will, but not even any creature whatsoever, can suffer violence from God. The reason is that the simply violent is that which occurs against the principal inclination of a creature; but everything which is done by God in creatures, insofar as it is done by Him, is according to their chief inclination; therefore nothing of this kind can be called simply violent. The major is established; the minor is proved. In every creature the chief and superior inclination is to obey God, the creator and governor of all things — whether by doing what He wills it to do, or by receiving whatever He wills to be done in it; therefore all that God does or can do in creatures is according to their chief inclination. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved by St. Thomas, I, q. 60, art. 5, by this reasoning: that which belongs to another has a greater inclination toward that to which it belongs, than toward its own good; but every creature is a part of the universe, and something of God's; therefore it has a greater inclination toward the good of the universe, and to obeying God, than toward the good proper and fitting to itself. The minor is established; the major St. Thomas declares by the example of the hand, which naturally exposes itself to a blow for the preservation of the whole body, and of the virtuous citizen, who exposes himself to the danger of death, for the preservation of the whole commonwealth. The same is clear in insensible creatures; for although a heavy body, by its own inclination, tends downward through gravity, and a light body upward through levity, nevertheless, lest a vacuum be given, a heavy body, forgetful of its own gravity, ascends, and a light body, its levity despised, descends; therefore a part is naturally more inclined to the good of the whole than to its own good.

This is confirmed: every creature is naturally more inclined toward the end than toward the means; for the opposite inclination is disordered, and consequently cannot be impressed on the creature by God; but the good of the universe, and the divine good, are the end of the particular goods toward which creatures are inclined; therefore creatures are more inclined toward the divine good, and to obeying God as creator and governor, than toward their own proper and connatural good. Whence in Wisdom 16 it is said: Fire, that the just might be nourished, forgot even its own power; for the creature,

serving thee its maker, etc. — by which words Scripture declares that, while creatures are moved by God toward some effect which seems contrary to the inclination of their own nature, they, as it were, forget such an inclination, subjecting it to an obediential power, through which they serve God at His nod; and so the aforesaid inclination, in order to an effect of resistance, is there, as it were, under oblivion, and as though it did not exist. Hence Augustine, book 26 against Faustus, says that God, the creator and founder of all creatures, does nothing against nature; for that is natural to anything, which He does, from whom is all number, motion, and order of nature. And St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 1, art. 3, ad 1, says that all creatures have, as it were, for natural, whatever is done in them by God, and for this reason a twofold power is distinguished in them — one natural, for their proper operations and motions; the other, which is called obediential, for those things which they receive from God.

You will object, first: God brings about many things which are repugnant to the natures of things, and consequently occur while these things resist — as when He stopped the sun in the middle of the sky at the voice of Joshua, and made it go backward in the time of Hezekiah, king of Judah; likewise when, dividing the Red Sea and the Jordan, for the crossing of the sons of Israel, He made the waters stand still as a wall; therefore He inflicts violence on creatures.

I respond that those effects were indeed against the particular inclination of those creatures, and consequently were violent in a qualified sense; but because they occurred according to the universal inclination, by which every creature is more inclined toward the divine good, and to obeying God as creator and governor of the universe, than toward its own proper and connatural good, they cannot be called simply violent, or against nature, but beside or above nature.

You will object, second: demons suffer violence in their binding to the fire of hell, since it has the character of a punishment, and the demons resist it as much as they can; but that binding is done by God; therefore God can inflict violence on creatures.

I respond that the demons suffer violence in a qualified sense in their binding to the fire of hell — which violence suffices for such binding to have the character of a punishment; yet they do not suffer violence absolutely and simply, because even in the nature and will of the demon must be granted that universal inclination to obey God, as the supreme Lord and founder of that nature, which is more powerful than any other, by which the demons chafe against the punishment inflicted on them by God.

Chapter III

On the mixed, composed of the voluntary and the involuntary

§ I

Whether, and how, things done from fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary?

I say, first, that things which are done from fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 6, where he proves this conclusion both from the Philosopher and from Nyssen, who call things done through fear mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary. Also because things done through fear, in themselves, are not voluntary — indeed, they are involuntary — but they become voluntary from fear, namely for avoiding the evil which is feared: for example, a merchant, absolutely and without the danger of a storm, would not wish to throw his merchandise into the sea; yet in time of storm, to flee the death which is feared, he wills to throw it, and in fact throws it into the sea; therefore things done through fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary. I add that in the object of an act done from fear are found both a notion of evil and a notion of good, sufficient for causing non-volition and volition, which are the principles of the involuntary and the voluntary — for example, in this, that it is to throw merchandise into the sea, there is a notion of evil, as is clear, since from this the merchant incurs the greatest loss, and a notion of good, since it is taken up as a means for preserving life, or for escaping the danger of death.

For a fuller understanding of this conclusion, it must be observed that it is one thing for something to occur "from" fear, another "with" fear; for the particle "with" imports only concomitance, while the particle "from" imports causality. Whence something is then said to occur from fear, when fear is the cause of such an act, so that man is moved by fear to act thus — as when someone, from fear of death, throws his merchandise into the sea. But something is then judged to occur with fear, when fear is found together with the action, but is not the cause moving and impelling toward it — as the Martyrs confessed the faith with fear of death, yet not from fear, but from love of God and obedience. Our conclusion, therefore, is understood of a work elicited from fear, and which fear is the true cause of the action, not of merely concomitant fear, since this does not influence the action, but only accompanies it.

I say, second: things which are done from fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary in a qualified sense. This is also the position of St. Thomas in the article cited, where he argues thus: that which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only in itself, abstracting from circumstances, is voluntary simply, and

involuntary only in a qualified sense; but a work done from fear is voluntary here and now, circumstances weighed, and involuntary, considered in itself; therefore it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a qualified sense. The minor is clear from the example given above of the throwing of merchandise. The major, however, is proved from the distinction which all admit between intellect and will; for the will is distinguished from the intellect in this, that the latter considers things in themselves, and with abstraction from singular matter, while the former regards the existing object, clothed with all the circumstances with which it is placed in exercise.

This is confirmed: that which is willed efficaciously and absolutely, but unwilled inefficaciously and conditionally, is voluntary simply, and involuntary only in a qualified sense; but a work done from fear is willed efficaciously and absolutely, and unwilled only inefficaciously and conditionally, as is clear in the aforesaid example of the throwing of merchandise; therefore it is voluntary simply, and involuntary only in a qualified sense.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: when someone observes the law from fear of the punishments of hell, such observance has nothing of the involuntary or of displeasure about it, otherwise it would be evil and vicious, which is repugnant to Trent, session 6, canon 8, and session 14, chapter 4. Therefore things which are done from fear are not mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

I respond, first, that fear does indeed cause the involuntary in a qualified sense, when the object which is chosen through fear is evil in itself, and only has the character of eligible for avoiding a greater evil, as in the example given above, the throwing of merchandise is not otherwise good, except because it conduces to avoiding death. But if the object which is chosen through fear is not evil in itself, but absolutely good, the will has no act of non-volition regarding it. Whence, since the observance of the commandments is good in itself, and in no way evil, even abstracting from the danger of the fires of hell, hence it follows that such observance, done from fear of punishments, has nothing of the involuntary or of displeasure. According to this solution and doctrine, our first conclusion is not to be taken as entirely universal, as though St. Thomas intended that the voluntary from fear cannot be found without the involuntary, but rather indefinitely, because this is verified in most cases.

But if someone should contend that the doctrine and conclusion of St. Thomas is true universally, and without any exception or limitation, one could respond that in the observance of the law, done from fear of hell alone, there can be something of the involuntary and of displeasure, without its being evil or vicious. For the action which is commanded can be considered in two ways, namely materially and in the being of the

thing, and formally as it is commanded, or as it imports the application of the divine law to it. If it is considered in this second way, displeasure toward it is always illicit, because the divine law has nothing evil, by reason of which it could licitly be rejected. But if it is regarded in the first way, its displeasure can be licit, because the thing commanded can bring with it some labor and irksomeness, which, considered in itself, without reference to the divine law, can terminate a licit displeasure — as is clear in the sorrow and sadness which Christ had in the garden of olives, not indeed concerning the observance of the precept of dying, imposed on Him by the Father, but concerning the difficulty and hardship of the work commanded to Him, taken in itself and precisely.

You will object, second, against the second conclusion: marriage and a solemn vow are invalid, if they are made from a fear falling upon a steadfast man; therefore things which are done from fear are not voluntary simply. The antecedent is certain, as is clear regarding marriage from the chapter "Locum," and from the chapter "Veniens," "On Betrothals"; and regarding a solemn vow from Trent, session 25, "On Regulars," chapter 19, where it is granted that religious who have professed from fear may protest within five years, and if they prove that the profession was made from fear, that it is null. The consequence also seems manifest, for every marriage, and every vow, simply voluntary, ought to be valid.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; and to its proof, I distinguish the antecedent: every marriage, and every vow, simply voluntary, ought to be valid, speaking per se, and attending to natural law, I grant. Per accidens, and attending to the disposition of positive law, I deny. For the Church can impose certain conditions, without which a vow or marriage are not valid, although they are simply voluntary — among which one is, that they be made without fear; just as also, in marriage, it establishes another condition, namely that it be made before the parish priest, and two or three witnesses; and therefore a clandestine marriage, although entirely voluntary, is invalid.

§ II

Whether concupiscence, or vehement passion, causes the involuntary in a qualified sense, just as fear does?

I respond negatively, with St. Thomas here, art. 7, where, having first objected this argument to himself: Just as fear is a certain passion, so also is concupiscence; but fear causes the involuntary in a certain way; therefore also concupiscence — he responds thus: To the first it must be said that fear is about evil, but concupiscence regards the good; but evil in itself is contrary to the will, while good is consonant with the will; whence fear has more power to cause the involuntary than concupiscence.

This doctrine of St. Thomas, however, seems difficult, and admits of several objections; for it is found by experience that many things are done through concupiscence which, taken in themselves, are repugnant to the will — as when a miser spends money to obtain some pleasure, which, considered in itself, apart from the order to the pleasure, he would without doubt wish to keep, and grieves not a little at spending it. Likewise, in one acting from concupiscence or passion, these two considerations are often present: this work is good for me according to sense, because delightful, and is evil for me according to reason, because against the law of God; therefore, when he consents to concupiscence or passion, he wills to do it insofar as it is delightful to sense, though he would not will to do it insofar as it is against reason.

I respond that when St. Thomas, in the article cited, following Aristotle, Nyssen, and Damascene, teaches that things which are done from concupiscence are not involuntary in a qualified sense, as those which proceed from fear are, he does not intend altogether to deny that something involuntary can be mixed with that which is done from concupiscence, but only to assert that such an involuntary is not caused by concupiscence, as, in those things which are done from fear, it is caused by fear itself. And the reason for the distinction which the Holy Doctor gives is excellent: for since concupiscence in no way regards evil, but precisely the delightful good, it does not of itself induce toward anything repugnant to the will; whence, if in those things which are done from concupiscence something involuntary is mixed, it does not come from concupiscence itself, but arises entirely by accident, from elsewhere. On the contrary, however, since the object of fear is an evil which can hardly be avoided, and therefore, in order to be avoided, it has the inclination to choose a lesser evil, which is in itself repugnant to the will, and is chosen only insofar as it conduces to such an end, hence it follows that the involuntary found in works done from fear draws its origin in a certain way from the fear itself, and is not merely accidentally adjoined to it, as in those things which are done from concupiscence.

§ III

Whether ignorance causes the involuntary

Ignorance is divided into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. That is called antecedent which precedes the act of the will, that is, which is in no way willed, whence for it, there is required that the one who is ignorant apply sufficient diligence to overcome it, with such an intention that, if it were removed, he would not produce the effect which he produces from the ignorance. For example, someone shoots an arrow into a place where a man is hidden; he is ignorant, however, that a man lies hidden there, and he applies sufficient diligence to explore whether there is a man there, with the intention that, if he knew a man were hidden there, he would not shoot the arrow; if he pierces and kills such a man, such a killing is said to proceed from antecedent ignorance.

That is called concomitant which is purely accidental and concomitant to the act of the will, and which neither moves the man to act, nor removes or prohibits him from the operation, but the man is so disposed that he would act equally, and in the same way, if such ignorance were not present, as he acts with it — for example, if someone, for the sake of hunting, goes around a forest, and comes upon an enemy, but is ignorant that he is the enemy, and, having first applied sufficient diligence, thinking there is a wild beast hidden there, shoots an arrow, and kills the enemy — such a killing is said to proceed from concomitant ignorance, because although he is ignorant that it is the enemy, he is nevertheless so disposed that, if he recognized him, he would kill him.

Finally, consequent ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will, or which is willed — namely, when the will wills to be ignorant of that which it could have known, and was bound to know. Now ignorance can be willed in two ways: first, directly, when the will expressly wills to be ignorant of some thing, that it may sin more freely, according to that saying of Psalm 35: He would not understand, that he might do well — and this ignorance is called affected. Second, indirectly, when the will indeed does not expressly will to be ignorant, but nevertheless does not care to learn those things which it can and is bound to know — and this ignorance is called crass, because it is voluntary on account of the carelessness of a negligent will, which is, as it were, made fat and thickened by tepidity. It is also called supine, because those who are slothful are accustomed to lie on their backs. These things having been premised:

I say that antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply; consequent ignorance causes the voluntary simply, and the involuntary in a qualified sense; concomitant ignorance, however, causes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary, but the non-voluntary.

The first part of this assertion is clear, for that which causes an effect altogether unwilled, and repugnant to the inclination of the will, causes the involuntary simply; but antecedent ignorance produces this, as is clear in the example given above, for one shooting an arrow from antecedent ignorance kills a man whom he would not have wished to kill, and whose killing he grieves; therefore antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply.

The second is shown thus: he who wills the cause of some effect also wills, in that very cause, the effect following from it; therefore, since consequent ignorance is willed simply, the effect following from it will also be willed simply in it, and consequently will be voluntary simply.

That such ignorance causes the involuntary in a qualified sense is proved thus: that which is against some inclination of the will is involuntary in a qualified sense; but the effect proceeding from consequent ignorance is against some inclination of the will; therefore it is involuntary in a qualified sense. The major is clear; the minor is proved. One acting with such ignorance is so disposed, while he acts, that if knowledge were present, he would not produce the effect; whence, this being posited, and knowledge arriving, he is saddened — as is clear when someone, not having exercised sufficient diligence, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills a friend; therefore the will acting with such ignorance has some inclination to the opposite. The consequence is clear, for, as Aristotle says, Ethics 3, chapter 1: Of those who act through ignorance, he who repents of the deed is said to have acted unwillingly.

The third part, finally, which asserts that concomitant ignorance causes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary, but the non-voluntary, is clear from the example given above; for if someone, ardently desiring the death of an enemy, and by chance walking through a forest, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills the enemy — such a killing of the enemy, on the one hand, is not positively involuntary, since it is in no way repugnant to the will of the killer; nor is it positively voluntary either, since the voluntary must be from an intrinsic principle with knowledge, while he is ignorant that the enemy lies hidden there, whence the shooting of the arrow is commanded only by the will to kill the wild beast; therefore such an effect is neither voluntary nor involuntary, but only non-voluntary.

From this you will understand that antecedent ignorance excuses from sin, since it removes the notion of the voluntary, without which there can be no sin; that consequent ignorance accuses, since the effect following from it is willed simply; but that concomitant ignorance neither excuses, because it does not remove all volition, at least

conditional, of the sin, nor accuses of itself, because the will does not sin, while it applies all due and sufficient diligence.

Chapter IV

On the free voluntary

The free is spoken of in three ways: from servitude, from coercion, and from necessity. We shall not treat here of the first or second kind of liberty, but only of the third, which is customarily called liberty of choice, or indifference, of which Bernard, sermon 81 on the Canticle, speaks excellently: The liberty of choice is plainly something divine, shining forth in the soul, like a gem in gold.

§ I

The liberty of indifference belongs to man, not only in the state of integral nature, or in his creation, but also after the fall of Adam, in the state of corrupted nature

Both points are certain from faith, for concerning man in his first state it is said, Genesis 1: Let us make man to our image and likeness — which the Holy Fathers commonly refer to the liberty of indifference, which man received from God in creation, as Tertullian, Irenaeus, Damascene, and others. Nor is it an obstacle that many also understand by the image of God in man his dominion over the other creatures. For it follows that whoever has dominion over others should have much more dominion over himself. Whence Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, chapter 6: For why should it be that man, possessing the whole world, should not first reign in the possession of his own mind — lord of others, servant to himself? And Novatian, book on the Trinity, chapter 1: When He had given all things into servitude to him, He willed him alone to be free; for he ought also to have been free, lest the image of God serve incongruously. From this the second part remains proved; for since the image of God was not entirely erased in us through original sin, after the fall of Adam, and in the state of corrupted nature, the liberty of indifference remained in man, though not so perfect as it was in the state of original justice. Whence Trent, session 6, canon 3: If anyone shall say that man's free will was lost and extinguished after the sin of Adam, let him be anathema.

You will say, first: Augustine, Epistle 107, to Vitalis, says thus: We lost free will for loving God, through the enormity of the first sin. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 30: Man, misusing free will, lost both himself and it. Therefore he holds that man, in the state of fallen nature, lacks free will, in punishment of original sin.

I respond that Augustine, in these places, does not intend that the natural and native liberty of man was lost through the sin of Adam, but the faculty for acting well, unimpeded, or the complete possibility of acting well and avoiding sin; because that possibility is had through grace, which we lost through the sin of the first parent. Thus Augustine himself clearly explains himself, book 1 against the two letters of the Pelagians, chapter 2, in these words: Liberty indeed perished through sin, but that liberty which was in paradise, of having full righteousness together with immortality; on account of which human nature needs divine grace. And book 2, chapter 15: We do not say that free will perished from the nature of men through the sin of Adam, but that it avails for sinning in men subject to the devil; but that it does not avail for living well and piously, unless the very will of man is liberated by the grace of God, and aided toward every good of action, of knowledge, and of speech.

You will say, second: Augustine, in the book of the Unfinished Work against Julian, and in many other places, most sharply attacks the two-faced power of indifference which Julian and the other Pelagians introduced into liberty, and rejects it as the very base and source, and nest, of the Pelagian heresy; therefore such liberty cannot be attributed to men in the state of fallen nature, without manifest heresy, and evident commerce with the Pelagians.

I respond that Augustine reproved the liberty of indifference which Julian and the other Pelagians admitted, because they thought that the will of fallen man was in perfect equilibrium, as it was in the state of innocence, and equally prone to good as to evil; and consequently they denied that free will had been weakened and enfeebled through the sin of Adam, and, by reason of concupiscence, made more inclined toward the delightful good contrary to reason, than toward the honest good consonant with reason — as St. Prosper testifies, in his letter to Augustine, where, relating the errors of the men of Marseilles, he says: They think that, just as the transgressor is said not to have obeyed because he did not will to, so it is not doubted that the faithful man was likewise devout, because he willed to; and that as much as anyone has a faculty for evil, so much he has for good, and that with equal weight the soul moves itself toward vices or virtues.

§ II

For the morality of human acts, or for merit and demerit, liberty from coercion does not suffice, but liberty of indifference is required

This assertion also is certain from faith, and the opposite opinion has been condemned as heretical by Innocent X, and is established from the Holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that, indifference of liberty being removed, our acts are worthy neither of reward nor of punishment, neither of praise nor of blame. Thus Jerome, book 2 against Jovinian, where he says thus: God made us of free will, and we are not drawn to virtues or to vices by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither condemnation nor crown. This saying Augustine relates, On Nature and Grace, chapter 5, and approves it as most true, most certain, and best known. And in the book On the Two Souls, chapter 11, he says that these things are sung both by shepherds on the mountains, and by poets in the theaters, and by the unlearned in their circles, by the learned in their libraries, and by masters in the schools, by bishops in sacred places, and throughout the whole world by the human race.

The same St. Thomas teaches, De Malo, q. 6, art. unicus, in these words: Some have held that the will of man moves itself of necessity to choose something, and yet did not hold that the will is coerced, for not everything necessary is violent. Of this opinion he immediately judges thus: But this opinion is heretical, for it removes the notion of merit and demerit from human acts. And in book 2, dist. 24, q. 3, art. 3, he says that the genus of morals begins where the dominion of the will is first found; but the dominion of the will is through the liberty of indifference, through which it is in its power to act or not to act, or to do this or that, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, I, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3, where he says that we are masters of our own acts, insofar as we can choose this or that. Therefore the liberty of indifference is the foundation of morality, and consequently of the merit and demerit of human acts.

Reason also persuades of this, for our acts are called moral for no other reason, than because they are subject to the rules of morals, and are regulated by them, just as some action is called artificial, from the fact that it is subjected to the rules of art; but purely spontaneous acts, and those free from coercion alone, cannot be subjected to the rules of morals, nor be directed and regulated by them; therefore neither can they be called moral. The major is clear; the minor is shown thus. Since a rule or law is applied to actions, in order to lead them from the extremes to the mean of the rule, it would be applied in vain to an action which is not variable according to a mean and extremes, but is by its own nature invariable, and determined to one; but purely spontaneous acts, and those free from coercion alone, are altogether invariable, and by their nature determined

to one, as is clear in beatific love, and in the volition of beatitude in general; therefore they cannot be subjected to the rules of morals, nor be directed and regulated by them.

It must be observed, however, that in order for acts to be morally good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, liberty of contrariety, or of specification, is not necessarily required, but liberty of contradiction, or of exercise, suffices; for by the very fact that some act is free as to exercise, and indifferent as to whether it is or is not, it can fall under the rules of morals, and be directed and determined by them. Whence Christ, while He was a wayfarer, exercised meritorious and morally good acts, and yet, since He was intrinsically impeccable, there was in Him no liberty of contrariety to good and evil. Likewise the Angels, in the first instant, merited beatitude through an act of charity, which was necessary as to specification, and free only as to exercise, since in that instant they could not sin, as shown in the Treatise on the Angels.

You will object, first: St. Thomas, book 2, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 1, says that acts are in the genus of morals, from the fact that they are voluntary; but purely spontaneous acts, such as the volition of the good as such, and beatific love, are voluntary, since they are from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge; therefore they are in the genus of morals, and enjoy moral goodness. Reason also persuades of this, for if beatific love lacked moral goodness, it would lack some perfection which belongs to the love of the way, and consequently would be less perfect, which seems absurd.

I respond that when St. Thomas says that acts are in the genus of morals, from the fact that they are voluntary, he uses "voluntary" for "free," as is frequently done, not for "spontaneous." Whence purely spontaneous acts, such as beatific love, do not enjoy moral goodness. Nor is beatific love, for this reason, less perfect than the love of the way, because the same and greater perfection than that which the love of the way has, by reason of morality, is found eminently in the love of the fatherland, by reason of physical entity, and necessary determination toward its object. I add that beatific love is not absolutely without moral goodness, just as it is not absolutely without liberty; because although it is necessarily terminated at God in Himself, yet as it is in exercised act, the notion of loving creatures is terminated freely, and as such participates in morality, as will be established from what will soon be said about the beatific love of Christ.

You will object, second: St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 29, art. 6, and in book 3 of the Sentences, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, teaches that the act of charity, by which Christ loved God while He was a wayfarer, was meritorious; therefore he holds that merit does not require liberty from necessity, but liberty from coercion suffices. Whence in the same place, ad 5, he says thus: Even if the free will of Christ were determined to one,

numerically, as to loving God (which He could not not do), yet through this it does not lose liberty, or the notion of praise or merit, because it tends toward it not by coercion, but spontaneously, and thus is master of its own act.

I respond that St. Thomas, in the places cited, only means that the act of charity of Christ, while He was in the way, was meritorious, not insofar as it regarded God in Himself, because as such it was necessary, but insofar as it was terminated at the divine essence and goodness, as it was the notion of loving creatures, especially rational ones, for whom He was bound to die, because as such it was free as to exercise.

But you will say: therefore St. Thomas wrongly assigned, for showing the liberty of the act of love in Christ, this causal reason: because it tends toward it not by coercion, but spontaneously — but he ought to have said, because, with respect to that act as terminated at creatures, He still has indifference.

But I deny the consequence: for although spontaneity, or the negation of coercion, is not the formal reason founding praiseworthiness and merit in the love of Christ, it is nevertheless the reason permitting, in that same love as terminated at creatures, indifference of contradiction, founding the notion of praiseworthiness and merit; because if the blessed love of Christ were coerced, it could in no way be free by the liberty of contradiction, nor consequently meritorious. In order, therefore, that St. Thomas might preserve that the act of love in Christ, under some consideration of itself, was free by the liberty of contradiction, and hence meritorious, he rightly assigns this causal reason: because it tends toward it not by coercion, but spontaneously — and adds, "and thus is master of its own act": because, as I said, spontaneity, or negation of coercion, is the reason permitting dominion and indifference of contradiction, in the blessed love of Christ, as terminated at creatures.

§ III

Indifference of contradiction, or the power to act or not to act, belongs to the essence of liberty; but not so the indifference of contrariety to good and evil

The first part is against Jansenius, who, in book 6, On the Grace of Christ, almost throughout, strives to show that liberty simply so called imports essentially nothing but mere immunity from coercion, with the light and direction of reason; and thus asserts that the will is free simply in all acts in which it operates from the direction of reason, although some are simply necessary, such as beatific love, or the love by which God loves Himself, or by which the Holy Spirit is produced.

Our assertion, however, is common among theologians, both of our own school and of others, and is proved, first, from the Holy Fathers, who explain the proper quiddity of liberty through indifference to contradictories, and therefore compare free will to a balance placed in equilibrium, or to a hinge turnable in either direction. Thus Basil, homily on Psalm 61, where he says thus: In each of us there is, within, a certain balance, fashioned by our maker, by which we can weigh the natures of things, and discern good from evil. This thought Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, chapter 6, expressed in these words: as a weigher, emancipated by the good God, a freedman, and the liberty of choice. Similarly Augustine, book 3, On Free Will, chapter 1, teaches that man is free, because he can turn this way and that, a certain hinge, as it were, of his will.

It is proved, second, from St. Thomas, who, I, q. 83, art. 1, proves that man is of free will, because the judgment of reason is open to diverse things, and is not determined to one. This reason would be nothing, if the liberty of our will consisted only in mere spontaneity, or immunity from coercion. And, q. 19, art. 10, ad 2, to explain how God is free, although He cannot will the evil of fault, he responds that this is no obstacle, because the divine will is open to opposites, insofar as it can will this to be or not to be. By these words he clearly has recourse to the indifference of the divine will, not to spontaneity, in order to preserve its liberty. Likewise, in book 2, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1, ad 2: To the liberty of choice (he says) it belongs, that one can do some action or not do it; and this belongs to God, for the good things He does, He can not do. Where he proves indifference in order to preserve the liberty of choice; therefore liberty, not only according to the accidental state which it has in us wayfarers, but even according to its proper formal notion, common to God and to men, includes indifference, or the power to act or not to act, and does not adequately consist in mere spontaneity, or in the notion of the perfect voluntary.

It is proved, third: the notion of free will consists in this, that we have our acts under our own power and dominion, whence the Greeks call the free principle αὐτεξούσιον, which word signifies one who is master of himself, and lord of his own action; but dominion and power over our acts does not denote mere spontaneity and immunity from coercion, but moreover essentially requires indifference and power for opposites; therefore so does liberty. The major is established; the minor is proved from St. Augustine and St. Thomas: for the former, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 31, says thus: Each one is said to have this in his power, which, if he wills, he does; if he does not will, he does not do. The latter, I, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3: We are masters (he says) of our own acts, insofar as we can choose this or that. And book 1 Contra Gentiles, chapter 68: The dominion which the will has over its own acts, by which it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the

determination of the faculty to one, and the violence of an externally acting cause; but spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, does not exclude determination of the faculty to one, but only the violence of an externally acting cause; therefore dominion and power over our own acts does not import mere spontaneity, and immunity from coercion.

It is proved, fourth: it is certain that Luther and Calvin took away true liberty from man; but they did not deny that the will of man acts spontaneously, and without coercion, and under the light and governance of reason — indeed, Calvin himself openly professes this, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 6, in these words: Man will in this way be said to be of free will, that he acts by will, not by coercion. And book 2, On Free Will: If (he says) liberty is opposed to coercion, I both confess and constantly assert free will, and hold whoever thinks otherwise for a heretic. Therefore the true liberty of man is not preserved in mere spontaneity or immunity from coercion alone, but also essentially includes indifference, or the power to act or not to act.

Finally, the same part can be proved by this argument: Augustine everywhere professes that the concord of liberty with efficacious grace is most difficult, most obscure, and intelligible to few; but if the true liberty of man consisted in mere spontaneity, and were violated only by internal coercion, that difficulty would be most slight, and altogether nothing, since it is established among almost all theologians that our will cannot be coerced by God, as to acts elicited by it, as we showed in chapter 2; whence the concord of our liberty with efficacious grace would not only be manifest, and intelligible to all, but their discord would be impossible, and altogether unintelligible, because, as Anselm, cited above, says: No one can will unwillingly, because he cannot will while not willing to will; therefore the true liberty of man does not consist in mere spontaneity or immunity from coercion, as Jansenius contends.

The second part of the assertion, which says that indifference of contrariety to good and evil does not pertain to the essence of liberty, but only to the accidental state which it has in us wayfarers, not yet clearly seeing the divine essence, is proved, first, from Augustine, book 1 of the Unfinished Work, folio 150, where he reproves Julian, and the other Pelagians, for explaining the essence of liberty through the power of indifference concerning good and evil, or as being able to will well and ill, and, from this false principle of theirs, argues thus against Julian: That alone is free which can will two things, that is, good and evil; therefore God is not free, who cannot will evil — of whom you have also said, God cannot but be just. Is this how you praise God, by taking liberty away from Him?

It is proved, second, the same part: indifference of contrariety to good and evil imports a power for sinning; but a power for sinning does not pertain to the essence of liberty; therefore neither does indifference of contrariety to good and evil. The major is clear; the minor is proved, first, from Anselm, in the dialogue on free will, chapter 1, where he says: Neither liberty nor a part of liberty is the power of sinning. It is proved, second, from St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 6, where he has this: To will evil is neither liberty, nor a part of liberty, though it is some sign of liberty. He declares this more fully, I, q. 62, art. 8, ad 3, where he argues thus: Free will has itself, with respect to choosing those things which are for the end, as the intellect has itself with respect to conclusions. But it is manifest that it belongs to the power of the intellect that it can proceed to diverse conclusions according to given principles; but that it proceed to some conclusion, omitting the order of the principles, is from a defect in it. Whence that free will can choose diverse things, the order of the end being preserved, belongs to the perfection of its liberty; but that it chooses something by deviating from the order of the end, this belongs to the defect of liberty; whence the liberty of choice is greater in the Angels, who cannot sin, than in us, who can sin. Here those words, "liberty of choice," must be noted, for they clearly declare that the Holy Doctor is not speaking of liberty from sin, or from misery (as some interpret), but of liberty from necessity, for this is what is understood by liberty of choice. Wherefore it is false, and altogether foreign to the mind of St. Thomas, what Peter of St. Joseph says, in the little work which he calls a defense of St. Thomas, disp. 2, sect. 8, namely that wayfarers are more free than the blessed, by liberty from necessity, although the blessed are said to be more free than wayfarers, both by liberty from sin, and by liberty from misery. This, I say, is altogether foreign to the truth, because since liberty from necessity is a simply simple perfection, and, as St. Bernard, cited above, says, something divine, shining forth in the soul like a gem in gold, and wayfarers are more free, by liberty from necessity, than the blessed and comprehensors, they would be superior to the latter in some simply simple perfection, which is formally found in God, and by which the intellectual creature excels all other things. Whence thieves and adulterers would surpass Christ, the most blessed Virgin, and the supreme of the Angels, in some simply simple perfection — which not only seems absurd, but even offensive to pious ears.

This is confirmed: the liberty of indifference is that excellent and singular perfection, according to which man is said to have been made to the image of God, as we declared in § 1 from the Holy Fathers; but it is absurd to say that the image of God is more perfect in wayfarers than in the blessed, and in sinners than in the saints; therefore it is also absurd to assert that they are freer than the latter by the liberty of indifference.

Jansenius objects, first, against the first part of our assertion: the notion of free will consists in this, that we have our acts in our own power; but purely spontaneous acts, or those free from coercion alone, are in our own power; therefore they are free, and consequently liberty is preserved in mere spontaneity. The major is established from what has been said above; the minor Jansenius proves from Augustine, very frequently asserting that that is in our power, which, when we will, we do, or which we do if we will, as is clear from chapter 3 of book 2, On Free Will, where he says: We are said to have that in our power, which, when we will, we do; but purely spontaneous acts, and those free from coercion alone, occur from us when we will; therefore they are in our power. Whence Jansenius says, book 6, On the Grace of the Savior, chapter 8, toward the end: It is a paradox in the doctrine of Augustine, that some act of the will is therefore free, because the will can desist from it, and not act — although this doctrine may seem wonderful, and not moderately wonderful, to the Scholastics.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor; and to its proof, drawn from the authority of Augustine, it must be said that when the Holy Doctor says that we have that in our power, which, when we will, we do, this must be understood of that which we so do, when we will, that we can do and will the opposite, and consequently of an indifferent act, and not a purely spontaneous one. This is clear from Augustine himself, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 31, where he pronounces thus: Each one is said to have this in his power, which, if he wills, he does; if he does not will, he does not do it — and from this he gathers that faith is in our power, because we believe if we will, and do not believe if we do not will. The common and customary manner of speaking also favors this; for when we are said to do something when we will, or if we will, it is usually understood, according to the common sense of men, that we do not do it when we will, or if we will, in such a way that it is in our power to will or not to will, and to do or not to do, as we please. For of those things which occur necessarily, such a manner of speaking is not used — for example, the blessed, who necessarily love God, do not say of themselves, we love God when we will, or if we will; nor does anyone say of them, the Saints, seeing God, love Him if they will, or when they will. Likewise we say that God can create another world if He wills, because He can will it; but we do not say that the Father and the Son can produce the Holy Spirit, if they will, or when they will, because indeed this manner of speaking signifies power for the opposite, which is lacking in the aforesaid examples.

It is also false, what Jansenius adds, namely that in the doctrine of Augustine it is an unheard-of paradox, that some act of the will is free for this reason, because the will can desist from it and not act; for besides the testimonies adduced above, the same Holy

Doctor, chapter 2 of the book On Grace and Free Will, which he wrote to reconcile liberty with grace, having related these words of Scripture: He has set before thee fire and water; stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death: whatsoever he shall choose shall be given him — subjoins, exclaiming: Behold, most openly we see expressed the free will of the human mind! — namely, in those words, which clearly sound the liberty of indifference concerning good and evil. From which it is clear that the opinion of our adversaries, which constitutes the essence of liberty in mere spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, is foreign not only to the mind of Augustine, but also to Holy Scripture. Whence we can rightly direct to them those words of Augustine, book 3 against Julian, chapter 3: The things you say are wondrous, the things you say are new, the things you say are false: at the wondrous we are amazed, of the new we are wary, the false we refute.

Jansenius objects, second, several testimonies of Augustine and of other Holy Fathers, by which they assert that only coercion is an obstacle to liberty, or define or describe the essence of liberty through mere immunity from coercion. For first, Augustine, book 3, On Free Will, chapter 4, says that men whom God foresees will sin are justly punished, because God, by His foreknowledge, does not coerce the things which are to be done to happen. And in the book On the Two Souls, chapter 10, he defines free will as a motion of the mind, no one coercing it. Likewise Bernard, in the book On Grace and Free Will, calls that consent free, which is not forced, not extorted. And the Master, in book 2, dist. 25, teaches that a choice is called free, because it can seek without coercion and necessity. Finally, St. Thomas, in the same distinction, q. 1, art. 4, says: Free will is so called from the fact that it cannot be coerced.

I respond that when St. Augustine says that men whom God foresees will sin are justly punished, because God, by His foreknowledge, does not coerce the things which are to be done to happen, he does not understand that strict and rigorous violence, of which the philosophers and theologians speak, but uses that term for simple necessity, and intends to teach that no necessity is inflicted on our wills by the foreknowledge of God, which would excuse from sin. Similarly, when he defines a free will as a motion of the mind, no one coercing it, he does not take coercion strictly, for violence properly so called, which is repugnant to acts elicited by the will, but broadly, for antecedent necessity. In this sense also Bernard, the Master of the Sentences, and St. Thomas must be understood. That this interpretation is legitimate is established, first, from Augustine, disputation 1 against Fortunatus the Manichean, where he addresses him thus: How do we have sins, if a contrary nature coerces us to do what we do? For he who is coerced by necessity to do something does not sin. And in disputation 2, he teaches that the

Manicheans affirmed that the soul is coerced by a contrary nature to transgress — that is, according to their own interpretation, so enticed to sin, that there is no power of resisting whatsoever. It is established, second, from St. Thomas, who, in the same sense, uses the term "coercion," book 2, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 2, when he says that the intellect is coerced by the force of a demonstration, that is, necessitated to assent. And Opusculum 3, chapter 10, toward the end, he says thus: This is the natural mode for man, that he act freely, not coerced, because rational powers are open to opposites. Likewise, I, q. 82, art. 1, in the body: The necessity of coercion (he says) is that which belongs to something from an agent, as when someone is coerced by some agent, such that he cannot do the contrary. In these places the Holy Doctor manifestly uses "coercion" for "necessity."

You will object, third: St. Thomas, I, q. 82, art. 1, ad 1, says that natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will. The same he teaches, De Potentia, q. 10, art. 2, ad 5, from which he there infers that God freely loves Himself, and the Father freely produces the Holy Spirit; therefore he holds that necessity is not repugnant to the liberty of the will, but only coercion.

I respond that a twofold liberty must be distinguished in us: one of complacency, or spontaneity, and willingness, which is liberty improperly so called, and in a qualified sense — for when any thing is borne spontaneously toward a good connaturally fitting to itself, as when water, spontaneously and without any impediment whatsoever, flows, it is said to flow freely; the other, properly so called, which is called liberty of choice, and imports indifference of judgment, and election of the will. When, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that natural necessity is not repugnant to liberty, that God freely loves Himself, and that the Holy Spirit freely proceeds from the Father, he speaks of the first liberty, not of the second — which he expressly teaches excludes not only violent coercion, but even necessity altogether, as is established, book 1 Contra Gentiles, chapter 68, where he says in express terms: The dominion which the will has over its own acts, by which it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of the faculty to one, and the violence of an externally acting cause.

You will say: St. Thomas, book 2, dist. 25, art. 1, ad 4, says that the blessed have free choice concerning the vision and love of God; therefore he admits not only the liberty of spontaneity or willingness, but also the liberty of choice, in relation to necessary acts, such as are the clear vision of God, and beatific love.

I respond that St. Thomas there does not speak of vision and love as they are terminated at God in Himself, but as they are terminated at the divine essence, insofar as it is the reason for seeing or loving these or those creatures, which have no necessary relation with

God; for thus they fall under the free choice of the blessed, since, under this aspect, they do not bring a goodness which necessarily seizes their will.

You will object, fourth, against the second part of the assertion: Holy Scripture, Ecclesiasticus 15, explains the liberty of man through the power of stretching out one's hand to good and to evil; therefore indifference of contrariety to good and to evil belongs to the notion of liberty.

I respond, granting the antecedent, distinguishing the consequent: it belongs to the notion of liberty, as to its essence and quiddity, I deny. As to the accidental state which it has in us wayfarers, not confirmed in grace, I grant. The solution is clear from what has been said above.

§ IV

It is not of the notion of a free agent, that, all the prerequisites of nature and causality for acting being posited, it can not act, in the composite sense

This is proved, first, by a fundamental reason: those things which are required only according to the order of nature, as prerequisites for acting, are simultaneous with the act (for priority of nature is only priority of causality and of the instant from which, not, however, priority of time and of the instant in which); whence, because that which is, when it is, is necessarily is, it is impossible that, all the things required by nature in a free agent for it to operate being posited, it can not act in the composite sense — that is, can compose the negation of the action with them — otherwise it could conjoin non-act with act, and form with its own negation.

This is confirmed: those things which precede an operation only by priority of nature and of causality, constitute the free agent in the notion of the actual principle of the operation; whence, just as the actual principle of an operation cannot be composed with its own negation, so neither can those things which precede the operation of a free agent only by priority of nature.

It is proved, second: one of the things prerequisite for God to operate ad extra is the eternal decree concerning that work — for example, concerning the creation of the world; but that decree being posited, God cannot not act in the composite sense, that is, He cannot compose His decree of creating the world with the non-creation of it (because this involves a contradiction on account of His immutability); and nevertheless God most freely created the world; therefore it is not necessary, to preserve liberty, that, all the prerequisites of nature and causality for acting being posited, one can not act in the composite sense.

This is confirmed. In the opinion of Suárez, Vásquez, and other more recent authors, congruous grace is among the things prerequisite for acting, and yet it cannot be composed with dissent, or with the negation of the action; otherwise divine foreknowledge would be deceived, which foresaw that man would infallibly consent, in these occasions and circumstances, and the same grace would be simultaneously congruous and incongruous, which involves a contradiction. Likewise predestination, the gift of perseverance, and of confirmation in grace, do not destroy liberty, and yet cannot be composed with sin and damnation. For, as St. Thomas says, De Veritate, q. 23, art. 5, ad 3: These are not incompossible: God wills this man to be saved, this man can be damned; but these are incompossible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned. The same doctrine, concerning the gift of perseverance, Augustine teaches, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12, where he says that this gift is such, that not only can those without it not persevere, but also that through this gift alone do they persevere. Which is the same as saying that non-perseverance cannot be composed with such a gift. Whence Petavius, tome 1, book 9, chapter 7: That gift which is bestowed through the merits of Christ, not only gives the ability to persevere if they will, but even gives the willing of what they can, and is such that, it being given, they cannot but persevere — that is, that they persevere certainly, and, as is said in the schools, infallibly, although they freely consent to that grace and gift, not necessarily, but in such a way that they could dissent, which the Council of Trent acknowledges, although, that they might not will to dissent, is accomplished by that same gift of perseverance. Therefore it is not of the notion of free will, that, all the prerequisites for acting, by priority of nature and causality, being posited, it can not act in the composite sense, or compose the negation of the action with them.

You will object, first: when the Philosophers say that a free agent is that which, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, can act and not act, they without doubt use both in the same way, and think both are possible in the same way; therefore, if a free agent, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, can act in the composite sense, it will also be able, in the same way, not to act.

I respond that the antecedent is true, if understood of the prerequisites for acting, by priority of duration and of the instant in which, but not if understood of the prerequisites, by priority only of causality and of the instant from which; because since these (as we said above) constitute the free agent in the notion of the actual principle of the operation, these being posited, the free agent, properly speaking, cannot act — but it in fact acts, retaining nevertheless the power for not acting, or for not continuing the action which it elicits.

You will object, second, with Fr. Jacques Platel, S.J., in his Synopsis of the Course of Theology, tome 2, no. 23: Trent, session 6, explaining the concord of liberty with grace, chapter 5, teaches that man can reject the inspiration by which he is led to justification. And canon 4 defines that free will, moved and excited by God, can dissent if it wills. These words — "reject," "dissent" — clearly indicate the composite sense; since to reject is to let go of a thing possessed, or to refuse a thing offered to oneself; while to dissent is not simply not to consent, or not to consent to an excitation which does not exist, but not to consent to an excitation actually existing, or to conjoin dissent or non-consent with its existence. This is also more openly indicated by the Council of Sens, in the decree of faith 15, saying: The aid of God drawing us is not such that it cannot be resisted. And St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, article 7, ad 2, where he says thus: On account of the fact that a rational power is open to opposites, God so moves the human mind to the good, that it can nevertheless resist this motion. Add that if these conciliar definitions were not understood in the composite sense, they would not conflict with the errors of Luther, Calvin, and the other enemies of liberty, who clearly did not deny these things in the divided sense, since they were not so foolish as to think that man, precisely as far as concerns the will, and indifference of judgment, could not exercise an act opposed to the divine excitation absolutely, and apart from the supposition of the existence of the excitation. Moreover, this same sense is proved by this reasoning, namely that for perfect liberty of indifference (which is established to belong to fallen man) there is required a proximate and unimpeded power for either alternative, by force of which man is said to be simply able to do either, and to have such full dominion of his own act, that it ultimately arises only from his own determination, whether it is posited or not posited. Now for such a power it is necessary that man, with all the prerequisites absolutely antecedent — or which it is not in his power to have or not have — can equally compose act and non-act; otherwise all, or nearly all, our necessary acts would be free to us, as will easily be evident to one considering the matter.

I respond that Trent, when it says, session 6, chapter 5, that man can reject the divine illumination and inspiration, speaks of grace morally exciting, which, since it stands on the side of first act, and is not among the prerequisites for acting by priority only of nature and causality, as physically promoting grace is, can be conjoined and composed with dissent. In the same way some interpret another passage, taken from canon 4 of the same session, and these words immediately preceding seem to favor such an interpretation: If anyone shall say that free will, moved and excited by God, does not cooperate at all by assenting to God exciting and calling, etc. — which words signify grace as calling, and only morally exciting. Whence, when afterward it is added that free will can dissent if it wills, they judge that this must be referred to that same exciting and

calling grace. This solution seems probable, standing on the words and text of that canon. But because many theologians hold that the intent of the Council in that canon was to proscribe the errors of Luther and Calvin, who denied that the will freely cooperates with divine grace, and retains, under the efficacious motion of God, the power for dissent, it is more likely and probable that the Council there speaks of the efficacious motion of God, and defines that free will, as it is subject to such a motion, retains the power of dissenting, not in the composite sense, but in the divided — for this suffices for its intent, and for proscribing the errors of Luther and Calvin, who, as we shall show below, denied an absolute power of dissenting in a will moved by God with efficacious aid. Nor is it an obstacle that the Council uses the word "dissent," which seems to indicate the composite sense; for that must be explained of dissent taken materially and specificatively, as it signifies an act contrary to that toward which God moves, not of dissent taken reduplicatively and formally, as it denotes the composite sense of resistance with grace, or the efficacious motion of God.

As for the Council of Sens (besides the fact that it was not confirmed nor approved by the Apostolic See), it is easily answered that those words, "the aid of God drawing us is not such that it cannot be resisted," must either be understood of sufficient aid, and moral exciting, or must be explained of the power of resisting or dissenting in the divided sense. In the same way must St. Thomas be understood and explained, when he says, Quodlibet 1, that God so moves the human mind to good, that it can nevertheless resist this motion. For the same Holy Doctor, in many places related in the Treatise on the Will of God, especially I-II, q. 10, art. 4, ad 3, expressly teaches that man cannot resist or dissent from the efficacious motion of God in the composite sense — for he says thus: If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to it; it is not, however, absolutely impossible.

As for what the aforesaid Author adds, namely that if the aforesaid definition of Trent were not understood in the composite sense, it would not conflict with the error of Luther and Calvin, this is trivial and frivolous, and manifestly repugnant to the truth; for since those heretics taught that the divine decrees and aids are so efficacious, that they absorb all indifference of the human will, and leave in it only spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, it is evident that they could not admit, consequently to that principle, a power of dissenting in the divided sense, in a will efficaciously moved by God — which cannot stand with mere spontaneity or immunity from coercion alone; whence, by the very fact that Trent, in the canon cited, defines that such a power of dissenting remains in the moved will, it altogether eliminates the error of those heretics, and establishes and confirms the concord of liberty with efficacious grace.

Nor does it avail what the same Author adds, namely that Luther and Calvin were not so foolish as to think that man, precisely as far as concerns the will and indifference of judgment, could not exercise an act opposed to the divine excitation absolutely, and apart from the supposition of the existence of the excitation. It does not avail, I say, both because, as we said, they thought that the efficacy of the divine motion absorbs and consumes all indifference of the will, and consequently leaves in it no power of dissenting; and also because, although they admitted that, grace being removed, and — as the adversary speaks — the existence of the excitation not being supposed, the will has a power of dissenting, he wrongly infers from this that they did not deny a power of dissenting in the divided sense, such as the Thomists admit; for this does not consist in the fact that the will, grace being removed, can not act, but in the fact that it can, while that grace stands and remains in the will — as that more recent author imagines and supposes, along with other theologians of the same Society; for this composite and divided sense is plainly Calvinistic, not Thomistic, as Álvarez witnesses, book 2, response, chapter 1, no. 34, where he says thus: The composite sense is not that which is insinuated in the argument, namely that when efficacious grace is in the will, the will cannot not act — for this sense was invented by Calvin. The same Fr. Annat testifies, in the book On Uncoerced Liberty, page 226, in these words: Whom will the Jansenists find among the Thomists, who said that the will, predetermined by divine grace, lacks a proximate power for dissenting? Whom will they produce who interpret the distinction of the composite and divided sense in such a way that the composite sense is: the will, thus moved, can dissent, when that motion has departed, and another has come?

Finally, to the reason it is answered that, although for perfect liberty of indifference it is required that free will have dominion of its own act, and that it arise from its own determination, whether it is posited or not posited; nevertheless, because such dominion is not supreme, but subject and subordinate to the dominion of the first free agent, and first determiner, the determination of free will is never posited, nor can it be posited, unless first, by nature, the will, under objective indifference of judgment, which is the proximate root of liberty, is moved and applied by God to willing and to determining itself. Nor is it necessary for the liberty of choice (as the adversary says) that man, with all the prerequisites absolutely antecedent, can equally compose act and non-act; otherwise, since the prerequisites for acting, by priority only of nature and causality, are simultaneous with the act (as being an application to it, and a certain inchoation of it, as it were), liberty would require that the will could simultaneously posit both act and non-act, or compose the negation of the act with its existence and positing — which manifestly involves a contradiction.

Treatise III

On Human Acts

The general condition of human acts having been explained — namely, the notion of the voluntary and free, which is the foundation of their morality — it remains that we discourse briefly on them, considered both in their physical being and in their moral being. These can be reduced to eight principal acts, some of which regard the end, others concern the means. The first is simple volition, which regards the end precisely in itself, with an inefficacious appetite of simple complacency. The second is called intention, because through it the will tends toward the end, as to be obtained through means. The third is counsel, which imports not only the inquiry into means, but also a judgment or verdict, by which one is judged to be preferable to the others. The fourth is consent, by which the will takes complacency in the means found, and approves them. The fifth is election, by which the will accepts one in preference to the others. The sixth is command, by which the intellect, with a certain motion participated from the preceding election, signifies to the will the execution of the means. The seventh is use, by which the will applies the executing faculties to the work. The eighth is the very attainment of the end, from which results rest or delight, which is called fruition. Of these eight acts, then, we must treat briefly in this treatise, beginning with those which are about the end, and proceeding to the others which concern the means.

Chapter I

On the simple volition of the end

Concerning this act there is scarcely any difficulty or controversy among theologians; for it is established from what has already been said, that it is called simple volition, because it has an altogether simple object, namely the end taken precisely in itself — whereas the other, later acts either regard the end in relation to the means, as intention, or the means with respect to the end, as election, consent, and use, and thus do not have a simple object, but one in some way doubled.

It is also established that this is the distinction between the will taken as the volitive faculty, and as its first act, which is simple volition — that in the first sense it has for its adequate object the good as such, abstracting from the good of end and of means, but in the second it regards only the end as its adequate object. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 8, art. 2: If we speak of the will insofar as it names the faculty, thus it extends to the end and to the things which are for the end. But if we speak of the will insofar as it names the act,

thus, properly speaking, it is only of the end. Because, indeed, the will, as it names the act, and signifies simple volition, is borne only toward that which is the per se object of the faculty — whence, since the per se object of the will is only the end (for those things which are for the end are not good or willed for themselves, but only from their order to the end), simple volition regards only the end, not the means. Just as the first act of the intellective faculty, which is called understanding, does not regard conclusions, but first principles. Whence the Philosopher, Ethics 3, chapter 2: The will is of the end, but choice of those things which are for the end — which words St. Thomas, expounding, in the article cited, ad 2, says that there the Philosopher speaks of the will insofar as it properly names the simple act of the will, not insofar as it names the faculty.

Third, it is established, among almost all theologians and philosophers, except the Nominalists, that the object of the will, or of simple volition, is only the good, as it abstracts from the true or the apparent, and consequently that the will cannot be borne toward evil, under the aspect of evil. St. Thomas assigns the reason here, art. 1: since appetite or appetition is nothing other than a certain inclination of the appetitive being toward something; but nothing is inclined except toward something like itself, or in some way fitting — but this is the good; therefore no one seeks anything but the good, true or apparent. Whence Dionysius, chapter 4, On the Divine Names: No one, intending evil, operates. And Aristotle, Ethics 1, chapter 1: Every art, and every doctrine, and choice, seem to seek the good. For this reason the ancients well said, The good is that which all things seek. When, therefore, someone wills evil to an enemy, he apprehends it as good for himself, and similarly grieves over the good of the enemy as evil to himself. Similarly, when the damned seek non-being, they seek it as conducing to the absence of evil, or to liberation from misery and punishment, under which consideration it has some notion of good; for, as St. Thomas teaches from Aristotle here, art. 1, ad 3: To lack evil has the notion of good. I add that, since beatitude includes two things — one positive, namely to be the sum of all goods, and the other privative, namely to lack all misery — it can be sought in two ways: first, by way of pursuit of good, and this happens when someone seeks to possess or obtain positively some good; second, by way of removal of evil, as when someone desires to lack some misery — and in this second way, the damned and the miserable, when they seek non-being, seek beatitude, insofar as they then desire to lack all misery.

You will say: the will is free by the liberty of contrariety concerning good and evil; therefore it can indifferently will good and evil. I respond that although the will is free by the liberty of contrariety in relation to any particular and limited good and evil, and consequently can indifferently will or not will it, it is not so, however, concerning good

and evil as such, but is determined by the Author of nature to love the good as such, and to hate evil as such. Wherefore, for the liberty of the will, it is not required that, by an act of pursuit, it can be borne toward evil under the aspect of evil, but it suffices that it can will evil under the aspect of good. Whence Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 105: For the will is not to be blamed, nor is it to be said, either that there is no will, or that it is not free, because we so will to be blessed, that we not only do not will to be miserable, but cannot altogether will it.

Chapter II

On the motive of the will

There are many motives of the will. The first is the will itself, which efficiently moves itself from potency to act. The second is the intellect, which moves it by the proposal of the object. The third is the sensitive appetite, which, on account of its connection and sympathy with reason, often inclines it toward the same object. The fourth is God, who, by way of an extrinsic principle, efficiently moves it to all its acts. Concerning these motives there is a threefold difficulty to be briefly resolved here. The first is, how does the intellect, by the proposal of the object, move the will — in the genus of efficient cause, or only of final or extrinsic formal cause? The second, whether in the first volition of the end the will moves itself, or is specially moved and applied to it by God? The third, whether the will is moved by God not only morally, but even physically?

§ I

The first difficulty is resolved

I say, first: the object apprehended, or the intellect through the apprehension of the object, moves the will in the genus of final cause, and of extrinsic formal cause, but not efficiently, or by way of an active principle by which.

The first part is clear: for the object proposed moves the will, insofar as it is good; therefore it moves in that genus of cause in which goodness can move; but goodness moves in the genus of final cause, alluring the appetite to love and desire of itself; therefore also does the object apprehended.

The second is likewise evident: for since the will, of itself, is indifferent and undetermined for eliciting an act of this species — for example, an act of love, or of hatred, of flight, or of desire — in order that it produce this rather than that, it needs some form, by which it is extrinsically determined; but such an extrinsic form can be nothing other than the object proposed by the intellect; therefore the known object

moves and determines the will in the genus of extrinsic formal cause. Whence St. Thomas, below, q. 18, art. 2, ad 2, says: The object has, in a certain way, the character of a form, insofar as it gives species.

The third part, however, which Cajetan, Conrad, Medina, and other of our Thomists deny, is proved by a fundamental reason. The principle by which, or the reason for acting, is intrinsic to the faculty which operates, since it constitutes it intrinsically potent for acting — for the impressed species, for example, which is the principle by which of intellection, constituting the intellect in first act completely potent for understanding, is received in it; but the known object does not intrinsically affect the will, nor is it received in it; therefore it cannot concur by way of an active principle by which, toward volition.

Nor does it avail — the common response of the adversaries — who say that it is not necessarily required that the form and reason of acting be intrinsic to the faculty, and inhere in it, but that it suffices that it be in the same essence of the soul. For not only the radical and remote principle must be intrinsically fulfilled, but also the proximate, when it is impotent and incomplete in first act; whence not only habitual grace is placed in the essence of the soul, but also the supernatural habits in the intellect and will, so that they can elicit supernatural acts; therefore if the will is not, of itself, sufficiently potent and in first act as to the specification of its acts, as the adversaries say, it will not be able to be intrinsically completed and constituted in act through the object as through a reason for acting.

This is confirmed: what is impotent cannot become potent, unless intrinsically changed, because the denomination of "potent" is intrinsic, whence it must necessarily be sought from an intrinsic form. From this principle the Thomists prove the necessity of physical premotion for operating, of the light of glory for seeing God, of the motion in the instrument for producing the effect of the principal cause; therefore if the will is of itself impotent for attaining the specific notion of its operations, in order that it become intrinsically potent, it must be intrinsically changed, and consequently that which is the reason for it to act must be intrinsic to it, and be immediately received in it, and not only remotely and mediately.

This same part can also be proved by this argument: that is the reason for acting to which the terminus produced by the action is assimilated; but the terminus produced by volition is not assimilated to the object, but rather to the will itself, since it is nothing other than an impulse and actual inclination toward the object, just as the will is an inclination in first act; therefore the object is not the reason for acting with respect to the will, but only with respect to the intellect, since the terminus produced through

intellection, namely the word, is assimilated to the object, and is its formal likeness.

You will object, first: the Word, in the divine realm, actively influences love, for He produces the Holy Spirit together with the Father, whence St. Thomas, I, q. 43, art. 5, ad 2: The Son is a word, not of just any kind, but a Word breathing love; therefore also in created things the word, or the conception of the intellect, actively influences love and volition, at least as a principle by which. The consequence is proved: the Divine Word differs from the created only in this, that the divine is per se subsisting, while the created is an accident; but subsistence added to a cause does not vary the genus of causality, though it varies the mode of causing — for if heat subsisted without a limiting factor, it would nonetheless actively heat, as it does now, though it would then operate as "that which," from the fact that it would be subsisting, whereas now it is only an agent as "that by which"; therefore, if the Word in the divine realm actively influences love as a principle "which," it must also, in created things, effectively influence it, at least as a principle "by which."

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity. Both because the Divine Word, from the fact that it per se subsists, has an order of origin with the Holy Spirit, which it would not have, unless it were the productive principle of Him — whereas the created word does not have this order with love. And also because the Divine Word, since it is infinite, and uncreated, and consubstantial with the Father, has the same will, and consequently the same spirative power as the Father, which does not belong to created and finite love; and therefore it is not surprising if the former is productive of love, but not the latter. Whence, to the proof of the consequence, it must be said that although subsistence as such does not vary the genus of causing or influencing, divine and infinite subsistence does; for just as it makes the Divine Word to be a person coequal and consubstantial with the Father, so it makes it, together with Him, actively to produce personal love.

The adversaries object, second, and this is their fundamental reason: although the will is sufficiently in act, as to the exercise of its act, because it itself is the moving principle as to exercise, it is not, however, of itself sufficiently in act as to the specification of its act; otherwise all its acts would be of the same species, just as it itself is of one nature, in the proportional way in which all the acts of heat are of the same species, because heat is of itself determined as to the species of its action; whence it must be that there is given another principle which, together with the will itself, causes the specification of the act; but this can be nothing other than the object itself as actually understood, or as existing in the intellect in the notion of the terminus of intellection; therefore it concurs actively toward the specification of the acts of the will. Whence the Commentator, On the Soul

3, says that the bath, within the soul, is the agent of desire, and St. Thomas, below, q. 22, art. 3, ad 2, says that the object of the intellective appetite is more active than the object of the sensitive appetite.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for the will has complete power, not only as to the substance of its acts, but also as to their specific notion — either of itself, or from habits or gifts superadded to it, both in the natural and supernatural order; and therefore, on the part of the object, or of the intellect proposing the object, an active influx is not required, but only a final, objective, and extrinsic formal one. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 27, art. 4, says thus: This is the difference between the intellect and the will, that the intellect is made in act by this, that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its likeness — but the will is made in act, not by this, that some likeness of the thing willed is in the will, but from this, that the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed. By these words he clearly declares that, since cognition occurs through the assimilation of the faculty with the object, and is, as it were, a certain intellectual offspring, proceeding from the object and the faculty, as from man and woman, it must actively proceed from the object, existing within the knowing faculty by reason of an intelligible species. Volition, however, since it is an actual inclination, and tendency toward the object, and not the offspring of it, does not depend on the object as on an effective principle by which, but only as on a terminus toward which it tends, or as on an extrinsic form by which it is specified. Whence it does not follow that all acts of the will are of the same species; both because the will is compared to its operations by way of an equivocal cause, which, though it be of one species, can nevertheless produce effects diverse in species, as light, the sun, the heaven, and similar things cause effects diverse in species; and also because, in order for acts to be of the same species, it does not suffice that they be produced by the same cause, but it is also required that the specifying form be the same — for upward and downward motions, even if sometimes produced by the same mover, are distinguished in species, because they have diverse termini "from which," by which they are formally specified; but the specifying form is not the same for all acts of the will, but diverse, according to the diversity of the objects toward which it tends, and on which, as on extrinsically specifying forms, it depends, as shown in the proof of the second part of our conclusion.

As for the testimonies of the Commentator, and of St. Thomas, it must be said that they used the word "act," or "be active," in a certain ample signification, insofar as it is said of any genus of cause, and of any causality and motion, and not strictly and in its proper signification, as it is attributed only to the efficient cause. Whence the same Holy Doctor, I, q. 48, art. 1, ad 4, says that "to act" can be taken in three ways: first, formally, as

when whiteness makes something white; second, efficiently, as when a painter makes a picture; third, finally, as an end is said to effect, by moving the efficient.

§ II

The other difficulty is resolved

I say, second: in the first volition and intention of the end, man does not move himself, but is specially moved by God; but not in every first act of any occurring business, although even such an act sometimes proceeds from a special instinct and motion of God.

The first part is proved: for the will to move itself in the first volition of the end, which man elicits at the beginning of life, it would have to be in act with respect to it; but the will cannot be understood to be in act with respect to such a volition; therefore it cannot move itself to it, but must be specially moved by God. The major is certain, for each thing moves insofar as it is in act; therefore nothing can move itself toward that with respect to which it is not in act, but in potency. The minor, however, is clear from this, that since that volition is the very first of all, it presupposes no other, through which the will might be constituted in act, and reduce itself from potency to act.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated: for this reason the will moves itself to the election of means, because it is supposed to be already in act through the intention of the end; since, therefore, no act is supposed prior to the first volition of the end simply speaking (for it is itself the first act of the will), the will cannot move itself to it, but must be moved by some actual extrinsic principle — just as the soul indeed moves itself in many ways, by means of the motion of the heart, but does not move itself to the very motion of the heart, but is moved by the generator, or by the Author of nature; because, since it is the first of all vital motions, it does not presuppose another, from which the animal might apply itself to it.

From this the second part remains proved; for in the beginning of any business, and the intention of any particular end, man presupposes the first volition and intention of the end, to which he was moved and applied by God, and other acts and affections of the will — namely of the useful, honest, or delightful good — from which he can move and apply himself to those businesses, and to the volitions of particular goods and ends. Whence it is not necessary that he then begin from a special motion and instinct of God, as in the first act of one's whole life.

That this sometimes happens (as is asserted in the third part of the conclusion) is manifest, for God sometimes moves man to works of which he had not before thought

— as to seeking a treasure, to pursuing enemies, and the like. Whence in Maccabees 4 it is said: Good counsel came to them. And in the life of St. Patrick it is related that, when he had been brought as a captive into Ireland, he found a treasure not without divine instinct, by which benefit he vindicated himself to his former liberty. Sometimes also God moves some specially and suddenly to faith, or to penitence, or to other supernatural acts, through operating grace, whose effects are from the will not moving itself, but moved by God, as St. Thomas teaches, below, q. 111, art. 2. Whence here, q. 9, art. 6, ad 3, he says thus: Sometimes God specially moves some to determinately will something which is good, as in those whom He moves through grace.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: God does not otherwise move the will to the first volition of the end than by applying it to the eliciting of such an act; but He also applies it to the intention of any particular end whatsoever, and to the election of means, since, according to the opinion of the Thomists, neither the will, nor any second cause, can operate, and proceed into act, unless applied by God; therefore in the first volition of the end the will is not specially moved.

I respond that God moves and applies the will to acting in two ways: first, by a certain general motion and application, by which He moves all second causes to acting, and reduces them from first act to second; second, by a certain special motion and application, by which, as a special mover and provider, He supplies the defect and impotence of some second cause. In the first way He moves the will to the intention of any end and the election of means; but in the second, to the first volition of the end, because with respect to it the will is not in act in the notion of the applicative principle. Whence God does, with respect to the first volition, what the will does, by means of the intention of the end, with respect to the election of the means, and therefore we say that He concurs to the first volition of the end as a special mover, because He supplies what the particular cause supplies in election; but to the election, or to the intention of any particular end, He concurs only as a general mover and provider, because, while He applies the will to those acts, He does not supply the place of any created cause, but performs the office of the first cause, and general mover.

You will object, second: man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason; therefore he is not specially moved by God to the first intention of the end which he elicits at the beginning of moral life. The consequence is clear, otherwise sin would be transferred to God — for by this same reason, in the Treatise on the Angels, we showed that the Angel could not have sinned in the first instant of his creation, because since God specially moves him to the first operation, sin would be attributed to God as its special author or mover. The antecedent, however, is proved by St. Thomas, below, q. 89, art. 6, where he

teaches that original sin can never be found together with venial sin alone; because if man, in the first instant of the use of reason, converts himself to God, he will be justified from original sin; but if he does not convert himself, he will sin mortally.

I respond, distinguishing the antecedent: man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason, if this is understood of the first initiating instant of the attainment of the use of reason, I deny the antecedent. If of the determinative instant, I grant the antecedent, and deny the consequence.

The solution is explained: man does not begin to attain the use of reason in a single physical instant, but a moral one — that is, in some interval of time, longer or shorter, according as he is of a subtler or slower intelligence. The reason for this is that he does not attain the use of reason, except through formal discourse, proceeding from confused and common knowledge to distinct and particular knowledge. But because every interval of time is terminated by two instants, and begins from one, and is completed and consummated in the other, when it is said that man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason, this must not be understood of the first instant of that interval, which is called the initiating instant of the attainment of the use of reason (for in it he has himself as the Angel in the instant of creation, because his intellect is applied by God to the first right dictate, from which the first act of the will infallibly follows), but of the other, terminative instant of it; because, since then the will is supposed to be in act, through the act which it elicited from the special motion of God, it can, through counsel and deliberation, apply itself to what it wills, and consequently sin, by converting itself to a useful or delightful good discordant with reason. Just as the Angel could sin, and in fact did sin, in the second instant of creation, by inordinately seeking his own excellence, because then he could fully deliberate, and move himself.

§ III

Resolution of the third difficulty

The third difficulty is, whether the will is moved by God not only morally, but even physically, to operate? For its resolution, it must be observed, with St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 9, that since the act of the will is, as it were, a mean between the faculty and the object, the change of the act of the will can be considered either on the part of the will itself, or on the part of the object. Whence a twofold motion of the will can be given: one moral and objective, standing on the part of the intellect, and positing nothing real and physical in the will, but only extrinsically, by the manifestation of the goodness which is in the object, alluring and inviting it — which Augustine explains, treatise 27 on John, by the example of the sheep, which is drawn by the showing of a green branch, and of the boy, who is incited to run by the display of an apple or a nut: You show a green branch to a sheep (he says), and you draw it? Nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn. The other stands on the part of the will, and intrinsically changes it, and applies it to willing that object, which allures it by its own goodness and fittingness. Whence the latter pertains to the genus of efficient cause, and is called real and physical, or effective and applicative; the former, however, pertains to the genus of final cause, and is customarily called metaphorical or objective, for the end, since it does not act by a proper action, but a metaphorical one, alluring the will to love of itself, is said to move only improperly and metaphorically. This being presupposed:

I say, third, that God moves the will to operate, not only morally, and on the part of the object, but also physically, and on the part of the faculty.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, art. 4, where he asks whether God can move the created will? And in the body of the article he distinguishes a twofold genus of motion, one standing on the part of the object, the other on the part of the faculty, and concludes that in both ways it is proper to God to move the will (understand efficaciously, as he explains there), but chiefly in the second way, inclining it interiorly; therefore he holds that God moves the will not only morally, and on the part of the object, but also physically, and on the part of the faculty. Whence there he objects to himself arguments taken from violence and injury to liberty, which would be objected to him in vain, if he were speaking of a merely moral and objective motion, since there could be no doubt or suspicion that such a motion inflicts violence, or injures liberty.

It is proved, second, from the same Holy Doctor, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 9, where he argues thus: Since the act of the will is, as it were, a mean between the faculty and the object, the change of the act of the will can be considered either on the part of the will

itself, or on the part of the object. On the part of the will, indeed, nothing can change the act of the will, except that which operates within the will — and this is the will itself, and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which, according to faith, is God alone; whence God alone can, by the inclination of the will, transfer it from one thing to another, according as He wills. By these words he clearly teaches that God moves the will not only on the part of the object, but also on the part of the faculty, really changing it, and transferring it from one inclination to another — and this he proves from the fact that He is the cause of the being of the will, and consequently can enter into it, and operate within it, which is granted to no creature, even angelic, according to that saying of Ezekiel 44: This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it, because the Lord God of Israel has entered by it.

He uses a similar argument, 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 88, where he says thus: It is necessary that every motion of the will proceed from an interior principle; but no created substance is conjoined to the intellectual soul, as to its interior, except God alone, who alone is its cause, and sustains it in being; from God alone, therefore, can voluntary motion be caused. And I, q. 106, art. 2, in the body: On the part of itself, the will can in no way be moved, except by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer toward the thing willed; but only He can change this inclination, who conferred on the creature the power of willing, just as also only that agent can change a natural inclination, which can give the power upon which the natural inclination follows. Now this argument would not be valid, but would be altogether trifling, if St. Thomas were speaking of merely moral motion; because for a purely moral and objective motion, an entering into the confines of the will is not required, nor its real and physical change, and it is irrelevant to that genus of motion that God be the author and cause of the will, since the Angels, who are not its cause, can move it morally, and by way of persuading, as he himself teaches, I, q. 111, art. 2, in these words: God alone can move the will efficaciously, but the Angel and man by way of persuading. By these words he suggests another reason to prove our conclusion: for no motion standing on the part of the object, in this state of the way, can be of itself and by its nature efficacious; therefore if God can move the will efficaciously, He can move it not only morally, and on the part of the object, but also physically, and on the part of the faculty. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved from the same Holy Doctor, I, q. 105, art. 4, in the body, where he argues thus: For nothing can sufficiently move some mobile thing, unless the active power of the mover exceeds, or at least equals, the passive power of the mobile; but the passive power of the will extends to the good in universal, for its object is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being; but any created good is a certain particular good, while God alone is the universal good, whence He alone fills the will,

and sufficiently moves it as an object. By these words he clearly declares that no created good, however fittingly proposed to the will, can, by its own power, efficaciously move and determine it to love itself, but that this belongs to the infinite and universal good alone. Whence even God, as He is known by us wayfarers obscurely and enigmatically, cannot, in the notion of object, efficaciously move the will; because He is not apprehended as the universal good, containing in Himself every notion of good, but is sometimes represented as inflicting the evil of punishment, or as prohibiting some delightful good toward which the will is inclined, which it can then pursue with hatred, or not love; and thus no motion standing on the part of the object, in this state of the way, can be of itself and by its nature efficacious, and efficaciously or infallibly move the will.

This is confirmed: a motion with which the dissent of the will cannot be composed is physical, and not purely moral; but God moves the will with a motion with which the dissent of the will cannot be composed; therefore He moves it physically, and not only morally. The major is established from what has already been said; the minor is proved from St. Thomas here, q. 10, art. 4, ad 3, where he says thus: If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to it. And II-II, q. 24, art. 11: The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly operates whatever it wills; whence it is impossible for these two to be true at once, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning.

Our conclusion can also be recommended by the reason which St. Thomas suggests, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 8, in these words: Just as the will can change its own act, so also, much more, can God; but the will not only morally, but even physically, moves and changes itself from one act to another, without violence and injury to its liberty; therefore much more can God do this.

This is confirmed: the will can physically move and change itself from one act to another, its liberty unharmed, by reason of the perfect dominion it has over its own free acts; but God has a more perfect dominion over them, since, according to Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, God has men's own wills more in His power than they themselves have. Therefore, a fortiori, He can, without injury to liberty, physically move the will, and change it from one act to another.

Finally, our conclusion can be proved by this argument: God, through prevenient grace, truly and properly effects the consent and determination of our will toward the good; but He cannot truly and properly effect this through merely moral motion; therefore He moves the will not only morally, but also physically. The major is certain from faith,

both because the will, as a second cause, truly and properly effects its own determination and consent — therefore, a fortiori, God, as first cause, produces this; for nothing falling under the causality and efficiency of a second cause can escape the causality and efficiency of the first cause, as is evident of itself. And also because Trent, session 6, chapter 7, teaches that the beginning of justification in adults must be taken from the prevenient grace of God — but the beginning of justification in adults begins from the consent and determination of free will toward the good, for example, toward believing the revealed mysteries, or toward loving God above all things; therefore God, through His prevenient grace, truly and properly effects the consent and determination of our will toward the good.

The minor, however, seems manifest, for moral motion is not a true and proper efficiency, but only an improper and metaphorical one, and belongs to the genus of final cause rather than efficient; for it moves only objectively, by presenting to the will a goodness which allures it by its fittingness. This is established by the example of a boy, who is morally moved and excited to run, by the display of an apple, or an image; for who would say that this moral motion and excitation is truly and properly the efficient cause of his running? Therefore God, through merely moral and objective motion, does not truly and properly effect the consent and determination of our will toward the good, but only improperly. Whence Prosper, in his poem On the Ungrateful, teaches that divine grace not only moves by counsels and persuasions, but changes and reforms the mind of man inwardly.

Similarly Augustine, book 1, to Simplicianus, question, teaches that grace applies the mind of man to acting well, which cannot pertain to a purely moral and objective motion, which does not apply, but only excites, allures, and invites the will to act. Likewise St. Bernard, in the book on Free Will, toward the end, says that God, through grace, applies the will to the work, and explains the work to the will. By these words he indicates both motions — the physical, indeed, when he says that He applies the will to the work; and the moral, when he adds: and explains the work to the will, that is, shows it the fittingness and goodness of the object or work, which pertains to moral motion. Both also Cyril of Alexandria seems to suggest, in the book on Adoration in Spirit, around the middle.

Just as, therefore, in man there is given a twofold faculty, namely intellect and will, so, according to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, a twofold motion is required, or a twofold grace, touching each faculty. For on the part of the intellect, illumination and pious thought is required; on the part of the will, motion and application, which Augustine sometimes calls the ministration of the spirit. These two graces are, as it were, the two

arms of God, embracing the soul, of which it is said in the Canticle: His left hand is under my head — that is, the intellect, which is the head of the soul, illuminated through knowledge. And his right hand shall embrace me — through His inspiration and motion, touching, and through charity, inflaming the heart and affection.

Both this grace and motion many think Trent, session 6, canon 5, suggests, in these words: If anyone shall say that free will, moved and excited by God, cannot dissent if it wills, let him be anathema. For by these words it seems to distinguish motion from excitation, and to teach that free will is not only physically moved by God, as Calvin asserted, nor only morally excited, as Pelagius taught, but is simultaneously physically moved, and morally excited, and consequently, under God's motion, retains the power to dissent, and consequently liberty.

You will object, first: Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34, says that God, by visible persuasions, acts so that we may will and believe, either through evangelical exhortations extrinsically, or through revelation intrinsically; but to consent or dissent is proper to the will; therefore he admits only a motion and grace morally exciting, subject to the will as to efficacy and use.

I respond that Augustine, in that passage, indeed transmits and explains motion and grace morally exciting, and that which stands, in internal calling, on the part of excitation and illumination, but does not exclude the physical and effective motion of a good will, but clearly expresses it there in these words: Indeed, God works even the good willing itself in man, and in all things His mercy anticipates us; but to consent to the calling of God, or to dissent from it, as I said, is proper to the will. By these words he clearly declares that although it is proper to the will to consent to the calling of God, God Himself nevertheless works the willing itself in us through grace. Whence in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 13, he says thus: We, therefore, will, but God works in us both the willing itself. We, therefore, work, but God works in us both the working itself for a good will. It is expedient for us to believe and say this: this is pious, this is true, that the confession be humble and submissive, and that all be given to God. And On Grace and Free Will, chapter 16: It is certain that we will when we will, but He brings it about that we will the good, of which it is written, The will is prepared by the Lord. And book 1, Retractationes, chapter 10: When I said, in the book on Genesis, that the divine light nourishes the pure hearts of those who turn themselves, from love of visible things, to the fulfilling of His precepts, which all men can do, if they will — let not the new Pelagian heretics think that this was said according to their view; for it is indeed altogether true, that this can be done, if they will; but the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so augmented by the gift of charity that they can.

You will object, second: if the will were moved by God to act not only morally, but also physically, it would not move itself, and consequently would stand merely passively with respect to its own acts — which is heretical, and condemned by Trent against Luther. The inference seems manifest, for it involves a contradiction that something be moved by another, and nevertheless move itself.

I respond that St. Thomas proposes this same argument to himself, I, q. 105, art. 4, where he asks, whether God can move the created will? And he responds that God can move it objectively and effectively, inclining it interiorly, and objects to himself, in the second place, on the contrary: God cannot make contradictories to be simultaneously true; but this would follow, if He were to move the will; for the will's being moved is itself its being moved from itself, and not from another; therefore God cannot move the will. Behold that same argument which the adversaries object to us, to which he responds thus: To the second it must be said that to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle; but that intrinsic principle can be from another, extrinsic principle, and thus to be moved from itself is not repugnant to being moved by another. The same he teaches, De Malo, q. 3, art. 2, ad 4, in these words: When free will moves itself, it is not excluded that it be moved by another, from whom it has this very thing, that it moves itself. It is not, therefore, repugnant that free will be moved by God as by the first cause and first mover, and nevertheless that, as a second cause, and as a second mover, it move and determine itself. Just as there is no contradiction in the fact that the generation of a plant is simultaneously from the sun, or the heaven, as the first generator, and altering agent, and from the earth, as a second generator, subordinate to it. Indeed, since among things moving that are per se subordinate, the second does not move itself except as moved by the prior — and the will, in acting and moving, is per se subordinated to God as the first cause, and first mover — it is altogether repugnant that the will move itself, without first, by nature, being moved by God, and consequently premoved, because, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics 4, text 23: The mover by nature is prior to the moved. Or as St. Thomas says, 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 149: The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the mobile, in reason and cause — that is, by priority of reason and causality.

Rightly and wisely, then, does Henriquez, the celebrated theologian of the Society, who was the teacher of Suárez, say, in the book On the End of Man, chapter 6: It is not so difficult to understand, as some think, that, the exercise of our free cooperation being preserved, God, tempering the force of His concurrence, moves by efficacious aid, both physically on the part of the faculty, and morally on the part of the object.

The other arguments of the adversaries, which proceed either from injury to human liberty, or from violation of divine sanctity, have been resolved in the Treatise on the Will of God, chapters 4 and 5, in explaining the concord of the predetermining decree, and of physical predetermination, with human liberty, and divine sanctity. Whence we refer the reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

Chapter III

On fruition

That it may be clearly perceived what fruition is, or in what it essentially consists, it must be observed that, for enjoying some thing, these three things are necessary: to love, to possess, and to rejoice, or to be delighted. For if someone loves, and in no way possesses, he desires, but does not enjoy, the thing which he loves. Similarly, one who loves and possesses something, but does not delight in its possession, does not enjoy it — as is clear in one who takes a bitter potion which he desires, for he is not said to enjoy it, because from its taking he perceives no delight. It is asked, then, in which of these three does fruition formally and essentially consist? For the resolution:

I say briefly that fruition, properly speaking, is neither the possession or attainment of the desired object, nor its love, but the delight caused by the love and presence of the beloved thing.

This is proved by the reason which St. Thomas suggests, here, q. 11, art. 1: fruition is derived from fruit, because just as fruit is that which is ultimately expected from a tree, and is perceived with a certain sweetness and delight, so fruition is something ultimate which we expect in a thing, and which we perceive with a certain sweetness. But these things belong most fittingly to delight, and with more right than to any other act; for delight is the last thing that we expect in a thing — for it is first that we love and desire the thing, then that we attain it, and finally that we rest and delight in its possession. The very rest or delight, too, always has sweetness or pleasantness joined to it, but not love and possession. Therefore fruition consists formally in delight, not in love, or attainment. Whence when Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1, chapter 4, says that to enjoy is to cling by love to some thing for its own sake, he speaks in the causal sense, not the formal; for love is the cause of delight, in which fruition formally consists.

From this it is gathered, first, that perfect fruition is only of the last end; for the ultimate simply expected by man is the last end, which totally satiates and quiets the appetite; because, however, an intermediate end is delightful in itself, and terminates the motion of the will, under this aspect it terminates some fruition and rest of the will.

It is gathered, second, that because the last end can be possessed in two ways, namely perfectly in reality, and imperfectly in hope, a twofold fruition of it can be given: one perfect, which is had in the fatherland concerning God clearly seen; the other imperfect, which is had here in the way concerning God, imperfectly possessed through hope and love, of which the Apostle says, Romans 12: Rejoicing in hope. These, however, differ in species, since one is borne toward the good known by faith, and hoped for, and not yet possessed, and is elicited by the virtue of hope; the other toward the good present, possessed, and known by intuitive vision, and is elicited in the fatherland by the habit of charity.

Chapter IV

On intention

Intention is formally an act of the will, as St. Thomas here, q. 12, art. 1, and proves it by a reason drawn from the etymology of the name. For to intend, as the name sounds, is to tend toward an end; but it is proper to the will to tend toward an end — both because the will is borne toward things according as they are in themselves, on the part of the thing, and thus properly, as it were, tends outside itself toward them, whereas the intellect is borne toward things as they are in itself, by reason of intelligible species, whence it rather draws them to itself, than tends toward them; and also because to tend toward an end belongs first and principally to that faculty which moves itself and all others toward the end, which belongs to the will alone; therefore intention, formally speaking, is an act of the will.

That it presupposes an act of the intellect is clear, because since nothing is willed unless first known, the will does not tend toward the end to be obtained through means, unless the intellect first proposes to it the end in order to the means, and their proportion with the end. And by reason of this presupposed act, intention is designated in Scripture by the name of eye, or light, as St. Thomas notes, in the article cited, ad 1, in these words: Intention is metaphorically named eye, not because it pertains to cognition, but because it presupposes cognition, through which the end toward which it moves is proposed to the will, just as by the eye we foresee where we ought to tend bodily. Whence Gilbert says excellently on the Canticle: If you have several eyes, after the example of the archer, close all the others, and use only this one, by which you may be able to gaze on your beloved.

The formal object of intention is the end, both ultimate and non-ultimate, as to be obtained through means. This is clear both from the common opinion of moral

philosophers and theologians, who indeed place in the will an act of intention concerning particular ends, such as acquiring health, making a pilgrimage, or something similar; and also from the difference found between intention and fruition. For, as St. Thomas observes here, art. 2, ad 3, intention regards the end by way of a certain motion and tendency; but motion and tendency regard not only the end or ultimate terminus, but also the proximate and intermediate. Fruition, however, regards the end by way of rest, which does not occur except when motion ceases; but motion does not cease, except when the ultimate terminus is acquired. Whence, although true and perfect fruition is only of the last end, which is the last thing simply expected by man, intention is not only of the last end, but also of particular and intermediate ends.

That the formal object of intention is the end, as to be obtained through means, is clear from the distinction which exists between intention, simple volition, and fruition; for simple volition regards the end as absolutely good in itself, intention as the reason for willing the means, and insofar as it is attainable through them, but fruition regards it as delightful, and quieting of the appetite. Whence, although these three acts are concerned with the end, and have the same material object, they are nevertheless distinguished in species, because they regard it under a diverse formal aspect already explained; and they have themselves as, in a stone, to seek the center, to tend actually to the center, and to rest in the center, which, as is established, are essentially distinct.

Of this act the Holy Fathers discourse elegantly, especially Gregory and Bernard — the former, explaining that saying of Job 38, Upon what were its bases made firm, says thus: The bases of each soul are its own intentions, for just as a building rests on columns, and the columns on bases, so our life rests on the virtues, and the virtues on the innermost intention. The latter, on these words of the Canticle, Thy cheeks are beautiful as the turtledove's, writes this: Two things are necessarily required in intention (which we have said to be the face of the soul): the thing, and the cause, that is, what you intend, and for what reason. From these two, indeed, either beauty or deformity is indicated: so that the soul which has both of these upright and modest may rightly and truly be told: thy cheeks are beautiful as the turtledove's. But that which lacks one of these cannot be said to have cheeks beautiful as the turtledove's, on account of the deformity which will be present in that respect.

Chapter V

On counsel and consent

Before we discourse on election, for which two acts are prerequisite, two must be explained. The first is called counsel, which includes two acts of the intellect, namely the inquiry into the means which can help toward obtaining the end, and the judgment concerning their goodness and fittingness: the first is as the way, the second as the terminus, for through the inquiry of reason we arrive at the judgment concerning fitting means. Whence Cajetan here, q. 14, art. 1, says: Counsel signifies a complete inquiry, that is, up to and including judgment. This is clear in the common counsel of several persons, for if, difficulties having multiplied, no judgment, or deliberation, or verdict is arrived at, but it is deferred to another day or hour, all commonly feel and say that counsel is not complete.

Counsel, then, as it is found in men, is the inquiry and practical judgment of reason, concerning the means to be applied by us, when the matter is doubtful, and of some importance. In this definition, or description, inquiry and judgment is the genus, because in man judgment concerning the goodness and fittingness of means is not found, without prior inquiry. It is added, "of practical reason," because the inquiries and judgments of the speculative intellect, such as mathematical consultations and demonstrations, are not counsels, as Aristotle says, Ethics 3, chapter 3. It is subjoined, "concerning means," because counsel is not of the end, but only of those things which are for the end; for since it is a certain discourse of the practical intellect, just as discourse is not of principles, but of conclusions, so neither is counsel of the end, which has itself as the first principle in matters of action, but only of the means which conduce to its attainment. Whence Aristotle, Ethics 3, chapter 3, says: We deliberate not about the end, but about those things which tend toward the end; for neither does the physician deliberate whether he ought to heal, nor the orator whether he ought to persuade, nor the statesman whether he ought to temper the state with good laws, nor does anyone else deliberate about the end; but all, when they have established the end which they seek, deliberate how, or by what means, they can attain it. Then it is said, "to be applied by us," because counsel is only about those things which are done by us, or which are subject to our care and dominion — for the Gauls, for example, do not deliberate how the Indians ought to live or do business. Finally, it is posited, "when the matter is doubtful, or of some importance," because those things which are certain and determined in some art or discipline do not fall under counsel. For in vain (says the Philosopher, cited above) would the grammarian deliberate how the characters of letters are to be formed, and the geometer how a triangle is to be described, how a circle; for these things occur in the

same way, and are determined in the art. Thus Moses, Exodus 25, did not consult skilled craftsmen how the Tabernacle was to be built, because God had already determined this. Similarly, too, concerning small matters there is no deliberation, for about these the prudent man is not solicitous, because it matters little whether they occur one way or another; whence it is said that the Praetor does not concern himself with the smallest matters.

I said, however, that counsel, as it is found in men, is inquiry and judgment; for just as knowledge is found in God without discourse, so also counsel without inquiry; because inquiry presupposes ignorance, or doubt, which have no place in God. Whence counsel is attributed to God, as regards the certainty of knowledge or judgment, which in us arises from the inquiry of counsel, but not as regards the consultation or inquiry of means, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 14, art. 1, ad 2, and I, q. 22, art. 1, ad 1, where he says: The very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God, not on account of inquiry, but on account of the certainty of knowledge, to which those taking counsel by inquiry arrive.

In the Angels, however, in whom there can be non-knowledge, there can also be inquiry, though without discourse. Whence Dionysius, chapter 7 of the Celestial Hierarchy, introduces the Angels asking a question of Jesus concerning the work of the flesh assumed for us, according to that saying of Isaiah 63: Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bosra, this beautiful one in his robe? And Psalm 23: Who is this king of glory? Wherefore in the Angels, counsel concerning supernatural things, of which they have non-knowledge, can include not only judgment, but also inquiry, because they can doubt concerning them.

The inquiry and judgment of counsel is followed by the consent of the will, approving the means proposed, and accepting them as useful and conducive to the intended end. Some doubt whether such an act is distinct from election. To this difficulty I respond briefly with St. Thomas here, q. 15, art. 3, ad 3, that when the will is borne, through consent, toward several means, then such consent is an act really distinct from election; for then consent is prior to election, since first several means please, and then one of them is chosen from among them. But when the will is borne toward a single means, then consent is not distinguished from election, which is then not determinative of some means among several, but the same act is consent, insofar as it takes complacency in the proposed means, and election, insofar as it prefers it to others which do not please. Whence the Holy Doctor, in the place cited: If only one thing is found which pleases, consent and election do not differ really, but only in reason, so that consent is so called insofar as it pleases for acting, but election insofar as it is preferred to those things which

do not please. Wherefore then consent does not precede election, but is intimately imbibed in it, being regulated by no other judgment than by the verdict by which the intellect practically judges that that single means must necessarily be chosen, in order that the end be obtained.

Chapter VI

On the election of means

Election is an act of the will concerning means, of which it accepts one in preference to another, in order to the end. It is called an act of the will, because although it presupposes an act of reason, by which the means are compared with each other, and in order to the intended end, and it is judged which is more useful — wherefore by Aristotle, Ethics 3, chapter 2, election is called the appetite of what has been counseled beforehand, that is, of the object proposed through counsel, and deliberated by reason — nevertheless it is elicitively and substantially from the will. Both because the object of election is the useful good, but only the will is concerned with the good. And also because election is an act of liberty, which for this reason is called the elective power; but the free resides in the will as in its proper seat and abode. And, third, because moral virtue, which is an elective habit, is subjected in the will; therefore also election itself. And, finally, because, as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 13, art. 1, when two principles concur toward some act, one directing, the other directed, providing the matter to be ordered, then that act is not elicited by the directing faculty, but by the directed one — as is clear in an act of fortitude, or of temperance, related and ordered by charity toward God as its ultimate end; for that act is elicited not by the habit of charity, but of fortitude, or temperance; but in the election of means, the will is borne toward a good ordered by reason; therefore such an act proceeds elicitively and substantially from the will, and only directively from the intellect.

It is said, moreover, that election regards means, not the end; because just as the intellect does not discourse about principles, but about conclusions, so neither does the will elect the end, insofar as it is such, but only the means which conduce to it. I said, "insofar as it is such," because just as in speculative matters, that which is a principle in one demonstration can be a conclusion with respect to another, as is clear in the principles of a subalternate science, which are the conclusions of the subalternating science — so that which is an end in one operation can be ordered to another as to an end, and then, of it, as it has the notion of a means formally, but the notion of an end only materially, there can be election. Just as health, which the physician does not elect, but presupposes as a principle of medicine, can be ordered to the exercise of virtue, and spiritual health, and

under this aspect be elected.

Third, it is said that through election the will accepts one means in preference to another, because we always elect that which the intellect, in the consultation which precedes election, judges to be better and more fitting for the attainment of the end, according to that saying of Aristotle, Ethics 3, chapter 3: That which, after consultation, we prefer to the rest, is that which is eligible.

From this it is gathered, first, that the will cannot, from several means, elect that which the intellect judges to be less useful, and less accommodated to the attainment of the end, because since it is a rational appetite, following the guidance of reason, and the cognition of the intellect, it cannot pursue anything except the object proposed to it by the intellect; therefore it cannot prefer one to the other, unless the intellect judges that one is to be preferred, and consequently more useful and more accommodated to the attainment of the end.

I add that if the will were to elect the means judged less good, the better one being left aside, it would elect evil under the notion of evil, which is repugnant, as shown in chapter 1. The inference is proved, for as Aristotle teaches, Physics 3, chapter 1, and St. Thomas, I, q. 50, art. 1, ad 1, a mean, compared to one extreme, appears as the other extreme — just as the lukewarm, compared to the hot, appears cold, and compared to the cold, appears hot; the dusky, compared to white, appears black, and compared to black, appears white; likewise the mean note of a scale is called grave in relation to the last, and acute in relation to the first. Finally, Damascene, book 1, On the Faith, chapter 3, teaches that the Angels are called immaterial and incorporeal with respect to us, and, compared with God, are called material and corporeal. But the lesser good is, as it were, a mean between the greater good and evil; therefore, comparatively to the greater good, it has the notion of evil, and consequently, if man were to elect the lesser good, known as such, the better having been left aside, he would elect evil under the notion of evil.

It is gathered, second, that if two altogether equal means, or equally conducive to obtaining the end, were proposed to the will, it could elect neither, until the intellect should devise, in one of them, some reason or fittingness, on account of which it might excel and outweigh the other. For since the will, as we said, is a rational appetite, following the guidance of reason, and the thought of the intellect, it can never determine itself toward that which is proposed to it by the intellect as altogether equal and indifferent. This can be confirmed from the fact that from a principle indifferent, and having itself toward either alternative, a determinate action cannot proceed, unless it is first determined by another, as the Commentator asserts, Physics 2, text 48, in these

words: From that which is indifferent to either, no action follows, unless it is inclined by something else to one. The same St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 19, art. 3, ad 5; Physics 2, lecture 8; and 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 2, in these words: That which has itself indifferently to many does not operate one more than another, whence from a cause contingent to either, no effect follows, unless through something by which it is determined to one. But while two altogether equal means are proposed to the will, it has itself, of itself, merely indifferently and undeterminedly; therefore, unless determined by the intellect, devising in one some goodness and fittingness, on account of which it excels and outweighs the other, it will be able to elect neither. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 13, art. 6, ad 3, reduces the whole reason for electing one in preference to another to a diverse consideration, by which something can more eminently stand out, and sway the will.

You will say, first: two equal means being proposed to the will, it remains free as to exercise and specification, since such means are particular and limited goods, and the will cannot be necessitated, except by the good in general, or by God Himself clearly seen; therefore, since liberty consists in the elective power over means, the will will be able to elect whichever of them it prefers.

I respond, granting the antecedent, distinguishing the consequent: it will be able to elect whichever of them it prefers, the practical judgment of the equality of the means remaining, I deny. Such a judgment being changed, I grant. The solution is clear from what has been said above; for although the will is free, because nevertheless it is a rational appetite, following the guidance of reason, and the cognition of the intellect, and its whole liberty proceeds from the judgment of reason as from its proximate root, it cannot operate, nor elect, without the prior judgment of reason, moving and determining it in the genus of final and extrinsic formal cause, as shown in chapter 2, § 1. Whence, just as the will does not have it from its own liberty that it can be borne toward the unknown, so neither that it can elect that which the intellect, by practical judgment, represents to it as the lesser or equal good.

I add that, just as the intention of the end depends on the will, so also the practical judgment concerning the more fitting means to be elected descends from its liberty, by which it willed to apply the intellect to consult concerning means; whence such a judgment can cease, either because the will can desist from the intention of the end, or even because, that being still supposed, it can apply the intellect to inquire into other means, or to devise other reasons of goodness and fittingness in the means which appeared less good or equally good, by which it might be moved to elect them. Whence, even the supposition of that practical judgment concerning the more fitting means being made, the will can, by antecedent potency, and in the divided sense, elect other means;

although the judgment concerning the more fitting means to be elected cannot stand simultaneously with the election of a lesser or equal good; otherwise it would not be a rational appetite, because it would not follow the guidance of reason, nor the practical dictate of the intellect.

You will say, second: the will can be borne, through election, toward all that which has the notion of the useful good; but in an equal, or even a lesser, good, the notion of the useful good is found; therefore the will can elect it.

I respond, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: in an equal, or lesser, good, the notion of the useful good is found, if they are considered in themselves, or separately, I grant. If they are compared to another equally or more good, I deny. For a lesser good, with respect to a better one, puts on the notion of evil, as we showed above; but an equal good, with respect to an equal one, has itself as indifferent, because it does not have, above it, a reason or goodness by which it is preferred to it.

You will say, third: if two goods, altogether equal in every respect, are proposed to a man — for example, to a starving man, two loaves or foods altogether equal in quantity, quality, proximity, and other conditions — does he elect one of them, or both, or neither? If the first, we have what is intended, for then the will will not be determined by some greater goodness proposed to it, since, as we suppose, there is none, but precisely by itself, and by its own liberty. But the second cannot stand, because we suppose that that starving man is not permitted to take both loaves, but only one. The third, finally, seems altogether improbable, for it seems ridiculous that that starving man, like Tantalus, should prefer to perish in his hunger, than to touch or elect the food prepared. Therefore man can, from two equal goods or means, elect one.

I respond that then that starving man, by a certain sudden motion and natural impulse, without deliberation and rigorous election, will take up one of those loaves. But if he wishes to deliberate perfectly, and to consult concerning the better of the food, the will will apply the intellect to investigate, in one of those means, some reason of good and fitting, or of advantage, by which it may excel above the other, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 6, ad 3. But if, after this inquiry, he finds in neither some new goodness, the will will be determined either by extrinsic motives, such as circumstances, or other occurring occasions, or by the experience of its own liberty, which it will be able to will to exercise concerning one rather than concerning the other; and then the very liberty of the will will stand not only on the part of the elicitive principle of election, but also on the part of the object, and will have the notion of an alluring and inclining motive, for electing that which, from its own intrinsic goodness, is equal and indifferent. This must be accurately

observed, so as to meet various objections.

You will ask, whether, supposing an efficacious and absolute intention of the end, if only one means occurs for obtaining it, the will is necessitated to its election? I respond affirmatively, and I show this by a twofold reason. The first can be proposed thus: just as the knowledge of principles stands to the knowledge of conclusions, so does the intention of the end stand to the election of means; but it is impossible, the knowledge of principles being posited, that the knowledge of the conclusion which has a necessary connection with them, and whose truth cannot stand without the truth of the principles, not follow; therefore it is also impossible for an efficacious intention of the end to stand, and the election of the single means, without which the end cannot be attained, not to follow.

The second reason is: man cannot (at least by an efficacious will) will impossibilities; but if he were to intend the end absolutely and efficaciously, and yet not wish to elect the means which is the only one, and without which the end cannot be obtained, he would will, by an absolute and efficacious volition, something impossible, as is established; therefore man cannot, supposing an efficacious intention of the end, reject the single means, but is necessitated toward it.

You will say: such necessity cannot be sought from the end, since no particular end necessarily moves the will; nor from the means itself, which also has only a finite and limited goodness, which cannot necessitate the will; therefore it is fictitious.

I respond that that necessity has its origin neither from the end nor from the means taken separately, but from the necessary connection of the means with the end. Just as when it is said, if Peter runs, he is necessarily moved, the necessity of this inference and consequence arises neither from the running, nor from the motion of Peter, which are contingent, but from the necessary connection found between the antecedent and the consequent, or between the motion of Peter, and his running.

Chapter VII

On use

Besides the election of means, there is given in our will an act by which it applies the other faculties to operating, which is called active use. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 16, art. 1 and 4, and above, in the introduction, q. 8, where he says there are three acts by which the will is moved toward those things which are for the end, namely to elect, to consent, and to use.

Reason also supports this, for acts having the same material object, regarded under a diverse formal aspect, are essentially distinguished, as is clear in intention, fruition, and simple complacency, which, although they are concerned with the end, because nevertheless they attain it under a diverse formal aspect explained above, are essentially distinguished. But election and use, even if they terminate at the means, tend toward it nevertheless under a diverse formal aspect, for election regards it as it pertains to the order of intention, and is the last thing in that order, and an effect of the end; use, however, regards it as it pertains to the order of execution, and is the first thing in that order, and the efficient cause of the end had in reality; therefore they are essentially distinguished.

This is confirmed: intention, which is an efficacious act concerning the end, is distinguished from the fruition of the same, because the latter regards it as present, the former as, so to speak, future; but likewise election regards the means as, so to speak, future, use, however, as present; therefore they are acts diverse in species.

I add that, when a new difficulty presents itself, the will needs a new application and effort, and consequently a new act to overcome it; but in execution a greater difficulty presents itself than in election alone; because to elect is a purely internal act, in which the will only contends with itself, and has no other impediment, or other difficulty, than that which stands on its own part; but in executing, it not only contends with itself, but also with the other inferior faculties, and with external impediments, by which the spirit is often broken, unless it is strengthened by the virtue of constancy and perseverance. Hence it is found by experience that some, with the greatest ease, rightly judge, take counsel, and elect, and desire, who fail in execution, as Bernard, book 1, On Consideration, chapter 1, declares excellently and elegantly, in these words: How often do you will, and in vain? How often do you move, but not proceed through? How often do you attempt, and it is not given further? You strive, and do not attain; you labor, and do not bring forth; you try, and are snatched away; where you begin, there you fail; while you are still starting, you are cut down. The children have come to the birth (says the Prophet) and there is not strength to bring forth. Therefore, besides the act of election, the will needs a new act for executing, or for applying the executing faculties to the work.

You will say, first: election is the efficacious volition of means; therefore it is, of itself, sufficient for their execution, and thus active use, by which the executing faculties are applied to the work, is useless.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence. For election is not called the efficacious volition of means because it alone, without another act of intellect and

will, suffices for the means to be committed to execution, but because upon it infallibly follows command in the intellect, and use in the will, by which the faculties are applied to executing what has been elected — just as upon efficacious intention infallibly follows the election of means.

You will say, second: the will, through election alone, moves and applies the intellect to eliciting the act of command, which precedes active use, as will be established from what will be said in the following chapter; therefore likewise, the election being supposed, the will can, without a distinct act, use the executing faculties, and apply them to the operation.

I respond, granting the antecedent, which some of our Thomists deny, denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the distinction is that in executing, a greater difficulty is found than in commanding; whence, although the will does not need an act distinct from election, to apply the intellect to the act of command, it does indeed need one to apply the executive faculties to the work.

Chapter VIII

On command

Concerning this act there are two difficulties and controversies to be briefly resolved here. The first is, whether command is given in man with respect to his own operations? The second, whether such command, supposing that it is given, is an act of the intellect or of the will?

§ I

There is given in man an act of command with respect to himself, and his own operations

This is proved, first, from St. Augustine, and St. Thomas: for the former, book 8 of the Confessions, chapter 9, says thus: The mind commands, and the hand is moved — so great is the ease, that the command is scarcely distinguished from the servitude. The latter, here, q. 17, art. 3, ad 1, writes this: Then, at length, does someone's will begin to use, by executing the command of reason — sometimes indeed the will of another, when someone commands another, but sometimes the will of the very one commanding, when someone commands himself.

It is proved, second: in a prince command is found, in order to other men subject to him; therefore also in any man, in order to his executing faculties. The consequence is proved,

both because just as a prince has dominion over his subjects, so in every man reason, with the will joined to it, has dominion over the other faculties. And also because just as in a prince there is political prudence, whose object is the common good of the whole kingdom or commonwealth, so in each man, operating according to right reason, there is monastic prudence, whose object is his own particular good; therefore, just as a prince, through political prudence, commands others what is fitting for the common good, so reason, through monastic prudence, commands the inferior faculties what is fitting for the particular good.

It is proved, third, by a fundamental reason: besides election, another act must be posited in the will, which is called active use, as shown in the preceding chapter; therefore likewise, besides the practical judgment preceding election, another act must be posited in the intellect, which is called command, by which the will is directed in the act of using. The consequence is proved, for since the will is a rational appetite, following the direction of reason, to each elicited act of the will there necessarily corresponds, in the intellect, an act directing it.

You will say that, to direct the act of use, that practical judgment which preceded election, continued up to execution, suffices, and thus an act of command is not required.

But against this, first: use is distinguished from election, in that the latter is of a future means, but the former is of the means as to be executed here and now, as we declared in the preceding chapter; therefore likewise the act directing use is distinguished from the act directing election. The consequence is proved: the acts of the intellect regulating the acts of the will have the same object as the acts to be regulated by them; therefore, just as in means, as they have the notion of the eligible and of the to-be-executed, a diverse objective formal notion of utility is found (namely, useful as future, and as present), sufficient for specifying and multiplying a twofold act of the will, so a diverse notion of objective knowability cannot fail to be found in them, sufficient for multiplying two acts of the intellect, namely judgment, and command.

Against this, second: the act of judgment, as it is continued after election, does not propose to the will anything else, than what it proposed before election; otherwise it would not be the same act continued, but a diverse one; but before election, it either proposed only the means as to be elected, or, if it also proposed them as to be executed, it did not propose the execution, except as future, and as it were distant; therefore, after election, it will represent it in no other way; but an act of the intellect proposing to the will the execution as future and distant is not sufficient to direct the use of the will,

which has for its object the means as to be committed to execution here and now; therefore another act of the intellect must be posited, which can be nothing other than an act of command.

Against this, third: for it to be committed to execution by subjects what the Prince judges ought to be done by them, a precept is necessary, on account of the difficulty which is in the execution of the work; therefore, since a similar and no less difficulty is in the same man with respect to his own faculties, in order that they execute what the will elects, and the intellect judges fitting, there must be constituted in the same intellect an act of command, distinct from the counsel and judgment preceding election. Whence, for these three acts, three virtues are posited in the intellect: for counsel is posited eubulia; for judgment or verdict, synesis, or gnome; for precept, however, or command, prudence, as can be seen in St. Thomas, below, q. 57, art. 6, and II-II, q. 48, and 51, throughout.

You will object, first: either command serves to move the inferior faculties, or to move the will? But it conduces to neither; therefore it is altogether useless. The minor is proved, because since the will is a blind faculty, and the inferior faculties are not intellectual, both the former and the latter are incapable of perceiving the command of reason; therefore it cannot serve to move the will or the inferior faculties.

I respond that command serves both to move the inferior faculties, and to move the will, but only mediately for moving the inferior faculties, but immediately for moving the will, so that it may use the inferior faculties, or apply them to acting — whence the intimation of command is made immediately to the will itself. Nor is it an obstacle that the will is a blind faculty, and lacking cognition; for just as the eye sees for the whole body, and not only for itself, so the intellect understands for all the faculties; whence, just as it is not necessary that the foot or the hand see, in order to be directed by the eyes, so neither is it necessary that the will know, in order to be directed by the act of command, to elicit use, and to apply the executing faculties to the work; otherwise the will would not only be incapable of being directed by the act of command, but also could not be regulated by the judgment of reason, nor be moved objectively by the intellect, which is absurd.

You will object, second: either the act of command moves the will to the execution of means as to specification, or as to exercise? Not as to specification, since the judgment preceding election, which dictates that the means are not only to be elected, but also to be executed, is sufficient for moving the will to the execution of means, as to specification. Nor as to exercise, because since the will, by reason of itself, is the first

mover as to exercise, it cannot be moved by it as to exercise — especially since the intellect is moved by the will as to exercise; otherwise there would be given between those two faculties mutual causality and dependence in the same genus of efficient cause, which seems repugnant.

I respond that the intellect, through the act of command, moves the will both as to specification and as to exercise: for although the judgment regulating election proposes the means as executable, and to be elected here and now, it does not, however, propose them as elected, and to be executed here and now; whence, for this second, another act of the intellect is required, subsequent to election, and regulating use, which we call command, as is established from what has been said in the third proof of our assertion. Similarly, although the will is the first mover as to exercise, and consequently to move as to exercise per se primarily belongs to it, this nevertheless does not prevent this from being able to belong to some act of the intellect secondarily, and consequently, and by participation from the will — just as, correspondingly, ordination, which is proper to the intellect, is participated by some act of the will, namely by election. Whence St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, art. 25, says: Election (he says) is an act of the will, not absolutely, but in order to reason, because in election there appears that which is proper to reason, namely to compare or prefer one thing to another — which indeed is found in an act of the will from the impression of reason, insofar as reason itself proposes to the will something not as simply useful, but as more useful to the end.

As for what is added concerning the mutual causality and dependence in the same genus of efficient cause, it must be said that this is repugnant with respect to the same act or effect, but not with respect to diverse ones, as is found only in the case proposed. For the will, through the act of election, moves the intellect to command the execution of means; but the intellect itself, through the act of command, participating a motive efficacy from the preceding election, moves the will as to exercise, not toward election itself, which is the cause of command, but toward another distinct act, namely active use, by which the will applies external faculties to the execution of means. But if you ask, why cannot the will, which is the first mover as to exercise, move itself to such an act without the intervention of command, I shall respond that this arises from the fact that, although it has power to move itself and other faculties absolutely, it does not have it by way of ordination, for this is proper to the intellect, whose function it is to order one thing to another, as will be clear from what will be said in the following section.

You will object, third: man cannot pray to himself; therefore neither can he command himself. But I deny the consequence and the parity: for to command belongs to the superior over the inferior; to pray, on the contrary, to the inferior over the superior;

whence, since in man the intellect is the supreme faculty, which has no other superior to it, it can, indeed, through command, subject to itself the inferior faculties, but not be subjected, through prayer, to another faculty superior to itself.

§ II

Command is substantially an act of the intellect, but necessarily presupposes an act of the will

The first part is proved, first: command is the principal act of prudence, which is preceptive, as Aristotle teaches, Ethics 9, chapter 9, saying that prudence is preceptive, for its end is to prescribe what is to be done; but prudence is in the intellect, since it is an intellectual virtue, as the same Philosopher teaches, Ethics 6, chapter 4, and St. Thomas, below, q. 57, art. 4; therefore command is substantially an act of the intellect.

The same part is proved, second: just as to obey belongs to the inferior, so to command belongs to the superior, because to command and to obey correspond to each other; but reason, or the intellect, is that which is superior and more excellent in man, according to that saying of Aristotle, Ethics 10, chapter 7: The mind is the most excellent of all things that are in us; therefore to command belongs to the intellect.

Third, the same part is recommended by the reason of St. Thomas here, q. 17, art. 1: To command someone is to order him toward something, by intimating and announcing to him what he ought to do, or to omit; but to order, to intimate, and to announce, belong to reason; therefore to command is an act of reason. The major is clear, for a superior cannot will and command something, unless he orders man to do this, by intimating and announcing to him that he should do it. The minor, however, is proved as to both parts, for first, to order one thing to another is to compare one with the other; but the comparison of one thing with another belongs to the practical intellect, just as to the speculative belongs the inference of one thing from another; therefore to order belongs to the intellect. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics 2, chapter 2, says that it belongs to the wise man to order, and St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 6, art. 1, that it belongs to reason alone to direct and order. Then, intimation and announcement is nothing other than a certain manifestation, or declaration, and speech; but to manifest and to speak belongs to the intellect, which is, as it were, the mouth or tongue of the spiritual substance, according to that saying of Psalm 31, The mouth of the just shall meditate wisdom; therefore also to intimate and to announce.

That command, however, necessarily presupposes an act of the will, is manifest, for it supposes the election of the will, from which it participates liberty, and motive efficacy,

or the power to move, as we declared in the preceding section. From this it follows that the weakness of command in us proceeds from the sickness and infirmity of the will, which sometimes does not fully and perfectly will the good which it does, and does the evil which it does not will, as Augustine declares elegantly, book 8, Confessions, chapter 9, in these words: The mind commands, that the mind should will, and yet it does not do it; whence this monstrosity? It does not will it wholly, therefore it does not command it wholly, either; for it commands, only insofar as it wills. The will commands, not with a full command, therefore that which it commands, is not. It is not, therefore, a monstrosity to will in part, to not will in part, but it is a sickness of the mind, because it does not rise whole, being lifted up by truth, but weighed down by sickness.

From these things you will understand that the act of command can be described thus: Command is the ordinative intimation, with a certain motion, of some work to be executed. For command, as is clear from what has been said, imports three things, or arises from a threefold act, namely from motion, direction, and intimation: the first it has from the will, which is the first mover as to exercise; the second, however, from the intellect, to which it belongs to order, and to speak. For those two faculties mutually help each other in their operations: for the intellect directs the will, and determines it as to the species of the act, while the will moves the intellect, and determines it as to exercise. Which some explain excellently by the emblem of two men, of whom one is blind, and the other lame; and the blind one carries the lame one on his shoulders, while the lame one directs the blind one with his own eyes, and, as Alciato says: The one lends his eyes, the other lends his feet.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion, testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, which sometimes seem to suggest that command is an act of the will. For the former, book 8, Confessions, chapter 9, says: The will is that which commands. The latter, below, q. 71, art. 6, ad 2, proves that the first cause of sin is the will, because it itself commands all the voluntary acts in which alone sin is found.

But it is easily answered that they either speak of command taken broadly and improperly, as it signifies the same as to move toward an end, in which way charity is said to command the acts of all the virtues, insofar as, from the motion of charity, the acts of all the other virtues are ordered toward the love of God, or toward God most beloved; or, if they speak of command strictly taken, of which we treat at present, they only intend that it is from the will, not substantially and elicitively, but causally and originatively, because the will, from the intention of the end, and the election of means, moves the intellect to elicit the act of command.

You will object, second: to that faculty belongs command formally, to which dominion belongs, since to command is the proper act of a lord and superior over subjects; but dominion resides formally in the will, which is called the mistress or queen of the other faculties, not in the intellect; therefore command is formally an act of the will.

I respond, distinguishing the major: to which dominion belongs, as to the power of moving, I deny the major; as to the power of announcing, by intimating, and ordering, I grant the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: dominion resides formally in the will, as to the power of moving and applying, I grant the minor. As to the power of announcing, by intimating, and ordering, I deny the minor and the consequence. Dominion, therefore, denotes two things, namely motive efficacy, and announcing and directive power: the first belongs to the will, which is therefore called the mistress and queen of the other faculties, for their motion, as to exercise, begins from the will; the other, however, belongs to the intellect, whose function it is to order, to announce, and to intimate — whence it too is called the king of the other faculties, because it rules them by means of prudence. Command, therefore, belongs substantially to the faculty to which dominion belongs, not as to the power of moving, but as to the power of directing; because, since it belongs to command to proceed rationally, it must not only move and impel subjects, but rule them rationally and moderately, which is done through prudence, and the direction of reason.

You will object, third: every act of the intellect is either simple apprehension, or judgment, or discourse, for the philosophers assign no other operations of the mind but these three; but command is neither simple apprehension, nor judgment, nor discourse; therefore it is not an act of the intellect, but of the will.

Some of our Thomists respond that command belongs to the second operation of the mind, and is a practical judgment subsequent to election, which judgment they call "practically practical," so as to distinguish it from the judgment regulating election, which is called "practical simply."

But against this: in every judgment of the intellect there is found truth or falsity; but in command neither truth nor falsity is found; therefore command is not a practical judgment subsequent to election. The minor is proved, for when someone commands another, "do this," he says neither the true nor the false, because he does not assert something to be or not to be; whence someone is not said to command truly or falsely, but well or badly.

It is, therefore, better answered, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, art. 1, ad 3, that the three operations of the mind which are commonly assigned by the philosophers pertain to the

speculative intellect, but that other distinct acts pertain to the practical intellect, such as prayer and command.

It must be observed, however, that although command is not formally a judgment, some judgment is nevertheless virtually found in it; for it is equivalent to this judgment: this is to be done by you, or it is expedient for you that you do this — and therefore it is called a "practically practical" judgment, as distinguished from the judgment preceding election, which, although it is practically practical with respect to election, efficaciously moving the will here and now to elicit it, is nevertheless practical only speculatively, with respect to the execution of means; because it only proposes its fittingness by way of simple enunciation, not by way of impulsive intimation.

Chapter IX

On the morality of human acts in general

The nature, or physical being, of human acts having been explained — that is, after we have considered them in their physical being, and as they pertain to the order of nature — it remains that we discourse on their morality, or moral goodness and malice. But because knowledge of the generic degree helps not a little for the species contained under it to be perfectly discerned, we must first treat of morality in general, and briefly explain what it is, and what it adds over and above liberty.

I suppose, then, as certain, that liberty is indeed the foundation of the morality of human acts, but not formally morality itself, since liberty is understood in human acts prior to morality; for we conceive first, the intellect proposing some object with indifference, that the will tends toward it with indifference (in which formally consists liberty), before we conceive it to have moral being in its act — indeed, from this, as from an a priori reason, it has moral being in its act, that it tends toward the object with indifference, because from this the act has that it be measurable by the rules of morals. I add that if there were no rule of morals, say no law, still, given the indifference of judgment in the intellect, liberty would be understood in the acts of the will, and yet in such a case there would be no morality in them; therefore morality is not formally liberty itself. Whence, when St. Thomas sometimes says that an act of the will is human, insofar as it is free, or insofar as it proceeds from deliberation of reason, the "insofar as" must be taken in the causal sense, not the formal.

The morality of human acts, therefore, consists formally in the relation of a free act to the rules of morals: both because the notion of morality in human acts belongs to the genus of the measurable and regulable by the rules of morals — but the measurable, as

such, denotes an order to a measure. And also because concerning moral matters we must philosophize in the same proportional way as concerning artificial matters; but in artificial matters, the whole formal notion of the artifact is taken from its order to the idea and rules of the art, which are in the mind of the craftsman; therefore also in moral matters the whole formal notion of morality must be taken from the order or relation which human acts have to their rule or measure.

This relation, however, is not one of reason, but real, since it belongs to human acts independently of any fiction of the intellect; for in reality, and on the part of the thing, human acts are morally good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, worthy of praise or blame. It is not, however, predicamental, but only transcendental: both because moral goodness has a contrary, namely moral malice, but nothing is contrary to a predicamental relation. And also because the predicamental notion regards the terminus as a pure terminus, whereas the relation to the object as subject to the rules of morals, in which the morality of human acts consists, does not regard it as a pure terminus, but as specifying, and as an extrinsic formal cause. And, finally, because a predicamental relation depends on the existence of the terminus, upon whose ceasing it vanishes; but morality is not so, since there can be given a good act of complacency concerning a past good, and a perverse gloomy delight concerning a past evil.

From these things you will understand the distinction between the moral being of money, for example, and the moral being of human acts: for the value of money, and the price of venal things, is directly and immediately taken from the human will or intellect; but the morality of human acts, although it presupposes divine and human laws, is not immediately taken from them, but from the transcendental order which such acts have toward the object as subject to the rules of morals, which order is real and intrinsic to them. Nor is it an obstacle that the object is sometimes not real, or really existing; for although the predicamental order requires an existing terminus, the transcendental order can nevertheless be concerned with the non-existent, and with non-beings, as is established in logic, which, although it is a real science, is nevertheless concerned with second intentions, which posit nothing real in objects. Likewise dignities and honors, jurisdiction, precedence, and other similar things, we desire and seek by real acts, and yet they are nothing but denominations and beings of reason.

You will say: the same act, in number, without any real change, can become from good, evil — indeed, even from non-moral, moral, as is established in the eating of meat continued from Thursday into Friday, which, without real change, on account of the extrinsic change of time, is made morally evil; and in a first motion, which, if it is continued, reason taking notice, becomes from non-moral, moral, just as from non-free,

free; therefore morality is not something real and intrinsic to human acts, but a mere being of reason, or a purely extrinsic denomination.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for when an act is changed from good to evil, or from non-moral to moral, it is changed intrinsically in its moral being, because it then takes on a new real mode, or a new respect toward the object, which order really inheres in human acts, as St. Thomas says of the relation to the end, here, art. 4, ad 2.

You will press further: that order is not predicamental, but only transcendental, as we said above; therefore it does not inhere. The consequence is clear, for the transcendental order, since it is not distinguished from its foundation, as the predicamental is, does not inhere in the subject, as the latter does.

I respond that human and moral acts import a twofold relation to the object subject to the rules of morals: one transcendental, by which they regard it as specifying, and as extrinsic formal cause; the other predicamental, which attains the same object by way of a pure terminus and correlative. The first is understood in the object prior, whence it founds the other, which really inheres in human acts, and of this St. Thomas speaks, when he says that the relation to the end inheres in the action. This can be explained by the example of the sciences, which denote a twofold relation to the object: one transcendental, by which they are specified; the other predicamental, which is that of the measurable to the measure, and belongs to the third genus, and presupposes the former as the reason for founding — whence, although the first does not inhere in the subject, the second nevertheless does.

Chapter X

On the species of morality

The moral genus, of which we treated in the preceding chapter, is divided into two species, namely moral goodness and malice. Moral goodness consists in a transcendental respect to the object as consonant with the rules of morals, as is evidently gathered from the principles established in the preceding chapter. For since goodness is a species of morality, it must, on the part of the genus, import that very thing which morality imports, and consequently that mode of relation in which we have placed the essence of morality. On the part of the difference, however, it can add nothing else, than that such a relation be to the object as consonant with the rules of morals; both because by this it is distinguished from malice, which regards the object as dissonant; and also because the goodness of any thing is conformity with its rule, and consequently the goodness of a human act must be conformity with the rule of the act, which is right reason.

This is confirmed: moral goodness, since it belongs to the genus of the measurable and regulable by the rules of morals, and the measurable, as such, denotes an order to a measure, cannot consist in an absolute mode superadded to a human act, but only in some respect to its measure. But such a respect is not one of reason, as is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter; nor predicamental, since it does not tend toward the terminus under the notion of a pure terminus, but regards it by way of specifying and extrinsic formal cause, and sometimes tends toward a non-existent object, as when someone seeks a possible good; therefore it can only be a transcendental respect to the object as consonant with the rules of morals.

You will object: St. Thomas here, q. 18, art. 1, explaining the essence of moral goodness, makes no mention of such a respect or relation, but places it in a fullness of being, namely that nothing be lacking to the human action from those things which are congruent to its being, such as a due end, due quantity, due place, etc. Therefore this goodness does not consist in such a respect or relation, but in the collection of these.

This is confirmed: the same Holy Doctor there equates moral goodness with natural goodness; but for goodness and perfection in natural things, it is not necessary to posit anything else than the collection of all those things which are required for, and ought to concur to, the integrity and fullness of the thing, as is established by induction in any natural thing whatsoever, such as man, horse, flower, etc., which then have goodness and perfection, when nothing is lacking to them of those things necessary for their integrity and fullness; therefore likewise the moral goodness of human acts consists in the collection of all those things which are required for them, without a superadded order or relation.

To the objection I respond that when St. Thomas says that the moral goodness of human acts consists in a fullness of being, which he constitutes in the collection of object, end, and due circumstances, he does not speak in the formal sense, but the causal, and only intends that the respect to the object consonant with reason, in which moral goodness formally consists, necessarily presupposes, in a moral act, the due object, end, and circumstances, and requires all these in order that it result in such an act. Whence the example he brings, concerning physical goodness, holds as to something, not as to everything. The parity consists in this, that just as for such physical goodness it is required that a thing have all the perfections and forms due to it according to the requirement of its own nature, and any thing lacking in that respect is called evil and imperfect; so for the goodness of a human action there is need of all that right reason demands, and through any defect and lack of these, it is rendered evil and sinful. The reason for the distinction, however, is that in absolute things, such as substance, the rule

of goodness is not something extrinsic, but the subject itself, and therefore the whole goodness is taken from conformity to it, nor is it anything other than the very forms which belong to the subject. But in actions, whose whole being is in order to the object, the whole goodness is respective, and therefore one thing is that which is required by way of terminus in order that such goodness result, namely a fitting object, a right end, and due circumstances, and another is the goodness itself which arises from their collection and concurrence in the human act. From this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

From what has been said about moral goodness, it is easily gathered what must be said about moral malice, which is the other species of morality opposed to it; for, supposing that such malice consists in something positive (as theologians more commonly teach, and as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins), it can consist in nothing else than in a transcendental relation to the object as dissonant from the rules of morals; since it must agree with goodness in the generic notion of morality, and consequently, according to the generic degree, import that relation in which morality formally consists; but in its specific notion it must be constituted by a relation to the object, opposite to that which constitutes moral goodness. Whence, since moral goodness is constituted by a relation to the object as consonant with the rules of morals, moral malice must be constituted by a transcendental order to the object, as dissonant and disformed from them. More on this at length in the Treatise on Sins, chapter 8.

You will ask, whether indifferent acts by object and according to their species — such as to lift a straw, to gather flowers, and similar things — are truly moral, and consequently whether indifference is some species of morality, midway between goodness and malice?

I respond that they can be called moral initially and radically, insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, and can, from the end or circumstances, put on morality, and in this sense St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, art. 5, calls them moral according to their species; but that they are not moral formally and completely, because formal and complete morality is taken from subjection to laws, which are the rules of the morality of human acts, as is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter. But acts indifferent by object and species do not fall under law positively, but only negatively, insofar as the law does not care about them, and withdraws its disposition from them, which does not suffice for morality.

You will say: St. Thomas, below, q. 92, art. 2, says that law has three acts, namely to prohibit, to command, and to permit. And he adds: There are three differences of human acts. Some are acts evil by their genus, as vicious acts, and with respect to these, law has the function of prohibiting. Others, however, by their genus are indifferent acts,

and with respect to these, law has the function of permitting; therefore, concerning indifferent acts, there is given some special act of law, namely permission.

This is confirmed: nothing is in the nature of things, whether evil, or good, or indifferent, which does not fall under the eternal law, which is the first rule of all morality; therefore indifferent acts are subject at least to the eternal law.

For the solution of this argument, it must be known that "to permit" is said to be an act of law, positive and negative. It is said to be a positive act, in one way only, namely when the law dispenses in something which ought to have been done, for example in the recitation of the office, in fasting, and similar things which the law prescribes, and in which a superior, for a just and legitimate cause, dispenses. It is said to be a negative act in a fourfold way. First, when the law does not command what is better: thus marriage is said to be permitted, because virginity is not under precept. Second, when the law does not prohibit: thus to hasten to second nuptials is said to be permitted, because it is not prohibited. Third, when it does not impede something, though it could: thus God is said to permit sin, because He does not impede it. Fourth, when the law does not punish some evil, in order to avoid a worse one. When, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that to permit is an act of law, either he speaks of positive permission, by which the law dispenses in something which was prohibited, and was not lawful to be done, and permits it — for example, to eat meat in the time of Lent, or to marry a relative in the second degree — which acts are not indifferent, but good, since they are conformable to the dispensing law, and remove from the object the deformity it would otherwise have. Or he speaks of the negative act, which does not suffice for morality, since for it there is required that the act be positively subject to law.

To the confirmation it must be distinguished, the antecedent: nothing is which does not fall under the eternal law, as it is the reason of divine providence, and transfers to the order to God — I grant. That nothing does not fall under the eternal law, as it is the rule of the created will, and consequently in order to us — I deny. For the eternal law can be considered either as it is the reason of the divine will, by which the acts of God Himself, in the production and government of creatures, are regulated; or as, through the mediate dictate of reason, it is participated by us, and applied to regulate our own acts, as they are freely exercised by us. In the first way, all that is in the nature of things falls under it, just as all things fall under divine providence and will. In the second way, however, only those things fall under it which fall under man's power, according as reason dictates concerning them that they are to be done by man; and because concerning things indifferent in themselves it dictates nothing, therefore, as such, they do not fall under the aforesaid law, and consequently do not receive, from their relation to it, any species of

morality.

From these things you will understand that indifference is not some species of morality, midway between goodness and malice, but that morality is adequately divided into moral goodness and malice; for the object of human acts, from which they derive their morality, does not regard reason and the rule, except either by adequating it, or not adequating it; if it adequates it, it is conformable to it, if it does not adequate it, disformable — therefore only a twofold objective morality can be found in the objects of human acts, namely conformity with the law, which specifies moral goodness, and disformity, or deviation from the law, which constitutes moral malice; and between them no positive mean can be given, but only a negative one, through the negation of both extremes, just as neither between odd and even, similar and dissimilar, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 8.

Chapter XI

On the principles of the morality of human acts

There are three principles of the morality of human acts, namely the object, the circumstances, and the end, of which we must briefly treat here.

§ I

The first and specific morality of human acts is taken from the object

This is proved by the reason of St. Thomas here, art. 2. Just as, in natural things, the first and specific goodness of a natural thing is taken from the form which gives it its species, so in moral things the first and specific moral goodness must be regarded from the form which gives species to the human act; but the object has itself as the form giving species to the moral act; therefore from it the first and specific moral goodness in human acts is taken. The major is clear; the minor is proved. Every motion and way to a terminus regards it as its proper form, because it is compared to it as potency to act, and as the determinable to the determinative; but the act is essentially the way and tendency toward the object; therefore the latter has itself as the form giving it species.

This is confirmed: the human act, considered both in moral being, and in physical being, is essentially respective; therefore it must take the first species of its morality from that which it primarily regards; but the first thing it regards is the object, for it attains the circumstances only secondarily, and consequently; therefore it takes the first species of its morality from the object — not, indeed, in real being, but in moral being considered; since diverse acts of the will, one of which is good, and the other evil, can be borne

toward the same object in real and entitative being — for the same money can be the object of theft and of restitution, the same food the object of gluttony and of temperance, the same woman joined in marriage the object of adultery and of the conjugal act. Just as in the sciences the same conclusion, as it is attained and demonstrated through diverse means, belongs to diverse sciences. Whence, just as the unity of the sciences is taken from the object, not in real being, but in knowable being regarded, so the first and specific morality of human acts is from the object, not in real being, but in moral being, and as it is consonant or dissonant with right reason, considered.

It must be observed, however, that when we say that the first and specific morality of human acts is taken from the object, this must be understood of acts good, or evil, but not of those indifferent as to species; for since these are concerned with a purely indifferent object, which is not subject to the rules of morals, they do not take their first and substantial morality from the object, but from the first circumstance, which formally determines the object itself to the notion of good or evil objectively; whence then the circumstance does not have the notion of a pure circumstance, or accident, with respect to the act, but passes, in a certain way, into the notion of the morally specifying object.

You will object, first: the human act takes the first species of its morality from that which it first regards; but the first thing it regards is the end; for the object is willed for the sake of the end, and consequently the end is willed prior; therefore the human act takes the first species of its morality, not from the object, but from the end. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 6, and above, question 1, teaches that moral acts take their species from the end.

I respond, first, that the human act does indeed regard the end of the work, which is called the intrinsic end, and coincides with the object, but not the end of the agent, which is called extrinsic, because the tendency toward this or that end of the agent is accidental to the human act — for example, that almsgiving occur for the sake of vainglory, or to make satisfaction for sins. Whence when St. Thomas teaches that human acts take species from the end, either he does not speak of the first species of morality, or he speaks of the end of the work, which is convertible with the object, and not of the end of the agent, which is distinguished from it.

You will say: there are given acts good by their species, which have no goodness from the object, but only from the end toward which they are ordered by the agent; for an act of fortitude, for example, from its proper object, which is the tolerance of passion or death, has no goodness, unless it be joined to the extrinsic end of some more perfect virtue, for

example of faith or of justice, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 124, art. 3. The same is clear in the act of virginity, or complete abstinence from venereal acts, which is not an act of virtue, unless it be referred to the worship of God, and the contemplation of heavenly things, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, ibidem, q. 152, art. 3, ad 3. Therefore the first and specific goodness of human acts is not taken from the object, or from the end of the work, but from the extrinsic end of the agent.

I respond that these acts too have their primary goodness from the object, for the act of fortitude is commended from the toleration of passions, and virginity from the abstinence from all venereal things, since in these a grave difficulty is to be overcome, which only virtue surmounts. There is required, however, by way of condition, the extrinsic end of the agent, in order that they have complete honesty and moral goodness, but not by way of formal reason. For a good end of the agent can be required for a good act in two ways, namely by way of formal reason, standing on the part of the object; and by way of condition, or extrinsic connotation. It is then required by way of formal object, when, even that object being posited, it has no goodness, apart from the goodness of that end — as when someone wishes to go into the field, to acquire health; for that going out into the field has no other honesty, apart from that which is in that extrinsic end, namely the acquisition of health. But it then has itself by way of condition, or extrinsic connotation, when the object, from its own nature, has a special honesty, apart from the honesty of the end, which nevertheless it would not have without such a condition or connotation, as happens in the examples adduced.

You will object, second: this act, "I will to live honestly," is singular, and determined in the genus of morals, and yet its object is not determined, but most common; therefore the specific morality of human acts is not taken from the object.

I respond that although that object, in real being, is common and generic, nevertheless as it is regarded under one motive of consonance with reason, it is one in the notion of object — just as the objects of the sciences, habits, and faculties, however ample and widely diffused they may be, nevertheless, as they are placed under one formal notion, obtain a specific unity in the notion of object.

§ II

Human acts take some goodness or malice from the circumstances

St. Thomas proves this assertion here, art. 3, from the analogy of moral things to natural things, in which goodness and perfection are taken not only from the form which gives species, but also from the accidents — for example, in man, goodness and beauty are taken not only from form, but also from figure, due proportion, and other accidents. For since any created being is potential, the whole fullness of its being does not consist in the essence, as in God, but also in accidents superadded to the essence; therefore likewise in human acts, goodness is taken not only from the object, which has itself in the manner of the form giving species, as shown in the preceding section, but also from the circumstances, which are certain accidents joined to it. The reason a priori, however, is that such circumstances can import an order of fittingness or unfittingness to reason different from that which the object imports — for it is not only unfitting to reason to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place, or in a great quantity; therefore they can cause in the act a moral goodness or malice different from that which comes from the object.

You will say, first: every moral circumstance affecting the object passes into the notion of object, since it brings no goodness or malice to the act which it circumstances, unless it is willed; but what is willed is indeed the object of the will, just as everything seen is the object of sight; therefore we wrongly distinguish goodness from circumstances, from goodness sought from the object. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 19, art. 2, teaches that the interior act takes its goodness from the object alone.

I respond that circumstances do not pass into the notion of object, when they are not per se, primarily, and immediately willed, but only mediately, and secondarily, or by way of an accident and accessory supervening. They nevertheless then have, in some way, the notion of object, because they are contained within the object, at least secondary, of the will. And in this sense St. Thomas says that the interior act takes its goodness from the object alone; for by the name of object he understands not only what the will directly, primarily, and immediately wills, but also whatever is willed by it, whether mediately or immediately, whether primarily or secondarily, whether directly or indirectly — for however something is willed, it is in some way the object of the will.

You will say, second: circumstances are, for the most part, extrinsic to the human act, as is clear regarding place and time; therefore they cannot give it intrinsic goodness or malice. But I deny the consequence: for just as human acts take from the object intrinsic, specific, and essential moral goodness or malice — because although it is extrinsic to the act, the transcendental order to it is nevertheless intrinsic to it — so too they receive from

circumstances intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but accidental, because likewise the transcendental order which the human act has to the circumstances is intrinsic to it.

§ III

Human acts also take goodness or malice from the extrinsic end of the agent, distinct from that which they have from the object and extrinsic end of the work

The reason is that every human act depends on the end, and its influence, according to that saying of Matthew 6: The light of thy body is thy eye; if thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome, etc. Therefore, if the end is good, it cannot fail to influence with goodness; if depraved, it cannot fail to pour out depravity. Whence a work good by object, ordered to a further good end, is better, and more meritorious; and, on the contrary, a work evil by object, related to a further evil end, has greater malice and deformity. For one who fasts, or preserves chastity from a vow, adds, beyond the honesty of the work, the honesty and merit of religion; and one who steals in order to fornicate commits, besides the sin of theft, the sin of fornication or adultery.

These things are certain and undoubted among all, but there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians, from what does an act ordered to an extrinsic end have its essential species of goodness or malice — from the object, or from the end? For the resolution, it must be noted that an act ordered to an extrinsic end — for example, the volition to give alms in order to make satisfaction for sins — can be considered in two ways: either reduplicatively, as it is commanded by penance, and proceeds from its virtue and intention, as a means chosen for making satisfaction; or specificatively, insofar as it is an act of mercy, regarding the honesty of its own object, although it may be commanded from elsewhere, and ordered to another further end. This being presupposed:

I say, first, the act commanded, as such formally and reduplicatively, is not specified from the object, but from the end of the agent.

This is proved briefly: the commanded act, insofar as it is such, essentially regards the end of the agent — for example, the volition to give alms, as commanded by the virtue of penance, essentially regards the honesty of penance, and does not stop at its proximate object, namely the honesty of mercy; therefore, as such, it is specified from the end of the agent. The consequence is clear, for respective things (such as human acts are, considered both in physical being, and in moral being) are specified from that which they per se primarily and essentially regard. The antecedent, however, is shown thus: the commanded act, insofar as it is such, essentially regards that which the virtue by which it is commanded regards; but the virtue by which the volition of giving alms, in order to

make satisfaction for sins, is commanded, namely penance, essentially regards the end of the agent, namely satisfaction for sins; therefore also the very volition of alms, as commanded by such a virtue.

This is confirmed: the commanded act, as such formally, is subordinate to the commanding act, and, in a certain way, one and the same with it; whence, insofar as it is such, it has its essential specification from that from which the commanding act takes it; but the commanding act is specified from the end of the agent, which it regards as its proper and immediate object; therefore also the commanded act, formally and reduplicatively as such, takes its species from the end of the agent.

I say, second, the commanded act, taken specificatively, is specified not from the end of the agent, but from the object or end of the work. For it first and immediately regards the object, but secondarily and mediately the end of the agent, as is established in the example adduced; for the volition to give alms, commanded by the virtue of penance, first and per se regards the honesty of mercy, but secondarily and accidentally tends toward the good of penance, to which it is ordered by the agent — indeed, it does not regard such an end, except as terminated at its proper object, and consequently as specified by it. Whence the end of the agent is a circumstance of the commanded act absolutely considered, which is called the "why" circumstance; but human acts are not specified by circumstances, nor do they take from them essential, but only accidental, goodness or malice, as is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter. I add that, if commanded acts were specified from the end of the commanding agent, all the actions of the just man, who referred himself and all his things to God through charity, would be essentially of the same species, namely of charity, and thus the just man would never exercise acts of other virtues, and consequently they would be idle and superfluous in him, which is absurd — for thus charity would not be the form, but the expulsion, nor the crown, but the ruin of the other virtues.

From these things you will understand that, a comparison having been made between those two species which are found in the commanded act, that which is taken from the object is essential, but the other, which is taken from the end, is accidental. For, as we just said, ordination to the end of the agent has itself by way of a circumstance, and comes to the act accidentally, and can be present or absent from it; but the order to the object is invariable, and can never be separated from the act.

You will say, first: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5, chapter 2, teaches that he who steals in order to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief; therefore he holds that that act is more in the species of adultery than of theft, and consequently that this species, not

that one, is essential.

I respond that one who steals in order to commit adultery is not said to be more an adulterer than a thief, from the fact that the act of stealing takes its species from the end of lust, but because the commanding act is more principal, and one so acting is more affected toward lust, than concerning the good of another which he steals. I add that the Philosopher can be understood and explained of the commanding act, insofar as it is such, and as it is formally and reduplicatively such; for, so considered, it is not specified from the object, but from the end of the agent, as shown in the first conclusion.

You will say, second: many sins have their essential species from the end alone, and not from the object; for St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, art. 2, distinguishes diverse species of lying from diverse ends — for if someone utters a lie with the intention of recreating himself or another, it is called a jocose lie; if from the intention of helping his neighbor, an officious lie; if from the intention of harming him, a malicious lie. Similarly, if someone utters an injurious word with the intention of taking away his neighbor's honor, it is contumely; if from the intention of dissolving friendship, whispering; if from the intention of confounding the hearer, mockery. Therefore human acts have their essential species from the end of the agent, not from the object.

I respond, distinguishing the antecedent: many sins have their essential species from the end, insofar as it has the notion of an end precisely, I deny. Insofar as it redounds into the object itself, and causes intrinsic diversity in it, I grant. For it can happen that an end which appears to be extrinsic, and of the agent, is really intrinsic, and of the work, as happens in the examples adduced; for because the object and intrinsic end of a lie is to say the false, with the intention of deceiving, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 110, it is plain that intention belongs to the object of the lie. Whence to say the false with the intention of deceiving, in a jocose matter, constitutes a jocose lie; in an officious matter, an officious lie; in a malicious matter, a malicious lie. The same, proportionally, must be said of the other sins of the tongue, such as detraction, whispering, discord, etc.

Chapter XII

Whether the same act of the will can, simultaneously and at the same time, have diverse species of morality, and be good by object, evil by end, or, conversely, evil by object, and good by end

I respond negatively, with St. Thomas here, q. 19, art. 7, ad 2, where he says thus: He who wills to give alms for the sake of obtaining vainglory wills that which is of itself good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, as it is willed by him, it is evil, whence his will is evil. And in book 2, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, ad 4: When someone wills to give alms for the sake of vainglory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from every part of it. Reason also persuades of this, for although the object of this act — "I will to give alms for the sake of vainglory" — materially, and in the being of the entity, is good, formally, however, and in the being of the object, and as it terminates and specifies that act, it is not good, but evil. Both because it has the notion of a means ordered to an evil end, namely vainglory; whence it is not conformable, but disformable to the dictate of right reason and prudence — for prudence and right reason dictate that a good is to be well done, and that a good done badly, or from an evil motive, is not good. And also because then the circumstance of the evil end passes into the notion of the specifying object, as St. Thomas teaches here, art. 5, ad 4, and consequently destroys the specific goodness which was to be taken from the object. Whence hypocrisy, or the appetite for vainglory, is compared to leaven, Luke 12: for just as a little leaven corrupts the whole mass of flour into which it is thrown, and taints the whole mixture with its own taste, so also simulation, once it has imbued the mind, will defraud the whole sincerity and truth of the virtues — says the venerable Bede, book 4, on Luke, chapter 52.

These reasons prove not only that some act cannot simultaneously be good by object and evil by end, but neither can it be evil by object and good by end, as when someone steals in order to give alms. For if malice, taken from the end of the agent, or from another circumstance, infects the whole act, and destroys its goodness, a fortiori that which is derived from the object, which is the chief and essential, will produce the same, and will likewise destroy all the moral goodness of the act. Then, just as it is against the dictate of prudence to elect some good means for an evil end, so also to assume an evil means for obtaining a good end; because evils are not to be done that good may come. Likewise, just as in him who gives alms for the sake of vainglory, the alms, insofar as it is the matter and instrument of vainglory, is not a good object, but evil, for it is vitiated by the end, and is drawn to its species — so in him who steals in order to give alms, the end is not good, but evil, because it is the cause of stealing, and the reason for electing the evil

means, by which it is vitiated, and drawn to its species. Therefore, just as the first act is altogether evil, not mixed from goodness and malice, so also the second. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 19, art. 7, ad 3: Whether the will is of that which is evil in itself, and under the notion of good, or of good under the notion of evil, the will will always be evil.

You will object, first: in natural things, the same subject can retain goodness in one respect, and be evil in another — for example, the same man can have beautiful eyes, and a deformed nose, be sick in the feet, but not in the hands. Similarly, in artificial things, the same work, according to one part, can be beautiful and conformable to the rules of art, and according to another part, deformed, distorted, and dissonant from the rules of art; equally, therefore, the same human action could be mixed from moral goodness and malice, and simultaneously be good by object, and evil by end of the agent, or, conversely, evil by object, and good by end of the agent. Wherefore St. Thomas here, art. 4, having enumerated in the body a fourfold goodness of the act, says in the solution ad 3: Nothing prevents an action which has one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or the converse; nevertheless it is not simply a good action, unless all the goodnesses concur. By these words he seems clearly to teach that a human action can have one moral goodness, say from the object, and yet lack others, which are taken from the end, or the circumstances, and consequently be simultaneously good and evil. Whence, in book 2, dist. 36, sole question, art. 5, at the end of the body, he says: It happens that an act has goodness from its matter, and yet is done badly on account of undue circumstances.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity: the reason for the distinction is that in natural and artificial things, the evil of one part does not infect or destroy the goodness of another; whence the goodness which is from the essence can stand simultaneously with an accidental evil, and the goodness of one part with the evil of another; but in moral things, the malice which is from the end, or from the circumstances, infects the whole act, and destroys all its goodness, and a fortiori the malice which is from the object destroys the goodness of the end; and thus it is impossible that the goodness from the object stand with malice from the end, or the goodness from the end with malice from the object. Whence when St. Thomas says that it happens that an action having one goodness, say from the object, lacks another, namely from the end, and, on account of this defect, is rendered sinful, the word "having" does not make a composite sense, as though the action retained such goodness simultaneously with such a defect, but produces a divided sense, and only signifies that, as far as it is of itself, the act would have had such goodness, unless malice from the end

had arrived, impeding it. Just as if it were said, it happens to one having health, that his humors be distempered, it would not be true in the composite sense, such that, when in fact there is distemper, there really is health, but only in the divided sense, because indeed, as far as it is from other principles, health would then be present, unless the distemper had occurred. In the same way must be understood and explained the other passage, taken from book 2 of the Sentences.

You will object, second: when someone, a precept to help a person in extreme or grave necessity being urgent, gives alms for the sake of vainglory, he fulfills the precept; therefore such an act is good by object, although it is evil by end, and consequently mixed from moral goodness and malice. The consequence is clear, since a precept concerning a good act cannot be fulfilled except by a good act, at least by object.

This is confirmed: if such an act were evil by object, it would have a twofold malice, one from the end, namely of vainglory, another from the depraved object, namely from the vitiated alms; but this cannot be said, otherwise one who gives alms for the sake of vainglory would commit two sins, which seems absurd; therefore such an act is not evil by object.

To the objection I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; to whose proof it must be said, with St. Thomas, below, q. 100, art. 9 and 10, that laws are of a twofold difference: some are given concerning human acts, precisely as to substance and physical entity, or, what is the same, as to material objective goodness — such as those which prescribe helping the needy, hearing Mass, and the like; others, however, are given concerning the end and manner of the aforesaid acts, and consequently concerning their honesty and formal goodness, of which sort are those which dispose concerning the interior rectitude of man, and concerning those things which pertain to the direction of the heart, and to justification itself and interior cleanness, such as to believe, to hope, to love, to repent, not to commit adultery in the heart, not to covet another's goods, etc.

Laws, therefore, which are given concerning only the substance of the act (such as, as I said, that which prescribes helping the needy) can be fulfilled through an act which has no formal goodness, provided it is concerned with good matter, or a materially good object. Whence this argument only proves that the object of this act — "I will to give alms for the sake of vainglory" — is good materially, and in the being of the entity, but does not show that it is good formally, and in the notion of the specifying object.

To the confirmation I respond that some think that in that act there are two distinct malices, one of vitiating vainglory, and another of vitiated alms; for then (they say) it is not true alms that remains, but it becomes the matter of vainglory, and an instrument of

pride. Whence Augustine, in the Rule, or Epistle 109, says that pride lies in wait for good works, that they may perish. And Chrysologus, speaking of hypocrisy, says: With cruel art it kills the virtues with the sword of the virtues themselves, it destroys fasting by fasting, it empties prayer by prayer, it overthrows mercy by mercy. More probable and likely, however, is it that malice is not there duplicated, nor is another given, distinct from pride, or vainglory, which vitiates that whole act, after the manner of vitiated leaven, which corrupts the whole mass of flour into which it is thrown, or of a moth, which gnaws the whole loaf from which it is born. Whence Christ, Matthew 6, said: If thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome. Where by the eye the Holy Fathers understand the intention of the end, which, if it is evil, renders the whole action evil and darkened, and excludes from it all light of goodness.

You will say: just as the intention of the end, if it is evil, renders the action evil, so, if it is good, it renders it good, although it be evil by object; therefore an act evil by object could be good by end. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved by various testimonies of Scripture and the Holy Fathers, in which acts evil and sinful in themselves are excused by a good end — as is established both concerning lying and concerning homicide. For, Genesis 20, Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister, and yet did not sin, as Augustine, book 12 against Faustus, chapter 34, and Chrysostom, homily 52 on Genesis, say, because he said this to save his own life. Jacob lied to his father, saying that he was his firstborn Esau, and yet can only be excused on account of a good intention, because indeed he said this to obtain his father's blessing. Judith lied to Holofernes in many things, and yet does not seem to have sinned, because she did it to save her people. Likewise the Egyptian midwives lied to Pharaoh, who nevertheless do not seem to have sinned, because they did it to prevent the killing of infants — whence it is said, Exodus 1: God dealt well with the midwives; but it is established that God does not reward sins. The same is proved concerning homicide: for, Exodus 2, Moses killed the Egyptian on his own authority, and is excused by the good intention of freeing his neighbor. Judges 16, Samson killed himself with many Philistines, shaking the pillars of the temple; and yet he did not sin, because he did this out of zeal for God, that he might kill the Philistines, enemies of the people of God, whence he is counted by the Apostle among the saints, Hebrews 11. Also the Blessed Apollonia, inflamed by the fire of the Holy Spirit, threw herself onto the pyre, as her history relates. St. Ambrose also writes, book 3 on Virgins, that Pelagia the Virgin threw herself headlong into a river, lest she be violated by the pursuing soldier. And that some holy women did the same laudably, at the time of persecution, to escape the assailants of their chastity, St. Augustine relates, book 1, City of God, chapter 16.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for the intention of a good end never excuses the malice of an evil election, because evils are not to be done that good may come. Whence it is not lawful to lie for the sake of some good end, such as to preserve the life of a neighbor, or to avoid some grave harm, as theologians commonly teach, against Cassian, who, Conference 17, chapter 18, seems to approve the opinion of Abbot Joseph, saying: When some grave danger threatens from the confession of the truth, then refuges of lies are to be taken.

As for those things which are brought forward from Scripture to excuse lying, I say first that Scripture relates the lies of many, but does not approve or excuse them; whence, when the midwives lied to Pharaoh, they were not rewarded by God for that lie, but for the fear which they had toward God, on account of which they refused to kill the Hebrew infants, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 110, art. 3, ad 2, and as is clear from Exodus 1: Because the midwives feared God, He built them houses.

Second, I say that Abraham did not lie, when he said that Sarah was his sister, because she was indeed his sister on the father's side, although not on the mother's, as is said, Genesis 20 — not because she had been begotten of the same immediate father, though not of the same mother, as though she were a full sister, but not by the same mother, as Cajetan and some more recent authors think; but because she was born from the same father, namely Terah, through the intervention of his son Haran, the father of Sarah, as Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, rightly observed on chapter 20 of Genesis. From which he infers that in the time of Abraham marriages between uncle and niece were indeed lawful, but not between brother and sister.

Concerning Jacob also it must be said that he did not lie, when he said to his father, "I am your firstborn Esau": both because the birthright itself was due to him by right, and thus he called himself Esau, not in person, but in right, just as John was called Elijah, not in person, but in spirit; and also because he spoke prophetically, and in a mystical sense, namely to designate that the lesser people, that of the Gentiles, was to be substituted in the place of the greater, namely of the Jews. Whence St. Thomas, in the place cited, in the response ad 3, says that in Holy Scripture the deeds of some are related, as it were, as perfect examples of virtue, concerning whom it must not be thought that they lied; if, however, something appears in their words which seems to be lies, it must be understood that these were said figuratively and prophetically.

Judith, too, in the words which she said to Holofernes, spoke with great caution and prudence, and, by some ambiguities, though not lies, wished to deceive him — as when she said that she would lead him through the middle of Jerusalem, and that not one dog

would bark against him; for indeed she was going to bring him through the middle of Jerusalem, but dead, not alive, carrying his head, etc. That she also, perhaps, lied in some word, is not on that account praised, but from charity and affection for the salvation of her people.

To what is said concerning the homicide of Moses, it is answered that if Moses is to be excused in the killing of that Egyptian, he either did it from an inspiration of God, who then gave him authority for this, or for the just defense of his neighbor, because he saw his brother or neighbor unjustly afflicted and oppressed by that Egyptian, and there was no other way of defending him, than by killing the assailant.

Finally, to what is added concerning Samson, it must be said that he did this at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, and thus lawfully, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1 of the City of God, chapters 21 and 26, and St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, art. 5, ad 4. The same must be said of St. Apollonia, when she threw herself onto the pyre, and of those holy women, who, at the time of persecution, killed themselves, or threw themselves into a river, to escape the assailants of their chastity, as the Holy Doctor teaches in the same place.

You will ask, whether the same act can simultaneously have two species of goodness, or two species of malice? I respond affirmatively: for moral goodness and malice of an act are taken from conformity or disformity to reason; but one and the same act can be conformable or disformable to reason in two ways diverse from each other; for it can have conformity or disformity to reason on the part of the object which it immediately regards, and on the part of the end to which it is ordered — for when someone gives alms in order to make satisfaction for sins, in that act there is given an object, namely the relief of another's misery, which is of itself consonant with reason; and an end, namely satisfaction for sins, which is likewise honest, and conformable to reason. Similarly, when someone steals in order to fornicate, in that act a twofold deformity is found, one from the object, namely from the property of another which is taken away, the other from the end to which it is ordered, namely fornication. Therefore the same act can simultaneously have two species of goodness, or two species of malice.

This is confirmed: the same act can proceed from distinct virtues, namely from one elicitively, and from another imperatively, as is established in martyrdom, which, as St. Thomas says, II-II, q. 124, art. 2, ad 2, is an act of charity as commanding, but of fortitude as eliciting; therefore it can have its special goodness from each. The consequence is clear, for an act cannot belong to some virtue, unless it attains the object under the formal notion of that virtue, in which notion a special goodness and honesty is necessarily imbibed.

You will say: when someone wills to fast, or to give alms, in order to make satisfaction for sins, he does not seek such a work for its own sake, but as a means to penance; but a means, as such, does not have the notion of the honest good, which belongs only to the end, but only of the useful good; therefore such an act does not have honesty or moral goodness from the object which it immediately regards, but only from the extrinsic end to which it is ordered, and consequently enjoys not a twofold, but only a single, goodness.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for fasting, or almsgiving, willed or done in order to make satisfaction for sins, is simultaneously sought both for its own sake, proximately and immediately, by reason of its own honesty and moral goodness, and for the sake of another thing, namely for the sake of penance, to which it is ordered by the agent; whence it does not have the notion of a pure means, nor of a pure end, but of both an end and a means simultaneously, or of an intermediate end, and is an honest good, by reason of itself, and a useful good, by reason of its ordination to penance; and consequently it has a twofold species of moral goodness, one from the object toward which it immediately tends, the other from the extrinsic end to which it is ordered, of which the first is essential to it, but the other accidental, as shown in the preceding chapter, § 3.

Chapter XIII

On the indifference of human acts to moral goodness or malice

It is certain that there are human acts indifferent by their species: for human acts take their species from the object, as shown above, chapter 2, § 1; whence, just as those acts are called good by their species which tend toward an object good in itself, and evil which regard an evil object, disformed to reason, so those are called indifferent by their species which are concerned with an object of itself indifferent to good or evil, as, in itself, neither consonant nor dissonant with reason. It is established, however, that there are many acts of this sort, for to walk, to lift a straw, to go to the field, to gather flowers, and the like, have from their object neither goodness nor malice, but are indifferent to both, whence they can be made honest by a good end, or vitiated by an evil one, according to that saying of Augustine, book 2, On the Sermon on the Mount: There are certain intermediate deeds which can be done with a good or an evil mind, of which it is rash to judge. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, then, is whether an act can be indifferent, not only in species, and by relation to the object, but also in the individual, and all circumstances and accidents which necessarily accompany it being weighed?

I respond negatively, with St. Thomas here, art. 9, and I prove this, first, by this reason which he adduces in the body of the article: although some act may not have, from its species and object, that it be good or evil, because nevertheless the moral goodness or malice of human acts depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances, which are, as it were, certain accidents of them, it must be that any individual act have some circumstance, by which it is drawn toward good or evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end — for if the end which the agent formally or virtually intends is honest, even if the object is indifferent, the act will be morally good, as when someone goes into the field for the sake of honest recreation; but if the end is not honest, by that very fact such an act will be morally evil, because by the very fact that an act does not have a good and honest end, it is evil. For since (says the Holy Doctor) it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason, and has the notion of evil. The same Augustine teaches, book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, in these words: When a man does something in which he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for the reason for which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning. And below: Whatever good is done by man, and is not done for the reason for which true wisdom prescribes it ought to be done, although it may seem good by its function, since it is not from a right end, it is a sin. Therefore an act indifferent by its species, or by its object, cannot be indifferent in the individual, or in its exercise, but must necessarily be either morally good, or evil.

The adversaries respond that man is not bound to apply a good and honest end to an act indifferent by object, but can exercise it merely for delight, or the convenience of nature; for it seems too rigorous (they say) to oblige man, in all his actions — especially those which pertain to the convenience of nature, and the preservation of the individual — always to apply a right and honest end; otherwise men would continually sin at least venially, since such actions continually occur, and men do not remember to refer them to a good and honest end.

But against this, first: as often as man operates with counsel and deliberation of reason, he is bound to operate as a man, and consequently according to the requirement and inclination of rational nature; therefore he is bound to operate in order to the good of reason, or the honest, which is the end of such a nature; otherwise he does not act as a man, but as an animal, and is likened to unwitting beasts, which have no understanding. Whence the Royal Prophet, Psalm 9, said: Appoint, O Lord, a lawgiver over them, that the Gentiles may know themselves to be men — that is, send, O Lord, Thy Word, and wisdom from heaven, that it may teach the Gentiles and sinful men, who live in the manner of brutes, attending only to the delightful and sensible good, to operate

conformably to human nature, and to follow the rules of right reason and prudence, and to pursue the honest good consonant with reason.

Against this, second: since operations are not for the sake of delights, but, conversely, delights for the sake of operations, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 4, art. 2, ad 2 — he who elects an operation for the sake of delight, and operates for this alone, acts inordinately, and sins, perverting the order of nature, as will be more established from what will be said below; therefore it is false, and altogether foreign to the principles of moral philosophy, what the adversaries say, namely that man can exercise acts indifferent by object, for the sake of mere delight or the convenience of nature, as for an end. For the sensitive and animal part, as inferior, must always be subject and subordinate to the rational superior, and be directed and regulated by it, and consequently the delightful good must be referred to the honest. It is not necessary, however, that there be an actual relation to the honest good, but a virtual one suffices; whence, although someone approaching the table may not think of the preservation of life, but only of the delight of food, he does not therefore sin, because he wills such delight, at least virtually, for the sake of the operation preserving life, and thus does not seek it inordinately. For this very fact, that someone acts in an ordered way for the sustenance or rest of his body, is ordered to the good of virtue in him, as St. Thomas says here, art. 9, ad 3. From which it is clear that his opinion is not too rigid and austere, nor an unbearable yoke, or a labyrinth inextricable to scrupulous consciences, as the adversaries object.

From these things, the reason of St. Thomas can be further illustrated and confirmed, and again proposed under this form: as often as man operates with counsel and deliberation of reason, he intends some end; either, then, such an end is the honest good, or the delightful; for the useful, as such, since it is not desirable for itself, but only for the sake of another for which it serves as a means, cannot have the notion of an end. If it is the honest good, the act will be morally good, and consonant with reason; but if it is purely delightful, the act will be evil, and dissonant with reason, because, as we have shown, it is intrinsically evil, and disformed to reason, to stop at the delightful good as at an end.

You will object, first: there are some operations ordered, by themselves alone, to giving pleasure — such as the sight of the beautiful for delighting the eyes, the smelling of an odor for delighting the nostrils, music for recreating the ears; therefore at least these could licitly be exercised for the sake of delight alone.

I respond, denying the antecedent: for no operation is ordered to delight alone as to its last end, but always further tends toward the fitting and useful end of nature. Thus the

sight of the beautiful, the hearing of sweet harmony, are finally ordered to exciting the spirits which serve for exercising human operations. The smelling of an odor is ordered to strengthening the brain, and so of the others.

You will object, second: there is no precept obliging man to refer all his actions to the honest good, and consonant with reason, as often as he operates with counsel and deliberation of reason; therefore the reason of St. Thomas rests on a false principle. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. If such a precept were given, would it be positive, or natural? Not the first, since it is not established from Scripture; nor the second, because it belongs to none of the precepts of the Decalogue, in which natural precepts are contained; therefore etc.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that such a precept is natural; for just as natural agents are determined by the Author of nature to their proper acts by natural inclination, so a free agent is determined through laws and precepts; but we see that natural agents receive from the Author of nature an inclination, that through all their acts they tend toward their proper ends consonant with their natures; therefore also a rational and free agent must have had a precept and law, that in all its deliberate acts it tend toward the good consonant with rational nature, which is the honest good. For it belongs no less to the Author of nature to give free agents, for all their acts, a moral determination, which is through precept, than to give natural agents a natural determination, which is through natural inclination. From this it is clear that such a precept is natural. But to which of the ten contained in the Decalogue it is reduced, authors variously opine. Some think it must be reduced to the precept of the love of God, for by reason of this precept we are bound to love God above all things, and to have Him as our last end, and consequently to refer all our actions to Him, at least mediately, which is done by ordering them to some honest end. Some say that just as there is a natural precept not to squander money, so also not to waste time uselessly, and not to occupy the faculties of the soul or body uselessly in vain and idle works.

More truly, however, or more probably, I think, that just as there are certain truths which do not per se pertain to the object of faith, but are, as it were, preambles to it — such as that God exists, that God is one, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 2, art. 2, ad 1 — so there are certain natural precepts, which are not contained in the precepts of the Decalogue, but are, as it were, preambles to them, such as the precept of loving oneself, to which is reduced the precept of not operating without a reasonable end; insofar as man, because he is rational, and lives an intellectual life, elevated above the brute life, ought to direct his own dignity, and operate as a man, not indeed be likened to unwitting beasts, as was shown and weighed above.

You will object, third: there is given an act indifferent according to species; therefore also as to the individual. The consequence seems manifest, because there is no species which does not have, or at least could not have, some individual.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, because (as we noted above) an act according to species is regarded only with respect to the order to the object by which it is specified, which, since it is often neither good nor evil in itself, casts no goodness or malice, but only specific indifference, onto the object. But the act in the individual is considered as clothed with all circumstances, of which the chief is the end, which, if it is honest, causes moral goodness in the act; but if it lacks honesty, induces moral malice in it. To the proof of the contrary it must be said that although the species which absolutely belongs to the human act is found in some individual, that which belongs to it under a certain precision and state, in which it attains or is conceived to attain the object without circumstances, cannot descend to individuals; because in the individual circumstances are found, without which individuation is not given: indifference to goodness and malice, however, does not belong to human acts absolutely, but only under some precision and reduplication, namely as they regard only the object, and abstract from circumstances.

Two most worthy corollaries to be observed.

From what has been said, it is gathered, first, that the opinion of Escobar, treatise 2, examination 2, no. 102, asserting that it is no sin to eat and drink to satiety for the sake of pleasure alone, and, for this opinion, citing Juan Sanchez, is false, and altogether foreign to the principles of moral philosophy. For it is established from what has been said that the delights of the senses are not desirable per se by the rational creature, but only by reason of the honest good, of which they are the allurement, and, as it were, the seasoning, which provident and wise nature has placed in operations necessary for the preservation of the individual or the species, so that brute animals, which cannot apprehend the honest good, might be drawn by the delightful. Whence to intend the delights of the senses primarily and principally, or as an end, is the nature of the brute, and the vice of man, according to that saying of Augustine, book on Original Sin, chapter 40: So great is the excellence of man in comparison with the beast, that the vice of man is the nature of the beast. Hence Tully, in his books on Duties, and the Tusculan Disputations, infers that the pleasure of the body is not worthy enough of man's excellence, and that it belongs to every question of duty to always keep in mind how much human nature excels the cattle and other beasts, which have no sensation but pleasure. And Seneca, book On the Happy Life, chapter 10, rebuking a certain pig of Epicurus's herd, says thus: You embrace pleasure, I restrain it; you enjoy pleasure, I use it.

And Epistle 88: Temperance (he says) commands the pleasures, some it hates and drives away, others it dispenses, and reduces to a healthy measure, nor does it ever come to them for their own sake. What shame, that theologians have not, after faith, arrived where philosophers arrived before faith. Wherefore it is permissible to retort against Escobar and Sanchez, similarly patronizing sensual pleasure, that saying of Augustine to Julian: I beg you, let not the philosophy of the Gentiles be more honest than our Christian philosophy. Whence, among the propositions recently condemned by our most holy Pope Innocent XI, this one is found: To eat and drink to satiety, without necessity, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts.

It is gathered, second, that another opinion of Juan Sanchez is false, and contrary to good morals, who, in disputation 23, no. 25, contends that in the married, an end of delight alone is not even a venial sin. For if it is a sin, and a disorder of the rational creature, to elicit actions pertaining to the preservation of the individual, for the sake of delight alone, as for an end, it will also be a sin, at least venial, in the married, to exercise an act ordered to the propagation of the species, for the sake of delight alone, as for an end. Whence Augustine, book On the Good of Marriage, chapter 6: Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generation has no fault, but concupiscence for the sake of satiation, although with a spouse, on account of the fidelity of the marriage bed, has a venial fault. And chapter 7: To render the conjugal debt is no crime, but to demand it beyond the necessity of generation is a venial fault. Likewise, book 2 against Julian, chapter 10, he says that spouses contract a debt whence they daily say, Forgive us our debts, when, for the sake of pleasure alone, they exceed the measure necessary for generation. Gregory the Great, book 12, Morals, chapter 17 (elsewhere 20), has similar things, where he writes this: Spouses are then only without fault in intercourse, when they come together not for the sake of satisfying lust, but for the sake of receiving offspring. And in the Pastoral Care, part 3, admonition 28: Spouses are to be admonished (he says) to remember that they are joined for the sake of receiving offspring, and, when serving immoderate intercourse, they turn the article of propagation to the use of pleasure, let them consider that, although they do not go outside the marriage, in the marriage itself they nevertheless transgress the bounds of marriage. Whence it is necessary that they be warned by frequent exhortations to grieve that a beautiful union is defiled by mingled pleasures. Finally, St. Thomas, book 4, dist. 31, q. 2, art. 2, in the body, says: Spouses come together without any sin only in two ways, namely for the sake of procreating offspring, and of rendering the debt; otherwise there is always at least venial sin there. Whence, among the sixty-five propositions recently proscribed by Innocent XI, this one holds the ninth place: The work of marriage, exercised for pleasure alone, is entirely lacking in all fault

and venial defect.

Chapter XIV

The exterior act does not add intrinsic moral goodness or malice above the interior, but only enjoys extrinsic goodness or malice, taken from the commanding act of the will

The truth is gathered from many testimonies of Scripture and the Holy Fathers, by which the will is reputed by God as the deed. For God, Genesis 22, said to Abraham, who was not killing his son, but prepared to kill him: Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not spared thy only-begotten son for my sake, I will bless thee. Where Chrysostom, homily 47: As far as the will was concerned, the Patriarch had already reddened his hand, and had offered a perfect sacrifice, and therefore the Lord, as though the sacrifice had actually been consummated, praises the just man. Likewise, Mark 12 and Luke 21, Christ preferred the two mites of the poor widow, cast into the treasury, to the great alms of the rich; because He regarded not the external work, but the affection of a pure heart: When the Lord saw the widow (says Cyprian, treatise On Works and Alms), examining and considering her work, not from her patrimony but from her mind, and considering not how much but from how much she had given, He said: This widow has cast in more than all into the gifts of God. From this Gregory the Great infers, homily 5 on the Gospel, that before the eyes of God, the hand is never empty of a gift, if the ark of the heart is filled with good will. Finally, the same Savior, Matthew 5, to suggest that the internal consent of the will has the same malice as if the act had been elicited, says: Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. Whence Augustine, book on Free Will, chapter 3: If someone does not have the opportunity of lying with another's spouse, but it is nevertheless plainly established, in some way, that he desires it, and would do it if he had the power, he is no less guilty, than if he were caught in the act itself.

Reason also supports this: for moral goodness and malice are founded on liberty, whence there can only be intrinsic moral goodness or malice where there is intrinsic liberty; but in the exterior act of the executing faculty, there is no intrinsic liberty, but only extrinsic, as the Philosophers teach; therefore neither is there intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but only extrinsic, taken from the commanding act of the will. Whence the exterior act, which is a mere execution of the interior act of the will, does not add goodness or malice to it simply, in order to essential reward or punishment, but only in a qualified sense, and in order to accidental reward or punishment, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, book 2, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 3, in these words: The exterior act adds

nothing to essential reward, for he merits as much who has a perfect will of doing some good, as much as if he did it — even if he performs only one act, as much as if he performed many, the will remaining equally perfect. But it is ordered to accidental reward through the goodness which belongs to the exterior act itself according to itself; and therefore the exterior act adds something to accidental reward. This is clearly evident in the act of martyrdom; for those who are martyrs by will alone can merit an equal or greater essential reward than those who actually suffer for Christ, if they elicit acts of charity equal or more fervent; they do not, however, enjoy the accidental reward, which is called the aureole, because that is owed only to the exterior passion itself, or the actual toleration of death, in which there is a special difficulty, to which some accidental reward corresponds.

Against our assertion, the disciples of Scotus object, first, a celebrated testimony of Augustine, taken from book 13 of the Trinity, chapter 5, where the Holy Doctor says thus: By an evil will alone, someone is made miserable; but more miserable by the power by which the desire of the evil will is fulfilled. By these words he confesses that the exterior act, which fulfills the evil desire, adds, above that desire itself, a greater misery, and consequently a greater malice.

But it is easily answered, from the principles already established, that the sinner is made more miserable by the exterior act, not from the fact that from it a new essential malice grows, but on account of the accidental malice, and various inconveniences which the exterior act brings with it, which without doubt render the sinner more wretched than he would be by the mere will to sin. For from an evil exterior act, the senses are more blunted, and the exterior faculties are rendered more prone to evil; from it also, scandal is often generated, and excommunication is incurred, or irregularity, or the obligation to restitution, which are not induced by the interior act alone.

You will object, second: the interior and exterior acts are prohibited by distinct precepts, for the ninth and tenth precepts of the Decalogue concern only interior acts, namely concupiscence of another's wife and of another's property; and yet fornication and theft, which are the exterior acts corresponding to them, are prohibited by the sixth and seventh precepts; therefore it is a sign that the exterior act adds a new malice above the interior act. Otherwise we would not be bound to express the external act in confession — for example, homicide or adultery — but it would suffice if we said that we had had the internal desire of killing or committing adultery, which the common custom of the Church condemns.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence. For distinct precepts are not therefore given concerning the interior and exterior acts mentioned above, because there is a diverse malice in them, or because they belong to diverse vices; but because, since concupiscence of another's property, and of venereal things, is, for this state of corrupted nature, more connatural to man, and more frequent, than the desires for other prohibited acts, it was fitting that it be prohibited by a special precept, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 122, art. 6, ad 4. Otherwise someone could easily persuade himself that to covet another's property or wife, provided the act does not follow, is not a sin, as some heretics have asserted; and that such a heresy reigned among the Jews, is gathered from those words of Christ adduced above: Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart.

As for what is added concerning the obligation of expressing the external act in confession, the inference must likewise be denied; for although the exterior act does not have an intrinsic and formal malice which it adds above the interior, nevertheless, since it is the substantial complement of the interior act, and from both there arises one moral act in a certain species of malice, say of theft or adultery, it must be declared in confession, so that the complete species of the sin be explained.

Chapter XV

On the first rule of the moral goodness and malice of human acts, namely the eternal law, or the divine will

There are two rules of the goodness and malice of human acts, as St. Thomas teaches, below, q. 71, art. 9. The first is proximate and intrinsic, and existing in man, namely the dictate of our reason, or conscience, of which we shall treat in the following chapter. The other is remote and extrinsic, existing in the divine mind, namely the eternal law, which is the very reason of God directing all creatures to their end. This law was acknowledged by Tully, book 1 on Laws, where he says thus: It was the opinion of the wisest men that law was neither devised by the ingenuity of men, nor was it some decree of peoples, but a certain eternal thing, which governed the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding. To this law is reduced the divine will, which, since it is rectitude itself, sanctity itself by essence, all the rectitude of human life must be conformed to it, according to that saying of Augustine, on Psalm 32: He has an upright heart, who wills what God wills. Whence theologians here ask, whether man is bound to conform himself in all things to the divine will? For its resolution:

It must be noted, from St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 2, art. 7, that in the object of the will two things must be considered: one which is, as it were, material, namely the very thing willed; the other which is, as it were, formal, namely the reason for willing, which is the end — just as in the object of sight, color is, as it were, material, but light is, as it were, formal, because through it color is made actually visible; and thus, on the part of the object of the will, a twofold conformity to the divine will can be found: one on the part of the thing willed, as when a man wills something that God wills; the other on the part of the reason for willing, or on the part of the end, as when someone wills something for the reason for which God wills it. This latter is called conformity in the formal thing willed; the former is called conformity in the material thing willed. This being presupposed:

I say that man is bound to conform himself in all things to the divine will, in the formal thing willed, but not in the material thing willed. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 19, art. 10, and De Veritate, q. 23, art. 8, and theologians commonly.

The first part is proved: to conform oneself to the divine will in the formal thing willed, is to conform oneself to it in the common and general reason for which God operates, which is the common good of the whole universe, insofar as such a good is ordered to God and His glory as to an end; but the human will cannot honestly and rationally differ from the divine in this, as is clear; therefore man is bound to conform himself to the divine will in the formal thing willed, at least negatively, that is, not to disagree positively with it in such a thing willed.

That he is not bound always to conform himself to it in the material thing willed, or in every object willed by God, is established from the fact that God, by the general will of the first cause, and universal provider, wills many things which it is not laudable, nor lawful, to will — such as wars, plagues, fires, the death of parents, and the like — because, indeed, related to the common order of the universe, or to the manifestation of divine justice, they are good; but evil respectively to us, since the common order of the universe, or of divine justice, does not pertain to us. Whence Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 101: Sometimes, with a good will, man wills something which God does not will — as if a good son should will his father to live, whom God, with a good will, wills to die.

This is confirmed: if someone sees his father die in heresy, or in mortal sin, and consequently be damned, from the very work he sees that this is the will of God, otherwise it would not so happen; but it is not good and laudable that a son will the eternal damnation of his father — indeed, from charity and piety, he is bound to will

and procure his eternal salvation; therefore it is not always good and laudable to agree with the divine will in the material thing willed.

You will say: we ask in the Lord's Prayer, that the will of God be done on earth, as it is in heaven; but in heaven the blessed conform themselves to the divine will, not only in the formal thing willed, but also in the material; therefore wayfarers on earth ought also to render this.

I respond that these words of the Lord's Prayer, Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth, either must be understood of the preceptive will, and, through it, we ask of God, that we may obey, in all things on earth, the divine precepts, just as the blessed in heaven always obey God in all things, as St. Thomas expounds from Augustine in the Catena on these words, and II-II, q. 83, art. 9, ad 1, and I, q. 19, art. 11; or, if it is speech concerning the will of God with respect to any thing willed, it only denotes that we ought to conform ourselves to the divine will in any thing willed, not according to itself and absolutely, but as it stands under order to the end to which God orders it, and to will that the order of the divine will be fulfilled in all things. That in the fatherland, however, all conform themselves to the divine thing willed, even the material, is on account of the perfection of that state, where, the will of God being known, they operate only according to eternal and superior reasons, and under that motive by which God wills those things. Whence they take complacency in the death and damnation of their parents, and in the permission of sins, and the whole series of the reprobation of others, revealed to them by God, according to that saying of Psalm 57: The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge; he shall wash his hands in the blood of the sinner. But for us, operating according to particular and temporal reasons, it is lawful to will the opposite — indeed, we are often bound to it, as is established from what has been said above.

Chapter XVI

On the other rule of the goodness and malice of human acts, namely conscience

Conscience, as it were the knowledge of the heart, can be thus defined or described: Conscience is an act of the practical intellect, namely a judgment dictating concerning the goodness or malice of those things which are to be done by us here and now. It is said, first, to be an act, for it is not a habit, as Scotus thought: both because we can act well without a habit, but not without conscience; and also because conscience is often laid aside, and changed from good to evil, or the reverse, whereas faculties, being properties of the soul, are invariable and inseparable. I add that the properties of conscience, which are to testify, to bind, to instigate, to accuse, and to gnaw, or reproach, consist in act, and not in habit; therefore also conscience itself. It is said, second, that conscience is an act of the intellect, and not of the will, as Durandus opines, both because the aforementioned acts belong to the intellect, and also because the Holy Fathers assert of conscience things which can belong only to an act of the intellect. For it is called by Tertullian a natural tablet, on which each one reads his own work. By Damascene, the law of the intellect, which is promulgated to the will. By Origen, the corrective spirit, and pedagogue of the soul. By Basil, the natural judicial court of the soul. By Chrysostom, the incorruptible judge; by Gregory the Great, the most faithful witness. It is added that conscience is an act of the practical, not the speculative, intellect; because it does not stop in contemplation of the work to be done, but instigates man to good, or draws him back from evil, and moves the inferior faculties to the work. Finally, it is said that conscience is a judgment dictating concerning the goodness and malice of things which are to be done by us here and now, because the cognition or consideration of the moral goodness and malice of human acts in general belongs to moral science, not to conscience. Whence St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, art. 2, says: Conscience adds, above knowledge, the application of knowledge to a particular act. From which you will understand that knowledge and conscience have themselves as understanding and speaking; for just as to speak is to understand in a certain way, namely by expressing a concept, or producing a word, so conscience is knowledge in a certain way, namely of application to a work.

Conscience is usually divided by theologians into certain, doubtful, probable, and erroneous. The reason for this division is deduced from the very definition of conscience; for since conscience is a judgment dictating to the will what is to be done, conscience can be taken in as many ways as the intellect has itself in judging concerning the honesty of a work. Now the intellect sometimes brings a certain and determined judgment concerning the honesty or malice of the object, and then it is certain conscience. Sometimes, wavering and undecided, adhering to neither part of the contradiction, it

suspends judgment, and then it is doubtful conscience, to which scrupulous conscience is reduced; because, just as doubtful conscience suspends judgment from apparent reasons, so scrupulous conscience does so from the slightest and sometimes ridiculous reasons. Sometimes it judges determinately concerning some opinion, because it appears likely to it, yet fears the opposite, and then it is probable or opinionative conscience. Finally, if the intellect judges concerning the object otherwise than it is on the part of the thing, calling good evil, and evil good, then it is erroneous conscience.

Of good conscience, Hugh of St. Victor discourses elegantly, book 2 on the Soul, chapter 9, where he says thus: A good conscience is the title of religion, the temple of Solomon, the field of blessing, the storehouse of delights, the golden couch, the joy of the Angels, the ark of the covenant, the treasure of the King, the hall of God, the dwelling of the Holy Spirit, a sealed and closed book, to be opened on the day of judgment. Bernard likewise writes this concerning it, book 1 on Conscience: A conscience is good, which has purity in the heart, truth in the mouth, rectitude in action. It is clean, when it is neither justly accused concerning the past, nor unjustly delighted concerning the present. It is pure, to which God imputes neither its own sins, because it did not commit them; nor others' sins, because it did not approve them; nor negligence, because it did not keep silent; nor pride, because it remained in humility. It is secure, when it does not suffer accusation, either from torpor toward the good, or from presumption of evil. It is right, whose own sin displeases it, nor does it dissimulate the sins of others, and when it reproves, does not insult. Such is a good conscience.

You will ask, first, whether the will, acting against an erroneous conscience, not set aside, always sins? I respond affirmatively; the reason is that the will is not borne toward the object except as proposed and judged by reason; therefore if, from error, a good object is judged evil, and the will is borne toward it, without doubt it will sin. Wherefore St. Thomas here, q. 19, art. 5: the will is not borne toward the good, except according as it is proposed by reason; whence if it is proposed by reason as evil, the will is borne toward this as evil — not because it is evil in itself, but because it is evil per accidens, from the apprehension of reason. And Quodlibet 9, art. 5: An error by which it is believed to be mortal what is not mortal, binds, from conscience, to mortal sin. The same is asserted in Canon Law, canon Omnes 28, q. 1, where it is thus held: Whatever is done against conscience, builds toward hell. And Ambrose, or Ambrosiaster, on these words of the Apostle, All that is not of faith is sin, says thus: Whatever is done, even if it is in itself good, if nevertheless it is not from faith, that is, against conscience — so that, namely, we believe it to be evil — it is a sin. Likewise St. Bernard, book on Precept and Dispensation, chapter 14, writes this: Therefore, whether you think evil to be good, which you perhaps

do, or good to be evil, which you do, either is sin.

You will say, first, for some act to be good, it suffices that it be conformable to the eternal law; therefore, although through erroneous conscience something is believed to be evil, if nevertheless it is consonant with the eternal law, it is not a sin.

I respond, denying the antecedent, for the eternal law is not derived into us, nor promulgated to the will, except by the mediation of reason; whence the act of the will must be conformable not only to the eternal law, but also to reason, in order to be good.

You will say, second: the precept of an inferior does not oblige, when it proposes something against the precept of a superior; therefore an erring reason, proposing something against the precept of God, does not oblige.

I respond that the precept of an inferior indeed does not oblige, when it proposes something which is known to be against the precept of the superior; it does oblige, however, when what it proposes is believed to be the precept of the superior. For, as the Holy Doctor says here, art. 5, ad 1: If someone were to believe the precept of the Proconsul to be the precept of the Emperor, in scorning the precept of the Proconsul, he would be scorning the precept of the Emperor.

You will ask, second, whether it is lawful to operate from a conscience practically doubtful concerning the goodness or malice of an act? I respond negatively, because he who operates from a doubtful conscience exposes himself to the danger of doing what is in itself evil and sinful; whence he who so operates does not act according to the laws of prudence and friendship, one of which dictates that one should not operate where the honesty of the object is not established, the other prescribes that a friend should not do anything that could offend a friend; wherefore he who so operates is clearly convicted of loving more the work which he does, than God, whose law's transgression he thus exposes himself to by acting. Whence St. Thomas, Quodlibet 8, art. 13: He who is led into some doubt by contrariety of opinions, if, the doubt remaining, he takes several prebends, commits himself to danger, and thus without doubt sins, as one loving temporal benefit more than his own salvation. And Cajetan, tome 1 of the Opuscula, last treatise, response 13, last doubt: If (he says) the application to the work fluctuates concerning right and oblique in morals, it is a scruple of conscience, against which one acts illicitly, and moral obliquity is incurred.

I said it is not lawful to operate from a conscience practically doubtful, because someone can lawfully operate with a conscience speculatively doubtful, provided it is practically certain concerning the honesty of the work which he proposes to do here and now; for

the rule of the will is not speculative knowledge, which stops at the mere truth of the object, but practical, which weighs the quality of all the circumstances; and because, from the occurrence of circumstances, an object which, considered in itself and speculatively, appears doubtful, can be rendered practically certain, someone can operate with a speculatively doubtful conscience, provided it is practically certain — for example, if a sick priest, considering the quality of the illness he suffers, speculatively doubts whether it is lawful for him to cease from the canonical hours, upon the counsel of a doctor, or confessor, he can become practically certain that this is lawful for him, and, with a secure conscience, abstain from the recitation of the divine office.

You will ask, third, whether, in doubtful matters, and in a conflict of probable opinions, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion, favoring liberty, in competition with another more probable one, which favors the precept?

I respond negatively, with many theologians and casuists, both older and more recent, most illustrious in piety and erudition. Thus teach St. Antoninus, part 1, title 3, § 10, rule 4; Scotus, to be cited below; Gabriel, book 4, dist. 15, q. 8, art. 3, doubt 2, in the 3rd proof of the 1st conclusion; Sylvester, under the word "Doubt," question 2; Conrad, On Contracts, treatise 7, question 110, conclusion 1; Cordoba, in his Quaestionario, book 2, question 3; Navarrus, in the Spanish Summa, chapter 28, add to no. 183, chapter 27, as cited by the asserter of the contrary opinion, Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 1, chapter 9, no. 13. Likewise, from the Fathers of the Society, Bellarmine adheres to the negative opinion, in a work to the Bishop of Teano, his nephew, whose words we shall relate below. Comitolus, book 5, Moral Responses, where, concerning the more probable and safer opinion to be followed, he rightly calls it the head of Christian ethics, most necessary for treating and deciding the remaining controversies of Christian duty. And he adds that the opposite opinion is a foul lapse, by which we depart from reason, despise the truth, or at least obstruct the ways of recognizing it, impose contumely on the eternal law, imitate those wicked judges who, having heard contrary witnesses, would follow the testimony which appears less likely; we also imitate the imprudence of those who choose what is more likely to be evil, the secure good having been passed over. The same, from the same Society, Michael Elizalde treats elegantly, in the work on right moral doctrine, and Candidatus Philaletus, or Andreas Blancus, who (as Julius Mercorus, Inquisitor of Mantua, says) first restrained, in Italy, the liberty of our age in moral matters.

Among the Thomists, most recently, against the opposite opinion, have taken up the pen the aforesaid Mercorus, in the book On the Practice of Opinions, where he relates more than twenty Doctors for our opinion; Vincent Baron, who elegantly and acutely

proves it in his Moral Theology, against the laxer probabilists; and Vincent Contenson, tome 3 of his Theologia Mentis et Cordis, dissertation 6, on the new invention of probabilism, where, with many arguments, both from authority and from reason, he overturns it. Finally, among the Canonists, against the more recent probabilists, most recently wrote Prosper Fagnanus, expounding the chapter Ne innitaris, where he treats this whole matter of probability erudite and copiously, adducing twenty-six reasons for our opinion, and citing several celebrated Canonists for it, to whom can be joined John Cabassut, priest of the Congregation of the Oratory, who, book 3 of the theory and practice of Canon Law, chapter 13, expressly teaches our opinion, and relates for it several of the authors cited by us.

Many reasons are usually adduced for it, which we have discussed at length in the dissertation on probability; here we shall briefly set out only three.

The first is: just as, in the moral controversies and difficulties daily emerging, we are bound to seek the truth, while it is hidden, and to follow it, when it is clear to us, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 32, Before all things let a true word go before thee — so, while we cannot attain and reach it, we ought to embrace and elect that which appears to us closer and nearer; otherwise Christianity would not be a school of truth, but a den of error; or we would not be bound to seek the truth, and to approach it as much as we can. But whoever departs from the opinion which he judges more probable, to pursue the less probable, of his own accord, and by his own election, departs from that which he judges to approach closer to the truth, with this end and intention, that he adhere to the opposite part, which he judges more remote from the truth; therefore he acts perversely, and sins.

The second reason is sought from the distinction found between one who, in a conflict of probable opinions, elects the verdict which he judges more probable, and one who follows the opinion which he considers less probable: for since he who cannot have perfect or evident knowledge of the truth, by following that which appears to him more probable, or more conformable or closer to the truth, does everything that is in him to attain the truth, if by accident he strays from it, that error will be invincible and inculpable, and consequently will excuse from sin — because, as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins, every invincible ignorance, since it removes the notion of the voluntary, without which sin cannot stand, excuses from sin. On the contrary, however, since he who adheres to the opinion which is less probable, and consequently more remote from the truth, is not thought to do everything he can to attain the truth — indeed, rather seems to spurn and flee it, and to depart from it — by the very fact that he departs from that which he judges closer to it, he does not labor under invincible, but vincible

ignorance, which does not excuse from sin.

The third reason, which is fundamental, and overturns the chief foundation of the adversaries, can be briefly proposed thus: he who does not act prudently does not act rightly; but he who elects the less probable opinion, favoring liberty or concupiscence, in competition with another which stands for the precept, does not act prudently; therefore he does not operate rightly, but sins. The major is certain among all, since prudence is the rule of the goodness and malice of human acts. The minor, however, which the adversaries deny, is shown, first, by the reason which St. Thomas suggests, II-II, q. 43, art. 1, in the argument sed contra, in these words: It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser; therefore to desist from the better belongs to imprudence. Just as, therefore, from the dictate of prudence, we are bound to buy those garments which appear to us better or more convenient, and are sold at a cheaper price, or to take that medicine which we consider more salubrious, or to entrust ourselves to that ship which we judge better and safer, so also, and much more, in moral matters (in which, as Lactantius says, if anything is erred, the whole of life is overturned), we ought to follow the more probable and safer ways or opinions, from the precept or dictate of prudence.

This reason Chrysostom discusses expressly, homily 44 on Matthew, where he argues thus: If, about to buy garments, you go around one merchant, then another, and, where you find better garments, and at a cheaper price, you buy from him — should not the people go around all the teachers, inquiring where the sincere truth of Christ is sold, and where corrupted, and choose the truer more than a garment? Where, although the Holy Doctor does not speak of the competition of a probable opinion with a more probable one, but of the competition of the depraved opinion of heretics, with the truths pertaining to the Catholic faith and religion, as is clear from the immediately preceding words — his discourse nevertheless holds also in the matter of probability, of which we now treat; because since prudence must prefer the greater good to the lesser, as we saw from St. Thomas, we are bound, in a conflict of many probable opinions, to elect the truer, or more probable, or closer to the truth, more than a garment.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated: he who, in temporal or bodily matters, would use a less safe and less probable opinion, in competition with another safer and more probable one, would act altogether imprudently and foolishly — for example, he who would take a medicine which he thinks less salubrious, having scorned and rejected another which he thinks more salubrious and more efficacious for recovering health; or he who would entrust himself to a ship which he thinks less safe, and less secure, having left a safer and more secure one; therefore similarly, and much more, they act imprudently who undertake a work which they think more probably to be illicit, and

who commit the spiritual health of their soul to a less safe, less probable opinion, as to a ship more probably going to perish; nor do they fear (as Hugh of St. Victor says) to give a law to their soul, which they refuse to prescribe to their body. Whence the Gloss, on chapter 1 of De Sentent. Excomm. in the Sext, says thus: He is foolish and stupid who commits himself to danger. And John Andreae adds there: For he more approaches that which is false, in matters pertaining to the salvation of the soul. Since, therefore, he who, in a matter of morals, elects the less probable opinion, favoring liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, more approaches that which is false, in matters pertaining to the salvation of the soul, as we declared in the first reason, he does not operate wisely and prudently, but altogether foolishly and imprudently, according to the opinion of this celebrated Canonist.

Nor does it avail to say that the less probable opinion is altogether safe and secure, since he who walks probably walks safely, as the new casuists commonly teach — for this we shall soon show to be false; and even if it were not false, it is nevertheless very uncertain and doubtful, since this is a question and controversy among theologians, some affirming, others denying; whence it does not belong to a prudent and wise man, to lean on this reed staff, and to commit his salvation to so weak and wavering a foundation. For it concerns the sum of the matter, when eternal salvation is treated, as Bellarmine says, to be cited below. Or, as Eucherius says, in the hortatory epistle to Valerian: There can be no cause of expediency, if it is established that loss to the soul intervenes, and where there is loss of salvation, there is certainly no profit. The Gallic Annals relate that Henry IV, of recent and illustrious memory, King of the French, when, from a colloquy held at his request between Catholic doctors and ministers of heretical pravity, he heard from the heretical ministers present, that those who followed the Catholic faith, provided they lived piously and rightly, walked in the way of eternal salvation; while the Catholic doctors, on the contrary, asserted that those who followed the doctrine of the Calvinists could not attain to eternal felicity — the King, I say, most wisely said that it was in accordance with prudent counsel, that he embrace the Catholic and Roman faith rather, than persevere in adhering to the Calvinist sect; since, indeed, by the consent of both parties, he could, by professing the faith of the Roman Church, become a partaker of future beatitude; but according to Catholic doctrine, if he did not abjure the Calvinist heresy, he could not avoid the punishment of eternal damnation — and that it belongs to a prudent man, in the business of salvation, to follow the safer part. This counsel of the most wise and most glorious King is not followed by those who, having abandoned the more probable and safer opinion, which all theologians confess to be certain and free from danger, teach that we can embrace the less probable — since many grave doctors think it lacks security, although, in the probable judgment of some, it is a means by

which we may attain salvation. Whence Cardinal Bellarmine, no less distinguished for piety than for erudition, in the little work to the Bishop of Teano, his nephew, writes these golden words: If anyone wishes to place his salvation in safety, he must altogether seek certain truth, and not regard what many, at this time, say or do; and if the certainty of the matter cannot appear clearly, he must in every way follow the safer part, and by no reason, by no authority, by no temporal utility proposed, decline to the less safe part. For it concerns the sum of the matter, when eternal salvation is treated, and it is very easy for an erroneous conscience to be put on by the example of others, and, in that way, conscience not gnawing, to descend to that place where the worm does not die, the fire is not extinguished. Wherefore Mutius Vitelleschi, most wise General of the Society of Jesus, in a letter written in the year 1617, on the 4th of January, to the Superiors of the same Society, among seven things which he earnestly commends to them, places this in the fourth place: Let the Superiors take every care, that those who teach, or write, use least of all this rule and norm in the choice of opinions: One can defend it. It is probable. It does not lack an author. But let them rather approach those opinions, which are safer, which are followed in the votes of the more weighty and more renowned doctors, which conduce more to good morals, which finally can nourish piety, and be of profit, not devastate, not destroy. Thus report Clement Scotus, on the power of the Pontiff over the Society of Jesus, folio 365; and Martin de Prado, tome 1 of Moral Theology, chapter 15, page 634.

The principal minor can also be proved (which asserts that he who elects the less probable opinion, favoring liberty or concupiscence, in competition with another which stands for truth and precept, does not operate prudently) by this argument, by which the chief foundation of the adversaries is overturned. Prudence, since it is a practical intellectual virtue, requires at least moral certainty in its object; but he who follows the less probable opinion, favoring liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, does not have moral certainty concerning the honesty and moral goodness of his operation; therefore he does not act prudently. The major is clear; the minor also seems manifest: for who would dare to assert that he has moral certainty concerning the honesty and moral goodness of that operation, which appears to him more evil than good, and concerning which he has this judgment or dictate: it is more probable and more likely, that this action is evil and illicit? But he who operates from the less probable opinion which stands against the precept cannot fail to have such a judgment or dictate in the intellect, since the more probable opinion, favoring the precept, dictates and persuades that it is more probable and more likely, that that action is evil and illicit; therefore he who follows the less probable opinion, favoring liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, does not have moral

certainty concerning the honesty and moral goodness of his operation.

The adversaries respond that although he who operates from the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, has this speculative judgment, it is more probable and more likely that this action is evil and illicit — nevertheless he simultaneously has another practical and reflex judgment, certifying conscience concerning the rectitude and moral goodness of his operation, namely this: He who acts probably, acts prudently and safely.

This response and doctrine is the chief and almost sole foundation of the adversaries, whence to it, as to a most safe refuge, they always flee, when pressed by the force of arguments, and, with that dogma, "He who acts probably, acts prudently," as with a most strong shield, they think they can repel all the darts hurled against them. But it is not difficult to drive them from that fortress, and to batter this wall, and to break through altogether that straw shield.

For, first, granted that he who acts probably acts prudently, when no more probable opinion occurs to him; nevertheless he acts imprudently, when, in competition with a more probable verdict, he elects the less probable, as shown above, for he more approaches that which is false, in matters pertaining to salvation, as John Andreae, cited above, says.

Second, if consent and probable were synonymous: then the physician would act prudently in applying probable remedies, safer and more efficacious ones having been passed over. Then the Judge would be excused, who, the accused being neither convicted nor confessed, but only probably suspected, though more probably innocent, condemns him with capital punishment — which, as erroneous, Innocent XI recently condemned. Then it would be lawful for Christians to reduce to practice all those corruptions of morals, which some more recent Casuists commonly teach to be probable, and supported by good reasons. Certainly, who does not see that the aforesaid dogma of the probabilists, "he who acts probably, acts prudently and safely," paves and clears the way to every kind of crime, and that from it follows the overturning of all religion and honesty, and that almost everything is rendered lawful, since, according to the more recent Casuists, almost everything is probable, as Prosper Fagnanus expressly declares on the chapter Ne innitaris, where he writes this: There is no doubt that every rule of morals can be overturned from the liberty of opining, not only in human precepts, but even in divine and natural ones, since concerning them sometimes no demonstrative reasons occur. Whence, in these times, the matter has been brought to such a pass, that there is almost no article in moral matters, in which there is not a variety or contrariety of

opinions; so that, in the work alone of the moral resolutions of Antonino Diana, recently printed, more than three thousand questions are numbered together, with opinions and authors for both parts generally affirming, either that both are probable, or that one is probable, and the other more probable, in almost all of which mortal sin is treated. Wherefore this doctrine of the probabilists seems to foster, as it were, a certain liberty of conscience, and consequently greatly to need the right hand of the provision of the most blessed Roman Pontiff, lest this poison, already too widely spread, creep further. Wherefore not undeservedly does Antonius Merenda, in his Treatise on this matter, most recently printed, in the preface, page 7, assert in round terms, that the use of probabilism is an invention of the Devil, to enervate the force of the precepts. Similar things Crispin of Borgia has, in his Select Moral Questions, question 9, where he says thus: In moral matters, there is scarcely a case in which there are not two contradictory and probable opinions, and this point Caramuel has so reduced to a point, that there is scarcely any ecclesiastical precept which cannot be evaded, if we adhere to his doctrine, which he thinks probable. For he contends that anyone can follow two contradictory opinions, this being probable; from which it follows that no one seems bound by the precept of fasting, of hearing Mass, of reciting the canonical hours, and other things of this kind. Whence, among the sixty-five propositions recently condemned by Innocent XI, happily governing the Church, this one is reckoned in third place: While, by probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, we do not depart from the bounds of probability, whatever we do, we always act prudently.

Third, I ask the adversaries, whether the aforesaid dogma of the more recent Casuists, that he who acts probably acts prudently, is certain and demonstrable, or only probable and opinionative. The first cannot be said, since it cannot be proved by any evident and demonstrative reason, and is denied by many most weighty theologians and Canonists. But if it be answered that it is only probable and opinionative — as indeed the adversaries are bound to answer — it is manifest that from it moral certainty cannot be derived, which would remove all moral dread and doubt from conscience, and altogether certify it concerning the rectitude of the operation, since opinion (as St. Thomas says, I, q. 79, art. 9) signifies the assent of the intellect, which is borne toward one part of the contradiction, with dread of the other. I add that, just as from the contingent only the contingent follows, and from the cold, cold, so nothing but the probable and fallible can follow from the probable and fallible; and just as a building resting on a weak and wavering foundation cannot stand certain and secure.

You will say, perhaps, that although such a dogma, from the intrinsic side, or from intrinsic reasons and motives, is not certain and infallible, but only probable and

opinable — from the extrinsic side, however, it has moral certainty, namely from the vote and authority of many weighty theologians and Casuists, who assert it to be certain, and promise every security to those who follow any probable opinion. But all those theologians and Casuists (however distinguished for erudition, wisdom, and piety) are not, doubtless, of such great authority in the Church, as St. Augustine, the eagle of doctors, the summit of human genius, and the greater luminary of the Church, and to whose wisdom, prudence, erudition, and piety they are much inferior; and yet that Holy Doctor candidly professes that the security given by himself is worth nothing before God, if it differs from the divine law. Behold (he says) the steward gives you security; what does it profit you, if the paterfamilias does not accept it? I am a steward, I am a servant — shall I tell you? Live however you wish, the Lord will not lose you. The steward has given you security; the security of the steward is worth nothing: would that the Lord would give you security, and that I could make you secure! For the security of the Lord is worth something, even if I do not will it; mine is worth nothing, if He does not will it. Since, therefore, God has not promised security to those who follow any probable opinion, nor does any trace of this dogma — that he who acts probably, acts prudently and safely — appear in Scripture or the Holy Fathers, it cannot have complete security, which excludes all moral dread, from the vote of new theologians; especially since this cannot elevate any opinion or dogma beyond the sphere of probability. Whence Lactantius, book 3, chapter 13, rightly warns: Let us not be dragged along by anyone's authority, but rather let us approach the truth. And he adds: There is no place here for rashness: the punishment of folly must be undergone forever, if either an empty person, or a false opinion, has deceived.

I add, from Cabassut, in the book on the theory and practice of Canon Law, cited above: Men eminent in piety and prudence are difficult to find in that host of writers, who, about thirty years ago, poured themselves out in every direction like a dense cloud of locusts, and disseminated portents of criminal opinions, by which each of these authors presumed to secure for himself, by his own single vote and authority, a great probability, placed in safety — indeed, he boasted that the human race was bound by the most ample beneficence, on account of the sins of the world taken away; because things which were once held to be crimes, he had, by the weight of his own authority, rendered licit and honest, and had converted that narrow and arduous way which leads to heaven, into a most ample and level field, whereby, safely and indiscriminately, all might come to heaven without any difficulty, except only those who did not acknowledge so great a benefit, and did not kiss those divine probabilities, whose salvation alone is desperate, and damnation most certain.

Finally, that the aforesaid dogma of the new Casuists is false, is clearly gathered from both the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor. For the former, Quodlibet 9, art. 15, says that this question, whether it is lawful to hold several prebends, is dangerously determined, because it is ambiguous, since Theologians are found to think differently from Theologians, and Jurists from Jurists. The latter, in book 3, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 8, says thus: When one holding two contrary opinions is perplexed, he would determine himself dangerously to one, unless, the matter having been diligently examined, he chose the more probable. Where he speaks of opinions in the matter of morals, not of speculative ones, as is established from these preceding words: In moral matters, when there are disputes about some sin, etc. But these things would be false, if the aforesaid dogma, that he who acts probably, acts prudently and safely, were true; for there would be no danger in the decision or determination of those questions — for whatever verdict anyone would elect, whether more probable or less probable, provided it were probable, he would act prudently and safely, and would be immune from the danger of sinning; therefore the aforesaid dogma clearly conflicts with the principles of the doctrine of St. Thomas and Scotus.

Some more recent authors also prove our opinion, from the fact that no invincible ignorance of natural law can be given, from which they infer that no probable falsehood, dissonant from the eternal or natural law, excuses from sin, although the falsity, or the disformity from the eternal or natural law, be invincibly ignored. But this reason is displeasing, both because it supposes as certain and undoubted something which is a matter of dispute and controversy among theologians, namely that no invincible and inculpable ignorance of natural law can be given, of which we shall speak in the Treatise on Laws, chapter 3, § 4. And also because, if this reason were valid, it would follow that not only he who elects the less probable opinion, in competition with the more probable, but also he who follows the more probable, indeed even the most probable, sins, if it happens that such an opinion is false, and dissonant from natural law, as can happen, since sometimes the false is more probable than the true, as Aristotle says in the books of Topics. From which would follow an incredible perplexity of conscience, indeed even an inevitable and harsh necessity of sinning here and now, as we shall more fully expound in the place cited.

The objections are resolved.

The chief objections of the adversaries having been almost all taken up, they remain resolved now from what has been said, in disproving our opinion. For it is established, from the third reason, that this argument, which among them is the trump card, is frivolous: He acts rightly who acts prudently; but he who follows the less probable

verdict, in competition with the more probable, acts prudently, and with reason, for a probable opinion is one which good reason supports, otherwise it is not probable; therefore he acts rightly. To this argument, I say, the solution is clear from what has been said above; for we showed, in the third reason, that he acts most imprudently, who, in competition with several probable opinions, prefers the less probable and less safe, to the more probable and safer. Nor does it matter that the less probable opinion is supported by some reason, for since the more probable rests on a better and more efficacious foundation, upon the arrival, or appearance, of the light of the more probable verdict, the light of the less probable verdict immediately vanishes — just as, when the sun appears, the light of the stars is hidden and disappears.

This can be explained and further illustrated by the doctrine which St. Thomas transmits from Aristotle, I, q. 50, art. 1, ad 1, where he teaches that a mean, compared to one extreme, appears as the other extreme — for example, the lukewarm, compared to the hot, appears cold, and compared to the cold, appears hot. The dusky, compared to black, is called white; and black, if compared to white. Likewise the middle notes of the strings, in a lyre or cithara, is called grave, compared to the last, and acute, if compared to the first. Finally, twilight, comparatively to night, is called day; and night, if compared to day. Since, therefore, the less probable opinion is a mean between the improbable and the more probable, although, comparatively to the improbable, it appears probable in some way, it does not, however, in competition with the more probable, and comparatively to it, especially if it is notably more probable. The same, proportionally, must be said of a less good and less efficacious reason, compared to a better and more efficacious one.

Another foundation of the adversaries also remains resolved from what has been said, by which they prove that he who elects the less probable and less safe opinion, in competition with the more probable and safer, is excused from sin, because he labors under invincible ignorance. For this is established to be false, since to him then shines forth the verdict which, on account of the weight of its reasons, appears to him more probable, and, on account of the removal of danger, is safer and more secure; and, that having been spurned, he deliberately elects the less probable, and less safe, even if it stands for liberty against the law, for pleasure against duty, for convenience against the honest, buttressed by more likely arguments. Whence he can rightly exclaim, with the Poet: I see the better things, and approve them — I follow the worse.

The adversaries object, third, that argument, which is also, among them, principal and fundamental: it is lawful to elect that which is less good and less perfect, a better and more perfect one having been left aside — for example, marriage and the secular state,

and to prefer it to the Clerical or Religious state; therefore likewise it is lawful to elect the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, a more probable one, which stands for the precept, having been left aside.

But I deny the consequence and the parity: for the state of marriage is secure, even in competition with the religious or clerical state, but not so a less probable verdict in competition with a more probable one, since it is not consonant with the rules of prudence, as we showed above.

You will say, why is he who elects the more probable verdict secure, and immune from the danger of sinning, but not he who follows the less probable verdict, since the more probable opinion can no less be false, and dissonant from the divine law, than the less probable?

I respond that there is a notable distinction between them: for he who elects the more probable verdict has this reflex and prudential judgment: He who does everything that is in him to seek the truth, if by chance he does not attain it, is excused from sin, by reason of invincible ignorance — which judgment is altogether certain, as resting on this principle: No one sins in that which he cannot avoid, which St. Augustine, in the book on the Two Souls, chapter 11, asserts to be so known and self-evident, that it is not only unknown to no one, but moreover sung and proclaimed by the whole human race. Do not (he says) shepherds sing this on the mountains, and poets in the theaters, and the unlearned in their circles, and the learned in their libraries, and Masters in the Schools, and Bishops in sacred places, and the human race throughout the whole world? But he who follows the less probable verdict, in competition with the more probable, cannot have this reflex judgment (since he cannot labor under invincible ignorance, as shown above), but only this: He who acts probably, acts prudently and safely — which is very doubtful and uncertain, and, at most, can be probable and opinable, as is established from what has been said above. Whence the first adheres to a most firm column, but the other rests on a reed staff, or a wavering and weak foundation.

They object, fourth: the same reason seems to hold for the more probable verdict, as for the safer; but we can elect the less safe verdict, in competition with the safer, as St. Antoninus teaches, part 1, title 3, chapter 10, § 10, in these words: To elect the safer way is a matter of counsel, not of precept; otherwise it would be necessary for many to enter religion, where one lives more safely, than in the world. And part 2, title 1, chapter 16, § 2, he wisely admonishes confessors, in these words: The safer way is always to be counseled, but not commanded; therefore likewise it is lawful to follow the less probable verdict, in competition with the more probable.

I respond, denying the major, for an opinion is called safer from the fact that it recedes more from the danger of sinning, but more probable, from the fact that it is or appears more consonant, or closer, to the truth; but although we are bound to follow that which appears to us more conformable or closer to the truth, when it favors the precept or the virtue, we are not bound to follow that which recedes more from the danger of sinning, if it is not consonant with truth or prudence, since prudence is the rule of human acts. Wherefore Ambrose, on Psalm 118: Just as there is no wisdom without fear, so fear ought not to be without wisdom. Whence when some authors cited above say that, in the matter of morals, the safer verdict is to be followed, this must be understood of the safer verdict, which is more probable, and more consonant with truth and prudence; not of those verdicts which are less probable, and less consonant with the rules of prudence. Otherwise, when someone doubted whether a thing he possessed was his own, or another's, he would be bound immediately to hand it over to another, or to divide it with him, since this is safer, and more removed from the danger of sinning; and universally, all opinions which teach that some contracts are illicit, even if improbable, or less probable, would have to be followed, as safer, and more removed from the danger of sinning — which would be an intolerable burden, and would almost destroy human commerce, since there is scarcely any action, and no contract, concerning which there is not some opinion condemning it. When, therefore, of opposite opinions, one is indeed safer, but the other more probable, it is lawful to follow the more probable, which, by this very fact, is safe and secure; for since, for acting rightly, there is chiefly required truth and the avoidance of error, hence it follows that a greater probability, in a doubtful matter, is to be preferred to a greater security, because it approaches more closely to the goal of truth. Where, however, the validity of some Sacrament, or the salvation of some soul, would be endangered, not only the more probable, but even the safer part, would have to be elected, as theologians teach in the Treatise on the Sacraments.

They object, fifth, since the yoke of Christ is sweet, and His burden light, as is said Matthew 11 — those opinions in the matter of morals are to be followed, which render the way of heaven more level and easier, such as the probable opinions, favoring liberty. Whence Caramuel, in Regular Theology, disputation 6, says that the Catholic Church ought to be called more fortunate, because it abounds in most learned men, who introduced benign opinions, since many would be condemned whom the opinion of probabilism saves. The same other more recent authors commonly profess, asserting that, by the skill and industry of the new Casuists, the way of salvation is daily rendered more level and easier; because new probable opinions are daily devised by them, which can more benignly and easily promote men to the empyrean laurel.

They confirm this from the law "Benignus," Digest, On Laws, and the final chapter On Transactions, where it is said that the more benign and gentler opinion ought to be preferred. And St. Antoninus, part 1, title 3, chapter 10, § 10, says thus: Between a hard and a benign verdict concerning precepts, the benign interpretation is rather to be made, other things being equal. It is also said in the Prologue of our Constitutions, letter I: The third thing (which impedes the salvation of souls) is too great austerity in counsels and opinions; for men are so terrified by this, that they neglect their own salvation. Wherefore the rigidity and austerity in counsels must be relaxed (as much as can be done), and men must be treated benignly.

To the objection I respond that the yoke of Christ is indeed sweet, and His burden light, but that its sweetness and lightness arise from the charity and grace of Christ, softening and mitigating it, as St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 98, art. 1, ad 3, not from the use, or rather abuse, and laxity of the probabilities which the new Casuists have introduced into the Church. Whence it is absurd to say that the way of salvation is daily widened by their skill and industry. For, as Sinnich, Doctor of Louvain, rightly says, in the book on Saul, the first monarch of the Israelite nation, tome 1, page 262: Assuredly human skill can no more add one finger's breadth to the path of heaven, than it can add one cubit of length to the stature of men. For He who established the boundaries of human life, which cannot be passed over, He also established the boundaries of the way of heaven, which cannot be widened; He also established the boundaries of the way of hell, which cannot be narrowed: and thus that remains narrow, as it was established by Him, and this remains spacious, as it was established by Him.

Mercorus, the Inquisitor of Mantua, adds, in the book on the limited practice of opinions, page 492, responding to the aforesaid words of Caramuel: If this new felicity of the Church, which this Author supposes, were to be applauded — namely, that by the opinion-makers, the faithful were promoted more easily to the empyrean laurel — one would have to grieve equally over the infelicity of the preceding centuries of the Church, for whom this door was closed. Whence, with the great Guigo, once General of the Carthusians, one would have to exclaim: O most unhappy times of the Apostles! O those men wrapped in the darkness of ignorance, and most worthy of all pity, who, in order to attain life, on account of the words of the lips of God, kept such hard ways, and knew not these shortcuts of ours!

To the confirmation I respond that when it is said, in Canon Law, that the more benign and gentler opinion ought to be preferred, this must be understood when such an opinion is safe, and within the line of honesty; but the less probable opinion, favoring liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, since it is

not consonant with the rules of prudence, is neither safe, nor within the line of honesty. In the same way must be understood and explained what is related from St. Antoninus. Similarly, when it is said in our Constitutions, that the rigidity and austerity in counsels must be relaxed (as much as can be done), and men treated benignly — this must be understood, as much as can be done, according to the laws of prudence, which is the rule of human acts; but the laws of prudence (as shown above) forbid electing the laxer and more benign, less probable opinions, in competition with the more probable, which stand for the precept.

I add that a benign opinion, among jurists, is not called that which favors liberty, but that which favors a will, marriage, religion, or a Sacrament, as Sylvester expounds. Or, as others interpret, that which favors the needy, orphans, widows, and pilgrims.

They object, sixth: the opinion which teaches that we are bound to follow the more probable verdicts in moral matters exposes conscience to many scruples and anxieties, from which those who teach that it is lawful to follow the less probable verdict, favoring liberty, in competition with the more probable, which stands for the precept, are freed; therefore, for the quiet and tranquility of conscience, this second opinion is to be held in practice, even if the other is speculatively truer, or more probable.

I respond, denying the antecedent; for it is so far from the case that, by following the more probable verdict, one is exposed to scruples of conscience, that rather one is altogether freed and exempted from them, as is established from the Clementine Exivi de paradiso, on the meaning of the word, where the Pontiff says: In those things which regard the salvation of the soul, for avoiding grave remorse of conscience, the safer part is to be held. Reason also persuades of this, for only in sincere inquiry of the truth can there be rest, and only in truth can there be perfect security; and thus he who embraces that part which he judges less probable and less safe, that is, closer to falsity than to truth, to sin than to virtue, must necessarily be anguished by scruples, and be pierced and tormented by the stings of conscience; but he who follows what he believes to be truer, safer, more probable, is quiet and tranquil, although he is not altogether secure; for he alone enjoys true and perfect security, who is secure of, and has attained, the first and eternal truth. Whence Gregory the Great, book 5, Morals, chapter 6: Holy men, when they surpass evils, fear even their own good deeds, lest, while they desire to do good, they be deceived by an image of goodness, lest the pestiferous decay of putrefaction lie hidden under the species of a good color. For they know that, weighed down by the burden of corruption, they cannot subtly judge good things, and, when they bring the rule of the final examination before their eyes, they sometimes fear these very things which they approve, with their whole mind indeed desiring them, but nevertheless trembling from

the uncertainty of their works, not knowing whither they walk. And again, in the following chapter: The just, placed even in good works themselves, tremble, and, lest they displease in the very eyes by some error, are occupied with continual lamentations. From which, although that tranquility of conscience, which the new Casuists promise to those following the less probable verdict, is suspect and dangerous, and that little pillow, or cushion, which they place under the head of the tepid and negligent, that they may sleep and rest more softly in their negligences, is reproved by the Lord through the Prophet, saying: Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow, and make pillows for the heads of persons of every age, to catch souls. Which words Gregory the Great expounds, book 18, Morals, chapter 4, saying thus: A cushion is placed, that one may rest more softly. Whoever, therefore, flatters those doing evil, places a cushion under the head or elbow of the one lying down, so that he who ought to have been corrected from his fault, being made soft by praises in it, may rest.

You will ask, fourth, when two opinions occur in the matter of morals, equally probable, or having equal reasons, of which one does not outweigh the other, which of them is to be elected and preferred.

I respond that then the safer is to be elected, and preferred to the less safe: the reason is that although, in speculative matters, man can, from innate liberty, determine himself to follow whatever probable verdict he wishes; in moral and practical matters, however, he must be determined to this by prudence, which is the rule of human acts, and consequently must be moved to this by some prudent motive, intrinsic or extrinsic; but when opinions are equally probable, he cannot be moved and determined to this by any intrinsic motive, or by any outweighing reason, since then the reasons on both sides are equal; therefore he must then be moved and determined by some prudent extrinsic motive, which can be nothing more fitting than the greater security which is found in one of those verdicts, rather than in the other. Wherefore there is a celebrated rule of Canon Law, that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be elected: whence, when, in competition with several equally probable opinions, man doubts which of them to elect, and, being wavering and undecided, and, as it were, in equilibrium, not knowing to which part he inclines, in order to act prudently, he must decline to the safer part, and elect the safer verdict.

You will say: there is another rule of law, which says, that in doubtful matters, the condition of the possessor is better; therefore, since man is in possession of his own liberty, he can, in competition with two equally probable opinions, elect whichever he prefers, and consequently is not bound to elect the safer.

I respond that this rule has place only in the matter of justice, and only in the judicial forum, not, however, in the matter of the other virtues: for in the matter of justice, possession, in doubt, favors the possessor, insofar as it makes a presumption that the possessor is the true owner; because, for the most part, he who possesses possesses his own property, and your right; for when someone alienates a thing, he usually hands it to the true owner, into whom, through alienation, dominion is transferred; whence, when someone possesses some thing, it is a sign that he has not alienated it, but truly has dominion over it himself. But in the matter of the other virtues, since possession does not regularly make a presumption of truth for the part which possesses, possession ought least of all to favor it, but, in doubts occurring in such matter, the rule of operating is to inquire for which part the presumption of truth stands, and this part is to be elected: but if the presumption stands for neither part, the safer part must be elected, as Prosper Fagnanus proves by many examples and rules of law, on the chapter Ne innitaris.

You will ask, last, whether, when, after diligent inquiry into the truth has been applied, in moral matters, and cases of conscience, nothing certain and fully clear appears (which frequently happens in human affairs), one can then act from a probable opinion?

I respond affirmatively, against Fagnanus, in the chapter cited, De Constit., no. 59, who, in any moral matter, denies that it is lawful to opine, because opinion (he says) concerns an uncertain matter, and has joined to it the dread of the opposite. Whence he constantly affirms that certainty is necessary in every moral action, without which man cannot act except with sin, on account of the danger to which he exposes himself, just like every agent with a doubtful conscience.

Our resolution, however, is that of St. Thomas, Quodlibet 8, art. 13, in the argument sed contra, where he says thus: If someone applies diligence, inquiring whether it is lawful to have several prebends, and finds nothing which moves him to believe that it is illicit, it seems that he can have several prebends without sin. Reason also persuades of this, for men ought to operate in a human manner, nor can they be obliged to have a clear and perfect knowledge of all things; therefore, while, sufficient diligence having been applied, according to the conditions of the matter and person, nothing more probable appears, man operates prudently, conforming his conscience to a probable opinion.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated from Cajetan, in the Summa, under the word "Opinion," where he says thus: God does not require of man more than the condition of man has, because divine wisdom disposes all things sweetly; but the condition of man has this, that in moral matters he cannot attain evidence of all things, nor have mathematical or exact certainty of all things to be done. Therefore God does

not require of him that he always operate with evidence and mathematical certainty concerning the moral goodness of his action; and consequently he can follow a probable opinion, while, sufficient diligence having been applied, another more probable does not appear to him. Whence St. Antoninus, part 1, title 3, chapter 10, § 10: The certainty (he says) which is found in moral matter is not the certainty of evidence, but of probable conjecture.

As for the foundation of Fagnanus, it is easily answered that he who, sufficient diligence having been applied to inquire into the truth, acts from a probable opinion, when another more probable does not occur to him, does not act with a practically doubtful conscience, and consequently does not expose himself to any danger of sinning; because he is then morally certified through the reflex judgment which he has (not indeed that in which the new Casuists rest, namely: He who acts probably, acts prudently and safely — for we showed above that such a dogma is doubtful and uncertain, and considered erroneous by many most weighty theologians), but through this: He who does everything that is in him to seek the truth, and cannot attain and reach it, is excused from sin, by reason of invincible ignorance — which principle is altogether certain, and confirmed by the almost unanimous reckoning and consent of all theologians, as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins.

From these things you will understand that, in this matter of probability, one must proceed cautiously, and not reject all probability absolutely (as some, more severe than is fitting, do), but that man can act from a probable opinion, when a more probable one does not occur to him; in a conflict, however, or competition, of several probable opinions, the more probable must be followed, especially if it is notably more probable, as shown above.

Between these two rocks of Scylla and Charybdis one must proceed cautiously, and two opposite extremes must be avoided in this matter, namely that of those who reject all probability, and that of others who, on the contrary, embrace all probability, and assert it to be a safe rule of morals, even though then another more probable verdict, and consequently closer to the truth, shines forth to them. For truth (as Novatian elegantly says) hangs midway between two errors, as Christ between two thieves. Certainly, if this mean were observed, and the probability of opinions, with the aforesaid moderation and temperament, were received by all, the uniformity and purity of morals would more easily be preserved among the faithful; and, in a short time (says Gravina in his Cherubim Paradisi), the world would be reformed, which, from the license of opining, rushes headlong, entering upon that most broad way which leads to perdition. Whence Cabassut wisely observes, in the Preface of the book cited above: By which minds, either

too severe, or too indulgent, the salvation of souls is more endangered, is difficult to estimate. By the more indulgent, indeed, souls are led through the spacious and broad way which leads to eternal perdition, and, with the assisting hand of such directors, the twisted serpent is brought forth, sin is conceived, born, and nourished. Hence, in Ezekiel, chapter 13, the Lord is indignant, and curses those who sew cushions under every elbow, and make pillows for the heads of persons of every age, so that, indeed, men, seduced, and pleased with themselves concerning directors of this kind, may rest softly and gently in their sins. Isaiah, chapter 30, censures these: Who say to the seers, See not, and to them that behold, Behold not for us those things that are right: speak unto us pleasant things, see errors for us.

But just as excessive indulgence is more harmful, so also is immoderate austerity in matters of conscience, which, having no regard for the weakness of men, nor distinguishing counsels from precepts, while it compels them to things too arduous, shuts off the way of eternal salvation which Christ had opened to them: it damns (as St. Bonaventure says) those who ought to be saved, and, conscious of their own weakness, drives them to despair. For it happens that wretched men, having heard this more rigid doctrine, believe or doubt that there is mortal guilt where there is none; but nevertheless, overcome by the difficulty of the matter, sin mortally from an erroneous conscience, and are damned. Whence St. Ambrose, on Psalm 118, sermon 5: There are among us those who have the fear of God, but not according to knowledge, establishing harder precepts than the human condition can sustain. There is fear in this, because they seem to themselves to take counsel for discipline, to demand the work of virtue. But there is folly in this, because they do not compare themselves to nature, nor do they estimate possibility.

Rightly, therefore, and wisely, St. Bonaventure, Compendium of Theological Truth, 52: A conscience too broad, and too strict, is to be avoided: for the first breeds presumption, the second, despair; likewise the first often calls evil good, the second, on the contrary, good evil; likewise the first often saves one who ought to be condemned, the second, on the contrary, condemns one who ought to be saved.

Treatise IV

On the Virtues in Common

After the Treatise on human acts, considered both in physical being and in moral being, we must treat of the virtues in common, which are the principles of good acts, and certain habits ordered to eliciting them, and their nature, subject, species, and properties must be briefly declared here. Of the virtues in particular, however, both theological and moral, we shall discourse in the fifth volume.

Chapter I

On the nature of virtue

Several definitions of virtue are current. The first is transmitted by Aristotle, Ethics 2, chapter 4, in these words: Virtue is a habit which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good. In this definition a twofold relation of virtue is explained: one which it has to its proper subject, as its form, when it is said to make its possessor good — for virtue alone makes man good, as Seneca shows, Epistle 76; the other which it has to operation, as to its proper effect, when it is added, and renders his work good.

The second is found in the same Philosopher, in the same place, where he says that virtue is an elective habit, consisting in a mean, as a wise and prudent man would determine it. This definition does not belong to the theological virtues, nor the intellectual, but only the moral: for the intellectual virtues are not elective, since election belongs only to the will; but the theological virtues do not properly require a mean, only the moral, such as justice, temperance, and the like, which are concerned with an object midway between two extremes, namely excess and defect — in such a way, however, that this mean is not understood according to the thing, but according to reason, according to the requirement of the person, place, and other circumstances; for sometimes food, for example, which is moderate and temperate with respect to one person, is excessive and intemperate with respect to another, and therefore it is added: as a wise and prudent man would determine.

The third, which is gathered from the words of St. Augustine, chiefly book 2 on Free Will, and is defended by St. Thomas here, q. 55, art. 4, is of this sort: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, and which God works in us without us. Where, first, "quality" is posited, because quality is the supreme genus of virtue — the definition would, however, be more fitting, if in place of "quality" "habit" were posited, which is the proximate genus, as St. Thomas says in the place cited.

"Good" is added, that the difference of virtue from vice, and from other qualities which dispose a thing badly, may be explained. By the term "of the mind," the subject of virtue is designated, which is a rational faculty, either essentially, or by participation, such as the sensitive appetite, which, as it is subject to reason, participates something from it, and is a subject of virtue, as we shall say below; and by this virtue differs from all bodily qualities, whether good or evil. By the term "by which one lives rightly," virtue is distinguished from non-operative qualities immediately — such as beauty and health in bodily things, and, in spiritual things, habitual grace, which immediately inheres in the substance of the soul. Here "lives" signifies, in the proposal, vital operation. By that term, "which no one uses badly," virtue differs from those habits and qualities which can incline toward evil or the false, or which someone can use either well or badly, such as opinion, human faith, character, and the like. Finally, the last terms, namely "which God works in us," belong only to virtues per se infused, which are distinguished from the acquired only in this, that the latter are acquired by us operating, and actively concurring to their acquisition; the former, however, are produced in us without our active concurrence, although we cooperate with God dispositively for their reception through our acts. Whence, if these last terms are removed, this definition, in the manner explained, belongs to every virtue, both intellectual and theological, as well as moral.

From these things you will understand that virtue is an operative habit, and concurs per se primarily to the moral goodness of human acts, and to their facility and delightfulness; secondarily, however, only to the physical entity underlying the moral goodness of the act, and its facility.

The first part is clear from the first and third definition of virtue, and from St. Thomas here, q. 55, art. 2, where he concludes thus: And therefore it belongs to the notion of human virtue, that it be an operative habit. Augustine teaches the same, in the book on the Good of Marriage, where he says that virtue is a habit by which something is done. Whence someone elegantly says that virtue is not like a lyre which no one plays, or a sword which is never drawn from its sheath, or a ship which, adorned to perfection, always stands in port, but rather like a fertile and productive field, than which (as Ambrose says elegantly, book on Isaac, chapter 7) nothing is more beautiful, when the crop waves, when the fruits redden, or when the clusters of grapes hang down, or the olive, laden with berries, bends, or, clothed in green grass, the mountain peaks and the humble valleys are dressed.

The second part is proved as to each part: and first, that virtue per se primarily concurs to the moral goodness of human acts, is manifest; for virtue concurs per se primarily to that for the production of which the natural faculty needs it; but the natural faculty needs the

habit of virtue to produce a morally good act, or to cause moral goodness in the act; for the faculty, according to itself, is only potent to produce the act as to its substance, or physical entity; therefore such a habit concurs per se primarily to the moral goodness of the act.

That it also concurs per se primarily to its facility, is established from the fact that in this the power of a superior faculty, communicated to an inferior one by way of something transient, differs from that which is communicated by way of a habit, or complete form, constituting a perfect and connatural principle of the act, that the first does not remove the difficulty, but the second induces facility and delightfulness; therefore the habit of moral virtue concurs per se primarily to the facility and delightfulness joined with the moral goodness of the virtuous act, and attains both per se.

Finally, that it does not per se effect the physical entity of the same act, but only per accidens and secondarily, insofar as it is underlying that moral goodness, and its facility, is clear from the fact that a habit only influences per se that which exceeds the powers of the faculty; but the physical entity of the virtuous act does not exceed the powers of the faculty, as is established — for the act, for example, of the irascible or concupiscible faculty, considered according to physical entity, denotes nothing other than a passion of the sensitive appetite, as it prescinds from the order of reason, in which way it is found in brute animals; therefore the habit of moral and acquired virtue does not influence per se the physical entity of such an act, but only per accidens and secondarily, insofar, namely, as such an entity is underlying that moral goodness, and its facility.

Chapter II

On the subject of the virtues

It is certain that the virtues, since they are habits, reside not in the very essence of the soul, but in its faculties. It is also established that the virtues can be subjected neither in the exterior members of the body, nor in the vegetative faculties, nor in the external senses; because faculties of this kind are not indifferent to operating well or badly, but altogether determined to one mode of operating, and consequently have of themselves no difficulty in exercising their proper operations. Theologians also commonly teach, with St. Thomas here, q. 56, art. 5, that in the internal senses no virtues are subjected, because, since virtue, according to Aristotle, is a disposition of the perfect to the optimum, and perfection consists in consummation, the faculty which is the subject of virtue must be consummative of the virtuous act, and not only preparative or inchoative of it; whence, since the cognition of the true, which is the good work of the cognitive faculty, is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive faculties, because they are only preparatory and dispositive for the cognition of the intellect, whose proper function is to attain the true, intellective virtues cannot be subjected in them. Finally, it is established among all, that the intellectual virtues, namely understanding, science, wisdom, art, and prudence, reside in the intellect: the first three indeed in the speculative intellect, but the two latter in the practical intellect, as it is subject to the motion of the will, whose proper function is to move, as to exercise, the intellect and the other faculties toward operation. There remain, therefore, only two difficulties and controversies among theologians, to be briefly resolved here. The first is, whether virtues properly so called can be subjected in the sensitive appetite, insofar as, in man, it is born to obey reason politically? The second, whether in the will there is to be placed a moral virtue, not only for attaining, promptly and easily, the good of another, but also in order to the connatural good of one's own suppositum?

§ I

Resolution of the first difficulty

I say, first, that the sensitive appetite of man, as it is born to obey reason politically, is the subject of virtue properly so called, namely of fortitude and temperance. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 56, art. 4, in the body, and in the response ad 1, where he says thus: The irascible and concupiscible, considered in themselves, insofar as they are parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and to brute animals. But insofar as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, thus they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. Nothing clearer or more express can be said in favor of our conclusion. Aristotle also supports this, Ethics 3, chapter 3, where he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational parts, that is, to the concupiscible and irascible appetite, whence he calls the subject of virtue the faculty of desiring.

Reason also supports this, for, as St. Thomas discusses in the place cited, and more fully in the question on the virtues, article 4, in order that some faculty be capable of virtue, three things are required: first, that it be apt to be moved and regulated by a superior; second, that it not be bound to one mode of operating; third, that it be elicitive of a perfect work. But the sensitive appetite, as it is in man, has those three conditions; for first, it is apt to be moved and directed by reason, whence upright men moderate the passions of the sensitive appetite according to the dictate of reason. Then, it is not determined to one mode of acting, but sometimes operates according to reason, sometimes deviates and strays from it. Finally, it elicits a work consummated with moral perfection, when the passions of the irascible and concupiscible, by temperance and fortitude, are reduced to the mean; therefore it is capable of virtue, whence in it reside the moral virtues, moderating fears and boldness in the danger of life, and restraining immoderate delights in food and venereal matters.

This is confirmed: virtue is to be placed there, where there is difficulty in attaining its object; but the will has no difficulty concerning the moderation of the passions, since that is the good of reason, proper and proportioned with respect to the will — but only the sensitive appetite does; therefore in the latter the virtues moderating the passions are to be placed, not in the will.

You will say: the faculty which is the subject of moral virtue must be perfectly free, since it is the principle of a free and moral act. It must also be able to elect, since virtue is defined as an elective habit. Likewise it must be able to attain the honest good, since that is the object of virtue. Finally, it must be regulated by prudence, which is the rule of the moral virtues. But those four conditions do not belong to the sensitive appetite, but only

to the will; therefore only the will can be the subject of the moral virtues which are moderators of the passions. The major is established; the minor, however, is proved as to each part. And first, that the first condition does not belong to the sensitive appetite, seems manifest, for although it, as it is in man, from the conjunction it has with the will, participates some liberty, that is nevertheless imperfect and qualified, which does not suffice for the notion of virtue, since the act of virtue must be simply free, just as it is simply good and honest. It is also established that the sensitive appetite cannot elect, since election is an act of the will, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 13, art. 2. It is likewise clear that it cannot attain the honest good, since its adequate object is the sensible and corporeal good. Finally, since such an appetite is regulated by the apprehension of sense, it does not seem able to be directed and regulated by prudence, which resides not in the sense, but only in the intellect.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, and to its first proof I say that although the sensitive appetite of man, by force of the conjunction it has with the will, does not become simply free, but only in a qualified sense, nevertheless, from the actual influx and motion of the will, by which it applies it to operating, it intrinsically participates a perfect and sufficient liberty, that it can be the subject of moral virtue, just as, by reason of it, it can be the subject of vice and sin.

To the second it must be said that the subject of the moral virtues which moderate the passions must indeed be in some way elective, but not simply and perfectly; for in this the moral virtues which are concerned with passions, and reside in the sensitive appetite, differ from those which do not have to moderate passions, and are subjected in the will, that the latter are elective habits formally, directly, and immediately, because they directly and immediately effect the election which resides in the will; but the former are elective habits only by participation, indirectly, mediately, and completively — both because they elicit an act of the appetite, in which the election of the will, and the order of reason, is participated; and also because, by moderating the passions of the appetite, which disturb the due election, they lead to it indirectly and mediately; and, finally, because although they do not directly elicit the election itself, they nevertheless effect the executive and completive act of the sensitive appetite of it, and consequently can be called elective habits executively and completively. This doctrine and solution the Carmelites of Salamanca discuss at length, in the treatise on the virtues, disp. 2, § 2, and illustrate it with various testimonies of St. Thomas.

To the third it may be said that although the sensitive appetite cannot attain the universal honest good, nevertheless, as actually moved by the will, through a certain participation of reason, it can attain the singular honest good, and regulated through the

cogitative faculty — just as the cogitative faculty itself, from the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates the power of discoursing concerning singulars, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 78, art. 4.

To the last it is likewise answered, that just as in the sensitive appetite there is a certain liberty participated from the will, so in sensitive apprehension, by which it is directed, there is a certain, as it were, imperfect prudence, participated from the intellect, which can attain several circumstances of the act elicited by the appetite, and consequently direct and regulate such an act.

§ II

Resolution of the second difficulty

I say, second, that the will needs no superadded virtue, for attaining the honest good of its own suppositum; but it does for attaining the good of another, such as to render to each what is his own.

The first part, which some more recent authors deny, is expressly taught by St. Thomas, question 1, on the virtues, article 5, where he suggests this reason: No faculty needs the habit of virtue for attaining an object in order to which it is, by itself, complete, determined, and proportioned; since a habit is ordered only to this, that it ultimately complete a faculty, and determine it to attain an object; but the will, by itself, is complete, and determined, and proportioned, for attaining the honest good of its own suppositum; therefore it needs no superadded habit of virtue in order to be determined to it. The major is established; the minor is proved, both because the honest good of one's own suppositum does not exceed the proportion of the willer, neither as to species, since it is of the natural order, nor as to the individual, since it is not another's, but proper to the willing suppositum. And also because, just as the will, from the fact that it is the appetite of a rational nature, is by its own nature inclined and disposed toward the honest good as such, and therefore no virtue is posited for attaining it as such, so, from the fact that it is the appetite of such a man, it inclines of itself toward the honest good of such a suppositum — for just as the individual difference contracts the will to be this one in number, so also it determines its inclination toward the good of this suppositum.

From this the second part of the conclusion remains proved; for although another's natural good does not exceed the proportion of the will as to species, as does the supernatural good, it nevertheless exceeds it as to the individual, because each one's will, by the very fact that it is rooted in this numerical suppositum, is determined, by its individual difference, to the good of its own suppositum, according to that saying of the

Philosopher: The lovable good is, to each one, his own; therefore the will needs the habit of virtue for attaining another's good, even natural. Whence in it are placed justice, and the other virtues annexed and akin to it, that, notwithstanding the weight of self-love, it may be inclined toward another's good.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: the habit of virtue is required in a faculty, when the act is difficult for it; but the will, in the pursuit of the honest good even of its own suppositum, sometimes suffers no little difficulty, by reason of which it abandons it, and slips into the opposite evil; therefore it needs the habit of virtue for attaining it.

I respond, distinguishing the major: the habit of virtue is required in a faculty, when the act is difficult for it per se, and from the object, I grant the major. Only per accidens, and by reason of some extrinsic impediment, I deny the major. Whence, since the difficulty which the will sometimes suffers in the pursuit of the honest and connatural good of its own does not proceed from the excess of the object or act, but from the immoderate passions of the sensitive appetite, or other impediments holding themselves on the part of the body, no habit of virtue is required in the will, for easily and delightfully pursuing such a good, but if any habit is necessary for this, it must be placed in the aforesaid appetite, for moderating its passions, from whose immoderation the pursuit of that good is rendered difficult. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible appetite are placed the virtues of fortitude and temperance, by which its immoderate passions are restrained and tempered, as shown in the preceding section.

You will object, second: a habit is acquired through the repetition of acts; therefore, by the repetition of virtuous acts in the will concerning the honest good of one's own suppositum, virtue must be generated.

I respond that the antecedent is true when the subject is capable of a habit, but not when it is incapable of it: for a stone, for example, however much it descends, does not acquire a habit, because it is incapable of it, since by natural gravity it is completely inclined toward descent. Similarly, natural faculties, such as the vegetative, nutritive, and the like, however much they operate, do not acquire a habit, because they are naturally determined and complete for acting. The same, proportionally, must be said of the will, with respect to the honest good of its own suppositum, because it is, by itself, complete and determined toward it, as shown above.

You will object, third: the will is capable of a vicious habit concerning its own good; therefore also of the habit of virtue, since contraries must be concerned with the same subject.

Some of our Thomists respond, denying the antecedent: for just as (they say), because a stone has a complete natural inclination toward descent, there is not generated in it a habit for ascending upward, however many thousand times it is thrown upward, so neither is there generated in the will a vicious habit concerning its own good, from several repeated evil acts, because the will has a complete natural inclination with respect to its own honest good, which resists a vicious habit inclining to the contrary no less than a perfect acquired virtue would resist, if it were present. This solution and doctrine is not without probability.

More easily and better, however, it is answered, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity: the reason for the distinction is that the will, toward evil acts, whatever object they are exercised concerning, is not of itself inclined, and therefore the habit of vice is required, that it be inclined toward them; but toward honest acts concerning its own good, it is inclined by its own nature, and consequently cannot be inclined toward them through a habit.

From what has been said you will understand the distinction found between the will and the intellect: for the intellect, since it is not, by its nature, sufficiently instructed in first act for the cognition of the true, but is, as it were, a blank tablet, needs species and habits for attaining any truth whatsoever, even of the natural order — whence in it is placed understanding, or the habit of first principles, for knowing the first principles. On the contrary, the will, since it is naturally inclined and determined toward the natural good, at least domestic, needs no habit of moral virtue, for pursuing the honest good of its own suppositum, but only for attaining the good of another, and for rendering to each what is his own.

Chapter III

A manifold division of the virtues is transmitted

Various divisions of the virtues are usually transmitted, but clearer and more compendious than the rest is that which the Holy Doctor pursues here, q. 57 and in the following, by which, namely, virtue is distributed into intellectual, moral, and theological. Intellectual virtue is that which perfects the intellect in order to the cognition of the true. Moral virtue is that which completes the will for the pursuit of the honest good. Theological virtue is that which is immediately concerned with God.

Intellectual virtue is subdivided into five species, which are called understanding, or the habit of first principles, wisdom, science, art, and prudence. The reason for this division is this: since intellectual virtue perfects the intellect in order to the true, there must be as

many intellectual virtues, as there are habits infallibly attaining the true; but the habits infallibly attaining the true are only the five enumerated; therefore only those are intellectual virtues. The major is clear; the minor is proved. The truth which can be attained certainly and infallibly by the intellect, is either universal, and consequently necessary, or singular, and contingent? If universal, either it is attainable immediately, and from the mere knowledge of terms, as are first principles — and for these is posited the habit of first principles. Or it is infallibly attainable mediately, and through its proper causes, which, if they were particular, science is posited; but if the causes were the highest and universal, wisdom is posited. But if such a truth were singular, either it is factible? — and for attaining it art is posited; or agible? — and for attaining it prudence is posited.

The moral virtues are of two kinds: some are concerned with operations, in which the notion of what is due or not due to another is regarded, such as justice, by which what is due to one's neighbor is rendered; religion, by which what is due to God is rendered; piety, by which what is due to parents is rendered; gratitude, by which what is due to benefactors is rendered. Others are concerned with the passions, which they reduce to the due order of reason, such as fortitude, temperance, and others which moderate the affections and passions of the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

Among the moral virtues, four are principal, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which are called cardinal; because, as St. Thomas observes, question on the cardinal virtues, article 1, upon them the whole reason of the human condition turns, and upon them, as upon hinges, the whole series and mass of an honest and civil life rests.

Finally, besides the intellectual and moral virtues, there are others which are called theological, because through them we are ordered to God as our last end, and these are only three, namely faith, hope, and charity, because man is ordered to his last end through the cognition of the intellect illumined by the supernatural light of faith; and through the motion of intention tending toward it as toward that which is possible to attain, which pertains to hope; and as to a certain spiritual union, through which we are in a certain manner transformed into that end, which is done through charity, as St. Thomas says here, q. 62, art. 3.

Chapter IV

On the infused moral virtues

Of the theological virtues, and of the moral, we shall discourse in the fifth volume, whence it remains here only to treat of the infused moral virtues.

I say, therefore, that besides the acquired moral virtues, there are given others per se infused. Thus theologians commonly, with a few exceptions, after the Council of Vienne, which chose this opinion as more probable, and more conformable to the sayings of the Holy Fathers and theologians. The same truth is expressly transmitted by the Roman Catechism, part 2, title on Baptism, no. 50, where, enumerating the effects of baptism, which are conferred with grace, it says thus: To this is added the noblest company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused together with grace.

The reason for the necessity of virtues of this kind is twofold. The first can be proposed thus: man, constituted by grace in supernatural being, ought to be no less perfect in operating in a supernatural way, than in the order of nature in operating in a natural way — for to grace, in its order, no less perfection is owed, than is owed to nature in its own; but in the order of nature man is perfected not only concerning the last end, which he has from a natural desire, and natural rectitude of the will, but also concerning non-ultimate ends, which he has through acquired moral virtues; therefore similarly, in the supernatural order, he ought to have both perfections, and consequently to the order of grace there are owed not only the theological virtues, by which man is perfected and ordered to supernatural beatitude, but also the infused moral virtues, by which man, in the supernatural order, is perfected in order to the means which conduce to it.

Nor does it avail to say that, for attaining supernatural means, the gifts of the Holy Spirit suffice. For, as will be clear below, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are posited only for operating in an extraordinary manner within the supernatural order, namely from the special instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit. Whence, besides those gifts, the infused moral virtues must be admitted, for operating in an ordinary manner within the supernatural order.

The second fundamental reason is suggested by St. Thomas, sole question on the virtues, article 10, ad 8. The virtues are multiplied and diversified according to diverse formal objects; but in moral matter, with which the moral virtues are concerned, a twofold formally diverse object can be given, one natural and the other supernatural; therefore two genera of moral virtues must also be distinguished, and, besides the natural and acquired, others admitted which are supernatural and infused. The major is established; the minor is shown thus. The formal object of moral virtue is the mean constituted, through prudence and right reason, in human passions and operations; but such a mean can be twofold, namely natural, if it is established through natural and acquired prudence; supernatural, however, if it is constituted by supernatural and infused prudence. Whence St. Thomas, in the place cited: Infused temperance seeks a mean by a different reason than acquired temperance: for infused temperance seeks the mean

according to the reasons of divine law, which are taken from order to the last end; acquired temperance, however, takes the mean according to inferior reasons, in order to the good of the present life. Similarly, equality in operations toward another, which is the mean of the virtue of justice, either can occur among men, as they are citizens of the human city of this universe, endowed with life and natural reason, among whom human society and peace must be preserved, and in this way it is a natural mean specifying acquired justice; or it can occur among men, insofar as they are citizens of the saints, and of the household of God, endowed with supernatural light, and capable of eternal beatitude, among whom, by a higher reason, peace and society must be preserved, and in this way it is a supernatural mean, and the object of infused justice. The same, proportionally, must be said of fortitude, for if it must strengthen the appetite against the dangers of death in a natural good, and in that measure which natural reason dictates ought to be preserved, the object of acquired fortitude will be constituted, as if someone remains firm, for the defense of his country, against the dangers of death. But if it strengthens in a supernatural good, as happens in martyrdom, in which, for the defense of the Christian faith, the Martyrs sustain death, it will be the object of infused fortitude. From which you will understand that the moral virtues per se infused are distinguished in species from the acquired, since they regard formally diverse objects, and the specific distinction of faculties and habits is taken from the formal object.

You will object, first: virtue per se infused, since it is supernatural, ought to have a supernatural intrinsic object and motive; but the intrinsic object and motive of temperance, for example, namely moderation in food and drink, does not exceed the order of nature, no more than the matter in which it is found; therefore no virtue of temperance per se infused is given, but only acquired.

I respond, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: moderation, as constituted through natural prudence, and in order to a natural end, does not exceed the order of nature, I grant the minor. As constituted through infused prudence, and in order to a supernatural end, I deny the minor, and the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said in the second reason.

You will object, second: a subject cannot be assigned for the infused moral virtues, which are occupied with moderating passions — for example, of infused temperance or fortitude; therefore those virtues are fictitious. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. Such infused virtues are not subjected in the will, in which the acquired are not received either. Nor in the sensitive appetite, since, being immaterial and spiritual, as supernatural, and properties of sanctifying grace, they cannot be received in a corporeal subject; therefore no subject can be assigned for those virtues.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that those infused virtues are received in the sensitive appetite, just as the acquired are; for virtues are subjected in that faculty, whose proper acts they are, because virtues are given to operative faculties for eliciting their proper acts; but the acts of the infused moral virtues which are concerned per se primarily with the passions, are the proper acts of the sensitive appetite, since they are the moderated passions of such an appetite, according to infused prudence, such as moderate boldness, moderate fear, etc. Therefore they are subjected in the sensitive appetite. To the proof of the contrary it must be said that the virtues infused into the sensitive appetite are formally immaterial, and eminently corporeal. Whence, just as the rational soul, although it is immaterial and spiritual, nevertheless, because it is at the same time corporeal as "that by which," and is received virtually, or eminently, in the body, so the aforesaid virtues, by the same reason, can be subjected in the sensitive appetite. Nor is it inconvenient that a form of a more perfect order be received in an inferior subject, so as to elevate, uplift, and perfect it.

Chapter V

Two chief properties of the moral virtues, mean-observance, and connection

The first is clear from the definition of moral virtue transmitted above, in which it is said that virtue is an elective habit, consisting in a mean, as a wise and prudent man would determine it. This is also established by the reason of St. Thomas, book 3, Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 3, where he argues thus: The moral virtues are concerned with passions and operations, which must be directed according to the rule of reason. But in all things regulated, the right consists in this, that they be equated to the rule; for equality is a mean between more and less; therefore the right of virtue must consist in the mean between that which superabounds and that which is deficient from the measure of right reason.

It must be observed, however, that between the moral virtues which are concerned with the passions, and justice, which regards another's right, and gives to each what is his own, there is this distinction, that the former consist in the mean of reason, but the latter observes not only the mean of reason, but also the mean of the thing. For the mean in the virtues which are concerned with the passions is not fixed by the nature of the thing, but only by reason, according to each person's disposition, and all circumstances of time, place, etc., being weighed, as is clear in temperance, for the mean of temperance is not a certain quantity of food fitting for all, that they may be temperate, but it varies in different people, according to their diverse constitution — indeed, even in the same person, for different times and circumstances. Justice, however, not only observes the

mean of reason, in rendering the due at its due time, and place, and according to the rules of prudence, but also has to make an equality of thing to thing — with this distinction, however, that commutative justice makes an equality of quantity to quantity, for if one owes a hundred, one renders a hundred; distributive, however, observes only an equality of proportion to proportion — for it does not give equally to all, but to each according to his condition, or merit, whether the soldier receives only proportionally as much as the tribune, as tribune; or whether, if one has merit as of eight, a hundred parts of the good of the commonwealth are given, to one having merit as of four, only fifty are given.

From these things you will understand this distinction found between the moral and theological virtues, that the former consist in a mean, and flee excess or defect, but not the latter; for no one can exceed in believing the things revealed by God, or in hoping for the beatitude which He has promised us, or in loving too much His infinite goodness — for, as St. Bernard says in the book On Loving God, The measure of loving God is to love without measure. Per accidens, however, and as to exercise, those virtues do require some measure or moderation, for they must be exercised according to the measure of our nature, condition, and the powers of our intelligence and constitution — not, however, with too great effort, so much that the body is injured, or excessively weakened. Whence the same Saint says, sermon to the brothers on the Mount of God: Although the devotion of the one loving ought to have no end or term, nevertheless the action of the one operating ought to have its own limits, and ends, and rules.

As for the other property of the moral virtues, namely their connection and concatenation, it must be observed that those virtues can and must be considered either in a perfect state, namely when they so firmly actuate the subject, that it can easily resist all things impeding rectitude; or in an imperfect state, namely when they are in the subject by way of a movable disposition, and do not confer a firm faculty for overcoming impediments. Since, therefore, it is said that the moral virtues are so necessarily connected with each other, that he who lacks one has none perfectly, this is understood only of those virtues according to a perfect state; not of those as they are in an imperfect state — for it is established by experience, that many are more inclined, not only from natural constitution, but also from the frequency of imperfect acts, to one virtue more than to another. This being premised:

By a twofold reason the connection and concatenation of the moral virtues in perfect being is shown. The first is: virtue, in a perfect state, inclines one to operate promptly and delightfully in its own matter, as Aristotle teaches, Ethics 4, chapter 4. But this it cannot have, unless it is connected with the other moral virtues; therefore the moral virtues, in perfect being, have a necessary connection among themselves. The major is

evident; the minor is recommended by a twofold example. For if someone had the virtue of justice, for example, and not of liberality, and consequently loved money too much, an occasion of obtaining it being offered, he would easily inflict injury on his neighbor, and only with great difficulty would he render the debt to another. Similarly, a chaste but avaricious, or timid, woman will scarcely be able to preserve chastity; for, money being offered, or the danger of death occurring, she will easily be called away from the proposal of chastity, either persuaded by the allurements of riches, or deterred by the fear of penalties.

The second reason is taken from St. Thomas here, q. 65, art. 1, and can be proposed in this way. There cannot be moral virtue in a perfect state, unless perfect prudence is present, which is the rule of the moral virtues, and which, as St. Bernard says, book 1 on Consideration, chapter 8, Sitting, as it were, as an arbiter between pleasures and necessities, sets bounds on each side by certain limits, assigning and offering to the latter what suffices, to the former, what is excessive, demonstrating. But there cannot be perfect prudence without the company of all the moral virtues; therefore neither can any moral virtue be in a perfect state, unless it has all the other virtues annexed to it. The major is established; the minor is recommended from the fact that the right judgment of prudence depends on the rectitude of the appetite, because each one, as he is affected toward the end, so he judges practically about it, according to that common saying: As each one is, so does the end appear to him. But the rectitude of the appetite cannot be had without the company of all the moral virtues, since the proper effect of those virtues is to rectify the appetite concerning the end and its proper matter; therefore neither can the right judgment of prudence. Whence Aristotle, Ethics 6, chapter 5, says that temperance is the preserver of prudence, and therefore is called σωφροσύνη [temperance/soundness of mind]. And he gives the reason there, when he asserts that speculative judgment is not perverted by depravity of morals, but practical and prudential judgment is often corrupted by it.

From these things you will understand, first, that between prudence and the other moral virtues there is a mutual causality and dependence, in a diverse genus of cause; for the virtues depend on prudence in the genus of directive cause, and of extrinsic formal cause; but prudence depends on the other virtues, in the genus of dispositive cause, because, in order that it be able to bring a right and uncorrupted judgment concerning all things in each business, it is altogether necessary that the appetite be rightly disposed concerning the ends of all the virtues, which is done by those very moral virtues.

You will understand, second, that there are not given partial prudences, which direct individual virtues, one temperance, for example, another fortitude, another justice, as

some think; but one total and perfect prudence, which directs all the virtues, and regards all things doable. For, in order that prudence direct some virtue, it must constitute for it a mean, cutting off the extremes by which, through excess or defect, it can be corrupted; but for this a partial prudence does not suffice: for since those extremes range through the matter of any virtue whatsoever (as is established by the example of a woman, who can recede from preserving chastity, and from the mean of temperance, either on account of delight alone, which is the matter of temperance itself, or from fear of death, which is the matter of fortitude, or on account of gain and love of money, which is the matter of liberality), to cut those off there is required a total and perfect prudence, which can attain them, and judge concerning them.

You will object, first: the Church and the Fathers commonly teach that individual just and holy persons excel in certain virtues, and surpass one another. Whence Bede says that the Saints are more humbled concerning the virtues which they do not have, than they glory in the virtues which they have. Therefore they hold that the moral virtues are not connected among themselves, but separable from each other.

I respond, from St. Thomas, book 3, dist. 36, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, that this must be understood of the virtues as to their uses, and not as to habits: for different saints exceed one another in different ways in the uses of different virtues, according as it is said of any Confessor, There has not been found one like him who preserved the law of the Most High. On account of such excess, therefore, on the part of use, we attribute to each saint certain special virtues, and deny others, not because they lack them, but because they shine forth more in them.

You will press further: if man can exercise the acts of one virtue, without exercising the acts of the others, he will also be able to acquire one virtue without the others; since virtues are acquired only through their proper acts, and consequently all the virtues will not be connected and concatenated among themselves.

I respond, distinguishing the antecedent: he will be able to acquire one virtue without the others, as to essence, and in imperfect being, I grant. In a perfect state, I deny. For the perfect state of virtue does not depend only on the acts which generate the essence of virtue, but also on the company and accompaniment of the others, by which it must be helped, that it can easily and promptly attain the mean of reason in its proper matter, not only by withdrawal from those things which, in its proper matter, can lead away from such a mean (for which the virtue itself suffices), but also by withdrawal from those things which can lead away absolutely, and in any matter whatsoever, as is established in the examples adduced above. Whence St. Gregory the Great, book 22, Morals, chapter 1:

One virtue without another is either altogether nothing, or imperfect. For, to speak of the first four virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, they are individually perfect insofar as they are mutually joined to one another; but disjoined, they can by no means be perfect; because neither is prudence true, which is not just, temperate, and brave; nor is temperance perfect, which is not brave, just, and prudent; nor is fortitude whole, which is not prudent, temperate, and just; nor is justice true, which is not prudent, brave, and temperate.

You will object, second: in a poor man the virtue of magnificence cannot be found, nor virginity in a married person, since their acts cannot be exercised by them; therefore one virtue can be had without another, and consequently they are not connected among themselves.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that for the acquisition of virtue it is not required that its exterior act be exercised, but the internal act of election, absolute or conditional, suffices; whence, if a poor person elicits conditional internal acts of liberality and magnificence, he will be able to acquire those virtues for himself; and similarly a married person can acquire the virtue of virginity, as to what is formal in it, because he can have, in preparation of mind, the resolve of preserving integrity, if this pertained to him. I add that, when we said that the moral virtues have a necessary connection among themselves, this must be understood of the moral virtues, of which the subject is capable, not of those of which it is incapable — but a married person who has experienced venereal things is not capable of virginal chastity, but only of conjugal.

Chapter VI

Whether the acquired moral virtues can be without charity, and whether, without it, they have the true and essential notion of virtue?

The negative was recently followed by the Author of the Theologia Mentis et Cordis, tome 4, page 49; our Thomists commonly affirm it, however, with whom I agree.

I say, first, that the acquired moral virtues can be without charity.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 65, art. 2, in the body, where he says thus: The moral virtues, as they are operative of good in order to an end which does not exceed the natural faculty of man, can be acquired through human works, and, so acquired, can be without charity, as they were in many nations. Nothing clearer or more express can be said in favor of our conclusion.

This is confirmed: since the same Holy Doctor there, in the second place, objects to himself: The moral virtues can be acquired from human acts; but charity is had only from infusion; therefore the moral virtues can be had without charity. Thus he responds: It must be said that this argument proceeds concerning the acquired moral virtues. Therefore, from St. Thomas, although the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity, the acquired can indeed be so.

Reason also supports this, for the infused moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity for this reason, that they are properties of sanctifying grace, flowing from it, and inseparable from it; and because they are regulated by infused prudence, which cannot be without charity, as St. Thomas teaches in the article cited; but the acquired moral virtues neither are properties of grace, flowing from it, since they are of the natural order, and are acquired by our acts; nor are they regulated by infused prudence, but by acquired; therefore they are not connected with charity, but can be separable from it.

I say, second, that the acquired moral virtues, separated from charity, are true virtues.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, art. 7, in the body, where he says thus: If virtue is taken according as it is in order to some particular end, thus some virtue can be spoken of without charity, insofar as it is ordered to some particular good; but if that particular good is not a true good, but apparent, the virtue too which is in order to this good will not be true virtue, but false — just as the prudence of the avaricious is not true virtue, nor the justice of the avaricious, etc. But if that particular good is a true good, for example, the preservation of the city, or something of this sort, it will indeed be true virtue, but imperfect, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good. By these words he suggests this fundamental reason for our conclusion: for some habit to be true virtue, it is required and sufficient that it tend and incline toward a good which is true and not merely apparent; but the acquired moral virtues, in themselves, and independently of charity, tend and incline man toward a good which is true, and not merely apparent, namely toward the honest good, consonant with reason, which is a true good, as being ordainable to the last end. Whence the same Holy Doctor, at the beginning of the same article, says thus: The secondary and, as it were, particular good of man can be twofold: one indeed which is truly good, as being ordainable, as far as it is of itself, to the principal good, which is the last end; the other, however, is an apparent, and not a true good, because it leads away from the final good; therefore the acquired moral virtues, independently of charity, are true virtues.

The conclusion is proved, second: that habit can be called true virtue, which has whatever is required for the essence of virtue; but the acquired moral virtues,

independently of charity, have whatever is required for their essence; therefore, independently of it, they can be called true virtues. The major is clear; the minor is proved. If anything essential were lacking to those virtues, as they are separated from charity, it would be the order to the supernatural end, as the adversaries say; but such an order is not of their essence, but a certain accidental perfection, superadded to them per accidens, by force of the command of charity; therefore etc. The minor is proved, first, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, art. 6, in the body, where he says thus: The end of the moral virtues is the human good, but the good of the human soul is to be according to reason. And in the response ad 1: Natural reason, which is called synderesis, prescribes the end to the moral virtues. Likewise in the response ad 3: The moral virtues tend toward the end prescribed by natural reason; therefore, according to St. Thomas, the order to the supernatural end is not of the essence of the acquired moral virtues, but only the order to the natural end, namely to the honest good, consonant with reason. Whence the same Holy Doctor, in the same place, art. 7, argues thus: This very thing, that it is to conform to right reason, is the proper end of any moral virtue whatsoever. For temperance intends this, that man not turn away from reason on account of concupiscences, and similarly fortitude, that he not turn away from the right judgment of reason on account of fear, or boldness; and this end is prescribed to man according to natural reason, for natural reason dictates to each one that he operate according to natural reason.

Second, the same minor is proved by a manifest reason: the order to the supernatural end cannot be of the essence of an entitatively natural habit, or an essential predicate of it; but the acquired moral virtues are entitatively natural habits, as is established of itself; therefore the order to the supernatural end cannot be of their essence, or an essential predicate of them, but only some perfection, extrinsic and accidental to them, supervening upon them from the command of charity.

The conclusion is proved, third, by destroying the chief foundation of the opposite opinion: charity is not the intrinsic and essential form of the acquired moral virtues, but only extrinsic and accidental; therefore, independently of it, they have the true and essential notion of virtue. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, art. 8, ad 1, where he says thus: Charity is said to be the form of the other virtues, not indeed exemplarily, or essentially, but rather effectively, insofar, namely, as it imposes form on all — namely, extrinsic and accidental, namely the order to the supernatural end, coming to it from the command of charity.

Reason also supports this: for if charity were the intrinsic and essential form of all the moral virtues, they would not be distinguished in species among themselves, which is

more than absurd, and against St. Thomas here, q. 60, arts. 5 and 6, where he teaches that the moral virtues are distinguished in species among themselves according to the diverse objects of the passions. The inference is clear, for those things are of the same species, which have the same essential and intrinsic form, since species is taken from the essential form; whence, because two men have an intrinsic and essential form of the same species, namely the rational soul, they do not differ in species between themselves; therefore, if charity were the essential and intrinsic form of all the moral virtues, they would not differ among themselves in species.

Finally, the conclusion can be recommended by this argument: the habits eliciting, in a sinner, honest and morally good acts, such as helping the needy, honoring parents, living chastely, rendering to each what is his own, etc., are not vices; therefore they are true virtues, and consequently true virtues are given without charity. The consequence is clear, since every habit, eliciting human and moral acts, must be either virtue, or vice, nor are any moral habits given midway between vice and virtue. The antecedent, however, is clear from the fact that vicious habits incline only toward sinful acts, and morally evil, or disformed to reason; but the aforesaid acts, elicited by a sinner, are not evil nor sinful (as theologians commonly teach, against Michael Baius, and as we shall show in the Treatise on Grace), but honest, and morally good, or conformable to reason; therefore the habits elicitive of them are not vices, but virtues.

I say, third: the acquired moral virtues, when they are separated from charity, are not perfect virtues.

This is proved, first: for some virtue to be perfect, it must be ordered to the perfect good, which is the last end; but the acquired moral virtues, when they are separated from charity, are not ordered to the last end, since they are ordered to it by the command of charity; therefore they are not perfect virtues. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 23, art. 7: If the particular good (toward which a habit inclines the will) is a true good, for example, the preservation of the city, or something of this sort, it will indeed be true virtue, but imperfect, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good.

This is proved, second: perfect virtue makes its possessor simply good; but this the moral virtues separated from charity cannot render, since a man deprived of grace and charity cannot be called simply good; therefore the moral virtues separated from charity are not perfect, although they participate the true and essential notion of virtue. Just as a boy is a true man, but not a perfect one. Or just as the Theology which is in us wayfarers has the true notion of science, although it is not in a perfect and connatural state, because it is not conjoined with the science of the blessed, or the clear vision of God, to which it is

subalternated, as we declared in tome 1, prooemial question.

The objections are resolved.

Against the first and second conclusion, the adversaries object, first, various testimonies of the Fathers, by which it is asserted that sinners and infidels have no true virtue: among these Augustine speaks most explicitly, against Julian, chapter 3, where he says that there are no true virtues, except where there is true wisdom, and the charity of God, and therefore that there were not among the Romans and Greeks any who ought to be judged truly wise and studious.

But to these it is answered that Augustine, by the name of true virtue, understands perfect virtue, which promotes man to eternal life, or, as he himself says, which serves to liberate and beatify men. Whence in the same place he says: If, for attaining the true beatitude, which faith through Christ has promised to us, virtues profit man nothing, they are not true virtues. That the same Holy Doctor, however, acknowledges in sinners and infidels true virtues, that is, which retain the essence and quiddity of virtue, is clear from Epistle 130, where he says that the continence of Polemon was valid for the honesty of this life, that is, was truly good within the degree of philosophical moral virtue, and calls it a gift of God, denying, however, that it was valid for future immortality, because it lacked charity and religion toward the true God.

From these things, several testimonies of St. Thomas which are objected to us remain explained. For when the Holy Doctor, in various places, asserts that without charity there are no true virtues, because they are not referred to the due end, and from this infers that in infidels and sinners there is neither true chastity, nor true justice, he speaks of virtue simply true, that is, perfect, as is established from II-II, q. 23, art. 7, where he says thus: It will indeed be true virtue, but imperfect, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good, namely the last end. Whence when he says here, q. 65, art. 2, that the acquired virtues are virtues in a qualified sense, but not simply, he does not intend to exclude from them the essence and quiddity of virtue, but only the notion and state of perfect virtue, comparatively to the theological virtues, and the infused moral virtues, which have the notion of perfect virtue. Whence he immediately adds: they order man to good, not with respect to the last end in some genus, but with respect to the last end simply. Which reason clearly demonstrates that he is not speaking of the essence of moral virtue, but only of its perfection, which is regarded according to the order to the perfect good, which is the last end simply, as we declared in the third conclusion.

Finally, when the same Holy Doctor says that charity is the form of the virtues, he speaks of an extrinsic and accidental form, not of an intrinsic and essential one, as is established

from the place cited above, where he says that charity is said to be the form of the other virtues, not exemplarily, or essentially. Otherwise, as we argued above, the moral virtues would not differ in species among themselves, because they would agree in the same essential form, from which species is taken. Charity, therefore, is only an assisting and extrinsic form, by which the other virtues, in their acts, are directed toward the last end, and, as it were, formed, receiving that extrinsic perfection which comes to them from the fact that they are referred to man's supernatural end, to which they would not be elevated without charity. Nevertheless, from their intrinsic and natural end, which is confined within the bounds of nature, they have natural honesty and goodness, underlying the supernatural perfection that is adventitious, but as it were unformed, in that they are stripped of that notable ornament which could accrue to them through charity.

A certain more recent author objects, second: all the virtues are connected and concatenated among themselves, and consequently he who has one possesses them all altogether, as we showed in the preceding chapter; but in infidels and sinners not all the moral virtues can be found; therefore no true virtue at all can be in them.

I respond that the doctrine on the connection of the virtues must be understood of the virtues perfect according to state, not of them as to their essence, and considered in an imperfect state, for thus one can be without the others, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 65, art. 1, in these words: Moral virtue can be taken either as perfect, or as imperfect: imperfect moral virtue indeed, such as temperance or fortitude, is nothing other than a certain inclination existing in man toward doing some work of the genus of good things — and, taking the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected. Whence this argument only proves that in infidels and sinners perfect moral virtues are not found, but does not show that in them there are no true virtues, or having the essence and quiddity of virtue, although imperfect, on account of a defect of ordination to the last end, as we declared in the third conclusion.

The same Author presses further: no true virtue can be found without prudence, which is the rule and measure of all the virtues; but prudence cannot be without charity, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 65, art. 2; therefore, without charity, no true virtue can be found.

I respond that no true virtue can be found without prudence, whether infused or acquired, and that this distinction holds between the infused and acquired moral virtues, that the former are regulated through infused prudence, which presupposes charity; but the latter through natural and acquired prudence, which does not essentially presuppose

charity. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, art. 6, ad 1: Natural reason, which is called synderesis, prescribes the end to the moral virtues. And in the response ad 2: The moral virtues tend toward the end prescribed by natural reason.

The adversaries object, third: just as the sciences depend on principles, so the moral virtues depend on ends; but it is impossible for there to be given science, the intellect erring concerning the principles, or being ignorant of them; therefore it is also impossible for true virtues to be found, if the appetite does not have a right affection concerning the end; but one existing in mortal sin is averted from God as the last end, both natural and supernatural; therefore he cannot have true virtues.

I respond that, for the intellect to have true science concerning some object, nothing else is required, than that it be well disposed concerning the proper principles of it, either by firmly believing them, or by evidently knowing them in themselves — whatever disposition exists concerning the most common principles, although, without knowledge of them, there is not perfect science, but has rather the state of a disposition than of a habit. Similarly, for true moral virtue to be acquired and preserved in the appetite, it suffices that the appetite be well affected toward the proper end of that very virtue, although it is not converted toward the last end simply; without which conversion virtue cannot be perfect virtue, nor should it be called simply virtue, but rather has the state of a disposition than of a habit, since it is on the way to corruption.

From what has been said you will understand that there are three genera of virtues: some are not true, but only apparent, because they are not ordered to a true good, but an apparent one — such as the prudence of the avaricious, by which they devise diverse kinds of profits; and the justice of the avaricious, by which, from fear of grave losses, they respect another's property; and the temperance of the avaricious, by which they restrain the appetite for luxury, which is costly; and the fortitude of the avaricious, by which, as Horace says: They flee poverty through sea, through rocks, through fires. Others are true virtues, but not perfect, because they are ordered to a true good, but not a perfect one, namely to the honest good, which does not have the notion of a last end, but only of an intermediate one; and of this kind are the acquired moral virtues. Others, finally, are not only true, but also perfect virtues, because, indeed, they are ordered to the last end, which is a perfect good, and simply such; and of this kind are the theological virtues, and the infused moral virtues. The virtues of the first genus are regulated, not by true, but by false prudence, which is called the prudence of the flesh. Those of the second genus are regulated by natural and acquired prudence. Those of the third genus, by supernatural and infused prudence. The object of the virtues of the first class, since it is not a true good, but apparent, is not ordainable to God as the last end, but rather turns away from

Him as the last end. But the object of the virtues of the second class, namely the honest good, and consonant with reason, of itself and by its own nature tends toward God as the last end in a qualified sense, namely as the author of natural light and of the honest good, and, as far as it is of itself, through the command of charity, is referable to God as the last end simply. Finally, the object of the virtues of the third class is actually referred to God as the last end simply, or is God Himself, as supernatural author, and last end.

Chapter VII

On the gifts of the Holy Spirit

That there are given in us gifts of the Holy Spirit, or certain special dispositions, impressed on the soul by the Holy Spirit, by which it is disposed to this, that it be moved well and easily by Him to extraordinary works, is established from various passages of Scripture, where express mention is made of those gifts, and from the Ecclesiastical hymns, in which the Holy Spirit is called of sevenfold gift, and is said to give us the sacred number of seven.

Reason also supports this, for, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 68, art. 2, that which has some nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot operate of itself, unless moved by another — just as the moon, in which the nature of light is imperfect, does not illumine, unless illumined by the sun; but the theological virtues, and the infused moral virtues, imperfectly inform the rational soul; therefore through them man is not so perfected in order to the last end, that he does not always need to be moved by a certain superior instinct of the Holy Spirit, and consequently by His gifts, which dispose the soul to that motion. From which it is clear that those gifts are habits, not merely transient motions; for the human soul must be habitually disposed, that it be moved connaturally by the Holy Spirit, just as it is habitually disposed, through the moral virtues, that it be moved connaturally by reason; therefore, just as those virtues are habits, so also are the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Whence St. Thomas, the question cited, art. 4: The gifts are certain habits perfecting man, that he may promptly follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit — just as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive faculties for obeying reason.

There are, however, some theologians who think that such gifts do not really differ from the infused virtues. But this opinion seems little probable, and can be confuted by this reason: those habits are really distinguished, which regard formally distinct objects; but the infused virtues, and the gifts, regard formally diverse objects: for the former regard their object, as directable through the rules of infused prudence, in a common and ordinary manner; the latter, however, as directable in a higher manner, namely through a

certain special inspiration and motion of the Holy Spirit, beyond the rules of prudence, and prior to the counsel and deliberation of reason, as will be established from what will be said below; therefore they are really distinguished among themselves.

This is confirmed and further illustrated: the habits by which some mobile thing is disposed to receive motion from some superior mover, must be distinguished among themselves, according to the distinction and quality of the movers; but man, by the acquired virtues, is rendered promptly movable by the light of nature; by the infused, by the light of grace and faith; by the gifts, by the special impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit; therefore the gifts must be distinguished from those virtues. The minor is certain; the major is established from this, that every mobile thing must be proportioned to its mover.

You will say: the theological virtues, and the infused moral virtues, equally dispose the soul to receive the motion of the Holy Spirit; for since man cannot elicit the acts of those virtues, unless the Holy Spirit moves, inspires, and illumines, by that very fact that they dispose and complete the faculties of the soul for eliciting supernatural acts, they also dispose it to receive the motion, inspiration, and illustration of the Holy Spirit; therefore the aforesaid reason does not hold.

But against this: although the theological virtues, and the infused moral virtues, dispose the soul to receive the motion of the Holy Spirit, they do so in a manner different from the gifts; for the gifts dispose it toward a special motion of God, by which man is moved by God, not by the medium of counsel and deliberation, but by divine instinct; but the theological and infused moral virtues dispose it toward receiving the common and ordinary motion of the Holy Spirit, within the supernatural order itself, by which, namely, man is born to be moved, counsel and deliberation of reason being supposed. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 68, art. 1, ad 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, according as it proceeds from the judgment of reason; but it is called a gift, according as it operates from divine instinct.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are seven in number; for just as the world was completed in seven days, so the lesser world is completed by the seven gifts of the Spirit, as, after Gregory the Great, St. Bonaventure says, book on the Seven Gifts, chapter 2. These are seven spiritual rays, as splendid as they are fiery, proceeding from the sun of justice. Seven columns, on which rests the house which divine wisdom has built for you. Seven lamps, of which it is said, Exodus 25: You shall make seven lamps, and you shall set them upon the candlestick. Seven stars in the right hand of Christ, which St. John saw, Apocalypse 1. Seven eyes upon one stone, of which mention is made, Zechariah 3. Seven

locks of hair, in which the strength of Samson was placed, as is had, Judges 16. Finally, the seven sons of Job, who feasted on each of the days. For (says Gregory, book 1, Morals, chapter 15) wisdom has one day, understanding another, counsel another, fortitude another, knowledge another, piety another, fear another. He adds that the Holy Spirit, by those seven gifts, strengthens and protects the soul against all temptations and vices. Against folly, by wisdom; against dullness, by understanding; against rashness, by counsel; against fear, by fortitude; against ignorance, by knowledge; against pride, by fear.

But if you ask, whether those gifts will remain in the fatherland? I respond that they, as to the matter with which they are now concerned, namely the works of the active life, will not remain in the fatherland, for those works have no place in the state of glory; they will remain, however, and indeed most perfectly, as to the essence of the gifts; because then man, totally subject to God, will follow the motion of the Holy Spirit most perfectly. All the gifts will also have their acts in the fatherland, concerning those things which pertain to the contemplative life, which is the blessed life. Whence Ambrose, book 1 on the Holy Spirit, chapter 20: The city of God, that heavenly Jerusalem, is not watered by the flow of any earthly river, but the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the fount of life, of whom we are briefly satiated by a brief draught, seems to overflow more abundantly in those heavenly spirits, flowing with a full stream of the seven spiritual virtues.

Treatise V

On Sins

We shall treat in this Treatise, first, of sin in general, and its nature, subject, and causes. Then of its principal species, namely of original sin, which is transmitted from Adam into his posterity by seminal propagation; of habitual sin, which remains in us after the sinful act has passed, and is called the stain of sin; of actual sin, of commission and omission, and finally of sin both mortal and venial.

Chapter I

On the nature of sin in general

I say, first, that it belongs to the notion of every sin to be against the eternal law. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 71, art. 6, where he argues thus: A human act has this, that it be evil (morally), from the fact that it lacks due commensuration; but every commensuration of any thing whatsoever is regarded by comparison to some rule, from which, if it deviates, it will be incommensurate. Now the rule of the human will is twofold: one proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; the other, however, is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is, as it were, the reason of God. Therefore a morally evil act essentially imports disformity, or disagreement, with right reason and the eternal law. Whence sin is defined by Augustine: A word, or deed, or desire against the eternal law — and consequently against the natural law, which is a certain participation of the eternal law impressed on our minds. Wherefore Ambrose, book on Paradise, chapter 14, says that such a law is not inscribed, but innate, nor is it perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each individual by a certain flowing natural spring.

I say, second, it is essential to sin that it be an injury and offense against God. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding: for if sin is against the eternal law, it cannot fail to be an injury or offense against God; for one who knowingly and willingly transgresses a law imposed by someone truly offends the lawgiver himself, because he contradicts his will, and denies him the due subjection and obedience. Then, sin not only opposes God as supreme lawgiver, but also offends Him as just judge, by not fearing His punishment and penalty; as supreme and highest good, by denying Him the due servitude; as friend and benefactor, by showing itself hostile and ungrateful to Him, and abusing His benefits; as first cause and first principle, by using His concurrence for sinning; and finally, as the supreme good and last end, because through any mortal sin the sinner is converted to a created good as to a last end, and is turned away from God, the true last end, in which God Himself is supremely offended.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: lying and hatred of God are something intrinsically morally evil, not only antecedently to positive law, and independently of it, but also antecedently to natural law, indeed even to the eternal law; for in that priority in which the divine intellect, through the knowledge of simple understanding, knows hatred of God precisely according to its essential predicates, it truly knows it as opposed to His goodness, and as turning the rational creature away from it, and as unfitting and dissonant to the rational creature itself; the same must be said of lying; therefore acts evil in themselves are sins, independently of the natural law, and of the eternal law, and

antecedently to them, and consequently it is not essential to sin that it be contrary to natural and eternal law.

I respond that lying, hatred of God, and other acts evil in themselves, antecedently to the natural law, or to the eternal law, are not morally evil and sins formally, but only initiatively and fundamentally, insofar as, of themselves and intrinsically, they are determined, such that they discord and deviate from the eternal law, and consequently from the natural law, which is its participation, and are apt by nature to be prohibited by it — after whose prohibition they will be evil and sins formally and completively. But if you ask, in what this initiative and fundamental malice consists: I shall respond briefly, that it consists in this, that acts intrinsically evil in themselves are repugnant to some divine perfection — as hatred of God to His supreme goodness, lying to the first truth, theft to His supreme justice and equity; for this contrariety and repugnance is the reason and foundation, why God, by the eternal and natural law, prohibits acts of this kind: for just as God is necessarily determined to love His own divine attributes, so He is necessarily determined to hate, and to prohibit by eternal law, whatever is contrary to them.

You will object, second, against the second conclusion: whatever is essential to sin, comes to it from the object by which it is specified; but from the object comes to sin only the notion of evil or moral defect, but the notion of offensiveness or injury comes to it from the order to the offended person, which is distinct from the object of sin; therefore it is not essential to sin, that it be an injury or offense against God.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor: for in the object of sin, God is virtually included, both as lawgiver, and as last end — as lawgiver indeed, because the object of sin is morally evil, and consequently prohibited by divine positive or natural law; as last end, however, because in moral matters some object is commanded or prohibited, in order to God as the last end; whence the notion of injury or offense against God, as lawgiver, and as last end, is virtually and implicitly included in sin, insofar as it is a moral evil, and cannot be perfectly prescinded from it.

Chapter II

Manifold division of sins

Sin is first divided into original, which is derived from Adam, and, through origin or generation, is transmitted into his posterity; and personal, which is committed by the sinner's own will, and is not derived from another.

Second, personal sin is divided into actual and habitual. The first is an evil act, disformed to the rules of morals; the second, however, consists in a certain stain, which is left in the soul from an actual sin, and remains in it, until it is removed through sanctifying grace.

Third, actual sin is subdivided into sin of commission and of omission. The former consists in the production of some evil act, disformed to the rules of morals. The latter is the lack, or privation, of some act due and prescribed by law. The former conflicts with a negative precept, positing an act which is commanded not to be posited; the latter with an affirmative one, neglecting the act which is prescribed.

Fourth, actual sins are divided into carnal and spiritual. The former are those which are consummated in carnal delight, such as gluttony and lust, which are consummated in the delight of food and venereal things. The latter are those which are consummated in spiritual delight, such as pride, envy, and the like, which are consummated only in the apprehension of some thing coveted, or desired at will. The former have more of conversion than of aversion; the latter, on the contrary, more of aversion than of conversion; whence the latter are graver as to guilt, the former greater as to attachment. Finally, as Gregory the Great says, book 33, Morals, chapter 11: Carnal sins are of lesser guilt and greater infamy. Of lesser guilt indeed, because we are impelled toward them by several and most vehement incentives. Of greater infamy, however, because they are concerned with those delights which are common to us and to brute animals. Whence the proud often, by God's just judgment, fall into those carnal sins, that they may be confounded and humbled, as the same Holy Pontiff observed, book 11, Morals, chapter 8, where, expounding that saying of Job 12, He looses the belt of kings, he adds: He thus looses the belt of kings, when, on account of the fault of elation, He destroys in them the girdle of chastity.

Fifth, of sins, some are against God, others against oneself, others against one's neighbor: for a threefold order must be in man, one by reference to the rule of divine law, another by comparison to the rule of reason, a third by reference to other men, with whom he must live together. When, therefore, someone fails in the first order, and detracts from God the love or reverence due to Him, he is said to sin against God — as the sacrilegious, the heretic, the blasphemer. When he deviates from the second order, and does not regulate his passions by reason, he sins against himself — as the avaricious, the gluttonous, the lustful. But when he recedes from the third order, and does not preserve the right due to his neighbor, or offends human society, to which he is naturally bound, then he is said to sin against his neighbor — as thieves, murderers, adulterers.

Sixth, sin is divided into sin of the heart, of the mouth, and of the deed, which division can be understood in two ways. First, so that by sin of the heart is taken that which is consummated interiorly, such as heresy; by sin of the mouth, that which is perfected by speech, such as lying; by sin of the deed, that which is completed by a work, such as adultery, or homicide. Second, so that this division is rather into diverse degrees of the same sin, than into diverse sins: for the wrathful man, for example, from this that he seeks vengeance, is first disturbed in heart, second bursts out in contumelious words, and third proceeds even to injurious deeds. The same is clear in lust, and in any other sin, in which there is first a conception of the heart, namely thought, then manifestation and speech, and finally external accomplishment.

Finally, sin is divided into mortal and venial: the former inflicts death on the soul, depriving it of grace and charity, and turning it away from the last end; the latter, however, deprives it of neither grace nor charity, but only diminishes its fervor, nor does it turn it away from the last end, but only diverts it from Him, and retards its attainment — whence it is called venial, because it is light, in comparison to the other, and worthy of the greatest pardon.

Chapter III

Comparison of sins with one another

I say, first, that sins are not connected among themselves.

This is proved by the reason of St. Thomas here, q. 73, art. 1, taken from the difference between one who sins, and one who operates according to virtue: for the intention of one who acts according to virtue tends toward one thing, namely toward that which is conformable to the rule of reason, which prudence prescribes, and consequently all the virtues are connected in prudence, as we showed in the preceding Treatise; but the intention of one who sins does not tend toward the same thing, but toward diverse things, having no connection; because the intention of one who sins is not to recede from reason (this indeed is not per se intended by the agent), but to tend toward desirable goods, from which vices and sins take their species — which goods are not only diverse, but sometimes even contrary to each other; therefore vices and sins are not connected among themselves, but disparate, and sometimes opposed to each other, such as avarice and prodigality; whence, as St. Augustine notes, Epistle 29, sometimes one vice is removed by another, as the love of money by the love of praise, or of pleasure.

You will say: just as all the virtues agree in one principle, namely in the love of God, so all vices and sins are united and agree in self-love, or philautia; therefore, just as the virtues

are connected among themselves, so are vices and sins.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity, for, as St. Thomas says in the article cited, in the response ad 3: The love of God is gathering, insofar as it draws the affection of man from many things into one; and therefore the virtues which are caused from the love of God have connection. But self-love disperses the affection of man into diverse things, namely as man loves himself, seeking for himself temporal goods, which are various and diverse; and therefore vices and sins, which are caused from self-love, are not connected.

I say, second, that all sins are not equal in malice and gravity. This is against the Stoics, who, as St. Thomas relates in the question cited, art. 2, considering sin only on the part of the privation of the rectitude of reason which it implies, and thinking that no privation can admit of more or less, said that all sins are equal. The Holy Doctor overturns this foundation, noting that there is a twofold genus of privation: one is pure and simple, which consists, as it were, in an accomplished or corrupted being, as death is the privation of life, and darkness the privation of light, and a privation of this kind — and this kind of privation does not admit of more or less, because it leaves nothing of the opposite form, or habit; for a man is no less dead on the first or second day, than after a year, when now the body is dissolved; and similarly a house is no more dark, if the lamp is covered with several veils, than if it is covered with a single veil, cutting off the entire light. The other is a privation not pure and not simple, but retaining something of the opposite form or habit, which consists rather in being corrupted than in being corrupted-completely, like sickness, which so deprives one of the due commensuration of humors, that nevertheless something of it remains in the subject; and such a privation admits of more or less, insofar as it leaves more or less of the opposite habit — for the sickness is greater or lesser according as it removes more or less of the commensuration of the humors. Since, therefore, sin (even if it formally denotes privation) is not of the first genus of privations, but of the second — because it so deprives one of the due commensuration of reason, that it does not totally remove the order of reason — inequality is found among sins, as to malice and gravity.

He has another reason, 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 139, where he argues thus: In all things whose perfection consists in a certain commensuration, the more one departs from the due measure, the greater will be the evil — just as health consists in the due commensuration of humors, beauty in the due commensuration of members, but truth in the due commensuration of the intellect or speech to the thing. It is clear, however, that the greater the inequality in the humors, the greater the infirmity; and the greater the disorder in the members, the greater the ugliness, and the more one departs from the

truth, the greater the falsity; but the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration, for it is a mean, established according to the due limitation of circumstances, between contrary vices; the more, therefore, one departs from this harmony, the greater the malice.

You will ask, first, whether not only in sins which are prohibited by natural law, but also in those which are forbidden only by positive law, an inequality in gravity and malice is given? I respond affirmatively; for those can constitute diverse species of sins — for it is of a different species to violate a fast, and to labor on a feast day, although both are only against positive law; but species, since they have themselves like numbers, are unequal among themselves; therefore also the sins which are prohibited only by positive law.

This is confirmed: the gravity of sin is taken from opposition to the virtue which it destroys, and hence, other things being equal, that sin is greater which is opposed to a more excellent virtue; but sins prohibited only by positive law are often contrary to diverse and unequal virtues — for example, eating meat on a Friday, is contrary to abstinence; and laboring on a feast day, or celebrating without sacred vestments, is contrary to religion; therefore sins of this kind are unequal in gravity and malice.

Nor does it matter that St. Thomas, in the place cited from the Summa Contra Gentiles, seems to teach the opposite; for there he speaks of the aforesaid sins, in order to the estimation of a human judge, who considers only the material and external transgression of the precept, which can consist in an indivisible, as is established from those words which he has there: This reason seems to be supported by what is done in human judgments, for if a limit is established for someone, which he should not transgress, it makes no difference before the judge, whether he has transgressed by much, or by little. Whence from this testimony it can only be inferred that some sins against positive law consist in an indivisible on the part of the thing prohibited, or on the part of the exterior transgression, which are considered in human judgment, but not absolutely, and from all the other principles which the divine judge attends to.

You will ask, second, whence in sins the inequality in gravity and malice is sought. I respond that the essential inequality of sins is taken from the object, but the accidental from circumstances not changing species. The first part is proved: sin, in the notion of sin, or of moral evil, is constituted through the transcendental order and relation to the object as dissonant with the rules of morals, as we shall show in chapter 8; therefore, since, according to the philosophers, the constitutive and the distinctive of a thing are the same, sins are distinguished and diversified in species, from the order and relation which they have to objects diverse in species. The second part is manifest, for accidental

inequality in sins must be taken from those things which have themselves accidentally to the act, considered in moral being, in the manner in which circumstances not changing species have themselves.

From these things you will infer, first, that a sin is graver, the worse its object is. Whence sins against God, such as idolatry, blasphemy, and other things of this kind, are the gravest of all. Then, sins against man occupy the second place, such as homicide and calumny. Last, those which are against the external goods of man, such as theft.

You will infer, second, with St. Thomas here, q. 73, art. 4, that that sin is graver simply, and according to species, which is opposed to a more excellent virtue — both because it has an object worse in the notion of object, and more repugnant to reason, and also because it has to corrupt and destroy a greater good, namely the mean of that very virtue.

For a fuller understanding of this corollary, and the solution of many arguments, three things must be briefly observed here, which the Carmelites of Salamanca discuss at length, in the Treatise on Sins, disp. 9, doubt 4. First, it must be noted that when we say that that sin is graver according to its species, which is opposed to a more perfect virtue, this must be understood of opposition according to the primary and principal object of such virtue; for if a sin is opposed to a more perfect virtue only as to its secondary object, it will not for that reason be graver, as is clear in hatred of one's neighbor, which, because it is not contrary to charity, as it tends toward its primary object, namely God, but as it is borne toward its secondary object, namely one's neighbor, is not the gravest of all sins. For, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 2, schism, although it is opposed to charity, is a lesser sin than infidelity.

Second, it must be noted that a sin which is opposed to an inferior virtue, if it also includes opposition to a superior virtue, by reason of this inclusion, can surpass that which is opposed to a greater virtue. Whence adultery, which is opposed to chastity, is, according to its species, graver than theft, which is opposed to justice, although the latter is a more perfect virtue than the former; because in adultery, together with opposition to chastity, is enclosed opposition to justice itself.

Third, it must be observed that the sins between which a comparison is made must have the same mode of opposition to virtue — such that either both are opposed to it contrarily, or both privatively, and consequently either both are sins of commission, or both of omission. But if one is of commission, which is opposed contrarily; and the other of omission, which is opposed only privatively, it is very probable that, even if this latter is opposed to a more perfect virtue, it can nevertheless be less grave than the former, because this diverse mode of opposition not a little changes their gravity.

Whence it can probably be said, that the sin of homicide, which is opposed to justice, is graver according to its species than the omission of Mass, which is opposed privatively to religion, although religion is a more excellent virtue than justice.

You will ask, third, whether diversity of precepts infers a specific distinction of sins? I respond negatively, if that diversity stands only on the part of those commanding, or forbidding; but otherwise, if it stands on the part of the motive of commanding.

The first part is proved, first, by the reason of St. Thomas here, q. 73, art. 6, ad 2: The specific distinction of sins is not taken from the terminus from which of aversion, but from the terminus to which of conversion; but the diversity of precepts which is only on the part of those commanding, or forbidding, does not stand on the part of the terminus to which of conversion, but of the terminus from which of aversion; therefore it does not infer a specific distinction of sins. The minor seems certain, for the terminus to which of sinful conversion is that toward which the sinning man is converted, that is, the object which he seeks; but a precept or law is not the object which he seeks, but that from which the object sought is turned away; therefore a precept, or diversity of precepts, does not stand on the part of the terminus to which, but on the part of the terminus from which. The major, however, is proved, first, because the specification of a thing, and consequently its distinction from all others, must be regarded according to that which is in it per se intended, both by nature and by the agent, and not according to that which is in it per accidens; but those things which, in sin, stand on the part of conversion, are per se intended by the sinner; but those which stand on the part of aversion, are intended only per accidens, since no one, intending evil, operates, as Dionysius says, chapter 4, On the Divine Names; therefore etc. Second, the same major is proved: motions are not specified nor distinguished from the terminus from which, but from the terminus to which, as is taught in physics; and therefore, although the terminus from which differs in species, if nevertheless the terminus to which is of the same notion, the motions are of the same species; but those things which, in sin, stand on the part of aversion, have themselves by way of the terminus from which; but those which stand on the part of conversion, by way of the terminus to which, as is clear; therefore sins are constituted and distinguished by that which stands on the part of conversion, not by that which stands on the part of aversion.

Second, the same part is proved, and it is further shown, that the specific distinction of sins is not taken from the diversity of precepts, when it stands only on the part of the principle, or of the one commanding or forbidding: theft is in fact prohibited by civil, ecclesiastical, natural, and divine law, and yet it is but a single species of sin. Likewise, in the Decalogue, theft and adultery are prohibited by precepts which are diverse from

those by which the interior desire to steal and to commit adultery is prohibited; and yet the desire to steal and theft do not therefore differ in species, nor adultery and the desire to commit adultery, since the exterior act does not add a malice specifically diverse from the interior; therefore the diversity of precepts, which stands only on the part of the principle, or of the one commanding, or forbidding, does not induce a specific distinction of sins.

That it does induce it, however, when the diversity of precepts stands on the part of the motive of commanding or forbidding, is manifest, because then the laws present diverse formal objects, from which the formal diversity of sins proceeds. Whence theft in a church is of a different species from theft committed elsewhere, because the Church prohibits theft in a temple by the special motive of religion, just as also when it prohibits the persecution of clerics; but a lie uttered in a church is not infected with the malice of sacrilege, because it is not forbidden by the motive of religion.

You will object, first, against the first part of this resolution: St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, art. 6, says that if there were some sins only because prohibited, in these it would be reasonable that, according to the difference of precepts, the sins would differ in species; therefore he holds that the specific distinction of sins which are against positive law is not taken from the objects toward which they tend, but from the precepts to which they are opposed.

I respond that the Holy Doctor there speaks of precepts which are diverse, not only on the part of the principle, or of the one commanding, but also on the part of the thing commanded, or of the end or motive of commanding. Whence this testimony does not militate against the first part of our resolution, but establishes and confirms the second.

You will object, second: when a sin is opposed to diverse laws, diverse obligations are violated, since each law imposes its own obligation, and all are violated by such a sin; therefore in it several malices are given, for malice is nothing other than the violation of law.

I respond, denying the antecedent, for when laws differ only on the part of the principle, they do not induce several nor diverse obligations, but only one and the same, which the first law newly imposes, and the others confirm.

You will object, third: sin is morally evil for this reason, that it denotes disformity to the laws which are the rules of morals; therefore, since it denotes disformity to laws diverse in species, it will be in diverse species of moral malice.

I respond, granting the antecedent, distinguishing the consequent: since it denotes disformity to laws diverse in species, it will be in diverse species of malice — if the distinction of the laws or precepts is formal, I grant; if it is only material, I deny. But when the diversity of laws stands only on the part of the lawgiver, and not on the part of the thing commanded, or of the end or motive of commanding, it is not formal, but only material, since they agree in one and the same formal notion of commanding or forbidding, namely in the same motive.

You will say: divine, natural, and human law always have motives or ends diverse in species; therefore they are always of diverse species formally. The consequence is clear from what has been said; the antecedent is proved from the fact that the end of divine law is to rectify the created will, in order to supernatural beatitude; the end of natural law is man's own natural rectitude, in order to natural beatitude; the end of human law is to rectify men politically, that is, in order to the peace and quiet of the commonwealth or community.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that those ends are only extrinsic, and should rather be called the ends of the lawgiver, than of the laws themselves; but for laws or precepts to be distinguished formally, the diversity of an extrinsic and remote motive does not suffice, but a diverse proximate and intrinsic motive is required, which is called the motive of the precept and of the work.

You will object, fourth, against the second part of our resolution: some sin can be prohibited from motives diverse in species, and yet have only a single malice; therefore diversity of motive in precepts does not induce specific diversity in sins. The consequence is manifest; the antecedent, however, is proved by a twofold example: for the Lenten fast is prescribed by the Church, from the motive of religion, and yet no one will say that the breaking of the Lenten fast has two malices distinct in species. Likewise, hearing Mass on a Sunday, on which falls the feast of some saint, is prescribed by the Church for a twofold motive; for on Sunday it is prescribed from the motive of latria, by which we show worship to God; but on the solemnities of the Saints it is prescribed from the motive of dulia, by which veneration is shown to the Saints; and yet the omission of Mass on a Sunday, on which falls the feast of some saint, is not in a double species of sin.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to the first proof of it, or to the first example, I say that the motive of religion is remote, and the extrinsic end of the Church prescribing the Lenten fast, but not the proximate and operative motive; but for diversity of motive to infer specific diversity in precepts, the motive must be proximate and intrinsic, as we said in the solution of the preceding objection.

To the second proof, or example, some respond, with Navarrus, granting that the omission of Mass on a Sunday, on which falls the feast of some saint, has a double malice distinct in species, for the reason adduced in the objection: just as (they say) blasphemy against the Saints, and against God, is a sin with a double specific malice; because blasphemy against the Saints is opposed to dulia, from which we are bound to honor them; but blasphemy against God is opposed to latria, by which we show the due honor to God. More truly, however, it seems that, both on the feasts of the Saints, and on Sundays, hearing Mass is prescribed by the same virtue, namely latria, and consequently, in the case proposed, only a single sin is committed. For just as in the Mass, even if it is celebrated on the solemnities of the Saints, nevertheless the sacrifice is offered, not to the Saints, but to God, so the precept of hearing Mass on the solemnities of the Saints is not proximately from the motive of the honor owed to the Saints, by reason of themselves, but from the motive of the honor which we show to the Saints, by reason of God dwelling in them; and consequently, not hearing Mass on the feasts of the Saints is not against dulia, but against latria.

Chapter IV

On the subject of sins

It is certain that the will, simply and absolutely, is the subject of sin, just as it is its cause, since every sin is voluntary, whence Augustine, book 7, Retractationes, chapter 9: The will is that from which sin comes, and by which right living comes. The only difficulty, then, can be, whether it can reside intrinsically in the sensitive appetite, and in the intellect, and in the exterior members and senses, as subject to the motion of the will, as to the formal malice which it imports? For the resolution:

I say briefly that sin, as to formal malice, can be intrinsically subjected in the sensitive appetite, and in the intellect, but not in the corporeal members, or in the external senses.

The first part, which Álvarez and Curiel deny, asserting that moral malice is found intrinsically only in the acts of the will, is proved by the authority and a twofold reason of St. Thomas. He has the first here, q. 74, art. 4, and it can be briefly proposed thus: act and habit belong to the same faculty, especially if the act is immanent, which is received in that faculty by which it is produced; but in the sensitive appetite are received the habits of vices, such as intemperance, pusillanimity, and other similar ones, just as in it are subjected temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues moderating the passions, as we showed in the Treatise on the Virtues; therefore also the acts of vices.

He suggests the second, book 2, dist. 21, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5, where he says: The concupiscible appetite has a certain liberty in man, according to which it can obey the command of reason, and thus in the concupiscible there can be sin. Whence I argue thus: that which is capable of liberty, can be the subject of sin; but the sensitive appetite, as it is in man, from the conjunction it has with the will, participates some intrinsic liberty from it; therefore it can be the subject of sin. The major is established; the minor, however, is shown thus. The cogitative faculty, from the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates the power of discoursing concerning singulars, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 78, art. 4, in the body, and ad 5; therefore similarly, the sensitive appetite, from the conjunction it has with the will, participates a certain imperfect liberty. The consequence is clear from parity of reason, for as to this no ground of disparity can be assigned between the appetite and the cogitative faculty, since the appetite has itself toward the will, exactly as, in point of conjunction and rootedness in the same principle, the cogitative toward the intellect; and consequently, if, by reason of this conjunction and rootedness, the latter participates some imperfect power of judging and discoursing from the intellect, there is no reason why some imperfect liberty should not be derived in the sensitive appetite, from the conjunction it has with the will. The reason a priori of these things is, that it is general, in causes and powers subordinately united, that the inferior, from conjunction to the superior, participate something of it, whereby it is elevated and perfected, and, by means of this elevation, somehow attains the mode of acting of that very superior. Thus the heaven, from conjunction to the moving intelligence, participates in itself a power for producing certain living things, though imperfect and lowly, which, in itself, being devoid of life, it would in no way produce. Thus also a phantasm, from conjunction with the agent intellect, receives a power which it did not have of itself, for producing an intelligible species in the possible intellect. What wonder, then, if the sensitive appetite in man, from conjunction to the will, should obtain some ray of liberty, by reason of which it can be the subject of venial sin, though not of mortal, for which perfect liberty is required, and disorder from the last end. Whence the Master of the Sentences, book 2, dist. 25: If the allurement of sin is held only in the movement of sensuality, it is venial and most light.

From this the second part remains proved, which asserts that sin, as to the moral malice it imports, can reside in the intellect; both because the vices of imprudence, infidelity, and the like are in the intellect, in which reside prudence and faith; and also because in the act of command elicited by the intellect, some intrinsic liberty is found, participated from the preceding motion of the will, as shown in the Treatise on Human Acts.

The third part also, which affirms that in the members, and in the external senses, moral malice does not reside formally, remains proved from what has been said: for in that subject cannot reside intrinsically and formally the malice of sin, which is not in some way intrinsically free; but the members of the body are not intrinsically free, no more than the external senses; therefore the malice of sin cannot reside in them. Whence St. Thomas, above, q. 20, art. 3, teaches that exterior acts do not have a formal goodness or malice distinct from that which is in the act of the will. Where, by the name of exterior act, he does not understand any act commanded by the will whatsoever (as Curiel and Álvarez think), but only the acts of the exterior members, as is established from the first argument of that article, where he says that the principle of the exterior act is the executing faculty of motion, and this he does not deny, but admits, in the solution of the same argument: but the executing faculty of motion is in the exterior members of the body.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: formal truth and falsity reside formally only in the intellect; therefore similarly moral goodness and malice are subjected only in the will. The antecedent is supposed as certain from Metaphysics. The consequence, however, is proved from parity of reason.

I respond that formal truth and falsity are, first and per se, in the intellect, but secondarily, and by participation, are formally in the cogitative faculty; because this, from the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates the power of judging and discoursing concerning singulars, as St. Thomas, cited above, teaches: but in words and things there is only truth by extrinsic denomination. The same is true of goodness and malice: for both are, first and per se, in the act of the will, secondarily and by participation, in the act of the sensitive appetite; but in the acts of the exterior members, only by extrinsic denomination.

You will object, second: the proper subject of moral malice is a free faculty; but the sensitive appetite in man does not have intrinsic liberty; therefore it cannot be the subject of moral malice. The major is established; the minor, however, is recommended, first, because to a free faculty an object must be proposed with indifference toward either alternative; but to the sensitive appetite an object is not proposed with this indifference, since it is proposed to it through the imagination or the cogitative faculty, or another internal sense; but the internal senses, since they do not know universal notions, as the intellect does, cannot propose an object with indifference; therefore the sensitive appetite in man does not have intrinsic liberty. Second, if some intrinsic liberty, sufficient for sinning venially, were granted to man's sensitive appetite, then such an appetite could offend in this way, using that liberty of its own, however much the will

resists it, or is impeded — which seems absurd. Third, if some liberty were admitted in the sensitive appetite, there would be no motion of sensuality, however primary-first, which would not be a venial sin, because in all cases the appetite would use that liberty of its own, which we say suffices for venial sin: the consequence is false and erroneous, as theologians commonly teach, and as is established from Augustine, book 1, City of God, chapter 25, where he says thus: How much more free from fault is that concupiscential disobedience in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the bodies of those sleeping? Therefore etc.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor: for since the manner of divine providence is to join together the orders of things in such a way, that the supreme of the lower touches the lowest of the higher, and the lowest of the higher the supreme of the lower, the appetite of an inferior order, namely the sensitive, must, in man, participate something of the perfection and liberty of the will, which is the appetite of a superior order, namely the rational. To the first proof of the contrary, it can be answered, with Gregory Martínez, that the cogitative faculty, as it is in man, by reason of the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates something of its power and perfection, by which it is elevated to forming a certain indifferent judgment, just as, from conjunction with reason, it participates some power of discoursing imperfectly, and of comparing means with the end, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited above. Or it can be said, with the Carmelites of Salamanca, that it is not necessary that the indifference, by reason of which the sensitive appetite acts freely, shine forth in the immediate proposal of its object, which is made through the cogitative faculty, or another internal sense, but it suffices that it shine forth in the proposal of the object of the will, which is made through the intellect; because for that imperfect liberty, which is derived in the sensitive appetite from conjunction with the will, it is not required that the appetite itself be able to withdraw itself from its own operation (for this is proper only to a faculty primarily and, as it were, essentially free, such as the will), but it suffices that it operate with respect and subordination to the principle by which it can be withdrawn, which is the will; for by this very fact it is verified that it operates freely, not with primary liberty, and, as it were, essentially, but secondary and participated; because since such a respect is toward a free principle as free, it cannot fail to draw the act, in which it exists, out of the necessary line, and render it free.

To the second proof of the minor, I deny the consequence, for the will not consenting, the aforesaid liberty is not in the sensitive appetite, because it is communicated to it from the conjunction and subordination to the will; but this influence is impeded by resistance and a contrary act of the will.

To the third, I likewise deny the consequence, for the imperfect liberty belonging to the appetite necessarily requires that its motions can be repressed by reason, such that, if this power is lacking to reason or the will, by that very fact liberty fails in the sensitive appetite; but first-first motions, which reason in no way notices, cannot be repressed by it, and therefore do not enjoy that imperfect liberty, which the sensitive appetite participates from the will, and consequently cannot be venial sins.

From this you will understand that it is false, what the Author of the Theologia Mentis et Cordis says, tome 4, page 757, that we do not speak consequently to our own principles, when, on the one hand, we teach, against Álvarez, that venial sin can be in the appetite and sensuality, even without actual motion and command of reason and will; and, on the other, against Calvin, and other heretics of this time, we assert that first-first motions of concupiscence are not venial sins, but only first-second. This, I say, is manifestly false: for since (as we said) that imperfect liberty which belongs to the sensitive appetite requires that its motions be able to be repressed by reason, and this does not belong to first-first motions, it is manifest that these two things rightly cohere with each other, namely that first-first motions of concupiscence are not venial sins, and that nevertheless there can be venial sin in the appetite, and sensually, even without actual motion and command of the will, provided that its motions can be checked and repressed by reason, as Martínez, the Carmelites of Salamanca, and several other of our Thomists teach, and as St. Thomas expressly seems to transmit, De Malo, q. 7, art. 6, in these words: Sensuality is sometimes moved without the command of reason and will, and then sin is said to be in sensuality, but nevertheless the sin cannot be mortal, but only venial. The same he teaches here, q. 74, art. 3, ad 3, and in many other places. Nor does it avail to say that St. Thomas excludes only formal and direct consent of the will, but not virtual, indirect, and interpretative. For q. 25, De Veritate, art. 6, ad 5, he writes this: Sin is not said to be in sensuality, on account of the interpretative consent of reason; for when the motion of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is no consent, neither interpretative nor expressed; but from this very fact, that sensuality is subjectible to reason, its act, although it precedes reason, has the notion of sin. Nothing clearer or more express can be said. See the Carmelites of Salamanca, disp. 10, doubt 2, where they treat this question at length and eruditely in their own manner; it is not necessary, nor expedient, to dwell longer here.

Chapter V

On the internal causes of sin

There are three internal causes of sin, namely ignorance on the part of the intellect, concupiscence on the part of the appetite, and malice on the part of the will. Of the two latter there is no difficulty or controversy among theologians, but concerning the first there are two celebrated difficulties, to be briefly resolved here.

§ I

Whether, and what, ignorance is the cause of sin, and what excuses from it?

I say, first, that ignorance can be the cause of sin. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 76, art. 1, where he argues thus: According to the Philosopher, the moving cause is twofold, one per se, and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. Per accidens, however, as that which removes an impediment, or as the very removal of the impediment; and in this way ignorance can be the cause of the act of sin, for it is the privation of the knowledge perfecting reason, by which the act of sin is prevented, insofar as it directs human acts.

This truth St. Bernard demonstrates with many testimonies of Scripture, Epistle to Hugh of St. Victor, chapter 5, where he thus attacks a certain Anonymous author, who asserted that one could never sin through ignorance: I do not think we need labor much against the third assertion, since it bears manifest falsity... It is to be feared, however, lest, if a fool is briefly answered according to his folly, thinking it will be wisdom, he may more safely scatter the seed-plot of folly in the ears of the unwise, and thus his folly may not be without number. Let, therefore, the manifest lie be confuted by a few clear testimonies of truth. He who perhaps asserts that one can never sin through ignorance, never prays for his own ignorances, but rather mocks the Prophet praying and saying: Remember not the sins of my youth, and my ignorances. Perhaps he also reproves God for requiring satisfaction for the sin of ignorance. And, various testimonies of Scripture having been adduced — concerning the offering of the High Priest for his own and the people's ignorance; concerning Paul, who says he obtained mercy, because he acted in ignorance; concerning Christ praying for His crucifiers, who knew not what they did; and concerning the killers of the Apostles, who thought they were doing service to God — he finally concludes: Does it not sufficiently appear from these things, in what darkness of ignorance he lies, who is ignorant that one can sometimes sin through ignorance?

This truth Bernard had drawn from Augustine, who, book 7, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 36, has this: Or is ignorance no evil, and consequently not to be purged? And what does that word mean, Remember not the sins of my youth, and my ignorances? For although sins committed by those who know are more damnable, yet, if sins of ignorance were nothing, we would not read what I have mentioned, Remember not the sins of my youth, and my ignorances.

I say, second, that vincible ignorance is the cause of sin. This conclusion is clear, both because vincible ignorance removes the knowledge which, if present, would impede sin; whence it is a cause per accidens of sin, just as he who removes the column supporting a stone is a cause per accidens of the stone's motion. And also because, since such ignorance is willed directly or indirectly, it does not impede the act consequent upon it from being voluntary, and consequently culpable. Whence Bernard, Epistle 77: Many things which ought to be known are not known, either from carelessness in knowing, or from laziness in knowing, or from shame in inquiring; an ignorance of this kind has no excuse. And St. Thomas here, q. 76, art. 2: Vincible ignorance is a sin, if it is of those things which one is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which one is not bound to know.

I say, third, that invincible ignorance, whether of positive or natural law (if the latter can be given, of which in the Treatise on Laws, chapter 3, § 4), does not cause sin, but excuses from it. This is against Jansenius, book 2, On the State of Fallen Nature, chapter 2, and following, where he distinguishes a twofold ignorance, one of natural law, and another of positive law, and teaches that the latter excuses from sin, but not the former, because (he says) ignorance of natural law flowed from original sin, and was voluntary in Adam for us (which he thinks suffices for actual sin), but not ignorance of positive law. Our conclusion, however, the Scholastics commonly teach, with the Master, book 2, dist. 22, and with St. Thomas here, q. 76, art. 3. Whence Luther, on Genesis, chapter 12: The Scholastics (he says) say that invincible ignorance renders one excusable: such is the blindness in the Pope's schools and churches. And Jerome Zanchi, a Lutheran-Calvinist, book 1, Theological Treatise, chapter 12, thesis 1: The Scholastics are mistaken, when they excuse from sin the ignorance which they call invincible, because it is invincible, as they say. Although we can prove that it is not simply invincible, since it was followed by a voluntary lapse into sin.

The conclusion is proved, first, from Augustine, book 3, On Free Will, chapter 19, where he says thus: It is not imputed to you as guilt, that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you are ignorant of. By these words he clearly teaches that unwilling and involuntary ignorance, such as invincible ignorance is, is not imputed as

guilt, but only ignorance which arises from negligence in learning, which is vincible and culpable, as being indirectly and in its cause willed. Whence St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 7, art. 7, ad 3: It must be said (he says) that ignorance which is altogether involuntary is not sin. And this is what Augustine says: It is not imputed to you as guilt, if you are unwillingly ignorant; but by that which he adds, but if you have neglected to know, he gives to understand that ignorance can be a sin from preceding negligence. Whence the same Augustine, treatise 89, expounding these words of John 15: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin — says that those to whom Christ did not come, and to whom He did not speak, have an excuse, not for every sin of theirs, but for that by which they did not believe in Christ. Similar things Bernard has, Epistle 77, saying: If He had spoken, but not to them, ignorance would excuse the fault of disobedience. Finally, Augustine, in the book on Questions of the Old Testament, related by Gratian, in the decretal, dist. 27, says thus: He who is ignorant can be excused from punishment, who did not find one from whom to learn. Where the Gloss interprets these words, can be excused from punishment, thus: that is, from the sin, for which punishment is owed, or from eternal punishment.

The conclusion is proved, second, from St. Thomas, who also manifestly teaches our conclusion, for here, q. 74, art. 1, ad 2, he says thus: If the defect of the apprehensive power in no way is subject to the will, it is not a sin, neither in the will, nor in the apprehensive power, as in those who have invincible ignorance. And q. 76, art. 1, toward the end of the body of the article, he says that no invincible ignorance is a sin. This word "no" excludes altogether every invincible ignorance, whether of positive or of natural law, from the notion of sin. Likewise, art. 1 of the same question, at the end of the body of the article, he writes this: If it is such ignorance that it is altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which one is not bound to know, such ignorance excuses altogether from sin. By these words the Holy Doctor requires two things for ignorance to be sin: one, that there be an obligation of acquiring knowledge; the other, that there be a power of dispelling ignorance; because if there is no debt of knowledge, ignorance has the notion, not of privation, but of mere negation, and natural not-knowing: but if the power of knowing is lacking, the will cannot be accused of fault, because no one is bound to the impossible. Whence:

The conclusion is proved, moreover, by a twofold fundamental reason. The first is: if invincible ignorance did not excuse from sin, God would prescribe impossible things to men, which is erroneous, and condemned by Trent. The inference is clear, for since our will is a blind faculty, only that is thought to be in our power, which is from the will, with full attentiveness of reason; and consequently ignorance, by which something is

altogether unknown, prevents it from being in our power; therefore, if man were bound to something which he invincibly does not know, he would be obliged to the impossible. Whence Medina here, q. 75, art. 2, rightly observes that for this reason invincible ignorance is not imputed to man as sin, because no one is obliged to the impossible.

The other fundamental reason can be briefly proposed thus: that excuses from sin which removes from an act the notion of the voluntary, and renders it simply involuntary; but every invincible ignorance does this; therefore every invincible ignorance excuses from sin. The major is certain: both because, as Augustine says, book On True Religion, chapter 14: Sin is so voluntary, that it would in no way be sin, if it were not voluntary. And this is so manifest, that no small group of the learned, no multitude of the unlearned, dissents. And also because sin is a moral and human act; but it belongs to the notion of a moral and human act, that it be voluntary and deliberate, as St. Thomas teaches, in this part, above, q. 1, art. 1; therefore also to the notion of sin. The minor also is no less evident, and is expressly taught by the same Angelic Doctor, above, q. 6, art. 8, where, speaking of antecedent and invincible ignorance, he says that such ignorance causes the involuntary simply. And this is clear from the definition of the voluntary, which is thus described: The voluntary is that which is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge; whence, just as it is caused by a twofold principle, namely from the operating appetite, which is the intrinsic principle, and from directing knowledge, and holding a light before the will, so its opposite, namely the involuntary, must be caused by opposite principles, and proceed either from the fact that the operation is from an extrinsic principle (as happens in those things which occur from violence or fear), or because knowledge is removed, or bound, or disturbed, as happens through ignorance, and passion, as we discussed at length in the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary.

Jansenius responds that ignorance of natural law was introduced into men's minds through the fault of the first parent, for if the most happy state of innocence had persisted, men would have been ignorant of nothing of those things which pertain to natural law; whence, since the fault of Adam is voluntary to men, because the wills of all men were, in a certain manner, contained in the will of Adam, as head of the whole human race, invincible ignorance of natural law, flowing and proceeding from that fault, is considered voluntary to them, and consequently evil and culpable; but not so invincible ignorance of positive law, since this does not proceed from original sin, as does that; for that a positive law, divine or human, be enacted, depends on the free will of the human or divine lawgiver, and consequently knowledge of it is not connatural to human nature, as is knowledge of natural law.

This solution contains the whole marrow, or rather root, of the Jansenist doctrine, whence it must be diligently confuted; for as Augustine says: To dig out and extirpate the root is the shortcut.

First, then, it is false what Jansenius says, that, for invincible ignorance of natural law to be evil and culpable, it suffices that it be voluntary by the will of the head of the whole human nature; for although, for original guilt, it suffices that it be voluntary in the head, namely in Adam, this does not suffice for actual, or personal sin, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, book 2, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, where he argues thus: It must be that, according as something has the notion of guilt, according to this the notion of the voluntary be found in it. But just as there is a certain good which regards nature, and a certain which regards the person, so also there is a certain guilt of nature, and a certain of the person. Whence for the guilt of the person, the will of the person is required, as is clear in actual guilt, which is committed through the act of the person; but for the guilt of nature (that is, original sin), only the will in that nature is required — that is, in the head of that nature. The same Augustine teaches, in the book On the Two Souls, chapter 11, where he says thus: Neither sin nor rightly done deed can justly be imputed to anyone, who has done nothing by his own will. By these final words he clearly declares that, for the notion of personal sin, an act elicited by the proper will of the sinner is required.

Second, if this doctrine of Jansenius were true, it would follow that motions of concupiscence, preceding the consent of the will, indeed even repugnant to it, would be truly and properly sins imputable to man; since the tinder of concupiscence, or the rebellion of the sensitive appetite, proceeds from original sin. But this is repugnant to Trent, session 5, chapter 5, which says that concupiscence cannot harm those not consenting. And Augustine, book 1, City of God, chapter 25, where he says thus: That concupiscential disobedience, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping, how much more so in the body of one not consenting.

Third, from this it would follow, that negative infidelity is a sin, since it likewise proceeds from original sin: but this is established to be false and erroneous, first from the bull of Pius V and Gregory XIII, against Baius, in which this proposition is condemned: Purely negative infidelity, in those to whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin. It is established, second, from Augustine, Epistle 105, where he says thus: That ignorance itself, in those who did not wish to understand, is without doubt a sin; but in those who could not understand, it is the punishment of sin. It is established, third, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 10, art. 1, where he expressly teaches, that if infidelity is taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing of the faith, it does not have the notion of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance is a consequence of the

sin of the first parent.

Fourth, from the same doctrine of Jansenius it would follow, that whatever the insane and the frenetic do is sin, and that a man blind from birth acts culpably, who, wishing, for example, to drive away a dog with a stick, strikes a man, invincibly not knowing that he is there. For frenzy, insanity, and bodily blindness, and other miseries of the human race, are effects and punishments of original sin, and flow from it like streams from a spring, as Jansenius himself teaches, book 3, On the State of Pure Nature, chapters 11, 14, and 15. But who does not see that this is most absurd?

Finally, our conclusion can be proved, and the opinion of Jansenius further impugned, from another absurd and unfitting consequence which follows from it: for if invincible ignorance never excused from sin, it would follow that he who, in a conflict or competition of several probable opinions, would elect not only the probable, but even the more probable, indeed even the most probable, would sin, if it happened that such an opinion were false, and dissonant from the eternal or natural law; because then, according to Jansenius, he would not be excused from sin by reason of invincible ignorance. But this seems not only most absurd, but also most harsh, and altogether intolerable. From this, indeed, would follow an incredible perplexity of conscience, indeed even a harsh and fatal necessity of sinning, whenever anyone probably and in good faith judges that something is to be done by him, and that it cannot be omitted without sin, and yet it is illicit by natural law. For he will sin by doing it, according to the doctrine of Jansenius, since, according to him, no invincible ignorance of natural law excuses from sin. He will also sin by not doing it, because he will act against conscience, which dictates to him that this is to be done: therefore he will sin, whichever way he turns, whether he does this, or does not do it: he will therefore necessarily sin. More on this at length in the Treatise on Laws, chapter 3, § 4.

§ II

The objections are resolved

You will object, first, with Jansenius: some deeds done from invincible ignorance are called sins in Holy Scripture; therefore invincible ignorance does not excuse from sin. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved from various testimonies of Scripture, for, Genesis 20, the action of King Abimelech, taking to wife a woman whom he invincibly did not know to be Abraham's wife, is called a sin. And Leviticus 5, sacrifices are ordained to be offered for those who have sinned through ignorance. Whence, to the Hebrews 9, the Apostle says that once a year the High Priest alone entered into the tabernacle which was called the Holy of Holies, not without the blood which he offered for his own and the people's ignorance. Likewise David, Psalm 24, among his sins recounts ignorances, thus praying: The sins of my youth, and my ignorances, remember not. Finally, Luke 12, it is said that the servant who did not know (his master's will), and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.

I respond, denying the antecedent, and to the first proof of it I say that the action of King Abimelech, wishing to take unknowingly Abraham's wife into marriage, is called a sin materially, because it was illicit by the nature of the thing, but not formally, because, on account of the defect of knowledge and science, it was not culpable. Or, second, it can be said that that ignorance was vincible, as Henry of Ghent teaches, Quodlibet 12, q. 25, in these words: Abimelech would really have sinned, if he had known Sarah, even having taken her as wife; because he did not sufficiently inquire whether she was Abraham's wife. This same thing, in almost the same words, Hugh of Cardona transmits, on chapter 20 of Genesis.

To the second and third, I likewise say that in the old law it was ordained that sacrifices be offered for those who had sinned through vincible and culpable ignorance. Whence the High Priest, once a year, entered the tabernacle which was called the Holy of Holies, to offer blood for his own and the people's ignorances, in some way voluntary and vincible, of which the Prophet also speaks, when he says: The sins of my youth, and my ignorances, remember not.

In the last place, there is talk of a servant not altogether ignorant of his master's precept, but not noticing it from negligence, or ignorant of it from vincible and culpable ignorance, as the Master expounds, book 2, dist. 22, and St. Thomas in the Catena on Luke, chapter 12, where he relates these words of Theophylact: Here some object: he who, knowing, does not follow his master's will, is deservedly punished. But why is the one who is ignorant punished? Because, since he could have known, he did not want to,

but, being lazy, he himself was the cause of his own ignorance.

You will object, second: Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, chapter 3, says thus: That ignorance which is not of those who do not want to know, but of those who, as it were, simply do not know, does not so excuse anyone, that he does not burn in everlasting fire, if for that reason he did not believe, because he did not hear at all what he should believe, but perhaps that he may burn more gently: for it is not without cause said, Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee.

I respond that Augustine there speaks of vincible ignorance of the evangelical law, which he teaches does not excuse from the sin of infidelity. Thus the Master of the Sentences understands and interprets him, book 2, dist. 22, where he says thus: There is a threefold ignorance, namely of those who do not wish to know, when they can, which does not excuse, because it is itself a sin; of those who, as it were, simply do not know, not refusing, or proposing to know, which excuses no one fully, but perhaps in this way, that he is punished less. Whence Augustine to Valentine (book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 3): Ignorance which is not of those who do not wish to know, but of those who, as it were, simply do not know, so excuses no one, that he does not burn in eternal fire, but perhaps that he may burn more gently.

This interpretation many things confirm. First, because St. Augustine does not say that ignorance is of those who simply do not know, but of those who "as it were" simply do not know: this particle "as it were" sufficiently indicates that the discourse is not about altogether invincible ignorance. Second, he establishes that this ignorance so excuses no one, that he does not burn in everlasting fire, but "perhaps" that he may burn more gently: but if he were speaking of invincible ignorance, he would not have added "perhaps," for nothing is more certain, than that he who sinned from invincible ignorance is at least less to be punished, than one who sinned from malice, or from vincible and culpable ignorance. But he inserted that word, to suggest that he speaks of vincible ignorance, not affected, but neglected; for sometimes the negligence from which it proceeds can be so slight, that, if it happens that from it some evil is done, that act can be somewhat excused, and consequently punished less. Third, this is confirmed by the example of the servant not knowing his master's will, etc., which Augustine adduces before the words quoted; for, as Theodoret, cited above, observes: He is punished, being ignorant, because, since he could have known, he did not want to, but, being lazy, he himself was the cause of his own ignorance.

You will object, third: In the Council of Diospolis, Pelagius being present, certain chapters were recited, excerpted from the book of Caelestius the heretic, one of which

was: Forgetfulness and ignorance are not subject to sin, since they do not occur according to nature, but according to necessity. And the recitation being finished, the Holy Synod said: What does the present monk Pelagius say to these chapters which have been read? For the holy Synod, and the holy Catholic Church of God, reprove these things. Thus Augustine relates, book on the Acts of the Council of Palestine, chapter 19. Therefore, according to the mind of that Synod, ignorance is subject to sin, or is sin, not only when it occurs according to the will, and is vincible and voluntary, but also when it occurs according to necessity, and is involuntary and invincible.

I respond that the Fathers of that Synod, when they taught that ignorance which is according to necessity is subject to sin, or is sin, only meant that such ignorance is called sin, because it is materially sin, or the effect of sin — just as concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle, because it is materially sin, and is inflicted as punishment for sin, as Trent, session 5, canon 5, teaches from Augustine. Whence St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 7, art. 7 [likely different numbering], says: Ignorance and the tinder are material in original sin, just as conversion to the changeable good is material in actual sin. That this interpretation is legitimate, and according to the mind of the Fathers of this Council, is established from the fact that when the Pelagians denied that original sin is transmitted from Adam into his posterity through generation, consequently they also denied that concupiscence and ignorance are derived from him, and said they are natural defects, and not punishments of sin, as Augustine testifies, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 11, in these words: The Pelagians say that ignorance and difficulty (that is, concupiscence, from which arises difficulty toward the honest good), without which no man is born, are original defects of nature, not punishments. In order, therefore, that the Fathers of the aforesaid Synod might altogether exclude this error, they said that ignorance is subject to sin, indeed even is sin, because it is materially sin, and an effect of original sin, since it is inflicted as its punishment. Whence Augustine, book 3, On Free Will, chapter 19: What each one, being ignorant, does not do rightly, and what, willing to do rightly, he cannot do, are for this reason called sins, because they take their origin from that sin of free will (namely of Adam); for that preceding one merited these following ones. For just as we call by the name "tongue" not only the member which we move in the mouth, while we speak, but also that which follows the motion of this member, that is, the form and manner of words, according to which one language is called Greek, another Latin — so we call sin not only that which is properly called sin, and is committed by free will, and by one who knows, but also that which is necessarily a consequence of its punishment.

§ III

No sin ever occurs in the will, without a prior defect of the intellect

The fundamental reason is that the will is a blind faculty, by its nature determined to follow the guidance of the intellect; for its specifying object is the good, true or apparent, proposed to it by the intellect; whence, just as if someone were blind, by his own nature determined to follow the guidance of another, he could not fail, and stray from the way, unless the guide fails and strays, so neither can the will fail in the moral order, unless in the intellect some defect of error or inconsideration precedes. Whence Proverbs 22 it is said: All err who work iniquity.

This is confirmed: in every sin some imprudence is found, whence Proverbs 1, sinners are called foolish and imprudent, and Gregory, book 15, Morals, chapter 23: Every sinner (he says) was a fool in his fault; therefore, since it belongs to prudence to direct practical reason in order to things doable in man, just as art directs it in order to things factible, it must be that in every sin some defect of practical reason, and consequently some practical error, or at least some inconsideration, is found.

I said "practical error," because it is not necessary that, when man sins, some speculative error precede in his intellect, otherwise every sinner would be a heretic, and as often as man fell into sin, so often would he lapse into heresy, which is absurd. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, art. 2: He who fornicates, electing fornication as a good for himself at the moment, has a corrupted estimation in particular, although he retains a true universal estimation according to faith, namely that fornication is a mortal sin. But if you ask, in what that practical error, which is found in any sin whatsoever, consists? I respond that it consists in the judgment by which the sinner practically judges, here and now, some useful or delightful good to be preferable to the honest good and to the observance of the divine law; for in such a judgment a practical error is manifestly found, since right reason and prudence dictate the opposite.

I also said that a defect of error or inconsideration must precede in the intellect of the sinner; because if he sins by electing something good in itself, but not with the due order, it is not necessary that he have a practical error in the intellect, but it suffices that in him there be some inadvertence, or inconsideration, as happened in the first sin of the Angels. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 63, art. 1, ad 4: Mortal sin in the act of free will can happen in two ways: in one way from the fact that some evil is elected — as man sins by electing adultery, which is evil in itself, and such a sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error, otherwise that which is evil would not be elected as good. In the other way it happens to sin through free will, by electing something which is good in itself, but

not with the due order or rule — as if someone elected to pray, not attending to the order instituted by the Church, and this kind of sin does not presuppose ignorance, but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered; and in this way the Angel sinned, converting himself through free will to his own good, without order to the rule of the divine will.

You will say: if, as often as man sins, some defect of error, or inconsideration, on the part of the intellect, always preceded, no sin would be given from pure malice, but every one would proceed from ignorance; but this must not be said, since theologians commonly divide sins into three genera, namely sins from weakness, from ignorance, and from pure malice; therefore not that.

I respond, denying the inference: for although in every sin some defect of error or inconsideration on the part of the intellect is found, sin from weakness, or from malice, is nevertheless sufficiently distinguished from sin from ignorance, from the diverse depraved disposition, namely, which is the cause of forming that erroneous judgment in the intellect, and the depraved election in the will: for in sins from ignorance, vincible and culpable ignorance is the cause of forming such a judgment, and depraved election; in sins from weakness, or passion, a vehement passion obscuring the intellect, and drawing the will to itself; in sins from pure malice, however, only the disorder and malice of the will.

Here we would have to treat of the external causes of sins, and explain, first, how God is not the cause of sin, even though He produces the whole act of sin as to entity and material, and, in the opinion of the Thomists, predetermines the will to it? Second, how the devil can be a cause of sin, and induce others to sin? Third, how one man, as a principle of generation, can transmit guilt together with nature, and, through seminal propagation, transfuse it into his posterity? But of the first we have treated at length in the Treatise on the Will of God, chapter 4, § 5, where we set forth at length the concord of divine sanctity with the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination, to the material of sin. Of the second there is almost no difficulty and controversy among theologians; for it is certain that the Devil is the cause of sin only indirectly and per accidens, first by way of proposing an evil object, second by way of persuading and alluring, when, together with the proposal of the object, he excites and moves the sensitive appetite, through the passions, or the imagination, by which he renders the object very fitting and desirable, and consequently draws the will toward sinning, but does not necessitate it, because no created and delightful good, however fittingly proposed to the will, can inflict necessity on it, since it cannot perfectly fulfill it, or fully satiate it — according to that saying of Bernard: Whatever is less than God will not fill

the soul capable of God. Of the third, which concerns original sin, we shall speak in the following chapter.

Chapter VI

On original sin

So difficult is it to grasp the nature of original sin, that the eagle of the Doctors himself, whose most piercing gaze penetrated the more secret mysteries of divine grace, seems to grow dim at the sight of this difficulty, and to be so weighed down by its weight, that, in the book On the Morals of the Church, chapter 22, he confesses he cannot overcome it: Nothing (he says) is more notorious for preaching than this ancient sin, nothing is more secret for understanding. Nevertheless, following in his footsteps, we shall attempt here to explain the existence, essence, subject, and causes of original sin.

§ I

The existence of original sin is defended against the Pelagians

The truth of the Catholic faith concerning the existence of original sin, which Pelagius and his disciples Celestius and Julian once impiously denied, seemed to Augustine of such great importance, that, in the book On Original Sin, chapter 24, he speaks thus: In the cause of two men, by one of whom we are sold under sin, by the other of whom we are redeemed from sins, the Christian faith properly consists. And book 5 against Julian, chapter 2, he asserts that knowledge of original sin is so necessary, that those who deny it strive to overturn the very foundations of the faith.

Theologians strive to establish this fundamental truth of the Christian faith with several testimonies of Scripture, but the chief is that of the Apostle to the Romans 5, which Augustine frequently uses against the Pelagians: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. From these words this argument can be drawn: through one man there entered into this world a certain sin, which made all men sinners, and liable to death; but a sin of this kind cannot be actual, that is, committed by an actual will, since even infants are liable to death, and often die, before they have done anything, good or evil, by their own will; therefore it is original.

This clear and open testimony of the Apostle the Pelagians tried to evade, interpreting it of the transmission of Adam's sin into his posterity, not through origin, but through imitation. But Augustine, in the book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, blocks the entrance to this evasion in a threefold way: first, indeed, because thus we would rather be

said to have sinned in the devil, for he indeed sinned first, and offered us the example of sinning. Second, because children, in their very conception, are said to be filthy in iniquities, before they can imitate Adam. Third, because the Apostle teaches that the sin of Adam is derived into his posterity, just as the justice of Christ is derived into the regenerate; but this does not redound into men through mere imitation, but through true regeneration in Him; therefore the sin of Adam does not pass into his posterity through mere imitation of him alone, but through origin and propagation.

Theological reasons also are not lacking for refuting Pelagius's error. The first is taken from the general redemption of Christ: for Christ is the redeemer of all men, not only of adults, but also of little children, since He died not only for adults, but also for little children, according to that saying of Paul, 2 Corinthians 5: Christ died for all; but redemption presupposes servitude of sin, just as medicine presupposes sickness; therefore not only adults, but also little children, are bound by the servitude of sin, not actual, as is established; therefore original. The second is sought from the necessity of baptism, which was instituted as a remedy for sin, and is applied to little children, according to the common custom of the Church; therefore in them is found sin, not actual, since they are incapable of it before the use of reason; therefore original. The third, from the necessity of dying, and the innumerable calamities and miseries, which men experience even from the cradle, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 40: A heavy yoke is upon the children of Adam, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb, until the day of their burial into the mother of all. For those miseries and calamities are the most certain signs of original sin, since the common punishment shows the common guilt to have preceded, and since God created man immortal, and imperishable, as is said, Wisdom 2, and in the state of innocence was immune from all pain and sadness, as we showed in the first part, treatise 8, treating of the states of human nature. Whence Augustine, book 5 against Julian, says that Tully, sensing this most harsh yoke, said that man was brought forth into life, not by his mother, but as if by a stepmother nature, with a body both naked and fragile and infirm, but with a mind anxious to troubles, prone to fears, soft toward labors, inclined to lusts. He saw the fact (the Holy Doctor adds), but did not know the cause: for since he was not instructed in the sacred writings, he was ignorant of original sin.

The Pelagians objected to Augustine, first, that saying of Chrysostom, homily to the Neophytes: We baptize little infants; although they are not defiled by sin, that holiness, adoption, and the brotherhood of Christ may be added to them. But Augustine responded, in the places cited above, that this must be understood of a personal sin, contracted by one's own act, not, however, of another's, and original, and adds that

Chrysostom was not solicitous about expressing this sense; because, disputing within the Catholic Church, he did not think he would be understood otherwise, and, since no one raised such a question with you (Pelagians) not yet disputing, he spoke more securely.

Second, thus Pelagius and Julian argued, in Augustine, book 2, On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 18, and book 3 against Julian, chapter 24: He who is born does not sin, he who begat does not sin, he who created does not sin: through what cracks, then, amid so many defenses, did sin creep in? To this argument the Holy Doctor responds elegantly and excellently in the same place: Why does he seek a hidden crack, when he has a most open door? Through one man, says the Apostle; through the sin of one, says the Apostle; through the disobedience of one, says the Apostle. What does he seek that is more ample, what does he seek that is more open, what does he seek that is more insisted upon?

Third, Julian, in Augustine, book against him at the beginning, and book 3 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 3, thus argued: If in baptism all sins are remitted, those born of the reborn cannot draw original sin from them; for parents cannot transmit to their children what they do not have.

To this argument the Holy Doctor responds, sermon 4 on the words of the Apostle, in these words: You wonder why a sinner is born of the seed of a just man, and do not wonder why a wild olive is born of the seed of a cultivated olive. Take another likeness: do you not notice that from purged grain, wheat is born together with the chaff, without which it is sown? Therefore a just man is not born of one baptized, because he who is baptized does not generate him from whence he was regenerated, but from whence he was generated.

Fourth, thus he reasoned: God is the cause of bodies, of the sexes, of the conjunctions; therefore from the generation of offspring sin does not follow, otherwise it would be attributed to God. To this Augustine responds, book 3, which he wrote against him, chapter 9: Just as, if I were to say concerning the offspring of adulterers: so many evils, that is, of lasciviousness, turpitude, crime, could not be a good fruit — you would rightly reply to me, that the man who is born of adulterers is not the fruit of lasciviousness, turpitude, crime, of which evils the Devil is the author, but of bodies, sexes, conjunctions, of which goods God is the author. So I say to you most rightly, that the evil with which man is born is not the fruit of bodies, sexes, conjunctions, of which goods God is the author, but of the first prevarication, of which the Devil is the author.

§ II

Another difficult argument is resolved, and it is explained how original sin is voluntary

This argument can be briefly proposed in this way: every sin is voluntary, as is established from Augustine, book On Free Will, asserting that sin is so voluntary, that if it were not voluntary it would not be sin; but original sin in infants cannot be voluntary; therefore neither can it be sin. The major is established; the minor, however, is proved, first, because the voluntary is that which is from an extrinsic principle... wait, let me check — actually it should be "intrinsic" principle with knowledge; but original sin is not in little children from an intrinsic principle, but from an extrinsic one, namely Adam, indeed even without any knowledge, since they lack the use of reason; therefore it is not voluntary to them. Second, the free voluntary, of which we speak at present, must be in the power of the will of him to whom it is called voluntary, that it be or not be; but original sin is not in the power of little children, that it be or not be; therefore it is not voluntary or free to them. Third, in order that what is done by another's will be voluntary to me, it is necessary that I have committed my own will and place to him; but the posterity of Adam did not transfer their own will into him, as to the preservation or loss of original justice, since they did not exist when Adam was created; therefore the privation of original justice, in which original sin consists, is not voluntary to them.

Some, oppressed and overcome by the difficulty of this argument, once said that original sin is not truly and properly sin, since it is not truly and properly voluntary. But this opinion manifestly conflicts with Scripture, calling original sin simply sin, and asserting that through it men are constituted sinners, as is established from John 1: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world. To the Romans 5: By one man sin entered into this world. And shortly after: As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners. It also conflicts with Trent, session 5, canon 5, saying anathema to him who should assert, that through baptism there is not taken away all that has the true and proper notion of sin. Nor is it an obstacle that Augustine, book 16, City of God, chapter 27, says that little children are born sinners, not properly, but originally. And book 3, On Free Will, chapter 19, suggests that original sin is not properly sin. For by "sin properly," he understands sin committed by one's own will, and personal, which alone is reprehensible, and retractable through penitence. Whence the same Holy Doctor, book 1, Retractations, chapter 13, explaining what he had once said, namely that the voluntary is required for sin, and that in no way is it sin, if it is not voluntary, says that this is true of original sin. That this may be more clearly perceived, two things must be briefly premised here.

The first is that something can be called voluntary to another in two ways, namely physically, and in order to its own proper will; and morally, in order to the will of another, in which its own will is morally contained: thus the will of a curator or guardian is considered morally to be the will of the ward or minor, as is established from the law "Cum plures," § "Qua bona fide," ff. de administr. et peric. tutor. Likewise the wills of underage sons are considered by law to be contained morally in the will of the father, so much so that he can testify for them, not only in the goods which they receive from the testator himself, but in all which they have acquired from elsewhere, law "Sed si plures," § "Ad substitutos," ff. de vulg. pupill. substit.

The second is that there is a threefold genus of sin, namely actual, habitual personal, and habitual original, which are voluntary not in the same way, but in a very different way. For actual sin requires that it proceed actually from the will; but personal habitual sin does not require the actual influence of the will, but it suffices that it proceeded from it, at some time, through a proper and personal act, and that such an act has not been sufficiently retracted. But for the original, since it is not committed by one's own will, it is not required that it be voluntary to the little children in such a way that it proceeded from them through an act of their own will, but it suffices that it belongs to them by force of an act of another's will, namely of the head — which will, however, is somehow reckoned to be theirs. Whence:

To the argument initially proposed, I respond, denying the minor, and to the first proof of it I say that original sin, in the manner in which it is voluntary, is from an intrinsic principle, with knowledge; but since it is not voluntary to us physically, and through an act of our own will, but only morally, through order to the will of Adam, it is not necessary that it proceed from its own intrinsic principle, and from its own knowledge, but it is enough that it proceed from an intrinsic principle of Adam, which is also, in a certain manner, intrinsic to us, in that Adam is the principle of human nature, and our head, not only natural, but also moral.

To the second, it must be said that the personal voluntary must be in the power of the will of that very person to whom it is called voluntary; but the capital voluntary need only be in the power of the will of the head, morally containing the will of the members. Wherefore, since original sin is not voluntary to little children by the will of the person, but only by the will of the head of human nature, it is not required that it be in their power to have or not have this defect, but it suffices that it was in Adam's power to sin or not sin. This is the solution of St. Thomas, book 2, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, where he says thus: Original sin, since it is not a vice of the person as person, but as it were per accidens, insofar as the person has such a nature, it is therefore not necessary that it be in the

power of such a person, to have or not have this defect, but it suffices that it be in the power of someone who is the head in that nature.

To the third it may be said that, in order for original sin to be voluntary to men by the will of the head, it is not required that they themselves transferred their will and consent, as to the preservation or loss of original justice, into Adam, but it suffices that God, constituting him our natural and moral head, placed in him the wills of all of us; for since He is the supreme lord and governor of all our affairs, and has our wills more in His power than we ourselves do, He could, by His own right, without our consent, establish that the will of Adam be our will, as to the preservation or loss of original justice — not indeed insofar as we are individual persons, but insofar as we are parts and members of the whole multitude of men receiving human nature from the first parent. For if, in human and civil affairs, a prince and lawgiver can transfer the wills of several into that of one, so that whatever has been done by that one is also considered to be done and approved by them, as is clear in wards and minors, whose wills, at the command of the Prince, and by the disposition of the laws, are transferred into the will of the curator or guardian, even without their consent being awaited — how much more is the same power found in God, the supreme Prince and lawgiver, who has a greater and more excellent dominion over our wills, than any human power, and than we ourselves.

From these things it is gathered that some decree must be admitted in God, by which He established that the will of Adam is to be held as the will of his posterity, as to the preservation or loss of original justice; because for original sin to be voluntary to us, the will of Adam does not suffice, that he be our natural head, but it is also required that he be a moral head; but for this the aforesaid decree was necessary, because being a moral head did not belong to Adam by right of nature itself, but by divine institution, which includes such a decree. It was also necessary, on the part of Adam, that this decree be manifested to him, otherwise he would have invincibly not known that he was operating as the moral head of all men, and consequently he could not have transgressed as head of nature, but only as a particular person. From this you will infer that a pact intervened between God and Adam, that if he obeyed, not only he himself would possess original justice, but that it would pass from him to all his posterity; but if he sinned, he would lose such justice for himself, and for all posterity. For that ordination of God, concerning the transmission or non-transmission of original justice, from the condition of fulfillment of the divine precept, known by Adam, and accepted by him, has the notion of a pact, whence in Scripture it is called by that very name, as is clear from Hosea 6: But they, like Adam, have transgressed the covenant; there have they dealt treacherously against me. Which words, concerning the aforesaid covenant, which we transgressed

together with Adam in paradise, are understood by Jerome, Cyril, Prosper, and others. And this is what those words indicate, "there they have dealt treacherously" — namely in paradise, where Adam dealt treacherously. Augustine mentions this wonderful pact of God with Adam, book 16, City of God, chapter 29, where, expounding that saying of Genesis 17: That soul shall be destroyed (namely, whose flesh has not been circumcised), because he has broken my covenant — he speaks thus: All in that one man dissipated the testament of God, in whom all sinned.

§ III

How original sin is transmitted through generation into the posterity of Adam?

It is certain that original sin is transmitted through generation, and seminal propagation, from Adam into his posterity, as Trent indicates, session 6, chapter 3, in these words: If men were not propagated from the seed of Adam, they would not be born unjust, since, by that propagation, they contract their own injustice, through Adam himself, at the moment of conception. St. Thomas also teaches this here, q. 81, art. 1, ad 2, where he says thus: Through the power of the seed, human nature is transmitted from the parent into the offspring, and at the same time, together with the nature, the infection of the nature: for from this it comes about that the one who is born is a partner of the guilt of the first parent, because he derives his nature from him through a certain generative motion. But there is a most grave difficulty, how, by means of the seed, which is a certain corporeal substance, original sin can be transmitted from Adam into his posterity, and the production of grace, or of original justice, be impeded?

Certain ancient authors, in order to free themselves from this difficulty, said that in the human seed there is some morbid quality, permanently existing in it, and virtually containing original sin, and causing it — just as in the seed of a leper there is a certain corruption, which is the principle and cause of leprosy. Thus Gregory, Richard, Henry, Almain, and others, who asserted that such a quality was derived, not from the sin of Adam, but from the venomous hiss of the serpent. But this opinion, or rather delirium, is commonly rejected by theologians: both because such a quality seems altogether fictitious. And also because, granted that the venomous hiss of the serpent could have caused it, it would have produced it only in Eve, with whom the serpent held converse, but not in Adam, with whom he did not converse. And granted that it had caused that quality in him, whence, I ask, could it have obtained roots so strong and firm, that it should have persisted stable through the courses of so many years, unless God, by special concurrence, conserved it — which seems impious to attribute to divine providence. In order, then, that the true opinion may be explained:

It must be observed, with Ferrariensis, 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 50, and several other Thomists, that because original justice was given to Adam, not only for himself, but under this pact, that, if he remained in innocence, he would propagate it into all his posterity, who would descend from him through seminal propagation, together with nature, and through the very act of generation — consequently, in his seed there was an instrumental power, causative of original justice, which was taken away from it through Adam's first sin, as St. Thomas teaches, De Malo, q. 4, art. 1, ad 9, whose words we shall relate below. Whence, just as in the state of innocence a twofold notion would have had to be considered in Adam's seed — one natural and, as it were, proper, according to which it would be an instrument of the generator in order to nature to be communicated according to itself; the other supernatural, or divinely superadded, according to which it would have itself as an instrument of God, in order to propagate, together with nature, original justice — so, after sin, in that same seed of Adam, and of his posterity descending from him, a twofold notion or function is found, one natural, insofar as it has the function of being an instrument of generation, and of the propagation of nature (for this notion or perfection, like other natural things, was not lost through sin), the other accidental and extrinsic, insofar as it is the instrument of the sinning Adam, for communicating the defect of original justice, in which, as we shall say below, original sin consists. The first belongs to it by reason of its natural and positive perfection; the second, however, it has from the privation of the above-mentioned vigor, productive of original justice, caused from the sin of the first parent himself. This doctrine is taken from St. Thomas, in the question cited on Evil, where he writes this: From the sin of the first parent, his flesh was deprived of that power, that from it seed could descend, through which original justice would be propagated into others. And thus, in the seed, the defect of this power is a defect of moral corruption, and a certain "intention" of it, just as we say that the intention of color is in the air, and the intention of the soul is in the seed. And from this also there is in the seed a power to a similar imperfection, just as there is in it a power for the production of human nature in the offspring generated. By these words the Holy Doctor teaches three things: first, that in the seed of man, in the state of innocence, there was an instrumental power productive of original justice, of which, in punishment for the sin of the first parent, it was deprived and stripped. Second, that in the state of corrupted nature, the seed, as deprived of that power, is the instrument by which Adam transmits original sin into his posterity. Third, that the privation of the power productive of nature together with original justice, is the corruption and infection of the seed, and, as it were, a certain intentional power, productive of original sin, which consists in the privation of original justice. Whence, according to this doctrine of St. Thomas, it can probably be said that the human seed, as

descending primordially from Adam, as lacking the aforesaid vigor, or instrumental power productive of original justice, is, in a certain manner, the physical instrumental cause of original sin, as the Carmelites of Salamanca teach here, disp. 14, doubt 3, § 3. Because the defective seed, by reason of such privation, contains original sin, in the same proportional way, in which, by reason of the natural power, it contains human nature, and just as, by reason of the aforesaid vigor, it would virtually contain original justice. For since original sin is something privative, and consists in the privation of original justice, as we shall say in § 5, a privative power, so to speak, suffices for its efficacy; for if the positive power of the cause contains the positive perfection of the effect, there is no reason why the privation of the power of the cause should not contain the privative defect which is found in the effect; since, where affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation.

Nor is this instrumental causality, and virtual containment of original sin, an obstacle, that the seed is something corporeal and material, for although such sin cannot be in a material and corporeal thing, as in a subject, or as in a principal effective cause, it can nevertheless be virtually, as in an instrumental cause, in the way that original justice itself was contained in the seed of Adam before sin. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 81, art. 1, ad 1: Even if guilt is not actually in the seed, it is nevertheless there virtually as human nature, which such guilt accompanies. And book 2, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 4: Although the seed does not have in itself the infection of guilt in act, it nevertheless has it virtually, just as also it is clear that from the seed of a leper a leprous son is generated, although in the seed leprosy is not in act; for in the seed there is some deficient power, through whose defect the defect of leprosy occurs in the offspring. Similarly, from this very fact, that in the seed there is such a disposition by which it is deprived of that impassibility and orderability to the soul, which the human body had in the first state, it follows that in the offspring, which is receptive of original sin, original sin is effected in act.

§ IV

Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

Given the existence and transfusion of original sin, several doubts arise, easily resolved from what has been said. It is gathered, therefore, first, from what has been said, that no other sin of the first parent, besides the first, is derived into his posterity through origin. For only that sin of Adam is derived into his posterity, which was capital; but only his first sin was capital, because it alone corrupted nature, and stripped it of original justice, for the other sins of Adam presupposed it already destroyed; therefore only the first sin of Adam is derived into his posterity. And this is what St. Thomas means here, art. 2, when he says that only the first sin of Adam, not the later ones, is transmitted into his posterity, because the first was a sin of nature, but the other sins were purely personal — that is, in the first sin, Adam bore the role of the whole nature, and was, as it were, the procurator of the whole human race, but in the other sins he only conducted his own affairs, and was occupied with private matters. From which it follows that the sin of Adam which is transfused into his posterity was the transgression of that precept, Genesis 2, Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat, because that sin was the first, by which he violated the divine command, for whose transgression God threatened death, and the privation of original justice, to be transmitted into all his posterity. But whether, if Adam had not violated that precept at all, and had first lapsed into another sin, that would likewise be transfused into his posterity — this is a doubtful and very uncertain matter among theologians, some affirming, others denying. Nevertheless, the affirmative opinion seems to be preferable, on account of the authority of St. Thomas, who teaches it most openly, book 2, dist. 33, at the end of the exposition of the letter, to the second argument, and II-II, q. 163, art. 3, ad 2, and in many other places. Reason also supports this: for this reason the sin of transgressing the precept of not eating of the forbidden tree is transmitted into Adam's posterity, because through it he lost original justice; but through whatever other mortal sin, if it had been first, he would have lost it; for original justice, as including sanctifying grace itself, was incompossible with any mortal sin whatsoever; therefore whatever mortal sin committed by Adam, if it had been first, would have been transmitted into his posterity, and consequently would have been the cause of original sin.

Nor does it avail to say that Adam, through whatever mortal sin, if it had been the first, would indeed have lost original justice for himself, but not for his posterity. For by that very fact that Adam, through the first sin, would have lost original justice, he would also have lost the vigor for communicating it to his posterity, because, as we showed above, such vigor, as it were, flowed from that very justice, and was annexed to it; therefore not

only for himself, but also for his posterity, through the first sin, he would have lost original justice. The consequence is manifest: for to lose original justice for one's posterity, is to lose the power for communicating it to posterity.

It is gathered, second, that if Adam had not sinned, when Cain sinned, his sons would not have contracted original sin; because such a sin would not have been capital, but personal, since Adam alone was constituted by God the head of his posterity.

It is gathered, third, that if Adam had not sinned, but Eve had sinned, their posterity would not have contracted original sin, because Eve was not constituted the head of the human race, as Adam was.

It is gathered, fourth, that if Adam had begotten sons before sinning, and afterward had sinned, those sons, begotten in innocence, would have contracted original sin. For only those contract original sin, who, by reason of seminal power, were contained in Adam when he actually sinned.

It is gathered, fifth, that if someone were miraculously formed from human flesh, as Eve from Adam's rib, he would not contract original sin, because he would not descend from Adam through seminal propagation, whence Adam would not be his natural head, nor consequently his moral head; since, according to the order of things established in fact by God, Adam is the moral head only of those, of whom he is the natural head.

§ V

Original sin consists formally and essentially in the privation of original justice, as to its first effect, insofar as it is voluntary to us by the will of Adam

Thus St. Anselm, book on the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 26, where he says: I cannot understand original sin, in infants themselves, through the disobedience of Adam, to be anything other than the nakedness of justice. Thus also St. Thomas, in various places, for here, q. 82, art. 3, he says that the privation of original justice, by which the will was subject to God, is formal in original sin. And then he concludes thus: Original sin materially indeed is concupiscence, but formally is the defect of original justice. Similar things he has, De Malo, q. 3, art. 7, saying: In original sin there is something formal, namely the lack of original justice — which he also repeats, q. 4, art. 2, in the body, and ad 10, and in many other places, which for the sake of brevity I omit.

A manifold reason also persuades this. The first is: original sin consists formally and essentially in that which is per se primarily removed through baptism, since this sacrament is instituted for blotting out original guilt; but through baptism, per se

primarily, the privation of original justice is removed, as to its primary effect, since through it, per se primarily, habitual grace is conferred, conjoining the mind to God; therefore original sin consists formally in the privation of original justice, insofar as it takes away its primary effect, common to such justice and sanctifying grace, which is to rectify the soul, and conjoin it to God as to the last end.

The second is: that in any thing whatsoever has itself as the constitutive notion, from which, as from a root and source, the other things pertaining to it flow and follow; but from the privation of original justice, as to its first effect, namely the conjunction of the mind to God, other disorders flow, which are transfused into us from Adam's sin through generation, namely the tinder or concupiscence, and the rebellion of the inferior appetite against the superior, the bodily penalties, such as diseases, pains, the exhaustion of the body, the necessity of dying, and other miseries which we daily experience, and which are usually called the wounds of nature; for since original justice, subjecting the mind to God, was, as it were, a golden bridle, by which the inferior powers were held in check, that being removed, the consequence was that the perfect subjection of the inferior powers to reason, and of the body to the soul, should perish; therefore the privation of original justice, as to its first effect, is the constitutive notion of original sin.

The third is: original sin does not consist formally in something positive, as will be established from what will be said below; therefore it must consist in a privation; but that privation can be nothing other than the privation of original justice, as to its primary effect; therefore in such a privation it formally consists. The minor is proved, first: original sin must consist in the privation of that form, by whose introduction it can be formally expelled; but no other form can formally expel original guilt, except original justice; therefore it cannot consist in the privation of any other. Second, the same minor is proved: since original sin is a sin of nature, it must consist in that privation which first and more immediately affects nature itself; but this is the privation of original justice, according to its primary effect; for just as this effect, namely the conjunction of man to God, was immediately in the essence of the soul, which is man's proper nature, so its privation immediately and primarily affects the same nature: this, therefore, will be the proper and formal constitutive notion of such a sin, but the remaining ones, which are in the will, and the other faculties, will belong to it secondarily and consequently, just as the faculties themselves belong to nature.

You will say, with Curiel, that from Adam's sin there is derived into his posterity a habitual privation of conformity to the law which he transgressed, and that this privation seems more fitting than all others for constituting original sin; because, since it belongs to the notion of sin to be contrariety and opposition to the law, every sin must

be constituted by aversion from it — such that, if it is actual sin, it is constituted by actual aversion, which is the privation of conformity in the very act; but if it is habitual, as original sin is, it is constituted by habitual aversion, which is the privation of habitual conformity, owed to be had by the suppositum.

But against this: just as, in us, habitual conformity to the law is not some form or habit distinct from grace and the virtues, which remain in him who fulfills the law, and through which he is habitually disposed, and in a preparation of mind to observe it — so neither, in Adam, if he had observed the law, would habitual conformity to it have been any other form or habit than original justice itself, and the perfections and virtues included in it, through which he would have been habitually disposed to the observance of the law; therefore the habitual privation of conformity to the law, neither in Adam, nor in his posterity, can be anything other than the privation of original justice.

The fourth reason can be briefly proposed thus: the defect of original justice in little children has the true notion of sin; therefore, since it cannot be personal, we must confess it to be original. The antecedent, in which lies the difficulty, is shown thus: such a defect is not mere negation, but privation of a due justice, since Adam received it not for himself alone, but to be transmitted into his posterity, by the will and pact of God, if he had persevered in the observance of the law. It is also unfitting to rational nature, since it removes from it a good fitting and consonant to it. Finally, such a defect is voluntary by the will of the first parent, in whom, as in a head, all our wills were contained; therefore it has all that is required for the notion of sin.

You will object, first: if original sin consisted in the privation of original justice, it would not be removed through baptism, since through it original justice is not restored to us; but this cannot be said, since this sacrament was instituted to remove original sin; therefore neither that.

I respond, with St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 4, art. 2, ad 2, that original justice is restored in baptism, as to this, that the superior part of the soul is conjoined to God, through whose privation the guilt of sin was present, but not as to this, that the inferior powers are subjected to reason; for from a defect of this kind is concupiscence, which remains after baptism.

You will object, second: the privation of original justice is the punishment of original sin; therefore in it the essence of original guilt cannot consist. The antecedent is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 85, art. 5, where he says thus: The withdrawal of original justice has the notion of punishment, just as also the withdrawal of grace. Reason also persuades this, for nothing is more common and celebrated, than that original justice

was taken from Adam and his posterity as punishment for sin. The consequence, however, is proved: punishment presupposes guilt in the subject, since therefore punishment is inflicted, because the subject is worthy of it by reason of guilt; therefore, if the privation of original justice is the punishment of original sin, it cannot be original guilt itself formally, or its formal constitutive notion.

I respond that the privation of original justice, as to its primary effect, which is to subject the mind to God as the last end, is not the punishment of original sin, but rather its formal constitutive notion; but as to the secondary effects, which are the subjection of the body to the soul, and of the inferior appetite to the superior, it is its punishment; for from the privation of these effects of original justice arise in man concupiscence, the tinder of sin, the necessity of dying, and other penalties of this life, which are punishments of original sin, and its effects.

You will object, third: our original sin must be of the same notion, of the same species, as Adam's sin; for the same sin, at least in species, which he committed, he transmits into us; but Adam's sin did not consist in a privation, but in something positive, for it was a sin of commission, against the negative precept of not eating of the forbidden tree, but a sin of commission, as we shall say below, consists in something positive; therefore our original sin does not consist in the privation of original justice, but in something positive.

I respond, distinguishing the major: our original sin must be of the same species as Adam's habitual sin, I grant; as his actual sin, I deny. Similarly I distinguish the minor: Adam's sin consisted in something positive: his actual sin, I grant the minor; his habitual, I deny the minor, and the consequence. In Adam, therefore, there was a twofold sin: one actual, from which Adam is called sinning, and we, insofar as we were in him as members in the head, are said to have sinned in him. The other, however, habitual, which was the terminus of such an act, and denominated Adam a sinner. The first indeed was positive, like the other actual sins of commission; but the second, as to what was formal in it, was nothing but the privation of grace or original justice, as will be established from what will be said in the following chapter, where we shall show that habitual sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. Since, therefore, the original sin transfused into us is not actual, but habitual, nor are we called sinning by it, but sinners, it must be equated and assimilated rather to Adam's habitual sin, consisting in privation, than to his actual sin, importing something positive as to what is formal.

§ VI

Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

From what has been said, it is gathered, first, that the essence of original sin does not consist formally in concupiscence, the tinder inclining toward sin, as Luther and Calvin teach. For through baptism is removed in us whatever has the true and proper notion of sin, as is defined at Trent, session 5, canon 5, and as is established from those words of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. But concupiscence is not removed through baptism, but is left for combat in the reborn, as the same Holy Synod teaches in the same place; therefore the essence of original sin cannot consist formally in concupiscence. Whence, when the Apostle, to the Romans 7, calls it sin, this must be understood in the causal sense, not the formal, because indeed it is from sin, and inclines to sin, as the same Council teaches in the place cited, after Augustine, book 1, On Marriage, chapter 23, where he says that concupiscence is called sin, because it is made by sin, just as speech which the tongue makes is called "tongue," and writing which the hand makes is called "hand," and just as cold is called lazy, not because it is made by the lazy, but because it makes them lazy.

It is gathered, second, that the opinion of Pighius and Catharinus is erroneous, who acknowledge nothing intrinsic in little children in which the essence of original sin might consist, whence they constitute it in the actual sin of Adam, insofar as it extrinsically denominates little children sinners, and from this gather that original sin is not multiple, but a single one in number, in all little children. For Trent, session 5, canon 3, teaches that original sin is transfused through propagation from Adam into his posterity, is in all, and is proper to all. And session 6, chapter 3, says that men, when they are conceived, contract their own injustice. But the sin which was in Adam has none of these characteristics, for it is neither in his posterity, nor affects them intrinsically, but only extrinsically and morally; nor is it the proper sin of each one, but one common to all; nor is it something transmitted through generation as through a cause; therefore, according to Trent, something distinct from Adam's sin must be admitted, in which the essence of original sin consists.

This is confirmed: the same Council, in the same place, compares the sin and injustice which we receive from Adam through generation, with the justice and holiness which we receive from Christ the Lord through the regeneration of baptism; but this is intrinsic to us, for there belongs to each one justified his own proper holiness, distinct from the holiness of Christ Himself; therefore similarly, in each of those who are propagated from Adam, there must be his own proper injustice, and sin intrinsic to him, distinct from the sin of Adam himself. Nor is that saying of the Apostle to the Romans 5 an obstacle: By

the disobedience of one, many were made sinners — for this must be understood in the causal sense, not formal, as is established from the following words: So also by the obedience of one, many are made just. For through the obedience of Christ we are not made just formally, but only effectively, insofar as Christ's obedience is the meritorious cause of our justification.

It is gathered, third, against Durandus, Fisher [Roffensis], and others, that the essence of original sin does not consist in the liability to punishment; for the obligation to punishment, or the condignity of punishment, is something consequent upon guilt, not guilt itself — just as the condignity of merit is not itself the moral goodness of a good and honest act, but something consequent upon it. Whence, when Augustine, book 1, On Marriage, chapters 25 and 26, seems to constitute the essence of original sin in the liability to punishment, he does not take liability formally, through obligation to punishment, but radically and fundamentally, namely for the root and foundation of such obligation, which is the privation of original justice. I add that in Holy Scripture, sometimes by the name "liability," guilt is understood, as is clear from Exodus 32: God struck the people for the guilt of the calf, that is, for the fault of worshipping the calf.

It is gathered, fourth, that original sin does not consist formally in a habit inclining the soul toward the changeable good as toward the last end, as some of our Thomists teach.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, who acknowledges nothing else in original sin, except concupiscence as material, and, as formal, the privation of original justice; for he says here, q. 81, art. 3: Original sin materially is concupiscence, but formally the defect of original justice; therefore he holds that original sin does not consist formally in a habit inclining the soul toward the changeable good. Whence, De Malo, q. 5, art. 2, he says that in original sin there is not conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul from original justice; and therefore to original sin is not owed the punishment of sense, but only the punishment of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision. By these words he suggests this reason against the aforesaid opinion: if original sin consisted in habitual conversion to a creature as to the last end, the punishment of sense would be owed to little children for original guilt: but the consequence is false, as we shall show in the following section; therefore also the antecedent. The inference is proved: the punishment of sense is owed to sin by reason of conversion to a creature, as St. Thomas everywhere teaches, and as will be established from what will be said below; therefore, if in little children there were, by reason of original sin, a positive conversion to a creature as to the last end, the punishment of sense would be owed to them, by reason of that same sin.

This is proved, second: Adam's sin does not exist now; therefore it cannot cause a habit inclining toward the changeable good. Nor does it avail to say that although it does not exist formally in itself, it does exist virtually in the corrupted seed, which is the instrument for producing a habit of this kind. For from Adam's sin nothing physical can be produced in the seed, by which it might be constituted, in the notion of an instrument, for producing that habit: for either it would be a morbid quality, permanently inhering in it, or a fluid and quickly passing quality, or an intentional motion, subordinating the seed to Adam's sin as to a principal cause? But neither can be said, as is established from what was said in the preceding §; therefore the seed cannot concur as a physical instrument for the production of that habit inclining toward the changeable good.

You will say that from this reason it follows that even according to our opinion, constituting original sin in the privation of original justice, the seed cannot concur, by way of a physical instrument, to its production — whose opposite we taught in the preceding § But the inference is denied, for according to the opinion constituting original sin in the privation of original justice, the superaddition of some positive power in the seed is not required for its efficacy, as is necessary according to the opinion constituting it in a habit inclining toward the changeable good, but a certain privative power suffices, or a defect of the vigor for communicating original justice, with which it was endowed in the state of innocence, as we declared there.

This is proved, third: we ought to philosophize in the same way about habitual original sin, as about habitual personal sin, since the reason for both is the same, and no more is required for constituting original sin, resulting from the personal sin of Adam, than for constituting habitual personal sin, which is caused from the actual sin of other sinning men; but habitual personal sin does not consist in a habit inclining the will toward the changeable good as toward the last end, but in the privation of sanctifying grace, as voluntary by the proper will of him who sins, as we shall show in the following chapter; therefore likewise habitual original sin does not consist formally in such a habit, but in the privation of original justice, as voluntary by the will of the head. The arguments to the contrary will be proposed and solved in the following chapter.

It is gathered, fifth, that the soul is the immediate subject of original sin: for the subject of a privation, and of the form by which it privates, is the same — for example, blindness is in the eye, in which the visual faculty is subjected; but the soul is the immediate subject of the form by which original sin privates, namely of original justice, which, since it was not distinguished from sanctifying grace (as we showed when we treated of the state of innocence), resided immediately in the essence of the soul, just as sanctifying grace itself

does; therefore it is the immediate subject of original sin.

You will say: the soul is not capable of guilt, except by means of the will; therefore original guilt is not received immediately in the essence of the soul. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved. Sin is essentially voluntary; but everything voluntary is in the soul by reason of the will; therefore the soul is not capable of guilt, except by means of the will.

I respond, denying the antecedent, speaking of habitual guilt, and to its proof I say that habitual sin is voluntary by way of a terminus, not by way of an act; but although the voluntary, even by way of a terminus, must belong to the soul by means of the will, by way of efficient cause, it is not necessary that it belong to it by means of the will, by way of subject; whence original guilt can be received in the soul immediately, as in a subject.

§ VII

Little children departing with original sin will indeed lack the beatific vision, but will suffer no punishment of sense; indeed, not even any sadness from the punishment of loss; they will not, however, be blessed with natural beatitude

The first part is certain from faith, as is established from that saying of John 3: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

The second, however, which is against Gregory of Rimini, Driedo, and Florentius Conry the Minorite, is proved, first, from Innocent III, chapter Majores, X, On Baptism and its Effect, where he says that the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God, but the actual punishment of sin is Gehenna, with perpetual torment. The former part, however, seems altogether to be understood of the lack of the vision of God, with the exclusion of the torment of Gehenna, otherwise the same punishments would correspond to original sin as to actual; therefore etc.

This is proved, second, from the Holy Fathers: for Nazianzen, oration on Holy Baptism, speaking of little children departing with original sin, expressly says that they are afflicted neither with heavenly glory, nor with punishments by the just judge. Ambrose, book on Abraham, at the very end, asserts that they will have immunity from punishment, but not the honor of the heavenly kingdom. Nyssen, in the oration on infants who are snatched away by untimely death, says that they will be neither in sorrows nor in sadness. Finally, Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 8 (elsewhere numbered), says: Who would doubt that unbaptized little children will be in the lightest damnation of all — what sort, and how great, it will be, although I cannot define, I dare not say, however,

that it would be better for them not to have existed, than to be there. By these words he first teaches that they will be in the lightest damnation of all, which would not be true if they sustained some punishment of sense; for their damnation will without doubt be milder, and more tolerable, if they are immune from all punishment of sense, and suffer only the punishment of loss. Then he suggests that this saying about the traitor Judas, it would have been better for him if he had not been born, cannot be applied to those little children; which would be false, if they were tormented by the punishment of fire: for although not to be, in itself, is not desirable, as being a pure privation of nature, it is nevertheless desirable, insofar as it removes torment and punishment, as St. Thomas teaches in the Supplement, q. 98, art. 3.

Add that the same Augustine, book 3, On Free Will, chapter 23, treating of the same little children, says: It is not to be feared, that, since life could be a mean between right deed and sin, the sentence of the judge might also not be able to be a mean between reward and punishment. But if little children suffered the punishment of loss and of sense, their sentence would not be a mean between reward and punishment, as is clear of itself; therefore, from Augustine's mind, little children departing in original sin are punished only by the punishment of loss.

Nor does it avail to say that Augustine constituted the sentence of little children as a mean between reward and punishment, because they are punished with a milder punishment than adults. It does not avail, I say, for even among adults one is punished more mildly than another, and men, regularly speaking, are to be punished with a milder punishment than the Demons, and yet no one says that an adult, to be punished with a milder punishment, would have or hear a mean sentence between reward and punishment; therefore, if little children suffered the punishment of sense and of loss, Augustine would wrongly assert that the sentence of little children is a mean between reward and punishment.

This same part is proved, third, by this argument: punishment must be proportioned to guilt; but the punishment of sense is not proportioned to original guilt; therefore original guilt is not punished by the punishment of sense. The major is established; the minor is shown, first: the punishment of sense occurs through the suffering of this particular person, but original sin is not through the will of the person, but through the will of nature; but to be punished through personal suffering is not proportioned with this, that one has sinned not through his own will, but through another's will; therefore the punishment of sense is not proportioned with original sin. Second: original sin is not contracted by one's own will; but the punishment of sense is owed to sin, by reason of one's own will, according to that saying of Bernard, sermon 3 on the Resurrection: Take

away one's own will, and there will be no hell. Nothing will burn in hell, except one's own will; therefore the punishment of sense is neither proportioned nor due to original sin. Third: the sharpness of sensible punishment corresponds to the delight of guilt, as is established from that saying of Apocalypse 18: As much as she has glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give her; but in original sin no delight is found, for delight follows operation, but original sin does not consist in an operation; therefore the punishment of sense does not correspond to original sin, nor has proportion with it. Finally, the Church, in imposing the punishment owed to sins, imitates the order and manner prescribed by divine justice in the punishment of sins; but the Church imposes no positive punishment for original sin; therefore she holds that sensible punishment is not proportioned to such a sin, nor inflicted for it by divine justice.

The third part of our assertion, namely that little children departing in original sin suffer no sadness from the punishment of loss, remains proved, against Bellarmine, Valencia, and other more recent authors, from what was said in the proof of the preceding: for Gregory of Nyssa, cited above, says that those little children will be neither in sorrows, nor in sadness, and Augustine, in the place cited above, says that their punishment will be the mildest — which would be false, if, by reason of the beatitude lost, they felt interior grief and sadness; since the grief which the damned feel, on account of the beatitude lost, is most grave, and greater than the sensible pain caused by the fire of hell, as Chrysostom teaches, homily 24 on Matthew, and homily 47 to the people of Antioch, in these words: I, however, say that the loss of that glory is much more bitter than Gehenna. Finally, Augustine professes that he does not dare assert, that little children dying without baptism are to be afflicted with so great a punishment, that it would be better for them not to have been born: but if they felt, from the loss of beatitude, interior grief and sadness, it would be better for them altogether not to be, since such grief, as we said, is most grave, and greater than the sensible pain inflicted by the punishment of sense; therefore those little children suffer no sadness from the loss of beatitude, and the punishment of loss. The principal reason adduced above for the former part also shows this: for this reason those little children are not punished with a positive punishment of sense, because original sin does not bring delight, nor is it committed by one's own will, but another's; but this reason equally militates against interior sadness and grief arising from the lack of beatitude; therefore those little children conceive no mourning and interior sadness from such a lack. I add that from this opinion it would follow that little children would be tormented by the worm of conscience, which is absurd. The inference is proved: if little children grieved over lost beatitude, they would also grieve and be pained over original guilt, even though caused

by another's will, without hope of its remission; but in this consists the worm of conscience: therefore, if sadness and interior affliction in little children over lost beatitude were admitted, consequently the worm of conscience would have to be admitted in them, just as in the other damned.

The fourth part, finally, which denies natural beatitude to those little children, is proved, against Catharinus, who asserts that little children dying with original sin, after the day of judgment, will not only lack all grief, both internal and external, but will even be blessed and happy, and will spend their life perpetually in a certain earthly paradise, as it were, full of wisdom and virtues, most content with their lot, loving and praising God with their whole heart, finally often enjoying the conversation and revelations of the Angels. This fourth part of our assertion is proved, I say, and Catharinus's opinion is refuted, first, because natural beatitude is not compossible with aversion from God the author of nature, just as supernatural beatitude is not compossible with aversion from God as the author of the supernatural; but little children, by reason of original guilt, are averse from God, not only as the author of grace, but also as the founder of nature, since original sin contains both aversions, and, according to the more common opinion of theologians, one aversion cannot stand without the other, supposing the elevation of human nature to a supernatural end; therefore they are not blessed with natural beatitude.

Then this same opinion is impugned by this argument: little children departing in original sin descend into hell, or limbo, there to remain in that place; but with the habitation of this place natural felicity cannot stand; therefore they will not be blessed with natural beatitude. The minor is established; the major, however, is proved, first, from Augustine, sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle, where he expressly teaches, that there is no middle place between the kingdom and hell; but little children, after judgment, will not be in the place of the kingdom, namely in the empyrean heaven; therefore they will be in hell, or in limbo, which is designated in Scripture by the name of hell, as is established from Genesis 37, where Jacob, lamenting the death of his son Joseph, said: I will go down to my son mourning, into hell. Second, the same major is proved from the fact that, according to the common opinion of theologians, the particular judgment of each one, and the universal judgment, contain the same sentence; but the souls of little children dying with original sin are, at the particular judgment, destined for limbo; therefore, after the universal judgment, they will remain in the same place. Third, the same major can be recommended from the common doctrine of theologians, asserting that after the universal judgment all the elements will possess their natural place, such that fire will be above air, air above water, and this above earth, and

the earth entirely covered by waters. For since (they say) water, at the beginning of the world, surrounded the whole earth, as its nature seemed to demand, and afterward, by God's command, was gathered into one place, that there might remain a place on earth for the generation of animals and plants — that generation ceasing with the motion of the heavenly bodies, reason itself and the nature of things demand, that the water return to its pristine place, and cover the whole surface of the earth; therefore infants, after the universal judgment, will not inhabit the surface of the earth, as Catharinus teaches (unless they are said to swim in the waters like fish, which is ridiculous), but will remain enclosed in limbo, an underground and dark place.

You will object, first, against the second part of the assertion: to little children, at the final judgment, will be said, Matthew 25: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels; but by the name of everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, is understood eternal punishment of sense; therefore little children will sustain it. The major is proved, for those words of Christ are referred to all who are to be placed on the left, namely to all the reprobate; but little children will not be on the right, but on the left; therefore that sentence of Christ is to be directed not only to adults, but also to little children. Whence Augustine, sermon 14, on the words of the Apostle, and book on Faith and Works, chapter 3, affirms that little children dying without baptism will go into everlasting fire. And Gregory, book 8, Morals, says that although they did nothing on their own, they nevertheless arrive there at torments. Likewise Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, chapter 17: Hold most firmly, and doubt not at all, that not only men now using reason, but even little children, whether they pass from this world with or without the sacrament of baptism, are to be punished with the everlasting punishment of fire; because, although they had no sin of their own action, they nevertheless drew, from carnal conception, the condemnation of original sin.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor, namely that by the name of everlasting fire the punishment of sense is determinately understood: for, according to the phrase of Scripture, by the name of fire, any punishment whatsoever is designated, as Augustine teaches, question 9 on Joshua, and as is clear from that saying of Psalm 66: We have passed through fire and water, and thou hast brought us out into a refreshment. Whence by this name Christ signified the punishment of loss for little children, and of sense for adults. In the same way must Augustine and Fulgentius be understood and interpreted, when they teach that boys dying without baptism are tormented by fire; for they speak metaphorically, and by the name of fire signify the punishment of loss. Thus St. Thomas teaches, De Malo, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1, and book 2, dist. 33, q. 2, art. 1, ad 1; St.

Bonaventure, in the same place, art. 3, q. 1, ad 1; and the Gloss, on chapter Nulla, De Consecrat. dist. 4. That this interpretation is legitimate, is established, first, because Augustine's intent was, against the Pelagians, to persuade that little children were not to be endowed with eternal felicity: but this is sufficiently proved, by taking, under the name of fire, eternal punishment, namely eternal punishment of loss, with which eternal felicity cannot be joined; therefore it must be so taken. Second, because Fulgentius asserts that it belongs to the faith, that little children departing in original sin are punished with the punishment of everlasting fire; but no one can assert, without manifest error, that it is a dogma of faith, that those little children will be eternally tormented with the punishment of sense, but only that they are damned, and to be eternally punished with the punishment of loss; therefore Fulgentius wished to signify, by the name of fire, the punishment of loss. Whence the Gloss cited above says thus: The lack of the vision of God is the punishment of fire, of which the most firm canon is to be understood, taken from Fulgentius. Third, if St. Augustine were taken in strictness, he could not be reconciled with himself, for in other places related above, he clearly teaches that little children sustain no punishment of sense.

From these things you will understand that when the same Holy Doctor, sermon 14, on the words of the Apostle, says: The Lord, about to judge, will make two parts, right and left; He will say to those on the left, Go into everlasting fire, and to those on the right, Come, ye blessed, etc. There is left no middle place, where he can place the infants — this must be explained, with St. Thomas, cited above, of a middle place according to the sense of the Pelagians, who wanted such little children to have felicity somewhere outside the kingdom of heaven.

You will object, second, since little children, in this life, sustain bodily afflictions and pains, if, after death, they are immune from all punishment of sense, it follows that they will be of better condition after death, than before death; but this seems absurd; therefore also that other.

I respond, denying the inference of the major, for it is better to sustain all miseries with an aptitude for seeing God, than to lack all punishment of sense, without such an aptitude.

You will object, third: venial sin, which is lighter than original, is punished in the other life with the punishment of sense; therefore, much more, original will be punished with the same punishment. But I deny the consequence and the parity: for venial sin, although it is lighter than original, is nevertheless voluntary by one's own will, and has some conversion and disordered delight, but original sin does not. Whence, since the

punishment of sense corresponds to one's own will, and to disordered conversion and delight, it is no wonder if that sin, in the other life, is punished with the punishment of sense, but this one, only with the punishment of loss.

You will object, fourth, against the third part of the assertion: every damned adult will grieve, and feel the greatest pain and interior affliction, on account of the lost beatitude, because such a loss or lack is their greatest evil, as depriving them of the greatest good, namely the beatific vision; therefore, similarly, for the same reason, the loss or lack of beatitude will cause sadness and affliction in little children.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence and the parity: St. Thomas assigns the reason for the distinction, book 2, dist. 33, q. 2, art. 2, in these words: Since every man having the use of free will is proportioned for attaining eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace, by which he will merit eternal life, therefore, if he fails in this, there will be the greatest grief, because he will have lost that which it was possible for him to have. But boys were never proportioned for this, that they should have eternal life, because it was not owed to them from the principles of nature, since to have proper acts, by which they would obtain such a great good, exceeds every natural faculty; and therefore they will grieve not at all over the lack of the divine vision; indeed, they will rather rejoice over this, that they will participate much of the divine goodness, and of natural perfections.

You will say: even if beatitude was not in the power of little children, by reason of their own will, it was nevertheless possible for them by the will of the head; but this suffices for them to reasonably grieve over its loss; therefore they will have grief over lost beatitude. The minor is proved: if someone is deprived of a patrimony, on account of the parent's crime, he grieves no less, than if he is disinherited by his own fault; and yet, then, the patrimony was not in his power, no more than the parent's crime; therefore the loss of a good not existing in the subject's power causes reasonable grief.

I respond, denying the minor, and to its proof, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the distinction, however, is that toward his own patrimony, each one is ordered from intrinsically, and has a natural right to it; and therefore, whether by another's or one's own fault, he is disinherited, he reasonably grieves: but no right to having glory preceded in little children, or, if it preceded, it depends altogether on something extrinsic, and therefore they cannot reasonably grieve for lost beatitude, in the same way that no wise man is afflicted at this, that he cannot fly like a bird, or because he is not a king, or emperor, because this was not due to him.

You will object, fifth, against the last part of the assertion: little children, on account of original sin, are deprived of no perfection naturally due to them, as is established from the common axiom of theologians, asserting that natural things remained integral after sin; but natural beatitude is a perfection due to man; therefore little children are not deprived of it on account of original guilt. Whence St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 5, art. 2, says: Through original sin, men are deprived of the right to supernatural beatitude, which original justice was providing, but not of the right to natural goods.

This is confirmed: God, at the general resurrection, notwithstanding original guilt, will grant to the infants, deceased in original sin, several gratuitous gifts, such as immortality, impassibility, and the quantity or size which they would have had, if they had come to adult age; therefore much less will He deny them natural beatitude.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor: for although natural beatitude is entitatively natural, it is nevertheless not natural possessively, from the principles due to human nature; whence, in the state of pure nature, man would not attain it, except from the special aid of God the founder of nature, as we said in treating of the state of pure nature, and as will be more established from what will be said in the Treatise on Grace. From which is clear the answer to the testimony of St. Thomas, for the Holy Doctor, when he says that man is not deprived by original sin of the right to natural goods, speaks of natural goods entitatively and possessively, that is, which are possessed from the principles due to human nature, of which also that common saying of theologians must be understood: natural things remained integral after sin.

To the confirmation, granting the antecedent, the consequence and the parity must be denied, for those gifts are not incompossible with original sin; but natural beatitude cannot stand with it, because, as we said above, natural beatitude imports conversion to God as the author of nature, but original sin turns one away from God, not only as author of grace, but also as founder of nature.

You will object last: if little children migrating from this life with original sin were to remain, after the day of judgment, perpetually enclosed in limbo, and bound to it, they would suffer the punishment of sense through the bondage to such a place — just as the Demons, and separated souls, existing in hell or purgatory, are tormented with the punishment of sense, through bondage to corporeal fire.

But the inference and the parity are denied, for although those little children must be perpetually enclosed in limbo, and bound to it, because nevertheless they do not apprehend that place, and such detention and bondage, as unfitting and harmful to themselves, and consequently do not grieve from it, nor do they struggle against it, they

suffer no punishment of sense from it. On the contrary, however, since the Demons and souls existing in hell or purgatory apprehend their bondage to corporeal fire, as harmful, and contrary to their liberty, as unfitting, and consequently grieve and are greatly afflicted from it, such a bondage has, in them, the notion of the punishment of sense. This is the solution of St. Thomas, question 26, On Truth, art. 1, ad 5.

From what has been said, one can perfectly understand the state of little children dying in original sin. For they are punished with no positive punishment, but only with privative punishments, namely the lack of glory, and of natural beatitude, without their conceiving from this any mourning or sadness. They will be, after the day of judgment, as to their bodies, whole, and will lack no member, and be of the same quantity or size, which they would have had, if they had arrived at adult age; because the works of God are perfect, and the resurrection of bodies is a work of divine power. As to the souls, however, they will know some natural objects, through species infused by God in the state of separation, for St. Thomas considers it improbable, book 2, dist. 33, q. 2, art. 2, to deny them all cognition. They will also have some knowledge of God the founder of nature, but not altogether perfect, sufficient to beatify them with natural beatitude. Finally, they will love God the author of nature with natural love, not indeed with amicable, efficacious, and perfect love (for this cannot stand with aversion from God the founder of nature, which is included in original sin), but with imperfect love, which is borne toward God, insofar as He is the natural principle of being, as St. Thomas teaches in the place just cited, in the response to the last argument.

Chapter VII

On personal habitual sin

Habitual sin is of one kind original, which is transmitted through generation, and results in us from the actual sin of Adam, by which he violated God's precept in earthly paradise, of which we treated in the preceding chapter; of another kind personal, which results from the actual sin committed by us, and remains in us, until it is removed through contrition and the infusion of grace, and is called by St. Thomas, and other ancient theologians, the stain of sin, by likeness to a stain in corporeal things. For just as some body is said to be stained, when, from contact and mixture with another, it loses its native splendor or luster, as a garment, when it is infected with mud or oil, so the soul contracts a spiritual stain, while, by the disordered affection of the will, which is, as it were, a certain touch of the soul, adhering to a creature, it loses the luster or splendor which it has from the reflected shining of the light of divine wisdom, and of sanctifying grace. For each thing, just as it is perfected by union to a more noble thing, so it is disfigured and made vile by mixture with inferior things; for we do not say that silver is impaired by mixture with gold, by which it comes out better and more precious, but by mixture with lead or tin, by which it is infected and vitiated. Whence St. Thomas, after Augustine, Opusculum 61, rightly says that the soul, midway between God and creatures, is illumined, bettered, and perfected by conversion to God, and darkened, deteriorated, and corrupted by conversion to creatures. The difficulty, then, is, in what this stain of sin, which is called by more recent theologians habitual sin, consists — not because it always supposes a habit of vice produced, but because it remains, and persists, so long as it has not been retracted through true penitence, as will be established from what will be said below.

I say, therefore, first, that the stain of sin, or personal habitual sin, is not a habit inclining the will toward the changeable good, as toward the last end. This is against those Thomists who teach that original habitual sin consists in a habitual conversion to the creature, for they think we must philosophize in the same way about personal habitual sin.

This conclusion is proved, first, from St. Thomas, book 4, dist. 18, q. 1, art. 2, in the argument sed contra, where he argues thus: From sin, nothing positive remains in the soul, except a disposition or habit, which follow upon the sin on the part of the act from which something remains; but a stain is not a disposition caused from an act, nor a habit, which is clear from this, that a disposition and habit can be destroyed without grace, through a contrary custom; but the stain is not removed without grace; therefore the

stain does not posit something positive in the soul.

This is confirmed: through justification the stain of sin is altogether taken away, and yet the depraved dispositions and vicious habits are not altogether taken away; therefore the stain of sin is not some depraved disposition or habit.

It is proved, second: the last end of the sinner is his own private good, as we shall show below, when we treat of mortal sin; but concerning one's own private good, no habit is constituted, since the will, as being the inclination of the whole suppositum, is, by itself, sufficiently disposed toward such a good, as shown in the Treatise on the Virtues in Common; therefore the stain of sin, or habitual sin, does not consist in a habit inclining the will toward the changeable good, as toward the last end.

It is proved, third: habits are not generated, nor destroyed, except through several repeated acts, as the philosophers commonly teach; but the stain of sin is caused in the soul through a single sinful act, and is removed through a single act of charity and contrition; therefore it is not a habit.

I say, second, that the stain of mortal sin, or habitual sin, insofar as it is mortal, is the privation of the luster of sanctifying grace, with respect to the preceding act of sin, from which it is caused.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 86, art. 1, ad 3, where he says thus: The stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it signify sheer privation, but it signifies a certain privation of the luster of the soul in order to its cause, which is sin. Nothing clearer or more express can be said in favor of our conclusion.

It is proved, second: that which is first and per se excluded through justification, is the stain of sin, or habitual sin, since the justification of the impious is the remission of sins, as St. Thomas shows below, q. 113, art. 1. But that which is first and per se excluded through justification, is the privation of grace, since its infusion is the terminus to which of justification, as theologians teach in the Treatise on Grace. Whence the Holy Doctor, in the same place, art. 2, says that the remission of guilt could not be understood, if the infusion of grace were not present; therefore the stain of sin, or habitual sin, consists in the privation of the luster of sanctifying grace.

It is proved, third: man must be constituted a sinner and unjust habitually, by that whose opposite constitutes him holy and just habitually, since opposite denominations must be sought from opposite forms or notions; but sanctifying grace immediately constitutes man holy and just habitually; therefore its privation immediately denominates and constitutes him a sinner and unjust habitually, and consequently in

such a privation itself habitual sin formally and immediately consists.

I said, however, that habitual sin, insofar as it is mortal, consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, because if we speak of habitual sin according to itself, and abstracting from mortal, it consists in the privation of conformity to the law, or of the rectitude of reason; for such privation is left in the soul from any sin whatsoever, but the privation of sanctifying grace, only from mortal sin. Whence St. Thomas here, art. 1, mentions both privations, when he says: The soul of man has a twofold luster (of which it is deprived by sin), one indeed from the reflected shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts; the other from the reflected shining of the divine light, namely of wisdom and grace, by which man is also perfected for acting well and fittingly.

I also said that the stain of mortal sin is the privation of the luster of grace, as it says a relation to the preceding act of sin from which it is caused; because for that stain to have the notion of guilt and of habitual sin, it must be moral and voluntary, and consequently connote the act of the will by which it was caused. From this it is easily understood, how, although the privation of grace is only one in each sinner, there are nevertheless stains diverse in species in it, according to the specific diversity of the sins from which it results, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, and it is like (he says) a shadow, which is the privation of light from the object of some body, and according to the diversity of the objecting bodies, the shadows are diversified. From this the chief foundation of the opposite opinion remains resolved, from which it was inferred, that since the privation of grace is unique, and of the same species in any sinner whatsoever, if the stain of sin, or habitual sin, consisted essentially in it, it would be only one in species, even after many sins of diverse species committed by him — which foundation, as is established from what has been said, is ruinous. Whence the same Holy Doctor, book 2, dist. 32, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1: Since all the genera of mortal sins have this in common, that they take away grace, there is not, however, one stain of them all, but diverse, according as the defect of grace is referred to diverse causes; whence the defect of grace proceeding from an act of lust, is the stain of that sin, and so of the others.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: man, the act of sin having passed, remains not only habitually averted from God, but also converted habitually to the creature, or to his own private good, as to the last end; but this conversion cannot occur, except through a positive habit, morally evil; therefore in the sinner, the act of sin having passed, there remains some morally evil habit, inclining his will toward his own private good, as to the last end, in which habitual sin consists.

This is confirmed: actual sin consists in a positive tendency toward an object dissonant with the rules of morals, or in an actual conversion to the changeable good as to the last end, as we shall show in the following chapter; therefore habitual sin, left and caused by the actual, must consist in a similar habitual tendency, or conversion.

To the objection, granting the major, I deny the minor: for since, toward the common notion of one's own private good, the will is of itself sufficiently determined and inclined, as any other faculty toward the common notion of its own object, it needs no habit determining and inclining it toward such a good, nor is it capable of it, since that essential inclination itself provides, more eminently, whatever a habit could provide.

To the confirmation, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence, and the parity: for actual sin consists in a tendency toward an object dissonant with the rules of morals, because the first thing understood in it, is the positive tendency toward the prohibited object; but the privation of grace, or of the due rectitude of the act, has itself only consequently and secondarily to that; but the first thing understood in the sinner remaining, the act of sin having passed, is not a habitual tendency toward the prohibited object, or a habitual conversion to the changeable good, but the privation of grace and charity, from which arises the whole perversity which is found in habitual conversion toward one's own private good.

You will object, second, against the second conclusion: if someone, placed in pure naturals, or in the state of pure nature, sinned gravely, he would contract a stain from such sin; but he would not have the privation of grace, but only its negation, since, in such a state, human nature would not be elevated to the order of grace; therefore the stain of sin, or habitual sin, does not consist formally in the privation of grace.

I respond that habitual sin, in the state of pure nature, would be of a different notion from what it is now, and consequently would have another constitutive, namely the privation of the subjection or conversion to God as the natural last end.

This response the Author of the Theologia Mentis et Cordis disapproves, tome 4, page 486, where he says this cannot at all be said: both because the essence of mortal sin, as mortal, is the wounding of divine grace, friendship, and charity; therefore the stain arising from that sin, is the privation of that grace, friendship, and charity. And also because, in the state of pure nature, through mortal sin, man would contract that stain, which could only be wiped away by justification, since justification is the remission of sins: but he could not then be justified, except through the infusion of grace, because no other form of justification is assignable; therefore etc.

But these are trivial, and do not need much sweat to be resolved. To the first, indeed, it is answered, that although in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order, through grace and charity, mortal sin, as such, is the wounding of divine grace and charity, and of God's supernatural friendship, it is otherwise, however, in the state of pure nature, since in it there would be neither grace, nor charity, nor God's supernatural friendship, but only the love of God as the author of nature, and conversion to Him as the natural end: whence, in that state, mortal sin, as such, would only exclude such love and conversion.

To the second, I deny that in the state of pure nature, the remission of sin, and the justification of man, could not occur without the infusion of habitual grace; for since man's habitual sin, in the state of pure nature constituted, and not elevated to the supernatural end, would not be the privation of grace, or of supernatural rectitude, but only of conversion to God as to the natural end, it could be removed through a conversion of this kind, since a privation is removed through the form directly opposed to it, and consequently the sinner could then be justified through an act of efficacious love of God as the author of nature, joined with an extrinsic favor of God, condoning the reason of offense. Otherwise, if, in the state of pure nature, for the remission and expulsion of sin, the infusion of habitual grace, or of another supernatural gift, were necessary, it would follow that the remission of sins would be impossible, man remaining in that state; since, through the infusion of habitual grace, or of another supernatural gift, man would be led out from the state of pure nature, and constituted in the state of grace. Whence, if the opinion of this Author were true, man remaining in the state of pure nature, would necessarily be wretched, since, once lapsed into sin, he would have no remedy, by which he could be justified, and attain natural beatitude, to which he would have been ordered. From which it would further follow, that the state of pure nature is impossible, and repugnant to divine providence, since it is repugnant to the sweetness of divine providence, to found man in some state, in which he is necessarily wretched, and cannot attain his own last end and natural beatitude. Wherefore the same Author, led by this reason, tome 5, page 23, denies that the state of pure nature is possible at all. Why, then, does he labor here in vain, in assigning the formal reason, by which habitual sin would be constituted in that state, and the form by which man, having fallen into mortal sin, would be justified? He ought, in conformity with his own principles, to have answered the argument proposed, that the major concerns a subject not supposed, since the state of pure nature is impossible.

From what has been said, the opinion of Scotus and the Nominalists remains confuted, who assert that the stain of sin, or habitual sin, consists in liability, or the condignity of

punishment, resulting from the act of sin. For someone is not sordid and stained with sin for this reason, that he is worthy of punishment, but is rather worthy of punishment for this reason, that he is infected with the stain of sin.

Also excluded remains, from what has been said, the opinion of Vásquez, thinking that habitual sin, or the stain, is only an extrinsic denomination, taken from the past act of sin, so long as, not being retracted through penitence, it perseveres. For the stain is something intrinsic, just as the luster of grace, of which it deprives; whence, just as being holy and clean arises from some intrinsic and permanent form, namely habitual grace inhering in the soul, as is certain from faith, so being stained, unclean, and a sinner, is not a mere extrinsic denomination taken from the act of sin, but a privation intrinsically affecting the soul in its own manner, just as darkness affects the air, and death the body. I add that the reason is the same concerning personal habitual sin, as concerning original: we showed, however, in the preceding chapter, against Pighius and Catharinus, that habitual original sin is something intrinsic to us, and distinct from Adam's actual sin, and derived from it; therefore similarly, personal habitual sin will be something intrinsic to us, distinct from the preceding actual sin, and not merely an extrinsic denomination taken from it.

From what has been said, it can also easily be gathered, in what the stain of venial sin consists: for it consists in the privation of the fervor of charity, caused from venial sins, which does not remove the form from which arises the soul's beauty and comeliness, namely grace and charity, but clouds it over, and, as it were, governs it, so that it shines and gleams less in acts; and it has itself to the soul existing in grace, as dust has itself to a comely face, by which it is somewhat sullied, but its beauty is not destroyed. In which sense St. Leo the Pope said, sermon 4 for Lent: While, through various actions, the concern of this life is dispersed, it is necessary that even religious hearts grow sordid from worldly dust.

Chapter VIII

On the sin of commission

Habitual sin having been considered, both original and personal, it remains that we discourse on actual sins — first on the sin of commission, second on the sin of omission, third on mortal sin, and last on venial.

§ I

The sin of commission, in the notion of moral evil, is not constituted through privation, but through something positive

This is proved, first, from three principles of St. Thomas's doctrine, from which the truth of this assertion is left manifest. The first is had here, q. 72, art. 1, where he teaches that sins are distinguished specifically, not by privation, but by positive order to an object dissonant with law and reason; whence, since the constitutive and the distinctive of a thing are the same, it is manifest, according to St. Thomas's doctrine, that the constitutive notion of sin is not privation, but positive order to an object dissonant with law and reason. Nor does it avail to say that St. Thomas there does not speak of the specific distinction of sins formally, but only materially as to malice. For the Holy Doctor, in the question cited, treats of the specification and distinction of sins, as they are formally sins, and in the genus of morals — for he treated of human acts considered in physical being above, from question 8 to 18, which is on the moral goodness and malice of human acts; therefore it is not rightly expounded of the specification and distinction of sins in physical being, and materially as to malice. Whence, in the same place, art. 6, he says thus: It must be said that in sins is found a twofold difference, one material, the other formal. The material is regarded according to the natural species of the acts; the formal, however, according to order to one proper end, which is the proper object. What could be clearer, that St. Thomas speaks altogether formally of sin, and of its specification and distinction, when he asserts that it is taken from order to the object? And certainly he would have been very deficient, if, in explaining the principles from which the specific distinction of sins is taken, he treated only of their distinction materially, and not formally.

The second principle of St. Thomas's doctrine is that this distinction is found between simple evil, and moral evil, that the first is constituted through privation, the second through something positive. Thus he teaches, I, q. 48, art. 1, ad 2, and 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 9, De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, and here, q. 76, art. 9, ad 1, where he says thus: Evil, insofar as it is such, is a privation, and therefore is diversified in species according to those things which are deprived. But sin does not obtain its species on the part of privation, or aversion, but from conversion to the object. Nor can it be said that St. Thomas, in those places, speaks of evil as to that material aspect on which it is founded; for according to this interpretation, the distinction he establishes between simple evil and moral evil cannot subsist, since simple evil is founded in a good, and necessarily presupposes some entity by which it is sustained, it imports something positive materially.

The third principle of St. Thomas's doctrine is had in the places cited, where he teaches that evil, as it is in moral matters, is contrarily opposed to the good; but if sin and moral malice were formally pure privation, moral good and evil would be opposed privatively and not contrarily, since form and privation do not enjoy contrary opposition, but privative; therefore, according to the principles of St. Thomas's doctrine, the moral malice of sin is not pure privation.

Nor can it be answered that St. Thomas speaks of moral evil, not formally, but materially, in the respect in which it is something positive, and contrarily opposed to moral good. For, in the place cited from question 1 On Evil, he says thus: The act of the will, insofar as it is borne toward evil, is contrary to the good properly, and this contrariety passes from acts into habit, insofar as act and habit are assimilated. But the act of the will, insofar as it is borne toward evil, does not denote the material, but the formal aspect of malice. Likewise, a vicious habit, insofar as it is such formally, is contrarily opposed to virtue, as the same Holy Doctor teaches here, q. 71, art. 1. Therefore he speaks of contrariety between moral good and evil, as they are formally such.

This is proved, second, by a fundamental reason: prior to the privation of rectitude, there is understood in the sin of commission a positive tendency toward an object dissonant with law and reason; but this tendency, prior to the privation, is morally evil; therefore, prior to the privation, the sin of commission is understood as constituted in the notion of moral evil, and consequently is constituted in the notion of such not through privation, but through something positive. The major is certain, for the reason that a privation of rectitude is understood in the sinful act, is that such an act tends toward an evil object, disformed to the rules of morals; therefore first, in it, a positive tendency toward the object dissonant with law and reason is conceived, before the privation of rectitude. The major, however, is proved, first: every tendency is specified by its terminus, and takes its specific notion from that toward which it tends, and consequently the tendency toward an object dissonant with law and reason cannot fail to take from it the species of unfittingness and dissonance with that same reason and law; but this is moral malice; therefore the positive tendency toward the object dissonant with law and reason, prior to the privation of rectitude flowing from it, is understood as morally evil. Second, the same minor is proved: that tendency, as it precedes the privation which it causes, is formally in the genus of morals, since it arises from the will, operating freely, and with subjection to the rules of morals, and consequently as from a moral agent, and regards the object as prohibited by law, and consequently as standing under the rules of morals; therefore it is contained under some species of morality; but it

is not in the species of moral good, as is known per se; therefore it is morally evil.

You will say that this tendency, as it precedes the privation of rectitude, is not evil formally, but only materially or fundamentally, because it does not terminate at the object reduplicatively as evil, but only as evil materially and specificatively; for it regards it as some useful or delightful good, not, however, as prohibited formally as dissonant with law and reason, since no one operates, regarding evil as evil.

But against this: the act of the will terminated at the foundation of privation, which, according to the adversaries, formally constitutes moral malice, does not terminate at it reduplicatively as the foundation is objectively evil; for just as no one, intending evil, operates under the notion of evil, so no one intends the foundation of malice, as it is the foundation of it; and yet the tendency of the will toward the foundation, takes from it its being the foundation of formal malice, prior to the privation founded in it; therefore, by parity of reason, although it does not terminate at the object reduplicatively as evil objectively, or as dissonant with law and reason, it will nevertheless have from it its being morally evil by formal malice, prior to the privation, which follows upon the aforesaid tendency; because indeed, although the will does not directly and formally attain the dissonance or objective malice which is found in the object, it is nevertheless considered to attain and will it indirectly and interpretatively, by that very fact that it attains and wills its cause and foundation, from which it is inseparable.

This is confirmed: the tendency of a vicious habit toward an object dissonant with law is morally evil, and yet it does not terminate at the object reduplicatively as evil, and disformed to the rules of morals; therefore likewise the tendency of a vicious and evil act toward an object dissonant with law and reason will be morally evil, even if it does not formally and directly attain the dissonance or objective malice, nor is moved by it, but by the notion of the useful and delightful good, which is found in the object disformed to the rules of morals.

From these things you will understand that the formal constitutive notion of the sin of commission does not arise from the positive and the privation, as some think, but consists adequately in the positive, namely in the aforesaid tendency of the human act toward the object as dissonant with law and reason, because that tendency, as antecedent by nature and reason to the privation, is dissonant and disformed to the rules of morals, as we have already shown.

§ II

The objections are resolved

The Adversaries first object several testimonies of the holy Fathers, by which they assert that sin is nothing other than the privation of good; for Augustine says, in the Enchiridion, chapter 11: "What else is that which is called evil, than the privation of good?" And chapter 24: "Sin (he says) is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good." Damascene, Book 2 of the Faith, chapter 4: "For evil is nothing other than the privation of good, no different, without doubt, than darkness is nothing other than the absence of light. For spiritual light is good, just as, on the contrary, darkness is evil." Basil, homily 9, and Fulgentius, On faith to Peter, chapter 21, have similar things.

I respond that the holy Fathers, in those places, either speak of evil simply and absolutely, which consists in pure privation. Or, if they speak of moral evil, such as sin is, this can be explained either of habitual sin, which consists only in the privation of sanctifying grace, as we showed in the preceding chapter; or of actual sin, which is a privation, not formally and in itself, but causally and consecutively, because upon the positive tendency of an act toward an object dissonant with law and reason, there follows a privation of due rectitude; and if the sin is mortal, a privation of grace.

They object, second, that the holy Fathers assert that sin is nothing: thus Ambrose, calling sin nothing rebellious and armed against God. And Augustine, tract 2 on John, where, explaining those words, "And without him was made nothing," adds: "Sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin." Wherefore the same holy Doctor, and other holy Fathers, in order to extricate themselves from that grave difficulty, how God, since He is the universal cause of all things, is not the author and cause of sin, respond in no other way than by saying that sin is nothing, and consequently is not caused by God, although He is the universal cause of the whole of being. Whence, Book 2 On free will, chapter 20, he thus says: "That motion, therefore, of aversion, which we confess to be sin, since it is a defective motion, but every defect is from nothing: see that it pertains to nothing, and (as the Louvain edition, and other more correct ones, have it) not to pertain to God, that you may not doubt."

I respond, first, that when Augustine, and other holy Fathers, say that sin is nothing, they only mean that it is not something substantial, or some subsisting nature; because they argue against the Manicheans, asserting that there are certain evil natures, by no means made by the good God. This is plainly gathered from Augustine himself, On nature and grace, chapter 64, where, to Pelagius alleging that John, Bishop of

Constantinople, says sin is not a substance, but a malignant act, he responds: "Who denies this?" From which it is clear that Chrysostom and Augustine only deny that the sin of commission is a substance, or something substantial, but do not deny, rather they assert, that it is a positive act. The same is established from the book On the perfection of justice, argument 4, where, to Caelestius asking what sin is, an act or a thing, he thus says: "We respond that sin indeed is said to be, and is, an act, not a thing." Where, while he opposes "thing" to "act," by "thing" he understands a subsisting nature, and consequently only means that sin is not some subsisting nature, as the Manicheans wished, but not that it is pure nothing, and consists in mere privation. This is clear from the example of limping, which he adduces there, adding: "Just as limping is an act, not a thing"; for it is established that limping is equally something positive, as is straight walking, although it connotes a privation of rectitude in the gait: therefore, according to Augustine, sin consists in something positive, as connoting the privation of the rectitude of reason, or of conformity with the law. Whence, Book 22 against Faustus, chapter 27, he defines sin through contrariety to the law, saying it to be a deed, or word, or desire against the law: but contrariety comes about through something positive, not through mere privation, which is opposed only privatively and not contrarily to the form which it expels from the subject.

I respond, second, that sin is called "nothing" by Augustine and other holy Fathers, because it is nothing for terminating right moral election; for as to this, that positive thing in which we placed the essence of the sin of commission, is nothing, because it cannot terminate right moral election. And this was sufficient for the Fathers' intent, namely to explain how that does not terminate God's causality. For what cannot terminate right moral election, cannot terminate God's causality. It can also be said that sin is called nothing by the holy Fathers, and sinners are said to be reduced to nothingness when they sin, because through mortal sin grace is expelled, which is, as it were, the substantial being of the supernatural order, since in such order it holds the place of substance, and is related as substance is in the natural order: in which sense the Prophet said: "Behold, I am reduced to nothing, and I knew not," and the Apostle: "If I have not charity, I am nothing."

The Adversaries object, third, several testimonies of St. Thomas, by which he everywhere teaches that evil consists in the lack, privation, or absence of good. But these must be understood and explained, just as the testimonies of the holy Fathers adduced above, namely either of evil simply, or of sin as it is in this genus of evil; or of the lack and privation causally and fundamentally, for moral evil consists in a positive form, which is the foundation and cause of the privation. But when he says here, q. 85, art. 4, that the

ordination of an act is a certain good, and adds: "And the privation of this is essentially sin itself," he does not speak of the sin of commission, of which alone we treat in the present, but of omission, which essentially consists in the lack, or privation, of the due and ordered act, as the Salmanticenses rightly observed, and as is established from the antecedent words, which run thus: "There is also a certain good, which is the ordered act itself, which also has its own mode, species, and order; and the privation of this (namely of the act) is essentially sin itself." Likewise, when he asserts above, q. 18, art. 1, that an act is evil, insofar as it lacks something of the fullness of being. And when here, q. 71, art. 6, he says that a human act has this, that it is evil, from the fact that it lacks due commensuration. It must be said that he does not speak in a formal sense, but only in an illative sense, so that he means it to be infallibly verified that an act is evil, if it has a lack of something due, or of due commensuration; which is most true, even if that lack is not the formal constitutive reason of sin. Finally, when the same holy Doctor, II-II, q. 118, art. 5, and q. 162, art. 6, and III, q. 86, art. 4, ad 1, teaches that aversion, or privation, and corruption of good, hold formally in sin, but conversion to a changeable good, materially, he does not mean that privation is the primary and constitutive reason of sin, but that it is the ultimate and completive reason, which accordingly, as it were, formalizes the conversion, and the other reasons found in it, on account of which it can be called formal. Just as in this part, above, q. 18, art. 6, he calls the species of goodness or malice which an act has from its object, which is essential to it, material, but that which it has from the end of the operator, which is absolutely accidental, he says is formal. And q. 13, art. 3, he says that if someone should exercise an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially of fortitude, formally of charity; and yet in that act the specific and essential goodness is the goodness of fortitude, but the goodness of charity is absolutely accidental. Why, then, likewise, although only the positive malice, which is found in the sin of commission, is essential and constitutive of sin, but the privative is altogether outside the essence, could this not be called formal with respect to that?

You will object, fourth: sin is contained under the notion of evil simply, whence it is called by the holy Fathers the highest and greatest of all evils: but evil simply is privation and non-being, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 48, art. 1. Therefore sin is not something positive, but a mere privation of goodness and rectitude.

I respond that in sin two things are found, namely the formal reason by which it is constituted, and the privation of rectitude, which is related as, so to speak, a property consequent upon it: by reason of the first it is not contained under the notion of evil simply and absolutely, but only under the notion of evil respectively and in a qualified sense; for it is not evil simply, but is evil to this nature, namely the rational, to which it is

discordant; just as heat is not absolutely evil in itself, but only with respect to water, which it deprives of natural coldness: by reason of the second, however, it is contained under evil simply and absolutely: because privation, since it is non-being, or lack of being, can imply and involve no notion of good.

You will say: that which is so evil and discordant to man, that it is fitting and good to no other, is evil in every way, and consequently is evil simply: but sin, in the nature of sin, is evil to rational nature, and is fitting and good to no other nature: therefore, in the nature of sin, it is evil simply.

I respond, first, by denying the Major, for sorrow and speculative error are so discordant to man, that they befit no other nature; for they do not befit God, to whom they are altogether repugnant, nor irrational nature, to which they bear no relation; because, nevertheless, they enjoy, in themselves, transcendental goodness, that is, because nothing is lacking to them of what is required for their integrity, they are not evil simply. Thus in the present case, although sin, in the nature of sin, is fitting and good to no other nature, because, nevertheless, in itself it is integral, it is not evil simply, or absolutely, but only respectively to rational nature.

Second, it can be said that, in order for sin, in the nature of sin, to be evil simply, it would have to be so discordant to man, that it would neither explicate nor implicate a fittingness to another nature, nor to man himself, under some consideration: but sin, although under the explicit notion of deformity, it means no fittingness, nevertheless under the implicit notion of entity and actuality, under which it is caused by God, is fitting to rational nature, not indeed with a moral fittingness, but a physical, or metaphysical one, insofar as it is its ultimate actuality, not explicating under that concept the notion of disorder or deformity, and therefore it is not evil simply, but evil respectively.

You will object, fifth: if the sin of commission consists in something positive, it will be caused by God, since no real and positive being can escape divine causality: but this conflicts with divine sanctity: therefore, etc.

I respond, first, that this argument must be resolved by the Adversaries themselves, for the foundation of the privation of rectitude, reduplicatively as such, is something positive: therefore if it is necessary that God cause everything positive found in the sin of commission, it will be necessary that He cause the foundation of the privation of rectitude, reduplicatively as such, and consequently the privation of rectitude itself; since that cannot per se, first, and directly, be caused, but per accidens, and secondarily results upon the positing of the foundation. The consequence is manifest; the Antecedent is

shown thus. The foundation of privation does not consist in mere negation, because privation cannot be founded upon mere negation; nor in another privation, otherwise another privation of that privation would have to be assigned as a foundation, and thus there would be given a process to infinity: therefore the foundation of the privation of rectitude, reduplicatively as such, is something positive.

I respond, second, by distinguishing the Major: sin will be caused by God, under the aspect of positive entity, I concede. Under the aspect of deformity, I deny. This, however, does not conflict with divine sanctity, because from this it does not follow that God is the cause of sin, as sin, but only insofar as it is a being and an act. Whence St. Thomas here, q. 79, art. 2, thus says: "Sin names a being and an action, with a certain defect: but that defect is from a created cause, namely free will, insofar as it fails from the order of the first agent, namely God. Whence this defect is not reduced into God as into a cause, but into free will; just as the defect of limping is reduced into the curved shin as into a cause, but not, however, into the motive power, from which nevertheless is caused whatever motion there is in limping; and according to this, God is the cause of the act of sin, but is not, however, the cause of sin, because He is not the cause of this, that the act be with a defect."

You will say: divine causality, as being terminated at being, not by our consideration, but as it is on the part of the thing, cannot be terminated at one formality, and prescind from others identified with it: but positive deformity is really, indeed also transcendentally, identified with the entity: therefore divine causality, terminated at entity, cannot prescind from positive deformity.

This is confirmed: the human intellect is much more capable of prescission than divine causality: but the human intellect cannot, through intellection, prescind the entity of sin from its deformity, since it is intimately and transcendentally imbued in it: therefore a fortiori divine causality cannot furnish this.

To the instance I respond that the Major is true, when the formality identified with the entity, is contained under the object of divine causality and efficiency, but it is otherwise when it is not contained under that: but the deformity of sin is not contained within the object of God's causality, as its entity is; because the adequate object of divine omnipotence is only that which is reducible into God as into an ultimate end; but the deformity of sin, since it turns away from God as ultimate end, is not referable into Him as ultimate end; and consequently God can, by His causality, attain the entity of sin, prescinding from its deformity, although this latter is really, indeed also transcendentally, identified with the entity. Just as the soul, by moving and applying the

curved shin toward walking, thus causes that motion, insofar as it is physical and vital, in such a way, however, that it does not effect it, insofar as it is oblique and defective; because indeed that obliquity, although identified with vitality, or at least intimately and inseparably connected with it, is not contained within the adequate object of the motive power of that place, but is reduced into the curved and deficient shin. Which example St. Thomas uses in the place related above.

From this the response to the confirmation is clear: for our intellect, conceiving entity, cannot prescind from deformity for this reason, because not only entity, but also deformity, are contained under the object of our intellect. Just as also, for the same reason, God's intellect cannot understand entity, and prescind from deformity, but God's will can indeed love entity, without loving the deformity including entity, because, in order to the intellect, it is contained within the sphere of divine intelligibility, but it is not contained within the sphere of God's lovability. Why, then, could not divine omnipotence likewise, by its concurrence and causality, attain the entity of sin, without attaining its deformity, since likewise entity is contained within the sphere of divine causality, but not deformity. But of this more at length in the Treatise on the will of God, chapter 4, § 5, explaining the concord of God's sanctity with the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination as regards the material of sin.

Chapter IX

On the sin of omission.

Having explained the sin of commission and the formal reason by which it is constituted, it follows that we should treat of the sin of omission, and briefly resolve and explain here some difficulties that occur concerning it and are wont to be debated among theologians.

§ I

A culpable omission cannot exist without a preceding or accompanying act, which is the cause or occasion of omitting

Thus St. Thomas seems to teach here, q. 71, art. 5, where he says as follows: "In the sin of omission, if we consider what per se pertains to the nature of sin, thus sometimes there is an omission without any act, either exterior or interior. But if in the sin of omission the causes or occasions of omitting are also understood, then there is not an omission without some act." By these words he clearly teaches that although culpable omission, according to its own and essential nature, does not require an act — because it essentially consists in the lack of the act commanded, or in the privation of it — nevertheless, as considered in the individual, and as it is exercised here and now, it requires an act which is the cause or occasion of it. Hence, when he concludes that article with these words: "It can more truly be said that some sin" (namely, of omission) "can be without any act," he only excludes the act which belongs to its essence, or which is directly and per se terminated to it, but not the act which is the cause or occasion of omitting; otherwise he would openly contradict himself and write and teach contrary things in the same article.

Nor is it valid to say that St. Thomas is there speaking of what regularly and ordinarily happens, but not of what can be done absolutely. For there he impugns the opinion of some who denied that an act by way of cause is always required for the sin of omission; but they could not deny that, regularly and by the ordinary law, such an act is required, since this would conflict with evident experience — but only that it is not required by extraordinary law, and in some metaphysically possible case. Therefore St. Thomas is speaking not only of moral necessity, but also of physical or metaphysical necessity. Hence above, q. 6, art. 3, ad 3, he says thus: "In the way that an act of cognition is required for the voluntary, so also is an act of the will; but for a voluntary and culpable omission, an act of the intellect is necessary, not only by moral necessity, but also by physical or metaphysical necessity, since it is repugnant that something be voluntary without cognition, as is clear from the definition of the voluntary. Therefore also an act of the will [is required]."

Nor are there lacking efficacious arguments by which the truth of our assertion can be favored, but the chief and fundamental one is taken from the notion of the voluntary, which is necessarily required for a culpable omission. Hence I argue thus: In order that some omission be culpable and sinful, it must be voluntary not only in first act, but also in second act. But, apart from any act of the will preceding or accompanying it, it cannot be voluntary in second act, but only in potency and first act, since the voluntary in second act denotes an act, as is clear from the terms, and requires some causality and

actual influence of the will. Therefore an omission, apart from any act of the will preceding or accompanying it, cannot be culpable and sinful.

Nor is the common response of the adversaries valid, who say that for some omission to be culpable, it suffices that it be voluntary in second act morally and interpretatively — that is, according to the estimation and interpretation of a prudent man — for which no positive influence of the will is required, but it suffices that a man be able, and be obliged, to do something, and not do it. This response is not valid, I say, first because since sin is essentially voluntary, in the same way that something has the nature of guilt, it must have the nature of the voluntary; but the culpable omission we are treating of has the nature of sin not merely according to the estimation or interpretation of a prudent man, but truly and in reality, independently of this or that person's estimation, and contains a true and real malice, although a privative one, by which it is constituted in the nature of sin; therefore in reality, and independently of men's estimation and interpretation, and consequently physically and really, and not only morally and interpretatively, it must be voluntary. Second, that from which an omission is denominated voluntary in second act must be something on the part of the thing itself in the one omitting; but interpretative volition is nothing on the part of the thing in the one omitting, but exists only in the intellect of the one interpreting; therefore culpable omission cannot from that be denominated voluntary in second act, but only from a physical and real act of the will preceding or accompanying it.

You will say that an omission is not denominated voluntary from the formal interpretation itself which exists in another's intellect, but from the foundation for so interpreting, which exists in the will, whenever there is added to it the power and the duty of acting, together with the negation of the operation.

But against this: of these three things that are mentioned — namely power, duty, and lack of operation — the third, since it is the omission itself, cannot have the nature of the foundation from which it would be denominated voluntary, as is manifest of itself; the other two alone do not suffice for the nature of a proximate foundation, because a foundation must be such that it is not separated from the omission, but infallibly entails it. But power and duty are separated from it, and are found both in the one who omits and in the one who does not omit. Therefore, besides those three, there must be given an act which is the cause of omitting, for this — that the omission be denominated voluntary in second act and consequently culpable.

A second reason, akin to the preceding, can be proposed thus: There cannot be sin without the exercise of liberty. But liberty cannot exercise an act through pure omission.

Therefore pure omission, apart from any act of the will preceding or accompanying it, cannot be sin. The major is established; the minor is shown thus. The exercise of the will, as free, must be vital. But pure negation cannot be vital. Therefore liberty cannot be exercised through pure negation or omission of an act. The minor seems certain, for to live in second act is to move oneself from within; but the will does not move itself through the negation of action and motion; therefore the negation of action is not life, but the negation of life. The major is persuaded first thus: the will, as free, is a vital power; therefore its exercise, as free, is an exercise of life, and consequently vital. Second, the will lacking every act is as it were dead, or at least sleeping; therefore pure negation of an act cannot be vital. Third, liberty in second act is a mode of actual life, or a species of it; therefore every exercise of liberty in second act must be vital, for there cannot be a species without a genus, nor a mode without the substance of the thing of which it is a mode. Finally, there is not a twofold life in second act, one consisting in the negation of motion, another in motion; therefore neither is there a twofold liberty in second act, one consisting in second act, another consisting in the negation or omission of it.

The adversaries respond to this argument in the same way as to the preceding, namely that the will actually sinning with the sin of omission does not live in second act physically and formally, but indeed morally and equivalently, because the pure omission of an act, as regards what pertains to sinning, is equivalent to a physical act, supposing that a man can, is obliged, and does not act. But, besides the fact that this is difficult to understand — how the will actually sinning with the sin of omission is physically dead or sleeping, and yet is living morally, formally, and physically equivalently — this solution remains refuted from what has been said against the response to the preceding argument; for since every voluntary act is free, if it is not sufficient for some omission to be culpable that it be voluntary morally and interpretatively, it will also not be sufficient that it be free morally and interpretatively, or equivalently.

You will object first: For some omission to be voluntary, and consequently culpable and sinful, it suffices that someone be able, be obliged, and not act, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 6, art. 3; hence it is said in James 4: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Therefore an omission, apart from any act preceding or accompanying it, can be voluntary and culpable. Wherefore the same holy Doctor here, q. 71, art. 3, ad 2, says that something is called voluntary, not only because an act of the will falls upon it, but because it is in our power that it be done or not be done.

I respond that when St. Thomas, and other theologians with him, teach that for an omission to be voluntary it suffices that a man be able, be obliged, and not act, the phrase "not act" is not taken purely negatively, and as importing every suspension and

negation of act, but privatively and morally, according as such a negation is caused by the will; wherefore, since the will cannot cause it unless it has some act preceding or accompanying it, by the phrase "not act" the act of the will is not excluded, but is understood — an act of the will accompanying or preceding the omission. Hence when it is said in James 4, "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin," the phrase "doeth it not" must be understood of a voluntary and free negation in second act, for which the exercise of liberty is required, as we showed above. Similarly, when St. Thomas says that something is called voluntary because it is in our power that it be done or not be done, either he is speaking only of the voluntary in first act, or he intends that something can be called voluntary in second act without a direct act immediately terminated to it — in which way we do not deny that an omission can be voluntary and culpable, as is clear in one who wills study, play, or hunting, at the very time when he is bound to be present at the sacrifice of the Mass.

You will object second: If God, at the instant of the obligation of some affirmative precept — for example, of the love of God — should deny to the will His concurrence to every positive act incompatible with the fulfillment of this precept, in such a case the will could not love God, and consequently could sin with the sin of omission; and yet then it would elicit no act incompatible with the fulfillment of such a precept, since it is repugnant that the will operate without the concurrence of God. Therefore, metaphysically speaking, and of absolute power, it is not repugnant that a culpable omission be given without any physical act preceding or accompanying it.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence; for although in that case the will could not love God, it could not, however, sin with the sin of omission, because since the exercise of liberty must begin from a positive act, and in the case posited no positive act would exist in the will, the negation of love would not be free and voluntary in second act, but only in first act, and consequently would not be moral and imputable to guilt, but purely natural and physical.

§ II

Other difficulties concerning the sin of omission are briefly resolved

You will ask first, whether every work of itself incompatible with the observance of an affirmative precept is vitiated by the malice of omission?

I respond: if such an act influences the omission by way of cause or occasion, it is vitiated by it and is a sin; but not so if it in no way influences it, but is related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly.

Both parts are manifest, for an act which is terminated to something that influences the omission by way of cause or occasion consequently is terminated and has influence in the omission itself; therefore it is vitiated by it. On the other hand, an act which is related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly is in no way terminated to it, nor influences it, and consequently cannot be vitiated by it. Both can be explained by this example: if someone, out of desire and eagerness for study, omits Mass, that study is bad, because although good in itself, it is the reason and cause of willing something evil, namely the omission of Mass. But if, after a man has decided not to be present at the sacred rite on account of laziness, or the labor of a journey, or a similar cause, and at the time when the precept of hearing Mass urges he devotes himself to study, that study is not vitiated by the omission of Mass, because it in no way influences it, but is related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly. Whence this general rule can be established, for discerning when an act joined with an omission is the cause or occasion of it, and when it is related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly. If works incompatible with the observance of the precept presuppose in the will a firm and efficacious decree or purpose of not observing the precept, then they are related to its omission merely accidentally and concomitantly, because since they presuppose a sufficient cause of the omission, namely the aforesaid purpose of the will, they do not in fact influence it. But if they do not presuppose such a purpose, they influence the omission, as causes or occasions of it.

Note, however, that in order for those works not to be considered as influencing the omission, it is required that there be no hope of changing the purpose, but that it be morally destined to persevere; for if there is hope of revoking the purpose, and it is likely that it will be changed, works incompatible with the fulfillment of the precept are considered to influence its omission. From this you will understand that one who, near the twelfth hour, in which the precept of hearing Mass was pressing, gave himself to sleep, after a firm purpose of omitting, does not sin by giving himself to sleep, because in so short a time there is no hope of changing the purpose. On the contrary, a cleric sailing, who, after a firm purpose of not reciting the canonical hours during the whole voyage, throws his breviary into the sea, sins mortally by throwing it, because in so long a period of time as the voyage must last, he could retract the purpose, and it is likely that he would change it; by throwing away the breviary he is made unable to fulfill the precept even if he should change his purpose, and consequently such a throwing-away is the cause of the omission.

You will ask second, whether an act which is the cause of an omission has a twofold malice of diverse species — one from the omission which it causes, and another opposed to that virtue from which it would proceed if it did not cause the evil omission: for

example, whether study causing the omission of Mass is not only against religion, by which the hearing of Mass is commanded, but also against the virtue of studiousness, which ought to regulate and moderate the disordered love of studying?

I respond that it has only one species of moral malice, taken from the omission which it causes. For he who omits Mass on account of study does not sin any more than he would sin if, remaining idle without such an act, he omitted it, as seems evident of itself. But if he omitted Mass without such an act, through mere idleness, he would commit a single sin, namely against the virtue of religion; therefore he too who omits Mass on account of study sins only against the virtue of religion, not against the virtue of studiousness.

You will say: One who omits Mass on account of study does this from an excessive affection for studying; but it pertains to the virtue of studiousness to correct and moderate excess in the affection for studying; therefore he who omits Mass on account of study acts against the virtue of studiousness and not only against the virtue of religion.

I respond that excess in the affection for studying is twofold: one is within its own proper matter, namely when someone studies forbidden or vain things, or things which surpass his own capacity; the other is not within its own proper matter, but is transferred to another matter, as when someone studies, and by studying is impeded from observing the precept pertaining to the matter of another virtue. The first constitutes the vice of curiosity, and is corrected by the virtue of studiousness; the second, however, ought to be corrected not by studiousness, but by that virtue whose precept is impeded through study, and of this condition is the excess of the affection for studying which impedes the hearing of Mass when the precept is pressing — wherefore it is corrected not by studiousness, but by religion.

You will ask third, whether a culpable omission occurring in sleep or drunkenness is formally in itself a sin, or only the effect of a sin?

I respond that it is truly in itself a sin. The reason is that for something to be truly and be called a sin, and not only the effect of a sin, it suffices that it be voluntary indirectly and in its cause. But the omission of Mass occurring in sleep is voluntary indirectly and in its cause, since we suppose that the one omitting, when he gave himself to sleep, foresaw it; therefore it is in itself formally a sin. The minor is established; the major is declared and persuaded by a threefold example. For first, nocturnal pollution occurring in sleep, although it is not in itself formally free and voluntary, is nevertheless, because it is free and voluntary in its cause — say, in an obscene thought, or in an immodest act, or some similar act — a sin, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p., q. 80, art. 7. Likewise if someone voluntarily makes himself drunk, or commits himself to sleep, foreseeing that in

drunkenness or in sleep he will kill a servant, he sins not only when he gives the cause, but also when he actually kills, although then he has no formal liberty; because such a killing is free and voluntary in its cause. Whence if he then kills a cleric, he remains excommunicated, as Sylvester, Paludanus, and others teach. Finally, when someone sins from vincible ignorance, the act of sinning is voluntary only indirectly and in its cause, namely ignorance; therefore for sin it suffices to be indirectly voluntary and in its cause.

This is confirmed: no more of the voluntary is required for sinning than for meriting or validly receiving some Sacrament; but for meriting or validly receiving some Sacrament, it suffices to be indirectly voluntary and in its cause; therefore also for sinning. The major seems certain; the minor is also established by the example of him who, on the vigil, having the purpose of martyrdom or baptism, either would be baptized in his sleep during the night, or would be killed for Christ; for he would truly obtain both the grace of baptism and the crown of martyrdom in this happy sleep, as theologians commonly teach. Why, then, similarly, could an omission occurring in sleep or drunkenness not be formally evil and sinful in itself, by reason of the voluntary act which preceded it, in which it was indirectly and as it were in its cause willed? For in order that such an act actually influence the omission occurring in sleep, it suffices that it exist morally at the time when the omission occurs; but he who has not retracted it is considered to exist morally at the time when the omission occurs; therefore it truly influences it morally, and confers on it liberty and morality sufficient for it to be truly and formally evil and sinful in itself, although it occurs in sleep or drunkenness.

You will say that from this reasoning and doctrine it follows that a drunk or sleeping priest could confect the Sacrament of the Eucharist, if before the sleep or drunkenness he had the intention of consecrating and of doing what the Church does, because similarly such a consecration would be free and voluntary indirectly and in its cause. But I deny the consequence, both because, although Christ could have elevated the voluntary pronunciation of the words, voluntary only in its cause, to the dignity of a sacrament, He nevertheless did not wish this, out of the reverence due to the sacraments; and also because it is required that the sacraments be confected by the minister with moral certainty regarding the due matter; but in sleep or drunkenness such certainty cannot exist, for although before sleep he might have set aside bread and wine for confecting the Eucharist, afterward, existing in sleep, he could apply other matter, and pronounce the words over it. I add that words uttered in sleep or drunkenness are not formally words, for lack of actual signification, but only materially so, just as words uttered by a magpie or a parrot, and consequently are not fit, nor sufficient, for confecting the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

You will ask fourth, whether sins of commission and omission, proceeding from the same motive, are of the same species?

I respond that although they, considered in physical being, are distinguished in species, and more than in species (for they are related in this genus as affirmation and negation, and as being and non-being, between which there is no conversion), nevertheless, considered in moral being, they are of the same species. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 72, art. 6, where he says: "If we speak of the species of the sin of commission and omission formally, thus they do not differ in species, because they are ordered to the same end and proceed from the same motive: for the avaricious man, in order to accumulate money, both robs and does not give what he owes, and similarly the glutton, to satisfy his gluttony, both eats excessively and omits the fasts that are due." By these words he insinuates this fundamental reason for our resolution: human acts and sins have their species from the end; therefore, if omission and commission are ordered to the same thing, and proceed from the same motive, they will be of the same species in moral being. Now since there is a twofold end of human actions, one which is called the end of the work, which is intrinsic and essential to the human act; the other which is called the end of the agent, which is accidental and adventitious to such an act — when omission and commission are ordered to the same end of the work, they will be of the same essential species in moral being, and in the nature of sin, as happens when they pertain to the same vice; when, however, they are ordered to the same end of the agent, they will be of the same accidental species in moral being, and in the nature of sin, as is clear if someone orders the omission of hearing Mass, and the commission of theft, to adultery or homicide.

Chapter X

On mortal and venial sin.

Many and grave difficulties occur concerning mortal and venial sin, which we shall briefly dispatch and resolve here.

§ I

The principal distinctions between mortal and venial sin

I suppose first as certain, that venial sin is distinguished by its own nature from mortal, and not only on the part of the subject or the one sinning — for whom all sins would be mortal, if he were an infidel or reprobate, all venial, if he were a believer or predestined, as Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, and other heretics held. Nor is it distinguished only from the mercy of God, who is unwilling to punish certain sins with eternal death, although in themselves all sins are justly punishable in that way, as Gerson and Almain once taught.

It is proved first from Scripture: for Christ in Luke calls certain sins motes in the eye, others beams; but motes cannot in themselves blind the eye in which they are; therefore certain light sins exist, which not only do not actually extinguish grace, which is the light of the soul, but which cannot even extinguish it, and consequently, of themselves and from their intrinsic lightness, are venial. Likewise Paul, 1 Corinthians 3, compares certain sins which the just commit — while nevertheless retaining a living adherence to Christ as their foundation — to hay and stubble placed upon the foundation, as Cyprian explains in his letter to Antonianus, Ambrose in Sermon 2 on Psalm 138, and Augustine, Book 21 of the City of God, chapter 26. But hay and stubble cannot of themselves destroy the foundation; therefore neither can those sins, of themselves and from their own nature, destroy the grace and charity by which we are united to Christ as foundation.

It is proved second by a reason which St. Thomas insinuates here, q. 88, art. 1. Sin is a certain infirmity of the soul; hence, just as among bodily infirmities some are grave, which bring about death by removing the principle of life, while others are light, which do not constitute that danger, although they dispose to it; so also among sins, some are of themselves and from their own nature grave, which bring about the spiritual death of the soul, depriving it of grace and charity; others are light, which, although they dispose to such an effect, cannot of themselves produce it.

I add that Gerson's opinion seems to be reproved by Pius V and Gregory XIII, who condemned this proposition of Michael Baius: "No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment." Whence after this censure such an opinion must be judged at least rash.

You will say: An infinite offense merits of itself and intrinsically eternal punishment, and according to infinite duration; but venial sin, since it is an offense against God, who is infinite, is an infinite offense; therefore of itself and intrinsically it merits eternal punishment, and consequently it does not have from its own intrinsic lightness that it be venial, but only from the divine law and mercy, which, in punishing it, does not impute

to it the deserved punishment. Whence Augustine in various places asserts that no one would be saved, if he were judged by God without mercy.

I respond, granting the major, denying the minor: for although venial sin is an offense against the infinite God, it is nevertheless not an infinite offense, as mortal sin is; because it does not offend Him simply, by removing from Him the character of ultimate end according to affection, as mortal guilt does, but only in a qualified way, by turning man away from Him insofar as he loves some created object outside the order to the ultimate end, as will be further declared below.

As for Augustine, it must be said that he only means that no one will actually attain eternal life without mercy, insofar as venial sins too must be forgiven for one to be saved and enter the kingdom of heaven, into which nothing unclean and defiled can enter. That he speaks in this sense is clear from Book 9 of the Confessions, the last chapter, where he asks readers to pray for his deceased mother, that (he says) she may obtain the mercy of God; but mortal sins are not forgiven to the dead, only venial ones; therefore their remission is a certain mercy, necessary for everyone in order to be received into eternal life.

I suppose second, that the distinction which is found by the nature of the thing between mortal and venial sin does not consist in this, that mortal is against a precept, venial against a counsel, as Scotus, Gabriel, and others teach. For just as a counsel obliges to no sin, so neither is acting against it any sin at all: whence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 7: "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." And shortly after: "If a virgin marry, she hath not sinned." The reason why a counsel obliges to no sin is that a man is not bound in his actions to follow what is more perfect.

You will say: to vow or purpose to act against counsels is a sin; therefore also to act against them. I respond that the reason a vow against counsels is a sin is that it is vain, since it lacks the due matter of a greater good, in which every vow, in order to oblige, must be founded. But the purpose of acting against counsels is by no means a sin; for if (as the Apostle witnesses) a virgin does not sin if she marries, a fortiori she will not sin when she conceives the purpose of marrying.

With these things premised, the principal distinctions between venial and mortal sin must be briefly declared here. The first and principal one is that mortal sin includes at least virtually a great contempt of God, consisting in this, that man prefers the love of a creature to the love of the Creator, and, for the sake of the love of the former, does not care to dissolve friendship and union with God as ultimate end. Venial sin, however, precisely because it does not dissolve friendship and union with God as ultimate end,

does not include this virtual contempt of God as ultimate end. From this distinction, which will be further declared below, arises another assigned by St. Thomas, q. 7 De Malo, art. 1, in these words: "If charity is excluded, it is a mortal sin; but if it is such a defect of rectitude as does not exclude charity, it will be a venial sin." For from this contempt mortal sin has that it excludes charity, but not venial, in which such contempt is not included. Hence is derived that denomination of mortal and venial in sin, for since charity, by which the soul is united to God, is as it were the form by which it lives a supernatural life, the sin which destroys it is rightly called mortal, as causing spiritual death in the soul; but that which leaves it in the subject is called venial, because it does not exclude the principle of pardon, but leaves in the subject something by which it can obtain it, namely charity.

From this follows a third distinction, situated in this, that mortal sin implies a defect of order to the ultimate end, or an aversion and disorder from the ultimate end; venial, however, has only a disorder concerning things that are for the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved. For since charity is what converts or orders man to the ultimate end, it follows that a sin which excludes charity turns him away from and disorders him from the ultimate end; but that which does not expel it does not cause such an aversion and disorder.

From this distinction another arises, namely that mortal induces an irreparable disorder, but not venial. For as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 88, art. 1, the ultimate end in moral matters is as the first principle in speculative matters; hence, just as error concerning first principles is incorrigible or irreparable, so a sin which induces aversion from the ultimate end cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but only by divine power; whereas that which does not imply disorder from the end, but only from the means, can be repaired by some intrinsic principle, namely by a right intention of the end, just as error concerning conclusions can be corrected from right cognition of the principle. From this arises a fifth distinction, consisting in the fact that mortal sin induces a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin merits only temporal punishment. For as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 87, art. 3, sin induces a debt of punishment from this, that it perverts the order of divine justice; whence that sin merits eternal punishment which implies a disorder that is, as far as it goes, irreparable, and consequently eternal; while that merits temporal punishment which denotes a disorder intrinsically reparable, and consequently of itself transitory and temporal.

The last distinction consists in this, that mortal sin is against the law, while venial sin is not properly against the law, but beside or outside the law. For as St. Thomas says here, q. 88, art. 1, ad 1: "He who sins venially does not do what the law forbids, nor does he

omit that to which the law obliges by precept, but he acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends." And q. 7 De Malo, art. 1, ad 1: "It is commonly said that venial sin is not against the law, but beside the law, because if in something it departs from the order of the law, it does not, however, corrupt it, because it does not corrupt love, which is the fullness of the law."

This is confirmed: there is a threefold kind of venial sin — one is venial by its genus, which always remains venial, and within its own proper matter never becomes mortal, such as an idle word; another is venial from imperfect deliberation, such as an obscene thought, or a movement of infidelity, a judgment forestalling [reason]; another finally is venial from lightness of matter, such as the theft of an apple. None of these venial sins is against the law: not the first, because an idle act is of itself indifferent, and lacks only order to a good end; nor the second or third, because since law is imposed on free agents, it is violated only by those who act freely and deliberately, and since it intends the common good, it is not violated simply by those acts which, on account of the smallness of the matter, bring no notable harm.

From what has been said you will infer, first, that the malice of mortal sin and the malice of venial sin differ essentially and in species; for, as we showed above, the disorder and malice of mortal sin reaches all the way to the end and destroys it, while the disorder or malice of venial sin does not reach all the way to the end, but stops at the means themselves, which the sinner does not actually refer to the end, but only habitually, as we shall say below. But a disorder and malice reaching to the end essentially and specifically differs from that which stops at the means, and which does not reach to the end; therefore the malice of mortal sin essentially and specifically differs from the malice of venial sin.

You will say: those sins are of the same species whose objects do not differ in species; but the objects of mortal sin and of venial sin sometimes do not differ in species, as is clear in the object of theft, for a thing belonging to another is of the same species, whether in a small or in a large quantity; therefore mortal sin and venial sin are of the same species in the nature of sin.

I respond by distinguishing the major: those whose objects do not differ in species, formally and in the being of object, I concede the major; only materially and in the being of the thing, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the objects of mortal and venial sin sometimes do not differ in species, materially and in the being of a thing, I concede the minor; formally and in the being of object, I deny the minor; for under this aspect their difference is attended to according to the relation of disproportion to the

ultimate end, which is of diverse nature and species in an object mortally and venially sinful, since the former denotes a disproportion that is aversive and destructive of the end itself, but not the latter; which diverse disproportion constitutes objects formally diverse in the nature of objects, and imparts to the acts terminated to them an essential distinction in the nature of sin or moral evil.

You will infer, second, that venial sin does indeed dispose to mortal, yet can never be so aggravated as to pass over into mortal, nor can a single mortal sin be made from many venial ones. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 88, art. 3, 4, and 5. This corollary is clear as to each part. First, that venial sin disposes to mortal is manifest, because a man, by neglecting venial sins, gradually and imperceptibly becomes accustomed to contempt of and transgression of the law, so that he finally falls into greater sins, according to Proverbs: "He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little." Whence Chrysostom, Homily 87 on Matthew, teaches this remarkable paradox, namely that with greater solicitude one must in some way beware of venial sins than of mortal ones: "It sometimes seems to me," he says, "not so much that great sins are to be avoided with as much zeal as small and viler ones; for as to those, the very nature of sin makes us avert from them; but these, precisely because they are small, make us slothful, and while they are despised, the mind cannot rise up generously to expel them, whence quickly, through our negligence, great things come from small ones."

That venial sin can never be so increased and aggravated as to pass over into mortal is no less evident, for those things which are of an inferior order, however much they are increased within their own species, can never reach to those which are of a superior order; but the malice of venial sin is of an inferior order, and of a different species from mortal malice, since the latter is aversive from the ultimate end, and destructive of it, but not the former, as is clear from what was said above; therefore etc.

From this the third part of the corollary is proved: for venial sins, however much they may be multiplied, cannot turn one away from the ultimate end, nor induce a debt of eternal punishment; therefore they cannot make a single mortal sin by their aggregate, just as a line cannot arise from many points joined together.

You will say: many light thefts multiplied constitute finally a single mortal sin; therefore from many venial sins one mortal sin can be made.

I respond by denying the antecedent, for when someone commits many light thefts, from these joined and collected together one mortal sin does not result, but the last theft, by which one arrives at a great quantity of matter, is the mortal sin; because although the theft is of itself light in matter, yet from its connotation of the preceding thefts, with

which it is morally joined, the theft is rendered a theft of grave matter, and grave harm is inflicted on one's neighbor.

§ II

He who sins mortally constitutes the ultimate end in a creature, at least virtually or interpretatively

Thus theologians commonly teach against Adrian. The reason is that everyone who sins mortally, appreciatively loves a creature more than God, since he despises His will and precept for the sake of it, according to that of John 12: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God"; but the end is that which is most loved; therefore he who sins mortally constitutes the ultimate end in a creature.

This is confirmed from Augustine, Book 83 Questions, question 30, where he places the whole perversity of human life in this, that man enjoys things that are to be used, and uses things that are to be enjoyed. But according to the same holy Doctor, Book 10 of the City of God, chapter 10, and Book 1 of Christian Doctrine, chapters 4 and 5, to enjoy is nothing other than to adhere to something as ultimate end; therefore he who sins mortally, and loves some creature in a disordered manner and against God's precept, adheres to it as ultimate end. Whence in Ephesians 5 avarice is called the service of idols, because, as St. Thomas observes there, lecture 3: "Idolatry is when the honor owed to God alone is paid to a creature; but a twofold honor is owed to God, namely that we constitute our end in Him, and that we finally place our trust in Him; therefore he who places this in creatures is guilty of idolatry." This the avaricious man does, who places his end in a created thing, and also his whole trust.

You will say: if he who sins mortally constituted the ultimate end in a creature, a man could have several ultimate ends at once, since he can commit many sins, having diverse disparate objects; but this implies a contradiction, as was shown in the treatise on the ultimate end, chapter 1, § 3; therefore that also [is impossible].

To this objection, which Cajetan calls the argument of Novices, I respond by denying the consequence of the major, and to its proof I say, with Cajetan, above q. 1, art. 1, where he writes as follows: that the creature in which the mortal sinner constitutes his ultimate end is not that which is the object of the mortal sin (for this is only the proximate and intermediate end), but the sinner's own proper and private good, considered not precisely in itself, but as connoting the privation of grace and charity. Thus Cajetan, above q. 1, art. 1, where he writes these things: "The sinner does not constitute his ultimate end separately in gluttony nor in injustice under apparent good, a sign of which

is that neither suffices for him, but all the changeable goods to which the sinner turns are referred to one common end, which is simply his ultimate end, namely himself, since he seeks all things as conducing to his own proper good, so that these goods are not sought as ultimate ends simply, but as partial ultimate ends, namely as parts of his own good, which is simply his ultimate end and intent in every mortal sin." He drew this doctrine from St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 2, art. 1, where he also says: "The ultimate end in the love of changeable goods is man himself, on account of whom he seeks other things; and therefore if the root of sins is taken from the side of the sinner himself, it will be one; but if it is taken from the side of the things which the sinner seeks for his own sake, they will be many." Reason also supports this doctrine: that is the sinner's ultimate end, for the sake of which and under whose aspect he seeks all the particular goods which he pursues; but whatever the sinner seeks, he seeks for himself, and under the aspect of his own private good; therefore that is the sinner's ultimate end. The major is clear; the minor is proved [thus]. Since love is a certain inclination founded in some nature, and, so to speak, rooted in it, it always tends to the good conjoined and suitable to that nature itself; otherwise it would not correspond to its radical principle, nor would the principle and the term of that inclination have proportion between themselves. Hence since charity is rooted in sanctifying grace, which is a participation of the divine nature, and, so to speak, a certain deiform nature, it always inclines the just man to the good of God Himself, and subjects and subordinates all his acts to the divine good, wherefore the Apostle says that charity "seeketh not her own." On the contrary, self-love or disordered love of self, which is opposed to charity, since it flows from a corrupt and vitiated nature, and is rooted in it, always tends toward and inclines the sinner to his own proper and private good, according to that of the same Apostle: "All seek the things that are their own." Whence Aristotle, Ethics 9, chapter 8, calls the wicked or sinners "philautoi," or self-lovers. And Augustine, City of God 14, chapter 28, teaches that just as the love of God, even to the contempt of self, builds the city of Jerusalem, or of the just, so the love of self, even to the contempt of God, builds the city of Babylon, or of sin.

I said that the ultimate end of the mortal sinner is his own proper and private good, not precisely and as considered in itself, but as connoting the privation of grace; for the ultimate end of the mortal sinner is unreferable to God, and opposed to Him; but one's own proper good, considered in itself, does not import such an opposition and unreferability, but abstracts from relation or the exclusion of relation to the supernatural end; yet by connoting the privation of grace, which is present in anyone sinning mortally, it is rendered wholly unreferable to God, and opposed to Him. From this you will understand that not all acts of one existing in mortal sin are evil and sinful, nor does every sinner constitute his ultimate end in a creature; for although all such acts rest in

one's own good, and none passes over to the supernatural order, they nevertheless do not rest in such a good privatively, excluding grace and charity, by which one's own good could be referred to the supernatural good, and to God as ultimate end. Whence one existing in mortal sin can elicit certain honest and morally good acts, such as honoring one's parents, helping the needy, loving friends, etc., as we shall say in the treatise on grace.

§ III

What ultimate end does he actually intend who sins venially?

The reason for doubting is that he who sins venially cannot have God as the ultimate end of such an act, since venial sin is not ordainable to God as ultimate end; nor a creature either, otherwise he would not sin venially, but mortally, since it is mortal sin to constitute the ultimate end in a creature.

Some, in order to easily extricate themselves from this grave difficulty, say that the venial sinner has no ultimate end in particular, but only in common, namely the satiating good of appetite, or beatitude in common, to which all actions, whether good or evil, can actually be referred, according to that of Boethius, Book 2 of the Consolation, prose 2: "All the care of mortals, which the labor of many pursuits exercises, proceeds by a different path, but strives to arrive at one end, that of beatitude." Thus Fr. Contenson, vol. 3, p. 162. But this opinion is commonly rejected by our Thomists, on the ground that in every human operation man acts for the sake of some material ultimate end, or in particular — true or apparent — as we showed in the treatise on beatitude, chapter 1, § 2. But venial sin, when it is done with deliberation, is truly and properly a human act, as is established; therefore it has some ultimate end, not only formal and in common, namely the notion of good as such, but also material and in particular, or that notion of good as such, as determined and contracted to some particular good, true or apparent, and consequently either to God or to a creature.

Others think that the venial sinner has, as the negative ultimate end of his act, that creature which he inordinately loves, and which is the object of venial sin. Thus Suárez, Vásquez, and other Recent authors commonly. But this manner of speaking also displeases our Thomists, because the ultimate end is called negatively that which is not ordered to a further end, as those authors say; but that creature which the one sinning venially inordinately loves, and which is the object of venial sin, is often ordered to a further end, as is clear in one who steals a coin to give alms, or who tells a light lie to save the life of a neighbor; indeed, the one sinning venially always refers the object of the venial sin to his own proper and private good, since every inclination tends to the proper

and perfective good of that nature from which it flows, and in which it is rooted, or of that suppositum in which such a nature exists; therefore that creature which is the object of venial sin is not, nor can it be, the ultimate end, even negatively, of the venial sinner.

I say, therefore, that the just man sinning venially regards his own proper and private good as ultimate end, not simply and absolutely, but in a qualified sense and with an addition, namely precisely under the aspect of an actual end.

The first part is clear from what has been said above, for since acts which in a just man are not commanded by charity have no other principle in which they are actually rooted and founded than the agent's own nature, they cannot have any other end to which they are actually referred than the proper and perfective good of such a nature, or of the suppositum in which it exists; otherwise the inclination would not correspond to its radical principle, or the principle and term of the inclination would not have proportion between themselves, as we said in the preceding section.

The second part, namely that such a good is not the simply and absolutely ultimate end of the venial sinner, is established from this, that the simply and absolutely ultimate end excludes every relation, both habitual and actual, to a further end; but the proper and private good in a just man sinning venially is, through the habit of charity, habitually related to God; therefore it cannot be said to be his simply and absolutely ultimate end, but only with a diminishing addition, namely under the aspect of a precisely actual end, or by the exclusion only of an actual relation to God, not a habitual one, which is to be the ultimate end only in a qualified sense.

But you will ask what must be said of him who is in the state of mortal sin, and sins venially; for in him, through the habit of charity, his proper and private good is not habitually related to God; therefore it will have the nature of a simply ultimate end.

I respond that this one, even while he sins venially, does not have his private good as simply ultimate end, but only in a qualified sense, because, as we said in the preceding section, it is of the nature of the simply ultimate end that it not only prescind from order to a further end, but also that it positively exclude such a relation. But although he who is not in the state of grace tends, through mortal sin, to his private good, excluding its relation to God as ultimate end, nevertheless when he sins venially, he tends to his proper good, only prescinding from such a relation, not positively excluding it, as we declared there. Whence, although the mortal sinner constitutes in his proper and private good his simply ultimate end, he who sins only venially does not.

You will say: the venial sinner does not use that creature about which he sins, and which is the object of venial sin, because using creatures does not denote any disorder; therefore he enjoys it, since there is no middle between enjoyment and use, according to Augustine: "Everyone who loves something either loves it using it, or enjoying it"; but enjoyment is only with respect to the ultimate end, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 11, art. 3; therefore the venial sinner constitutes his ultimate end in that creature which he inordinately loves, and which is the object of venial sin.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, and to its proof I say that between enjoyment and good use there is something intermediate, namely evil and unlawful use, which is properly called abuse, in which venial sin consists, as St. Bonaventure teaches, In II Sent., dist. 42, art. 2, q. 1, in these words: "If you ask what venial sin is, whether it is use or enjoyment, it must be said that it is neither use nor enjoyment, but abuse. Whence when Augustine says, 'Everyone who loves something either loves it using it, or enjoying it,' he takes 'use' and 'enjoyment' broadly, use for every love that is referred, whether directly or indirectly, enjoyment for love that is not referred." This doctrine is taken from Augustine himself, Book on Christian Doctrine, chapter 4, where, besides enjoyment and lawful use, he posits unlawful use, which he also calls abuse.

§ IV

Mortal sin, in the nature of an offense, contains malice and gravity in moral being that is simply infinite

This assertion is proved by a threefold reason. The first and fundamental one is: the gravity of an offense increases according to the measure of the dignity of the person to whom it is offered; but the person offended by mortal sin, namely God, is of simply infinite dignity; therefore mortal sin, in the nature of an offense, is of simply infinite gravity. The minor and the consequence are clear; the major is taught everywhere by Aristotle and St. Thomas, and is proved by examples. For an injury inflicted on a plebeian is less than that which is inflicted on a soldier; that which is inflicted on a soldier is less than that inflicted on a knight; and this less than that by which a Prince is offended; because a Prince exceeds a knight, a knight a soldier, a soldier a plebeian, in dignity. Salvian insinuates this reason, Book 6 On Providence, chapter 7, in these words: "Always through the dignity of the one suffering the injury, the guilt of the one committing it increases, because it is necessary that the greater the person who suffers the affront, the greater the offense of him who commits it. And hence it is that we read in the Law that even those who seem to have done light things against the sacred command were nevertheless most severely punished, so that we might understand, namely, that nothing pertaining to God is to be called light; because even what seemed a small fault was making a great injury to the Divinity."

The common solution to this argument is that an offense does not increase arithmetically, that is, to equality, from the dignity of the person to whom it is offered, but only geometrically, that is, according to proportion. Whence from the fact that God, offended by mortal sin, is of simply infinite dignity, it does not follow that the sin, in the nature of an offense, is of simply infinite gravity, but only that it exceeds all offenses inflicted on creatures, and is of a superior order to them.

But against this: God, when offended, imparts to the offense committed against Himself a gravity of a superior order for this reason, that He Himself is of a superior order; but He is not only of a dignity of a superior order, but also of a dignity that is simply infinite; therefore He imparts to the offense committed against Himself a simply infinite gravity.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated: God, when offended, is no less of Himself capable of conferring simply infinite gravity than of conferring a superiority of order, on the offense inflicted upon Him; and moreover, on the part of the offense, there is no assignable reason why it should participate in the one and not the other; therefore the gravity of the offense inflicted on God is not only of a superior order to all offenses

inflicted on creatures, but is also simply infinite.

You will say: an infinite person is prevented from imparting infinite gravity to an offense, by the limitation of the sinner's endeavor; for just as an infinite object, if attained in a finite manner, does not confer on the one attaining it an infinite perfection — as is clear in the beatific vision and in the act of charity — so the divine majesty, although it is infinite, because it is nevertheless attained by the sinner through a limited and finite act, does not transfuse an infinite malice and gravity into the offense which he inflicts upon it.

But against this: although the limitation of the endeavor and mode of tending to the object prevents the act from deriving from the object or person to which it tends an infinite goodness or malice in physical being, as is clear in the examples adduced, it nevertheless does not prevent the act from receiving from them an infinite value or malice in moral being, as is clear in the meritorious and satisfactory acts of Christ: for although in the physical order, and in the genus of being, they were finite and limited, inasmuch as they proceeded from a soul and its powers, which were of finite and limited perfection in the physical order, nevertheless that physical limitation did not prevent them from drawing from the person of the Word a dignity and value that is morally infinite, as almost all theologians, except Scotus, teach in the treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore likewise the limitation of the endeavor and mode of the act's tending toward the offended person will not prevent the offensive act from drawing, from the offended person of infinite dignity, a gravity and malice infinite in the genus of moral being.

This is confirmed: the endeavor of the sinner, or the mode of tending toward God, suitable to the offensive act, is not only finite, but also of an inferior order to the offended person; but such inferiority of order does not prevent the offended person, because he is of a superior order, from imparting to the offense a gravity of a superior order; therefore neither will it be able to prevent an infinite person, because he is infinite, from communicating to it an infinite depravity.

The second reason is taken from St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, art. 5, in the body, where he has this: "It must be said that the reason why mortal sin binds one to eternal punishment can be taken from three things. First, from the part of Him against whom one sins, who is infinitely great, namely God; whence His offense too is worthy of an infinite punishment, because the more worthy He is against whom one sins, the more the sin is punished." And in his response to the second objection: "From this," he says, "that one sins against the infinite, an infinite punishment is owed to him; it cannot, however, be infinite in acerbity, because in a finite creature there cannot be infinite

intensity, but it is compensated by infinite duration." From this doctrine I draw this argument for our opinion: just as an efficient cause containing a physically infinite effect cannot but be physically infinite, so also a cause containing a morally infinite effect cannot but be infinite in the genus of moral being, otherwise the effect would exceed its principal cause in that genus in which it is a cause; but mortal sin, in the nature of an offense, efficiently and morally contains an infinite effect, since it merits an infinitely bitter punishment, as is clear from the words of St. Thomas already cited; therefore, insofar as it is an offense against God, it is morally infinite, or contains gravity and malice in moral being that is simply infinite.

This is confirmed: from this theologians gather, in the treatise on the Incarnation against Scotus, that the satisfaction of Christ contains a value simply infinite in moral being, because it enjoys a satisfactory power sufficient for guilts infinite in a categorematic sense; therefore the meritorious power of punishments infinite in a categorematic sense argues an infinity simply speaking in mortal sin, in the nature of an offense.

A third reason for our assertion is taken from the doctrine which theologians commonly hand down in the treatise on the Incarnation, treating of Christ's satisfaction; for there they teach that the value of satisfaction increases in proportion to the person satisfying, so that when this is of infinite dignity, it communicates to the satisfactory act a value simply infinite, from which they infer that Christ's satisfaction was of a value simply infinite; but similarly the gravity of an offense increases in proportion to the dignity of the offended person, as we showed by the first reason, and declared by various examples; therefore, from the infinitely worthy person, such as God offended by sin, it will receive a gravity simply infinite in moral being.

The adversaries respond by denying the parity; for this difference (they say) is found between satisfaction and offense, that the person satisfying is compared to the satisfaction not as object, but as subject, which induces the nature of a moral form, and consequently by itself dignifies it formally, and imparts a satisfactory value equal to itself, and consequently infinite if such a person is infinite; on the contrary, the offended person is compared to the injury inflicted on him, not as subject, but only as object; whence he does not take on the nature of a moral form with respect to it, nor by himself make the offense grave, and consequently it is not constituted infinitely grave from the infinite dignity of the offended person.

In this distinction lies the whole probability of the contrary opinion. But it rests on a false foundation, namely that the offended person is compared only by way of object to the injury inflicted upon him — which I show to be false in three ways. First, from the

common saying: "Honor is in the one honoring, but injury is in the offended person." Second, from the difference which is found between sin considered in the nature of malice, and considered in the nature of offense: for under the former consideration it is called and is the evil of the sinner; under the latter it is called an evil not of the sinner himself, but of the offended God; therefore in the nature of offense it regards God as moral subject. Third, from the common manner of speaking, for it is not the one offending, but the offended person, who is said to suffer the offense; but he who is said to suffer the offense is the subject of the offense; therefore the offended person is the moral subject of the offense. From this you will understand that just as the person of the Word, because it is the subject of the acts elicited by the humanity of Christ, is in the genus of morals a form dignifying such acts, and constituting them infinitely meritorious and satisfactory, so, because God is the moral subject of the offense committed in mortal sin, He has the nature of a moral form making such an offense grave, and consequently influencing it with a malice and gravity simply infinite in moral being.

Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, says that sin has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty. For he adds this diminutive particle in order to denote that sin is not infinite physically and in the genus of being, but only morally, or in the genus of moral being; and that even in this genus it is not infinite according to every aspect of morality that is found in it; for it does not have a simply infinite malice insofar as it is the evil of man, but only insofar as it is the evil of God, and insofar as it has the nature of an offense.

Nor likewise is it an obstacle if you say that from the solution and doctrine handed down it follows that not only mortal sin, but also venial, is in the nature of offense of simply infinite gravity, since the latter no less than the former regards God as moral subject, and consequently receives from Him as from a form gravity and infinity. It is answered that although venial sin, in the nature of offense, is subjected in God, it nevertheless does not receive from Him a simply infinite quality, because, since it is a light offense, it is incapable of receiving infinity: for a form united to an incapable subject does not confer on it the effect which of itself it could bestow; just as the subsistence of the Word united to an irrational nature would not sanctify it, nor constitute a person, because such a nature is not capable of those effects.

Finally, it is no objection if you object that from our opinion it follows that one sin, in the nature of offense, is not greater than another, which seems absurd and the error of the Stoics, impugned above, chapter 3. The consequence of the major seems manifest, for one infinite is not greater than another in the same genus in which it is infinite; therefore

if mortal sin, in the nature of offense, is simply infinite, one in this genus cannot be greater than another, but all will be equal in the nature of offense.

To this objection a twofold response can be given. First, by denying absolutely the consequence of the major, to whose proof it can be said that although the infinite by essence and in a genus of being demands that it cannot be exceeded by anything, an infinite of a determinate genus can nevertheless be materially exceeded by another: just as in the opinion of those who admit that there can be an infinite according to quantity or multitude, an infinite body would materially exceed an infinite surface, and an infinite surface an infinite line; and if an infinite multitude of men were given, it would be materially exceeded by the number of fingers or hairs. Whence, since moral sin, in the nature of offense, is infinite only in a determinate genus, namely in the genus of moral being, one sin, in the nature of offense, can be greater than another. St. Thomas seems to insinuate this solution and doctrine, 3 p., q. 10, art. 3, ad 3.

Second, it can be responded that just as in Christ's meritorious actions a twofold value is distinguished by theologians — one objective, drawn from the object and circumstances, and other headings, and this is unequal according to the inequality of objects and circumstances; the other personal, drawn from the divine person, infinitely dignifying and, so to speak, valorizing all of Christ's theandric actions, and reflecting back upon the person of the divine Word, and this was equal in all of Christ's satisfactory and meritorious actions, as theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation — so likewise in mortal sin a twofold gravity or malice of offense can be distinguished, one taken from the object, the intention, and other headings; the other taken from the infinite dignity of the person who is offended; and although this latter is equal in all mortal sins, inasmuch as it is drawn from the infinite person, infinitely making grave every mortal sin, the former is nevertheless unequal, according to the inequality of objects and circumstances. Whence our opinion is far distant from the error of the Stoics, since according to it, it is absolutely true that sins are unequal, because according to their specific essences they are unequal, even if in the nature of offense, following upon the nature of malice, they are equalized in personal gravity in the manner explained.

You will say: God is more offended by one sin than by another, for example by the sin of hatred, or blasphemy, than by the sin of theft, or lust; therefore He communicates to one a greater gravity than to the other, and consequently the gravity taken from the offended person is greater in one sin than in another.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: God is more offended by one sin than another — extensively, I concede the antecedent; intensively, I deny the antecedent and

the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said above, for all sins, as we said, are intensively equal in the malice drawn from the side of the infinite person who is offended, although from the side of the object and circumstances they are unequal.

From this is easily understood the reason why the infinite goodness of God, as an object of the act of charity which it terminates, does not confer infinite dignity, while yet the infinite majesty of God, when offended, gives infinite gravity to the offense simply speaking: because the infinite goodness of God is compared to the act of charity as object, whereas the offended person is compared to the injury as its moral subject; but in this a moral subject differs from an object, that the former communicates to the act the whole of what it can of itself, whereas the latter does not so influence it except through commensuration to the endeavor of the act, and to the influence of the operative principle.

§ V

Whether mortal sin, per se, and from its own intrinsic malice, induces a debt of eternal punishment?

I suppose first, that every sin per se condignly merits a punishment proportionate to it; for as St. Thomas discusses here, q. 87, art. 1: "Whoever sins, sets himself up against some prescribed order, under which he himself is contained; but it is just that whoever rises up against a prescribed order be brought down by the ruler of that order as much as he raised himself above such order, which is to suffer punishment." Now there is a threefold human order — natural, and divine [and human]. The first is transgressed by the creature by violating the human law, the second by violating the natural, the third by breaking the divine; whence sin incurs a threefold punishment, one appointed by human law, another by the natural law, which is the bite of conscience, the third by the divine.

I suppose second, as certain by faith, that mortal sin, not remitted in this life by baptism or penance, must, by divine law, be punished in the next life with eternal punishment. Scripture declares this in various places, especially Isaiah 66, where it is said of the damned: "Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched." And Apocalypse 14: "They shall be tormented with fire and brimstone for ever and ever." Of this thing the furnace of the Babylonian fire is a type, which rose forty-nine cubits above the furnace, but never reached the fiftieth, which was the year of Jubilee, so that by this it might be signified (as Fr. Louis of Granada rightly observed) that the burning of the fire of Tartarus would be perpetual, and that the damned would never obtain indulgence or forgiveness of sins. Whence Psalm 48 says of them: "They are laid in hell like sheep, death

shall feed on them." Weighing these words, Bernard, Sermon on the words of the Apostle, says: "How well it is said, like sheep, because, stripped of the fleece of worldly riches, hard-pressed and thrust down, they will be reckoned naked for eternal burnings. Death shall feed on them, because they shall always be dying to life, and always living to death. For death shall not root them out, taking away life entirely, but shall feed on them, preserving the root of life, so that they may again sprout, again and again, and forever be fed upon."

By this is excluded the error of Origen, who in Book 1 of the Periarchon, chapter 6, asserted that the punishments of the damned would not last forever, but would at length, by God's mercy, be brought to an end. This error (as St. Thomas says, Contra Gentiles, chapter 144) seems to have arisen from the opinion of certain philosophers, who said that all punishments were purgatorial, and thus would at some time be terminated. Indeed, Gregory the Great noted, Book 34 of the Morals, chapter 16, on the words of Job 41, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old," that this had been devised by the devil to draw sinners back from penance. For he says thus: "Leviathan will esteem the deep as growing old, because he so infatuates the hearts of the reprobate that he instills in them a suspicion about the coming judgment, as if it might come to an end. For he esteems the deep to be growing old, who thinks that the supernal severity will at some time be terminated in punishment."

With these things premised, the difficulty is whether mortal sin, of itself, and from its intrinsic malice, demands eternal punishment, or whether this only befits it accidentally, on account of a law made by God, by which He willed to punish it with eternal punishment. The reason for doubting is that punishment ought to be proportionate to guilt, but eternal punishment seems to have no proportion with mortal guilt, which is committed in a very brief time, and almost in a moment.

I say, nevertheless, that mortal sin, of itself, and from its own intrinsic malice, induces a debt of eternal punishment.

It is proved first from the foundations established in the preceding section: for a sin containing malice and gravity in moral being that is simply infinite, of itself and from its own intrinsic malice, merits an infinite punishment, since it must be proportioned to the guilt; but mortal sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, contains malice and gravity in moral being that is simply infinite, as was shown there; therefore, of itself and from its own intrinsic malice, it merits an infinite punishment, at least in duration, that is, eternal. St. Thomas insinuates this reason, In IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, art. 3, in these words: "Another reason can also be assigned why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal,

because one sins by it against God who is infinite; whence, since the punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because a creature is not capable of any infinite quality, it is required that it be at least infinite in duration."

It is proved second by another excellent argument of the same holy Doctor here, q. 87, art. 3: A sin denoting an irreparable disorder, per se and from its intrinsic malice, induces a debt of eternal punishment; but mortal sin denotes an irreparable disorder; therefore per se, and from its intrinsic malice, it induces a debt of eternal punishment. The major is clear, for sin induces a debt of punishment by reason of its disorder, as we declared in the first supposition; whence the debt of punishment must remain as long as the disorder of guilt remains, and consequently if this is irreparable and perpetual, that too will be eternal and interminable. The minor, in which the difficulty lies, can be persuaded thus: mortal sin turns man away from and disorders him from the ultimate end, as is clear from what was said in § 1. But disorder from the ultimate end, from its own proper nature, and on the part of the sinner, is irreparable, because the ultimate end in moral matters is as the first principle in speculative matters, but error concerning the first principle in speculative matters is irreparable; therefore mortal sin denotes or implies an irreparable disorder.

From this reason it follows that venial sin of itself induces a debt only of temporal punishment, because it does not denote an irreparable disorder, since such a disorder is not concerning the end, but only concerning the means, which can therefore be repaired by a right intention of the end, just as error concerning conclusions can be corrected by right cognition of the principle. Whence mortal sin is related as the death of the soul, destroying the first principle of spiritual life, which is grace, and union to God as ultimate end; but venial sin is as it were a disease and sickness of it, which does not destroy the principle of spiritual life, but only induces spiritual languor and debility. St. Thomas adduces other reasons, 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 144, which may be seen there.

To the reason for doubting it must be said that between guilt and punishment equality is not required in all respects, and especially as to duration; for in human judgments we see that for a very brief crime a perpetual deprivation of life, or perpetual exile, is often inflicted, but it suffices that there be proportion between the debt of punishment and the disorder of the guilt, so that if the latter is eternal and irreparable, the former too ought to be perpetual and interminable. I add that although the act of mortal sin is transitory, and sometimes momentary, nevertheless the will to sin is in some way eternal, inasmuch as he who sins, and who prefers, say, pleasure to God, is so disposed that if he were always to live, he would always wish to persevere in sin, and to enjoy such pleasure perpetually. Whence Gregory, Book 4, Dialogues, chapter 4: "The sinner would wish to

live without end, that he might without end be able to sin." And chapter 44: "It is just that he who sinned in his own eternity against God be punished in the eternity of God." Explaining these words, St. Thomas here, q. 87, art. 3, ad 1, adds: "Someone is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only by reason of the continuation of the act throughout the whole of his life's duration, but because, from this very fact that he constitutes his end in sin, he has the will to sin eternally."

§ VI

A venial sin in a damned person, if it was not remitted as to guilt in this life, will be accidentally punished in hell with eternal punishment; but not so if in this life it was forgiven as to guilt, but not as to punishment

The first part of this assertion is expressly taught by St. Thomas, q. 7 De Malo, art. 10, in the body, and q. 5, art. 2, ad 8, and is proved by the reason which he insinuates there: venial sins not remitted in this life are not remitted in hell as to guilt; therefore neither as to punishment. The consequence is clear, for since the debt of punishment is the effect of guilt, it persists as long as the guilt remains. The antecedent is proved, first because the remission of any sin does not occur without some application of the merits of Christ, which does not exist in hell, since there is no redemption there, as the Church says. Also, because to one existing at the term [of his state], no remission of sin occurs; but the damned are simply and totally at the term, since they have neither faith nor hope, in which they differ from souls existing in purgatory, which, since they have faith and hope, which are virtues of wayfarers, and are not remaining in the fatherland, are in a qualified sense wayfarers; whence, although venial sins are remitted to them, both as to guilt and as to punishment, they are not remitted to the damned; especially since the damned are obstinate in evil, and can have no displeasure at sin, which would be a morally good act, but always have a formal or virtual affection toward it.

The second part also, namely that venial sin forgiven in this life as to guilt is not punished in hell with eternal punishment, but only temporal, is likewise taught by St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 1, ad 5, where, although in the first response he insinuates the opposite opinion, in the second, however, which he more approves, he openly professes ours, in these words: "Others say that the punishment of which someone is a debtor after guilt has been remitted will be punished temporally in hell. Nor does it follow from this that there is redemption in hell, because the punishment which is paid off is not redeemed, nor is it inconvenient that, as to something accidental, the punishment of hell be diminished up to the day of judgment, just as it is also increased."

Reason also supports this: for the reason why venial sin not remitted in this life as to guilt cannot be remitted in hell as to punishment is that in hell it always remains, and is never blotted out as to guilt, and while guilt remains, the debt of punishment cannot cease, as we declared in the proof of the first part; therefore if it is supposed that venial sin is forgiven in this life, as to guilt, there is no reason why, through a condign and equal satisfactory suffering, the temporal punishment owed for it cannot be paid off in hell. Nor is it an obstacle that such a satisfactory suffering is in [that] life and involuntary in the damned. For although merit or satisfaction requires that the punishment which is endured be voluntary, or spontaneously accepted, this is nevertheless not required for [mere] satisfactory suffering, for which it suffices that there be equality between the punishment and the guilt. Whence in human affairs, a guilty man who undergoes the punishment appointed and prescribed by a judge pays the debt of justice, although he suffers it not spontaneously, but unwillingly.

You will object first against the first part of the assertion: God, according to the common axiom of theologians, punishes below what is condign, and rewards above what is condign; but if in hell He punished with eternal punishment the venial sins of the damned not remitted in this life as to guilt, He would punish them not below but above what is condign, since only a temporal punishment is owed for venial sin; therefore He does not punish them in hell with a punishment lasting forever.

I respond, granting the major, denying the consequence of the minor. For God punishes above what is condign the venial sins of the damned not remitted in this life as to guilt, even if He punishes them with a punishment lasting forever; because although eternal punishment is not per se owed to them, it is nevertheless owed to them accidentally, by reason of the subject in which they are found, which is incapable of every pardon and indulgence, or remission of sin, because it is at the term, and no application of the merits of Christ can be made to it; but guilt accidentally irremissible accidentally condignly merits eternal punishment. This is the solution of St. Thomas, q. 5 De Malo, art. 2, ad 8.

You will object second against the second part: the unanimous consensus of the Church holds that in hell there is not only no redemption, but not even any mitigation of punishments; but if venial sins, forgiven in this life as to guilt, were not punished in hell with eternal punishment, but only temporal, there would be given to the damned a certain remission and mitigation of punishments, for when that temporal punishment would be paid off, they would not experience as much punishment as before; therefore such sins are punished in hell with eternal punishment.

I respond, with St. Thomas, in the place cited in the proof of the second part of our assertion, that although the punishment of hell is not remitted or diminished as to anything essential — because the essential punishment of the damned is invariable, just as the essential glory of the blessed, since both are at the term — nevertheless it is so as to something accidental, for just as the accidental punishment of the damned is increased, so also it can be diminished.

§ VII

It is impossible for venial sin to be found in someone with only original sin

Thus St. Thomas here, q. 89, art. 6, where he proves it by a twofold reason. The first, which is had in the argument sed contra, is taken from the inconvenience which would follow from the contrary opinion. For if someone were to die with venial and original sin only, there would be no place in which he could be punished — not in the limbo of infants, for there men are punished for original sin only; they do not descend to purgatory except souls of those who die in grace, that, purged by that fire, they may ascend to heaven; but to hell men are thrust down only on account of actual mortal sin.

Nor is it valid what some Recent authors say, that in such a case, venial [sin] joined with original would be punished in hell with a light and temporal punishment of sense. Both because, as I said, men are thrust down to hell only on account of actual mortal sin, and also because, although in hell venial sins forgiven as to guilt in this life are punished with temporal punishment, this is not so of those which were not forgiven in this life as to guilt, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section; but in the case posited by St. Thomas, the venial sin joined with original would not have been forgiven in this life as to guilt, since a man infected with original sin is not capable of grace, and of the application of the merits of Christ, without which no sin is forgiven as to guilt; therefore it would not be punished in hell with a light and temporal punishment, as those authors say.

The second reason, which the same holy Doctor has in the body of the same article, can be proposed thus: if in a man there could be found venial sin with only original, either this would befit him before the first instant of the use of reason and liberty, or in that very instant, or immediately after that instant. None of these can be said; therefore etc. The major is clear from a sufficient enumeration; the minor is proved as to each part. For first, that this cannot befit a man before the first instant of the use of reason is manifest from the fact that before that instant a man is master of neither reason nor liberty. That it also cannot belong to him in that very instant of the use of reason and liberty, or immediately after, is shown thus: a child, in the first instant of the use of reason, either is justified, or sins mortally; therefore in that instant, or immediately after, there cannot be

found in him venial sin with only original. The consequence is clear, for if he is justified, he obtains, through grace, the remission of original sin; but if he sins mortally, the venial sin which he will afterward commit will not be joined with only original. The antecedent is proved thus: a child, in the first instant of the use of reason, is inexcusably bound to convert himself to God, either explicitly, or at least implicitly; if he fulfills this precept, by that very fact, in the same instant, he is cleansed from original sin through justifying grace, which is infused into him by God; because love of God above all things is not compossible with this guilt, just as neither with any other mortal one; but if he does not fulfill it, he sins mortally with the sin of omission; therefore a child, in the first instant of the use of reason, either is justified, or sins mortally.

You will say first: this reason of St. Thomas presupposes something false, namely that there is given a natural precept of converting oneself to God in the first moral instant of the use of reason; for it is not likely, nor consonant with the sweetness of divine providence, that God should immediately, in the very first dawning of reason, urge and, as it were, oppress man with a precept then first to be fulfilled.

But that such a precept is in fact given, and was not gratuitously invented by St. Thomas, can be shown in many ways. First, because as soon as any law has been sufficiently promulgated to someone, he is bound to accept it, and to subject himself to it: for example, when the evangelical law is first proposed to someone, and he sufficiently recognizes the truth of such a law, he is bound to embrace it, and to purpose to live according to it, at least in general, and unless he does so, he sins mortally, as theologians commonly teach enough in the treatise on laws. But to a man in the first moral instant of the use of reason, through the dictate of synderesis, and the natural light of reason, the natural law is intimated by God, dictating that the honest good is to be followed, and preferred to the useful and the delightful: whence the holy Fathers, especially Cyril, understand that saying of John 1, "He enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," of the illumination in the first instant of the use of reason, in which a man is then said to come into the world, because then he first begins to live as a man; therefore in that instant a man is bound to subject himself to such a law, and to deliberate to follow the honest good consonant with reason, which is virtually and implicitly to convert oneself to God; since in the love of the honest good, God, as the author and end of this good, is virtually and implicitly contained.

Second, a man in that first instant morally enters into the world, and begins the way of rational and human life; whence just as one who begins some long journey, from the dictate of right reason and prudence, is bound at its beginning to set for himself some goal; so also a man in that first instant ought to propose to himself a certain rule of

acting, and a certain and fixed aim, to which to direct his operations, namely to live honestly, and in conformity with the dictate of right reason; otherwise he will expose himself to the greatest danger of erring in the course of his life, since a small error in the beginning is greatest in the end.

Third, the Angel was bound by the precept of loving God, and converting himself to Him, in the first instant of his liberty, which was the second instant of his creation, and corresponds to our first moral instant; therefore we too are bound, in this our instant, to elicit a similar love, and to convert ourselves to God, in the manner in which at that age we are capable — that is, explicitly or implicitly, according to the illumination which is then given to us by God — inasmuch as the same reason applies in both cases, namely that every rational creature, as soon as it fully exercises dominion of its will and acts as wholly free, is bound to submit itself to its Creator, and to consecrate to Him its first love, as it were the first fruit of the will. And indeed it seems very much in accord with reason that God, the author of such a creature, should require from it, from that time, such a tribute for the benefit of creation, and demand that the first-fruits of liberty created by Him be consecrated to Him, just as of old in the Mosaic law He commanded that all the firstborn of animals, and all the first-fruits of crops, be offered to Him.

Finally, all the other times assigned by the adversaries for the fulfillment of the precept of the love of God are not so apt and suitable as that first moral instant of the use of reason, which is assigned by St. Thomas, as will appear by citing them from Tamburini, Book 2 On the Decalogue, chapter 3, § 2, where he recounts the opinions of ten theologians, in these words: "The first time which some assign is the beginning of the use of reason; the second, the end of life; the third, the whole of life indeterminately taken, so that at least once in it God be loved; the fourth, all feast days, on which we ought specially to be free for God; the fifth, the time in which an adult receives baptism; the sixth, the time when someone receives the Eucharist; the seventh, when perchance martyrdom is undergone; the eighth, when one receives a great benefit from God; the ninth, when you hear someone blaspheming against God; the tenth, when you are gravely urged by temptation, especially of hatred of God, with danger of consent, unless you convert yourself to God through love." It is clear that all these times are not so apt and suitable for fulfilling the precept of love as the beginning of the use of reason. For what is said of the instant of death is commonly rejected: because since the precept of the love of God was given for the right ordering of human life, through the reference of our operations to God as ultimate end, and for establishing and preserving friendship with Him, it is dissonant with reason that it should oblige only at the very departure of life, and that the whole span of life should be outside such an obligation. Whence Domingo de Soto,

Book 2 On Justice and Right, q. 1, art. 10, speaking of this opinion, says thus: "If you say that it suffices to fulfill the precept of the love of God once in life, and that at the article of death, you certainly stray far from the nature of this precept: for since this precept is the preamble of all the others, and, as Paul says, their end (for the end of the precept is charity), it would be ridiculous to say that it is permitted to pass through one's whole life before it obliges us."

Similarly the other opinion, which assigns the whole time of life indeterminately, is commonly rejected, because to any determinate precept a certain and determinate time in which it obliges ought to be assigned; whence this manner of speaking does not resolve the difficulty, but disguises it. The other opinions, except the last, lack all probability, since to elicit acts of charity at the times designated by those authors (say on feast days, when baptism or the Eucharist is to be received, or when martyrdom is impending, or some great benefit is received from God) is not a precept, but only a counsel.

The difficulty can lie only concerning the last opinion, which Thomas Sánchez teaches, Book 2 of the Summa, chapter 35, where, having rejected the other ways of speaking, he teaches that the precept of charity obliges only when grave temptations of hatred of God press, and there is danger of succumbing to them, unless the tempted person elicits an act of the love of God. But the Carmelites of Salamanca show that this manner of speaking too is insufficient, Disputation 20, doubt 1, no. 5. First, because the obligation to the act, which is precisely by reason of the occurring and pressing temptation of the occasion, is not an obligation per se, but per accidens; just as it is per accidens and not per se that such a temptation then occurred, and could not be overcome in another way; but the time which we seek is not that in which the precept of the love of God urges per accidens, but that in which it obliges per se, since it is certain that some time of this per se obligation must be assigned. Second, because such an obligation ought to be common to all adults and bind all of them, just as the precept itself is common, and is imposed on all; but that occasion in which grave temptations of hatred of God press, and the danger of succumbing to them, is not common to all adults, for very many there are who throughout the whole time of their life are troubled by no such temptations; therefore by this way a sufficient time for the aforesaid obligation is not assigned.

From these things you will understand that St. Thomas did not invent or devise a new precept, when he asserted that a child arriving at the use of reason is bound to convert himself to God, but only determined and declared the time at which the first and most ancient of all commandments, namely of charity, begins to oblige, namely the first moral instant of the use of reason.

Nor is it an obstacle if you allege the weakness of this age, which does not seem fit to undergo such an obligation; for it is easier for a child to elicit such a conversion in that instant, when no indisposition left by any personal sin is present, than after that has passed, when such an indisposition could retard the will. Whence divine providence seems to have acted more gently, restricting such a precept to the first instant, than if it had further delayed it.

I add that a child arriving at the years of discretion is not bound to convert himself to God, except according to the illumination and knowledge of God which is then communicated to him; so that if the knowledge of God is explicit, he is bound to explicit love; if implicit, only to implicit — that is, to love of the honest good, in which God, as the author and end of this good, is virtually and implicitly contained.

You will say second: a child arrives sooner at an imperfect use of reason than at a full and perfect one; for reason in man does not begin altogether suddenly, but successively and gradually its bonds are loosed, through the purification of the organs, and the drying up of the humors; therefore since imperfect deliberation suffices for sinning venially, as is clear in the first-second movements of concupiscence, a child, before the moral instant of the use of reason, in which he has full and perfect discourse, or use of reason and liberty, will be able to sin venially through certain undeliberated movements, and consequently venial sin can exist with only original.

I respond, granting the antecedent, denying the consequence, and to its proof I say, with Cajetan here, q. 89, art. 6, that although less liberty in exercise suffices for sinning venially than for mortal, because one sins venially without deliberation, nevertheless it is not sufficient in faculty; because one does not sin venially without the free faculty of dominating over individual movements, which faculty does not exist without full liberty. Whence since a child, before the first moral instant of the use of reason, lacks such a faculty, even if perchance he might have some imperfect use of liberty, he is nevertheless then incapable of sinning venially.

You will say third: since the first instant in which a child, in St. Thomas's opinion, is bound to convert himself to God is not mathematical and wholly indivisible, but moral, enclosing in itself some span of time, a time can be assigned in it sufficient for a child to sin venially, even with full advertence, before he fulfills such a precept; therefore venial sin can be found with only original.

I respond by denying the antecedent; for although such an instant is not physical, but moral, and includes in itself some span of time, nevertheless since in it God, by a special dictate caused in the child's intellect, intimates to him the obligation of fulfilling such a

precept, and since through such cognition he is urged to deliberate about himself, in order to the due end, if the child then, given the opportunity, turns aside to think of or do something else, he sins mortally, and consequently original sin is not then found in him with venial alone.

You will say fourth: even if a child, in the moral instant of the use of reason, fulfills the aforesaid precept, and orders himself to the honest good, he is not on that account justified, and cleansed from original sin; therefore the chief foundation on which St. Thomas's reasoning relies falls away. The consequence is clear from what has been said above; the antecedent is proved from this, that for justification is required knowledge of the mysteries of faith, at least of the mystery of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, as theologians teach in the treatise on justification, and on faith; therefore even if a child, in the first instant of the use of reason, converts himself explicitly to the good, and implicitly to God as the author and end of such good, he is not on that account justified, nor cleansed from original sin.

I respond by denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that if God, by His infinite mercy and providence, confers on a child arriving at the use of reason an efficacious help by which he converts himself to the honest good explicitly, and implicitly to God as the author and end of such good, then, consequent upon this special mercy and providence, He will either immediately, by Himself, illuminate him concerning the aforesaid mysteries, or He will direct some preacher to him, to instruct him about them. Thus St. Thomas, q. 14 De Veritate, art. 11, ad 1, where he says that if someone raised in the forests, or among barbarous peoples, where he has heard nothing of our faith, should follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him, through internal inspiration, the things necessary for belief, or would direct some preacher to him, just as He sent Peter to Cornelius, Acts 10. But more of this in the treatise on grace.